1. Introduction
Soon after the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol,Footnote 1 the European Union issued a directive recommending that member states set ‘national indicative targets’ for the consumption of electricity produced from renewable sources.Footnote 2 These previously indicative targets have since been made binding by the legislative process for a recast of the renewable energy directive – which is still ongoing.Footnote 3 Therefore, many EU countries have introduced incentives, which were deemed indispensable in order to kick-start investments in renewable energies.Footnote 4
With favourable support schemes resulting in significant investment in renewables – meaning significant expenses in terms of incentives payable by host states – and hit by a global financial crisis, many European countries scaled back their original investment incentives to smaller amounts and shorter durations. Regulatory changes were often needed to comply with those countries’ obligations under European Union law.
This has resulted in the surfacing of numerous arbitral proceedings where investors claimed that such regulatory changes breached the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standardFootnote 5 afforded by the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).Footnote 6 In general, legal certainty and the investor’s capability to foresee the consequences of their actions are prerequisites for rational enterprise in a capitalist economy. This is even more true for the renewable energy sector, because it depends on large, upfront investments, which can only be recouped over time, and are highly vulnerable to externalities. National legislations usually provide in advance for eligibility requirements and incentive rates applicable for three or four years, with the specific purpose of enabling operators in the renewable energy sector to properly foresee and evaluate costs and revenues. Investors make decisions on the financial viability of their investments based on the rate-setting decisions made and implemented by the host states. Thus, they have a strong interest in the stability of the regulatory regime – in particular the continuity of any incentive schemes over the expected amortization period – and protection from unwarranted government policy changes. Unsurprisingly, in the above-mentioned arbitration cases, investors complained that regulatory changes affecting incentives in renewables diminished or exhausted the commercial viability of their investments.
The core issue is clearly to strike a balance between foreign investors’ reliance on the regulations that underpin their long-term investments and the host states’ right to adapt regulations to new needs. In other words: to what extent can investors expect that the level of incentives initially granted will be protected by the ECT over time and, vice versa, what are the boundaries of host states’ regulatory freedom? Unqualified protection of legitimate expectations may have the effect of fettering a state’s right to regulate. On the other hand, an unlimited right to regulate would imply that investors should be ready to accept whatever the host state decides, resulting in a poor investment climate which would ultimately be detrimental to the host state itself.
To strike a balance, in line with an increasing tendency in international practice, the principle of FET shall be clarified, delimited, and encapsulated in a more precise set of rules.Footnote 7 Indeed, there is a risk, and a wrong premise, in the viewpoint shared by several arbitral tribunals and authors, according to which, with the FET principle not being precisely defined, its content depends on the interpretation of specific facts.Footnote 8 The risk is that the FET principle gets diluted into a rhetorical framework that gives the tribunal a free pass to judge the legitimacy of investors’ expectations at its whim. The wrong premise is that it is one thing to say that facts need to be interpreted in order to verify whether the requirements for the application of a rule are met and another thing to infer the legal content of a rule from the facts of a specific case. The legal content is provided by the rule itself and should be identified. It will be ascertained that, despite its flexibility, the FET standard is not devoid of an independent legal content and is susceptible to specification through arbitral practice.
This work follows a step-by-step approach, starting with a clarification of the relationship between the FET standard and the protection of legitimate expectations. The analysis continues with an assessment of whether a legislative act or contract, entailing a specific commitment to regulatory stability, may be a source of legitimate expectations, and whether – and under what circumstances – legitimate expectations may arise in the absence of a specific commitment on the part of the host state. Based on the conclusion reached, safeguards are identified, which states should observe in order to avoid liability under the ECT when they are about to change a regulatory framework in a manner that is likely to impact foreign investors.
The common distinction between ‘principles’ and ‘rules’ captures one set of typical relationships, namely those between norms of a higher and lower degree of abstraction, where rules have greater clarity and definiteness.Footnote 9 Thus, the ‘translation’ of the FET principle into more specific rules would increase legal certainty and reduce ex ante the number of disputes between investors and host states. Reference by arbitral tribunals to the host state’s performance of these safeguards, rather than to the sole FET standard, would also have the merit of making arbitral decisions more foreseeable and coherent with each other, which regrettably is not always the case today.
2. When does a change in a host state’s legal framework constitute a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard?
In arbitral practice, the fact that a state cannot generate legitimate expectations of a stable legal environment to incentivize an investor to make an investment and later ignore such expectations, is grounded in the FET standard,Footnote 10 often combined with the principle of good faith, which is customary in international law.Footnote 11 The tribunal in CMS v. Argentina, for instance, observed that the stability of the legal and business framework is an essential element of FET.Footnote 12 In this regard, the principle of estoppel, encapsulated in the maxim nemo venire potest contra factum proprium, as a corollary of the principle of good faith, is also often recalled.Footnote 13
This does not mean that a breach of the FET principle requires the deliberate intention or bad faith of the host state, although, and admittedly, such intention or bad faith may be taken into account and aggravate the position of the host state.Footnote 14 If a state acts fraudulently or in bad faith, then there is at least a prima facie case for arguing that the FET principle has been violated.Footnote 15 Think of a state which promises incentives to investors up to a certain date and then suddenly removes them prior to that date as soon as the pursued objective of the state’s energy policy has been achieved.Footnote 16
On the other hand, investors’ needs for stability and predictability shall be balanced with the host state’s right to regulate, which may involve changing previous regulations to meet evolving circumstances and public needs. As the tribunal in EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania noted, the FET requirement cannot mean ‘the virtual freezing of the legal regulation of economic activities, in contrast with the state’s normal regulatory power and the evolutionary character of economic life’.Footnote 17
What seems to be admitted at a preliminary stage is that the host state’s right to regulate includes the right to adapt the level and duration of support in order to avoid overcompensation of investments. No doubts of compatibility with the FET standard seem to arise here. Fed-in tariffs, for instance, can lag behind the technology change they create, thus generating windfall profits and over-subsidizing the industry. As a result, the regulatory framework underpinning these incentives could become outdated. This bears specific relevance to renewables, because, thanks to technological development, renewable energy technologies have rapidly increased their efficiency, while simultaneously decreasing the energy price per kWh.
But neither is it a question of whether the framework can be dispensed with altogether when specific commitments to the contrary have been made. International investment law has been developed with the specific objective of limiting ex ante the chance of discretion in the actions of public authorities vis-à-vis foreign investors. When a state undertakes a specific commitment to stability, it renounces to its complete freedom of exercise of regulatory power.Footnote 18 The crucial issue is to establish when such commitment is undertaken as well as the degree of specificity required to hold the state to its commitment.
Of course, the specific content of the FET standard – and thus the limits of legitimate expectations – may vary depending on the wording of a particular treaty. The Investment Agreement for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Common Investment Area explicitly contemplates an element of flexibility in the interpretation of the FET standard based on the level of development of the host state.Footnote 19 A binding interpretation by the parties to a treaty, or by an authorized treaty body, may expressly state the equivalence between the FET standard and the minimum standard of treatment under customary law.Footnote 20 For instance, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission, a body composed of representatives of the three NAFTA state parties, with the power to adopt binding authentic interpretations, issued a Note of Interpretation stating that the FET standard contained in Article 1105 NAFTA does not require treatment in addition to or beyond what is required by the customary minimum standard of treatment of aliens in international law.Footnote 21 Arbitral tribunals applying Article 1105 of NAFTA at times, as in the Glamis case, have coherently applied strict requirements, demanding that investors’ expectations be based on the definitive, unambiguous, and repeated commitments or assurances by the host state that have ‘purposely and specifically induced the investment’.Footnote 22 This tendency was confirmed in the Mesa Power Group case, where the Tribunal held that ‘the failure to respect an investor’s legitimate expectations in and of itself does not constitute a breach of Article 1105, but is an element to take into account when assessing whether other components of the standard are breached’.Footnote 23 This case law suggests that, in the application of NAFTA, a narrow interpretation of the FET standard is adopted.
The ECT instead expressly refers to the host state’s duty to create ‘stable’ and ‘transparent’ conditions for foreign investments, as well as to the ‘commitment to accord at all times … fair and equitable treatment’Footnote 24 to such investments, giving particular weight to long-term stability. One may argue that this provision could serve as a basis for affording the legitimate expectations of investors operating in the energy field comparatively greater protection against regulatory changes.Footnote 25
3. A specific commitment to regulatory stability
The first issue to deal with is whether a legally binding act under domestic law, entailing a specific commitment to regulatory stability, may be a source of legitimate expectations under the FET standard.
