Research on relations between the Former Han Dynasty and nomadic Xiongnu polity has blossomed in recent decades to incorporate archaeological finds and increasingly diverse text-based sources. Markley's Peace and Peril accordingly deals with received textual material. Mainstream studies of Han–Xiongnu relations strive to “de-barbarianise” the Xiongnu, deconstruct the bipolar northern frontier and challenge core narratives of Ban Gu's (32–92) Hanshu and Sima Qian's (145?–86) Shiji. Peace and Peril likewise admonishes contemporary scholars who accept Shiji’s Xiongnu memoir (SJ 110) at face value (pp. 147, n. 332). Markley asserts Shiji’s author was driven by an “agenda” to defame Emperor Wu's (r. 140–87) foreign policies and contrast them with co-operative Han–Xiongnu relations under his predecessors (p. 3). Markley therefore employs evidence within Hanshu, Jia Yi's (200–168) Xinshu and other Shiji chapters to demonstrate how authorial biases manifest in SJ 110 and contradict the objective historical reality of almost constant Han–Xiongnu conflict and foreign policy failures (p. 4).
Peace and Peril consists of an introduction, five chapters and appended translations. The introduction covers general overviews of the Xiongnu, the early Former Han and Sima Qian. Chapter 1 focuses on the mythical consensus between Emperor Gaozu (r. 206–195) and the Xiongnu Chanyu Modu (r. 209–174) after the Pingcheng incident. Markley aptly demonstrates that peace was not negotiated at Pingcheng or immediately after the Han's shameful retreat. Instead, conflict likely continued until heqin (harmony–kinship) was established in 198 bce, but was violated soon after. Liu Jing's diplomatic successes are refuted as rhetorical inventions to make heqin’s innovation appear more stable than they were in reality (pp. 44–5). During the reigns of Emperor Hui (194–188) and Empress Lü (187–180), SJ 110 misleadingly suggests that, although the Xiongnu behaved provocatively, Han adherence to heqin and Gaozu's precedent remained the preference. Chapter 2 shows how information which potentially legitimized the Lü clan (including foreign policy decisions) was suppressed and omitted during Sima Qian's time (pp. 76–8), but Markley proposes the Han were actually making serious preparations for offensive action and Xiongnu raiding continued (pp. 70–2). Chapter 3 argues that Sima Qian portrayed Emperor Wen (r. 179–157) as a zealous heqin proponent, contrasted with the unfilial Emperor Wu who impoverished the state through militarism (p. 80). Markley instead argues that Wen was not the portrayed pacifist, because only domestic distractions prevented him from initiating planned offensives (p. 91). Markley masterfully demonstrates how Sima Qian glossed over a chronological gap in the SJ 110 narrative, when heqin relations were actually under immense criticism (by Jia Yi) as appropriate policy, filling the section with implied criticisms in the voice of Zhonghang Yue (pp. 93–4). Chapter 4 argues SJ 110.2904's summary of Han–Xiongnu relations under Emperor Jing (r. 156–141) as wu da kou 無大寇 (no large bandit operations) leads readers wrongly to assume frontier inactivity (p. 141). Citing the relatively frequent military deployments of Han generals, an extensive horse-breeding programme, aggressive military proposals by Chao Cuo (200–154), climatic factors and ritual dances intended to subjugate, Markley proposes Han–Xiongnu relations under Jing's reign were quite hostile (p. 168). Chapter 5 argues that Emperor Wu gave heqin opportunities to produce the ideal peace and he did not break heqin treaties with the Xiongnu first as Sima Qian portrays in recounting the Mayi incident. Given the Xiongnu's constant hostility and provocations, Markley concludes Wu was forced to initiate an offensive strategy which was sustained between 129 and 119 bce, but Wu's foreign policy was just as accepting of diplomatic attempts at peace during a lengthy armistice period (pp. 224–5).
Markley has been remarkably thorough in addressing nearly all consequential information on the Xiongnu and early Former Han contained within Shiji, Hanshu and Xinshu. However, that Sima Qian resented Wu's foreign policy may not constitute a ground-breaking discovery. Peace and Peril’s title somewhat misleadingly promises a reassessment of Han–Xiongnu relations, but SJ 110 can only offer limited objective information on Han foreign policy and not “interrelations”, given the absence of Xiongnu language sources. Archaeological evidence and excavated texts in Chinese could perhaps have been compared with SJ 110 narratives. That said, all Xiongnu studies scholars face these criticisms and the text of Peace and Peril does not pretend to have superior solutions.
On a brief critical note, Markley unnecessarily claims an appended translation of Xinshu 4 is the first full English translation. Charles Sanft's inaugural dissertation, Rule: A Study of Jia Yi's Xinshu (Münster, 2005), offers near complete translations of this chapter. Peace and Peril also does not thoroughly contextualize the chosen Shiji edition (Zhonghua shuju) and determine its appropriateness against alternatives. Peace and Peril’s method and findings are solid, but claiming that the Han's offensive campaigns represented a “logical progression” and were “almost inevitable” is a wanting assumption. The claim to universal human and strategic “logic” is tenuous and filling in an absence of objective information with common sense is not ideal. Eurocentric concepts of the realpolitik, parabellum and Hobbesianism pervade Markley's explanations regarding causes of hostile Han–Xiongnu relations and thus represent only one side of ongoing epistemological debates. It perhaps stands to reason that Wu's offensive strategy was not inevitable but again predicated pragmatically on both domestic and international political conditions. The fact remains that although conflict remained the norm throughout the Former Han, Wu was still alone in choosing to break with policy precedent, and proposing what Wen would have done if there were no domestic unrest is speculation. The reviewer suggests Markley could also better classify the different types of Xiongnu raids. Rogue bandit parties surely did not equate to frontier invasions led by chanyus or xian princes or the gamut between. Taking this into consideration, purely hostile characterizations based on frequency and quantity of conflict may change.
Peace and Peril is an outstanding contribution, producing a timeline of early Han–Xiongnu relations which can be taken as a standard that is as accurate as possible. This book is a timely and essential read for researchers of Han–Xiongnu relations, with a structure and clarity of argument that make it accessible to non-specialists. Myriad specific discrepancies (namely Gaozu's ineligible princess) identified within the SJ 110 narrative are also likely to inspire much-needed reassessment of accepted facts in this field.
