THE PES AND THE STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT OF CEE PARTIES

The first area to examine is the structural adaptation of the CEE parties. We need to be conscious of the fact that parties are bound to adapt structurally to the EU in some form or other, so any measure of the impact of the PES ought to look beyond the simple fact of adaptation to evaluate the significance of that change. Our analysis will suggest that the PES did not intervene early or effectively in supporting structural adaptation. Thus, although the indicators of structural adaptation to the EU are evident – particularly in the form of new internal structures and membership of Europarties – the PES cannot claim great influence.

This is largely due to concerns on the side of the Europarties about the possible detrimental impact of enlargement. Enlargement offered both potential advantages and potential disadvantages to Europarties. As Bardi argues, EU expansions can expose Europarties to disturbances from arenas not yet socialized to EU rules and procedures.Footnote ¹⁷ The PES became involved in a complex scenario in which it was trying simultaneously to promote social democracy and European integration in the CEE states, while at the same time trying to protect the interests of its established member-parties. Indeed, the PES took time to respond to the changed situation after 1989, in part due to fears that enlargement might delay or weaken attempts to reform EU decision-making but also reflecting concerns about the nature of the newly emerging left parties in CEE.Footnote ¹⁸ The PES was also wary that enlargement could have deleterious consequences for it because of the challenging nature of enlargement to CEE states, unless effective operational practices and coherent organizational statutes were put in place.Footnote ¹⁹ Therefore, in the early phases of the establishment of social democratic parties in CEE, structural assistance tended to come more from bilateral tiesFootnote ²⁰ and the Socialist International (SI) took the initiative in including CEE parties, and subsequently sought to persuade the PES in turn to incorporate them. An indication of this was the establishment of the European Forum for Democracy and Solidarity in January 1993, which, although based in the PES secretariat, was an SI initiative.Footnote ²¹

The approach of the PES changed following the adoption of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993, at which point the PES moved to incorporate CEE parties.Footnote ²² Ladrech argues that, apart from obvious notions of social democratic brotherhood, there were two practical reasons why the PES decided to develop and strengthen ties with these parties. First, the PES was in a position to advise parties on issues such as organizational development in order to influence the partisan composition of governments. Second, by influencing the partisan composition in nation states the PES could try to influence the ‘balance of power in an enlarged EU’.Footnote ²³

More substantially, the PES also set out a path for CEE parties to become members. The party's articles of membership identify three categories of association: first, observer status for social democratic and socialist parties with ‘close links with the PES’ (Article 8.5); second, associate status for ‘Socialist International parties in countries that are candidates for accession to the European Union, or are EFTA member states, or in countries with an association agreement with the Union’ (Article 8.3); finally, full membership for ‘Socialist International parties in European Union member states or in states having signed an accession treaty with the European Union’ (Article 8.1). Thus, there is a clear hierarchy of membership in the PES, and parties from CEE states have had to ascend that ladder to attain full membership and full voting rights.Footnote ²⁴

They did so at varying speeds. Parties from the Central European states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) had the quickest trajectory. In 1995 six parties (two of them from Poland) were granted observer status. The process in the three Baltic states took a little longer, with the three parties only becoming observer parties in 1998, along with two Romanian parties. In the case of Bulgaria, the PES sought additional ‘observation time’ due to the perceived complexity of the case.Footnote ²⁵ However, all 12 parties were ‘upgraded’ to associate party status by the PES Milan Congress of March 1999. This decision provided the accession parties with a much better structure for cooperation as the parties were able to become more involved in policy discussions. A real change in the quality of relations came in May 2001 when the Eastern parties were fully integrated into the PES's internal decision-making machinery.

Overall, it is argued that by incorporating parties from CEE prior to full EU membership, the PES was able to socialize these parties.Footnote ²⁶ In some countries – notably BulgariaFootnote ²⁷ and LatviaFootnote ²⁸ – PES influence has been highlighted as playing an important role. However, the PES was more of a follower than a leader in this process. The key catalyst to greater engagement with CEE states was the European Council meeting which adopted the Copenhagen criteria. The greater engagement of the PES came as a consequence of that decision, and this limited the ability of the PES to engage effectively with the CEE parties. There is similar evidence for this conclusion on the part of both the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR) and to a lesser extent the European Peoples’ Party (EPP).Footnote ²⁹ This analysis supports the argument that the PES lacked effectiveness in its engagement with CEE parties prior to their accession.

THE PES AND THE REORIENTATION OF PATTERNS OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY COMPETITION

In relation to our second criterion, the main debate within the PES was focused on the attitudes of members to former communist parties. To begin with, the PES sought to encourage the emergence of parties that originated from movements opposed to communism,Footnote ³⁰ while parties associated with the former communist ruling parties were generally treated as pariahs. The newly emerging social democratic parties in the CEE states had to deal with that taint of the past regime and its failed policies, just through sharing a common left-wing heritage. For example, the Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (LSDSP) included members of the former Latvian Communist Party – indeed, they played a leading role in the party in the 1990s. This led to a deterioration in relations with the PES, particularly because the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) and German Social Democrats (SPD) were suspicious of the role of some of the former communists. It was only in the mid-2000s that the LSDSP began to re-establish contact with the PES.Footnote ³¹

In some cases, that problem was not just in the mind, as the new social democratic parties were actually derived from or associated with the former ruling communist parties. Thus, the problems of organizational establishment were particularly fraught for social democrats, as the difficulties involved either trying to create brand-new structures (as in the Estonian Social Democrats (SDE)) or having to deal with the negative connotations that came with the territory if the PES were seen to be associated with a former ruling party (such as the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)). For example, an official of the Latvian LSDSP noted how ‘official ideology and the mass media write every day that left-wing ideology is something wrong, something shameful, something pro-Moscow, something pro-communist’.Footnote ³²

Three types of relationship between social democratic and communist parties can be identified: antipathy, adaptation and accommodation.Footnote ³³ First, there are those who are antipathetic to any collusion with the former communist party. This would include, for example, the Estonian social democrats, though the picture here is muddied by the overlapping ethnic tensions between Estonians and Russians (the social democrats being a largely Estonian party, the former communists being preponderantly Russian). Second, there are cases where the former communists have successfully adapted and have claimed the social democratic mantle for their own. The most prominent example is the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), although the Hungarian MSZP also fits this category to some extent. Third, there are social democratic parties that have sought an accommodation with the former communist party, either through some form of electoral cooperation or through allowing the one-time communists to merge with them. Examples include the Lithuanian LSDPFootnote ³⁴ and the Democratic Left Alliance-Labor Union (SLD/UP) alliance in Poland.

It is this latter form that has emerged as the predominant pattern. The continuing transformation of CEE party systems made it increasingly difficult to distinguish between the different forms of social democratic parties. Elections throughout the 1990s were marked by persistent regroupings and the foundation of new parties.Footnote ³⁵ In some countries, the social democrats emerged as clearly the dominant party. But sometimes successor parties teamed up with newly founded social democrats, often to save themselves from sinking into electoral irrelevance, and thereby created more serious identity problems for the parties. Delwit argues that the most successful strand included the parties from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and that these were also the ones that were most similar to West European social democratic parties.Footnote ³⁶ In these three countries social democratic parties have been able to form governments on a number of occasions, although the implosion of social democracy in Poland in 2005 suggests that they were not all as well established as first thought. In other countries, social democrats have been less successful. The Romanian party has lagged behind, while social democratic parties in the Baltic states have generally struggled to play a key role in their countries. In part this situation can be attributed to the lack of support from Europarties in the early days of their formation.

As a result, the PES has had to change its stance, accepting the necessity of working with former communist parties. This reflects the weaknesses of its original strategy, which had clearly failed to take account of the realities on the ground. In many cases it clearly did not automatically make sense to exclude former communists and seek to have nothing to do with them. But other problems with the initial strategies of the PES can be identified. In some cases, it agreed to admit parties too early, before their true identity had been secured, and this created problems.Footnote ³⁷ As van Biezen argued, both the cleavage structure and therefore partisan identification were weaker in CEE states than in the majority of Western states.Footnote ³⁸ This produced considerable electoral volatility, to which some social democratic parties responded by shifting their ideological focus. As a result, political labels could become meaningless but the status of PES member conferred legitimacy upon these parties and allowed them to distance themselves from any communist past, granting external legitimation.Footnote ³⁹ These ‘badges of legitimacy’Footnote ⁴⁰ are also obvious in the EPP and are of course not limited to CEE states (Italy and Spain provide excellent examples) but the practice seems more pronounced there. Many of the parties from CEE learned to say the right things, but whether they had genuinely adopted those norms is another matter. Parties had the ambition to fit smoothly into the European associations, but there was not always evidence of ideological or behavioural change.Footnote ⁴¹ The situation was not helped by the fact that the PES was willing to choose and subsequently drop parties, not on the basis of their ideology, but rather on how powerful they were. ‘Politics tended to prevail over ideological orientation and the larger parties happened to be more easily recognized as sister parties.’Footnote ⁴² Two good examples come from Slovakia and Romania.

In Slovakia, relations between the PES and the Direction-Social Democracy (SMER) have been complicated since the SMER was formed when Robert Fico left the Democratic Left Party (SDL) and founded his own party. This move confirmed the failure of the SDL's strategy of trying to integrate and unite the left of the political spectrum. SMER – whose EP observers had chosen to sit with the PES – was the only source of Slovak reinforcements for the PES.Footnote ⁴³ Enyedi and Lewis note that SDL initially tried to block SMER's application to the PES. But eventually, though the SDL had the ‘European’ pedigree, it lacked domestic electoral support, and opted for a ‘political marriage’ with SMER. It merged fully with SMER in 2005, which reinforced SMER's social democratic credential. However, after the 2006 election, Fico led the party away from a clear social democratic position by forming a government with two nationalist parties.Footnote ⁴⁴

Even in advance of this decision, SMER representatives acknowledged that, ‘in the real politics, of course, we don't want to make coalitions with the communists, we don't want to make coalitions with nationalists, of course; for us it is better to make the coalition with standard parties’; but they were also prepared to acknowledge, ‘there are very concrete conditions in which we are prepared to make coalitions with other parties’.Footnote ⁴⁵ So SMER regarded the decision to form an alliance with the nationalists as a normal political decision.

However, in October 2006 the PES decided to suspend the SMER.Footnote ⁴⁶ The key reason was because of the alliance with the far-right Slovak National Party (SNS). The decision was based upon Article 10.3 of the PES statutes, which allows for suspension if a party does not respect the statutes, while forming an alliance with a far-right party was deemed to be a contravention of Article 3.2 of the statutes, which states, ‘the PES promotes the value of tolerance and specifically condemns racism and xenophobia’. Only the SMER and the Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD) opposed the suspension. This willingness and ability to sanction members was seen as an important institutional development for the PES. However, in February 2008 the PES presidency agreed by qualified majority to lift the suspension of the SMER,Footnote ⁴⁷ after receiving a signed letter from Fico committing the government to respect minority rights – a way for the PES to save face.Footnote ⁴⁸ Only the Belgian and French parties were opposed to this reinstatement. This is despite the fact that the SNS remained part of the government coalition. This was seen as a major victory for the SMER; its website stated it was back ‘where it always belonged’– in the social democratic family.

The situation in Romania is also interesting. The theme of belonging to the international structures of the left was used for internal political legitimation. The Romanian Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) emerged out of the National Salvation Front in 1993. The fact that the PDSR was not yet a member of the Socialist International in 2000, when it won the elections, was felt at the level of the party's leadership to be an important deficiency. This international recognition was made even more necessary by the fact that the main rival, the Democratic Party (PD), used to attack the PDSR constantly on the grounds of its ‘not being a true social democratic party’, and instead claiming the mantle of being ‘the only authentic left party’ for itself.Footnote ⁴⁹

After 2000 the international influence on the Romanian left became somewhat more visible at both doctrinal and organizational levels. In 2001, the PDSR absorbed a smaller social democratic grouping, the Romanian Social Democratic Party (PSDR), in part due to the PSDR's membership of the PES, and changed its name to the Social Democrats (PSD). The PSD's relations with the PES meant an acceleration of the democratization of a party structure that has inherited strong authoritarian and conservative influences from its electoral basis.Footnote ⁵⁰ In May 2005 the PSD was granted provisional membership of the PES, which prompted the PD to announce in June 2005 its decision to give up its associate membership of the PES. Enyedi and Lewis argue that this decision was taken because the PSD was the bigger party, although the clear shift to the right on the part of the PD also contributed.

Pridham argues that Europarties played a key role in fostering democratic standards among CEE parties, especially since the Commission did not engage with political parties in the accession process. The examples from Slovakia and Romania question this conclusion. Indeed, in relation to Romania, Gallagher argues that, ‘the wrecking role of west European interests is evident, led (perhaps astonishingly) by the European socialist parties in the European parliament. The latter continue to back the PSD despite its lead role in sabotaging reforms designed to bring a corrupt oligarchy to account.’Footnote ⁵¹ Overall he argues that ‘the story of Romania and the EU is an unedifying one of top figures in the European left allying with big business to take Romania in on a prospectus that benefits only a tiny handful of local elite figures and foreign investors while worsening local social conditions’. Even Pridham acknowledges that the Europarty ‘activity involved mainly certain party elites and restricted groups of activists, so that its direct effects, while significant, could not be described as widespread’.Footnote ⁵²

The PES had clear ideas about preferred political partnerships, but these did not always correspond to the preferences of social democratic parties on the ground. The PES was also quite willing to drop smaller and therefore less influential parties, even if they had been members for a while, once it became clear who could claim to be the main social democratic party in a country. The fact that these larger parties were the communist successor parties was not an issue for the PES. Therefore it is clear that the PES did not shape the party system; it merely responded to the adapting situation with a clear focus on preserving its influence by if necessary choosing the communist successor party ‘winners’ rather than awaiting the emergence of smaller social democratic parties.

THE PES AND PROGRAMMATIC ADAPTATION

A further dimension of the attempted engagement by the PES was in relation to policy adaptation. There are two aspects worth considering. First, the PES wished to play a role in terms of general social and economic policy adoption and development, and, second, it was involved with policy towards the EU and integration. Initially, policy transfer was not high on the list of either the PES or the CEE parties.Footnote ⁵³ Indeed, as Ágh has argued, the social democratic parties often lacked a vision of the future and clear programmatic profiles.Footnote ⁵⁴ However, the programmes of the PES clearly acted as templates in some countries, and the PES sought to engender a West European social democratic vision.Footnote ⁵⁵

In Slovakia and Poland, there was some borrowing from the PES in the construction of early programmatic documents.Footnote ⁵⁶ This also meant extending the policy portfolio of the parties. For example, in Romania ‘affiliation to PES also meant adopting some themes which were not in the traditional portfolio of Romanian social democracy (the European social model, the environment problem, gender balance)’.Footnote ⁵⁷ The conditions placed upon applicant parties were an incentive for programmatic adjustment.Footnote ⁵⁸

However, the extent to which these new values were embraced suggests only a shallow Europeanization. In part this is linked to the feeling that the process of enlargement was very one-sided and very much along the lines of ‘if you want to be in then this is what you have to accept’.Footnote ⁵⁹ This is borne out by the impressions of politicians in the CEE states. As one of them put it, ‘it was never a question of whether we wanted it or not, because the rule of the game was that you had to accept it’. These parties were obliged to ‘confront Europe as a matter of adaptation and not as a matter of creation’.Footnote ⁶⁰ This contributed to some difficulties between the PES and CEE parties. For the CEE social democrats, demonstrating their own independence and capacity was an important part of trying to establish their electoral identity, so that being seen to be overly reliant on PES prescriptions in the policy sphere caused some problems. Although the CEE parties appeared to embrace the PES programme, the fact that parties from these states have very different traditions and approaches is crucial. MEPs representing CEE states tend to be less libertarian and more traditional or authoritarian than their colleagues from Western Europe. We also see a similar issue of ideological dilution for the EPP, with the introduction of fewer federalist-minded parties from the CEE states and the ELDR who saw more economically liberal parties join from CEE states. Eastern–Western differences are important in accounting for internal divisions within the EP groups as enlargement has made them less cohesive.Footnote ⁶¹

This was particularly true in terms of general differences of opinion about the nature of ideology. One criticism of the process of integrating the new parties into both the PES and the EPP was that ‘there was little sense that newcomers would be asked “what is your definition of social-democracy/Christian-democracy?” ’.Footnote ⁶² At one level, this was little more than an abstract issue, as the new member parties tended to regard the EU as being social democratic by definition. This is evident in comments from the Latvian and Estonian parties, both of whom asserted simply that ‘the European Union is a social democratic project’.Footnote ⁶³ But once you go beyond general notions of the nature of the EU to examine detailed policy preferences, the fact that the PES failed to engage in any significant policy discussion with its new members becomes significant.

It was salient precisely because many of the CEE social democratic parties brought a different perspective. They were strongly in favour of rapid growth and transformation, often only paying lip service to the idea of social cohesion. The PES was trying to absorb new actors ‘which voice an unprecedented amount of difference’ and whose ‘representatives will defend positions of countries whose institutions, politics, mentalities and needs have a radically different history and connotation’.Footnote ⁶⁴ As Day argues, ‘despite the smiles, warm handshakes and “family” photo sessions, “identity dilution” is a problem that will have to be faced by the Europarties’.Footnote ⁶⁵ This was a key problem for the EPP with the eastern enlargement offering allies to the British Conservative Party. The new rules on Europarties and their funding agreed in 2004Footnote ⁶⁶ allowed the British Conservatives to form an anti-federalist bloc called the European Conservatives and Reformists Group, with Poland's Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the Czech Civic Democrats (ODS). The access to money via Europarties is important, but it is clear that ideological and political concerns still take precedence.

Social democratic parties in the CEE states had a quite different perception of their preferred economic and social policies to that of many of their West European counterparts. Rather than seeking to ‘come closer to the western model of social democracy’,Footnote ⁶⁷ they were quite prepared to accept a radical transformation, and were undertaking a rapid adjustment to market capitalism and embracing quite a neoliberal brand of economics. For them, support for EU membership was an intrinsic part of this transformation precisely because it reinforced the policy direction in which they were heading. Of course, this was in keeping with the views of some western social democratic leaders as well, who saw the EU as a means of ‘binding leviathan’.Footnote ⁶⁸

Since becoming full members, some parties have been seeking to flex their muscles. For example, one party threatened to organize a referendum to say no to enlargement if its demands were not met.Footnote ⁶⁹ Within the PES, the election of Poul Nyrup Rasmussen as PES president in 2004 can be attributed to the role of new members from CEE states. His opponent, Giuliano Amato, enjoyed the support of Germany's SPD, Britain's Labour Party, Spain's Socialist Party (PSOE) and Italy's Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) and Democratic Socialists (SDI). However, Rasmussen enjoyed the support of the majority of new members, plus the French, Belgian, Portuguese and Nordic Socialists, and this was enough to swing the election in his favour and show that the new member parties were not afraid to stand up to the PES's big guns.

In terms of programmatic links, the PES has tried to become more involved in discussions of domestic policy issues and to promote policy cooperation in specific policy areas between the member parties. The problem for the PES has historically been the creation of policies in areas that may not traditionally be seen as social democratic.Footnote ⁷⁰ The social Europe concept is perceived to be important. ‘ “Currently existing capitalism” in CEE has, in fact, an “inhuman face”, hence one could even blame CEE social democrats for not taking the opportunity to “build” a better capitalism. It is particularly important that the PES has regularly emphasized the importance of “economic and social governance in the Union”.’Footnote ⁷¹ However, even in areas of perceived agreement, ideological tensions often prevent anything more than lowest-common-denominator policies. While the inclusion of CEE states has not increased the ideological variation within the PES, it has helped strengthen the position of parties such as the British Labour Party.Footnote ⁷² As we have argued, many CEE parties state, ‘in the areas which we want to support and we want to act in, these are much more close to the British model than the French one’. Indeed, it was said in one interview, ‘we are more to the third way than to the traditional social democracy’. A SMER party member stated, ‘I think that we are much closer to the British Labour Party, because I perceive the positions of Tony Blair and the British Labour Party as being right-ish tools in a left mood’.Footnote ⁷³ In Hungary, the MSZSP noted that ‘Hungarian people have an exceptionally positive attitude towards British policies, whilst we have more reservations as far as German and French ideas are concerned’.Footnote ⁷⁴ Again, in the Lithuanian LSDP there is a strong attraction to the Third Way approach of the British Labour Party.Footnote ⁷⁵

Nonetheless, there are some indications that social democratic parties in the CEE states are starting to develop a more appreciative view of the social protections and restrictions employed in the EU. An interesting example was provided by the VaxholmFootnote ⁷⁶ case, as it provided an indication of changing attitudes within the LSDSP. Although the Latvian press was united in its support for Laval and its opposition to the Swedish position, the LSDSP ‘tried to say that Swedish trade unions are really fighting for the rights of Latvian workers too. Because of our company, they got as much money as Swedish companies would have done, but they paid workers salaries ten times lower than in Sweden.’Footnote ⁷⁷ This provides a classic example of national positions being set aside in favour of a form of social democratic solidarity. However, the final court ruling suggests that social democratic parties still face serious challenges to their policies in the EU.

A second aspect of the attempted policy impact of the PES is in relation to attitudes towards the EU. This is less problematic because before accession it was already apparent that the majority of social democratic parties in CEE states were relatively Euro-enthusiastic.Footnote ⁷⁸ Indeed, some CEE social democratic parties are very strongly in favour of EU membership. The Hungarian Socialist Party has been described as ‘by birth, pro-European’ and as one which has always had ‘a very, very strong pro-European approach’.Footnote ⁷⁹ One of the leading members of the SMER in Slovakia asserted, ‘we have supported all integration steps for Slovakia into the European Union’.Footnote ⁸⁰ In Estonia, the SDE claimed to be ‘the only party that was playing the pro-European card, while the rest were bringing a sceptical angle into the campaign’, while their Latvian counterparts in the LSDSP note how ‘our party has supported from the early 1990s all European projects’.Footnote ⁸¹

In some cases, the supportive position of the social democrats contrasts sharply with the positions adopted by other parties. One of the criticisms that the Hungarian social democrats have of their right-wing opponents is that they ‘were always gambling with the option of not Europe’.Footnote ⁸² But in other countries there is a very high degree of consensus on EU affairs. For example, in Slovakia, ‘it's quite apolitical’, and the parties there ‘can always agree on quite pragmatic issues in this area of European affairs’; ‘basically, really, 95 per cent is agreed’.Footnote ⁸³

However, this enthusiasm of social democrats frequently fails to translate into any more practical support. Partly, this is because Europe simply does not feature in political discourse in CEE states, save for very occasional and in very specific issues. For example, in Estonia, ‘there are no debates whatsoever on basically anything that is related to the European Union’; ‘there is a lack of European debate in Estonia, a real lack of a European debate’.Footnote ⁸⁴ Similarly, in Hungary it has been noted that ‘European questions are not at the top of the political agenda in the party. I would even say that they are around the bottom.’Footnote ⁸⁵ A further example comes from the Czech Republic, where the ČSSD gained the reputation of being the most powerful ‘pro-European’ party during its four-year period of minority government, yet it largely neglected the European issue in its 2002 electoral programme.Footnote ⁸⁶

This situation arises because countries sought membership as a goal in itself, and did not have an agenda they wished to pursue post-accession. For example, in Estonia, ‘before, we had two goals: integration into NATO and integration into the European Union. After that, nothing.’Footnote ⁸⁷ But now that the CEE countries are inside the European Union, the acquiescence necessary to achieve membership is being replaced in some cases by greater assertiveness. This is particularly evident in Hungary, where ‘people accepted the conditions of membership. However, they don't feel really comfortable with this membership.’ For the Hungarian social democrats, membership is a means to an end: ‘It's a tool, and it has always been a considered as a tool, nothing else, just a tool. For us, for the party, EU membership was to get this tool, not just arriving in paradise.’Footnote ⁸⁸ The weakness of the PES in promoting a shared outlook is therefore evident.

Such attitudes can also be seen in relation to the debate about the European Constitutional Treaty. In Hungary, the view was, ‘we want a constitution, but not this one. Of course, we have accepted it as a compromise. We are sorry that the others did not. But we are not crying for this present document. I think that everybody has to swallow the pill, sit down again, and find another solution for a European constitution.’Footnote ⁸⁹ But other parties recognized the need for a constitution of some sort, and were prepared to accept this document as the best thing on offer. The view in Latvia was that ‘the European constitution is necessary to protect small states and small nations and self-government from the pressures of national governments’.Footnote ⁹⁰ And again, other parties were very much in favour of the document, such as SMER in Slovakia: ‘We have supported the constitution. We thought that it was a very good compromise, and we still think that it's a good document, it's not a problem.’Footnote ⁹¹

Thus, enlargement and the expansion of the social democratic family in the EU created particular challenges for the PES. There was perhaps an initial assumption that parties from the accession countries would be not only pro-EU but also grateful for the opportunity to join in. This was always an unrealistic view, but nonetheless Western European parties are still adapting to the changed parameters of political partnership. However, it would be inaccurate to argue that enlargement has weakened social democratic support for integration. The Hungarian party asserts that ‘Euro-scepticism is something which has never prevailed in my party’, and accepts that ‘for us, the great interest is that Europe should work well’.Footnote ⁹² And the EU is still seen as a very important guarantor of democracy in the CEE states. The recent research on support for European integration in CEE states does not suggest a dramatic rise in Euroscepticism among left parties.Footnote ⁹³ However, we have seen a decline of enthusiasm for the integration process among some PES members. As Vachudova argues, it appears that being freed from the constraints of conditionality has allowed social democratic parties to revert to policies that they see suiting national electoral circumstances best.Footnote ⁹⁴

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the evidence presented in this article, it is hard to conclude that the PES played a significant role in helping to construct social democracy in CEE. There is some evidence to suggest that the PES contributed to the framing of a broad social democratic identity in terms of values and abstract ideas,Footnote ⁹⁵ and there is also evidence of a degree of organizational adaptation. However, on a number of issues – policy engagement, competitive influence and structural adaptation – the PES has not played a central role, either before or after the accession of CEE states. And this is despite the fact that there is probably a greater propensity for social democratic parties to develop shared ideas and practices than in many other party families. There is some evidence that the EPP played a more significant role in socializing CEE parties in the early stages, but the withdrawal of the Polish and Czech parties to form a new political party with the British Conservatives shows the weakness of this role. Evidence from the ELDR is even less convincing.Footnote ⁹⁶

We also conclude that the perspective that argues that the long-term impact of party federations has been superficial – after an initially significant contribution to the foundation of parties in CEE – is also somewhat flawed. We agree that unlike previous enlargements where parties tended to look for external legitimacy from individual social democratic parties or federations in the run-up to accession, in 2004 parties looked to the documents of the PES.Footnote ⁹⁷ This tends to support the conclusion of Poguntke et al., who argue that Europarties provide ‘at the very least, a socialization effect’ or ‘at most, a feedback of best practices or ideas to national parties’.Footnote ⁹⁸

However, our analysis has shown that even in the early stages of the evolution of social democratic parties in the post-communist CEE states, the PES was quite a reluctant and hesitant participant in a number of areas. In terms of organizational linkages, the PES was initially slow to extend contacts into the CEE region. Once it did become more thoroughly involved, it struggled to help support social democratic parties. In part this was linked to limited PES resources, although the fact that the PES is an elite-dominated organization is also important. This has exacerbated the degree of disconnection between party elites and civil society and is helping to create new parties on the left, contributing to an impact in terms of patterns of competition. The weak civil society basis of many CEE parties is also contributing to a kind of ‘democratic rollback’ in many states, testifying to the fact that earlier expectations about convergence were too monodirectional, simplistic and teleological.

If we return to Haughton's framework, he suggests a low to medium benchmark with regard to the influence of Europarties since accession, albeit with two exceptions. This challenges the view developed by Enyedi and Lewis and is supported by our analysis. Our analysis therefore supports Haughton's conclusion, but refines it by identifying a low benchmark of ‘very little evidence of any impact’, even before accession. We argue that the main factor that restricts influence is that of domestic political constraints. This conclusion supports that offered by Goetz and Hix and of course is applicable across the EU and to both of the other Europarties.Footnote ⁹⁹

Overall, the role played by the PES in CEE has been superficial, and it has not contributed to deep programmatic or organizational change or to significantly altered patterns of domestic party competition. The superficial dimension should not be completely discounted – PES membership is still an attractive lure for social democratic parties in non-EU states. It is already clear that both the Democratic Party of Serbia and the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina hope to become associate members as soon as their countries have signed a stabilization and association agreement with the European Union. Further afield, both SI and PES membership are a clear goal for certain sections of the Socialist Party of the Ukraine and as a result new research is being published on Europarty influence over post-Soviet parties.Footnote ¹⁰⁰

It is therefore already evident that the PES will again be faced with the challenge of dealing with new member parties in applicant countries. If the federation is to learn the lessons of the enlargements of the 2000s, it will need to be prepared to engage with new parties as early as possible and in as open a manner as possible. To do this, it will need to overcome problems of both a practical and a political nature. It will need to address resource issues, it will have to be prepared to countenance disruption of its existing structures and it will also have to be prepared to disturb the interests and preferences of its existing members.