In arbitral practice, the most certain case of legitimate expectation to regulatory stability is generally considered that of contractual commitments with individual investors, where the state undertakes to grant subsidies and, once granted, to leave them unchanged for a certain period of time. When the Tribunal in Continental Casualty v. Argentina categorized the different types of ‘factors’ on which the claimant based its expectations, it asserted that expectations arising from contracts deserved greater protection as they generate ‘legal rights and therefore expectations of compliance’.Footnote 26
This seems to be particularly true for the ECT. Article 10(1) ECT, contemplating the FET principle, contains an ‘umbrella clause’ which requires a host state to ‘observe any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor’, arguably elevating contractual breaches to treaty breaches.’Footnote 27 The strictness of this obligation is echoed by Article 22(1) ECT, where states have ‘to ensure’ the compliance of state enterprises with such obligations.
As shown by conflicting arbitral decisions, the scope of application of the so-called umbrella clause is not unequivocally conceived. According to a first interpretation which is grounded on and emphasizes the plain text of the provision, it is ‘any’ obligation which requires observation. The clause serves to bring any contractual agreements between the investor and the state under the ‘umbrella’ of the ECT, thus making contractual rights enforceable under the ECT.Footnote 28
According to a second, narrower and nuanced interpretation, the rationale of the provision is to prevent that a state abuses its governmental powers to escape from its contractual obligations when it acts in its dual role as contracting party on the one hand and regulator on the other. Thus, a claimant can trigger the umbrella clause on the sole condition that the core or centre of gravity of a dispute is the exercise of governmental powers (la puissance publique) or reliance on governmental prerogatives and advantages, with the exclusion of normal contractual non-performance.Footnote 29 The scope of the umbrella clause is thus reduced and the risk of ‘opening of the floodgates’ avoided.
Whatever the point of view adopted, the unilateral change of tariffs by the host state affecting a contract or licence and, in general, a reduction or withdrawal of incentives, seems to intrinsically constitute the exercise of governmental power. Therefore, if a contract contains a commitment to tariffs/incentives stability, a breach thereof certainly triggers the umbrella clause and is elevated to an ECT breach.
That expectations arising from contracts deserve greater protection can be supported by the fact that contracts are a kind of lex specialis concluded by the host state so as to attract and accommodate foreign investors. They reflect the carefully negotiated balance achieved by the opposing parties and could be said to crystallize the parties’ expectations.Footnote 30 As such, they could seem to justify special protection of the affected investor, more so than the expectation of the investor who has decided to operate under the host state’s general legislation. According to the Tribunal in Continental Casualty v. Argentina, general legislative statements which are not specifically addressed to the relevant investor only ‘engender reduced expectations, especially with competent major international investors in a context where the political risk is high’.Footnote 31 Indeed, a stabilization commitment made in a law is just as much subject to change as all the other dispositions of the law in question – within the limits of ‘respect of fundamental human rights and ius cogens’, which were not elaborated on further by the Tribunal.Footnote 32
These arguments are not persuasive, mainly because it is debatable that a piece of legislation engenders reduced expectations compared to the ones engendered by a contract. Quite the contrary: it may be argued that contractual arrangements deserve less protection, precisely because they deviate from general legislation, which may be considered to reflect the public good more comprehensively than an individual contract.Footnote 33
As a practical matter, in today’s market economies, modern states cannot negotiate contracts with large numbers of private actors, and therefore rely on the ability to make binding commitments and provide guarantees to private parties, including investors, by way of legislative or regulatory instruments.Footnote 34 To deny states this power would gravely obstruct a state’s governance and regulation, and undermine the rule of law.
The reasons are not just practical, but also legal. If it is true that contracts create ‘legal rights’, the same holds true for legislative acts.Footnote 35 According to a principle which can be derived from comparative law, the legal effect of a contract is that of a law for the parties to the contract.Footnote 36 It therefore seems contradictory to grant contractual entitlements greater protection than that accorded to a law. The EU-Canada CETA contemplates the equivalence of a specific commitment to stability undertaken through a contract or legislation, which is also worthy of note as an element of state practice.Footnote 37 Finally, if one adopts the point of view that general legislative instruments grant reduced protection, the investor should be ready to accept whatever the host state decides to do, on the sole condition that this is done through a legislative act amending a previous legislative act.Footnote 38
In the light of the above, it seems that where a state is found to have provided undertakings or commitments to a class of investors regarding a specified treatment for a prescribed period of time in its general legislation, a legal right to stability arises from these undertakings or commitments no less than where the state has made a specific stabilization commitment to an individual investor.Footnote 39
As a general rule, as long as an appearance of legitimacy is met (apparentia juris), it is insignificant whether relevant acts are then declared null and void, or susceptible to invalidation, under national law.Footnote 40 On the other hand, the mere existence of a legal norm, or of a contract, is obviously not sufficient to create a right to stability.Footnote 41 For a legal right to arise, they must contain a stabilization clause freezing a specific host state’s legal framework, or the contractual regulation, on a certain date and for a certain period of time.Footnote 42 The setting of the final term for the enjoyment of an incentive can be read as a sign that the legislator has undertaken a commitment as it reinforces certainty (Selbstbindung).Footnote 43
In summary, a breach of a previously adopted specific undertaking to stability is automatically a breach of FET. One may say that, while the FET is not a stabilization clause as such, it nonetheless guarantees the stabilization commitment already made by the host state by way of a legislative act or contract.Footnote 44 In both cases, the state no longer retains a margin of discretion to balance the investor’s expectations against public policy objectives, no matter whether the regulatory change is properly or improperly retroactive.Footnote 45 In particular, a reason of mere budget opportunity, or a political choice to no longer consider renewable energies worthy of promotion, cannot justify such regulatory changes. Otherwise, compliance with the FET standard would become dependent on the mere discretion of the host state. Thus, if the problem was budget opportunity, the economic burden should be borne by the host state and should not be to the disadvantage of the investors.Footnote 46 The possible application of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness – for instance, the state of necessity – is of course justified if the corresponding prerequisites are satisfied.Footnote 47
4. The acceptable margin of regulatory change in the absence of a specific commitment
In the absence of a specific commitment by the host state, an investor faces a steeper burden but protection is not a priori excluded. In this realm, even mere political declarations may assume a specific value, at least as supporting arguments to the investors’ claims.Footnote 48
As arbitral awards demonstrate, there is no single answer to the question as to when a change in regulatory framework, in the absence of a specific commitment, would entail a violation of the FET standard. The tests proposed by tribunals vary, ranging from consideration of the total or drastic or radical extent of the regulatory changeFootnote 49 to its unreasonableFootnote 50 or disproportionate character in respect to the objective to achieve,Footnote 51 or to a combination of such criteria.Footnote 52 The Tribunal in the Charanne case specified that the proportionality requirement is fulfilled as long as the modifications are not random or unnecessary, provided that the essential features of the regulatory framework in place are not suddenly and unexpectedly removed.Footnote 53 In similar terms, in the Novenenergia case, the Tribunal emphasized that ‘drastic and unexpected’ regulatory changes entail a violation of FET.Footnote 54 And yet, in spite of the differences in the wording used, the emphasis always is on the subversion of the legal regime.
The public interest is also often outlined in arbitral awards, although in different ways. The Electrabel v. Hungary decision emphasized that the host state is entitled to maintain a reasonable degree of regulatory flexibility to respond to changing circumstances in the public interest.Footnote 55 Tariff deficit, for instance, is a legitimate public policy problem which may be addressed by adopting regulatory changes on the condition that they are appropriate and reasonable.Footnote 56 Other awards are less demanding, as they require that regulatory changes are not contrary to the public interest. According to the Tribunal in the Charanne case, for instance, the FET standard is breached when regulatory changes are made in a manner that is unreasonable, disproportionate, or contrary to the public interest.Footnote 57 This was excluded by the Tribunal in this case, since the main function of the regulatory change was to limit the deficit and control electricity price increases for the consumer.Footnote 58
Within the outlined limits, a ‘margin of change’ is acceptable and compatible with the FET standard.Footnote 59 Beyond this margin, a state cannot change its regulatory framework, or rather, it can change it, but under the obligation to redress the damage suffered by an investor whose expectations were frustrated.Footnote 60
The substance does not change if the FET principle is viewed not as a statement of a state’s obligation, but from the standpoint of the investor.Footnote 61 Prudent investors must know that economic activities may require changes in discipline. This is part of the business risk they have to bear when investing in a particular country.Footnote 62 The investor nonetheless has reasonable expectations that the legal framework of the host state will not change beyond the outlined acceptable ‘margin’.
A cautionary note is necessary here on the circumstances surrounding the investment, which arbitral tribunals often emphasize to demonstrate that the regulatory change was foreseeable. An unqualified emphasis on the circumstances surrounding the investment entails a risk of subjectivism associated with legitimate expectations and gives the tribunal a free pass to judge the legitimacy of investors’ expectations at its whim.Footnote 63 Thus, circumstances surrounding the investment can be used to demonstrate that the regulatory change was foreseeable on the sole condition that they are univocal, which is often not the case. The instable character of the legal framework regulating a specific area of investments, for instance, could be used to exclude the legitimate expectations of the investor only when continuous regulatory modifications are absolutely necessary to adapt the market to changing objective circumstances. On the contrary, when such instability simply mirrors poor legislation, instability may be used as an argument to demonstrate a breach of FET by the host state. Otherwise a state will be taking advantage of its own fault.Footnote 64
5. Safeguards to prevent a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard
In the absence of a specific commitment to stability, a definition of the exact threshold applicable in all types of situations may be an impossible endeavour. When is the regulatory change drastic, unreasonable, or disproportionate? Some may view this as regrettable for the ensuing lack of legal certainty, with investors unable to predict when a regulatory change will cross the line and become a breach of the FET standard. However, certain safeguards can be identified which states should observe in order to avoid liability under the ECT when they are about to change a regulatory framework in a manner that is likely to impact foreign investors. The ‘translation’ of the FET principle into more specific rules would increase legal certainty and reduce ex ante the number of disputes between investors and host states. Reference by arbitral tribunals to the host state’s performance of these safeguards, rather than to the sole FET standard, would also have the merit to make arbitral decisions more foreseeable, and more coherent than they are today.Footnote 65
Legal certainty is intrinsic to law. It can be argued that law is certain and foreseeable, otherwise it cannot be classified as law.Footnote 66 Thus, above all, under a precautionary perspective, each host state should assess the rationale and the appropriateness of each new incentive before its adoption, thus define in advance and in line with its objective the duration of and the amount to spend on the incentive. Without time and means being tailored to pre-established objectives, an incentive could create unlimited expectations among investors, which the host state could subsequently frustrate should the objective no longer be considered worthy of promotion.
A regulatory measure affecting the past should be assessed with caution beyond the traditional case of proper retroactive impact on acquired rights,Footnote 67 even with reference to pending contractual relationships (improper retroactivity, quasi-retroattività, unechte Rückwirkung). For instance, a new law withdraws or reduces an incentive for renewable energy plants already in operation, but only from its entry into force.Footnote 68 It is true that the new regulatory measure only applies to events occurring after its entry into force, thus for the future, but in doing so may affect a set of previously balanced interests. In more precise terms, it may interfere with settled expectations that arose, or even with vested rights accrued prior to the entry into force of the law. Rather than wondering whether or not a new regulatory measure is retroactive, an assessment of the effects any new law may have on the operations in progress, and on the legitimate expectations of the investor, should be made by the host state, and eventually by the arbitral tribunal, with a specific caveat: a minimum impact on the past. Thus, the balance of the traditional principle of lex posterior derogat priori with the FET principle may result in the old law prevailing over the new one.Footnote 69
In particular, since a sudden and unexpected regulatory change may be detrimental to legitimate expectations of investors, especially when the regulatory change introduces a new or heavier burden, or removes or reduces benefits, the host state should give those potentially affected by the change adequate warning and adopt transitional measures, unless when the regulatory change was per se foreseeable by a prudent investor.Footnote 70 The lack of transitional rules, rather than the regulatory change per se, which falls within the regulatory discretion of the host state,Footnote 71 may cause a prejudice to the legitimate expectations of the investors. However, such transitional measures must be harmonized with the objective situation. Their adoption must not undermine the effectiveness of the new legislation and jeopardize the objective it pursues. Thus, transitional measures can be avoided when their adoption is prevented by an overriding public interest requiring the immediate application of the new regime without warranting any claims for damages. