Amy Liu’s review provides thoughtful and generous consideration of my book. Her commentary on whether and how the three mechanisms for depoliticization relate to each other is particularly cogent and, in retrospect, is something I wish I had elaborated on. That the two primary modes of communication inside EU institutions—non-native language use and reliance on translators and interpreters— “beget each other” is evident, for example, in that non-native users of already depoliticized “EU English” consciously simplify their language further to facilitate translation and interpretation, or in that non-native speakers of EU English learn much of the vernacular from language service providers. It would have been worth spelling this out more explicitly, however, and to specify if and how the EU’s language rules provide a foundation for depoliticized communication between EU actors. For instance, I argue that “the political” is partially suppressed by the linguistic limitations of those involved in making political decisions and by their reliance on indirect communication via interpretation and translation. It is conceivable that the successful institutional resolution of “the language question” in the EU critically facilitates this reality because it is only when language choice is depoliticized that the practical, communicative aspect of language may be elevated over the political, national, or ideological.

I also appreciate Liu’s questions concerning generalizability. This is always tricky territory for a comparativist studying the EU, because the characteristics that make the EU sui generis ought not preclude efforts at comparison. And so, I agree with Liu’s observation that, empirically, the EU’s language regime and linguistic practices appear unique. However, generalizability is a matter of degree and of specifying scope conditions, which I attempt in the final chapter of the book. It is, moreover, important that the EU can inform and serve as a useful reference point for understanding politics in multilingual states and international organizations precisely because it is neither but shares features with both.

Finally, the depoliticizing effects of multilingualism can be positive—for example, when it facilitates compromise in a polity characterized by remarkable levels of heterogeneity—or negative (e.g., when it unduly mutes the potential for political contestation). Unlike much previous research on the topic (mostly in disciplines other than political science), I try to avoid value judgments and focus instead on identifying and explaining the consequences of multilingualism on EU politics. But in the conclusion of the book, I completely agree with Liu that the disconnect between the depoliticization of language at the institutional level and the increasing politicization of the EU as a polity and political project is problematic for its quality of representation and popular legitimacy. It is possible that the EU’s language(s) of politics will change such that this divide will diminish over time, as Liu suggests, if EU English evolves to carry more cultured, non-neutral meaning. Such processes are slow moving, however, while the EU’s legitimacy problems are very much in the present.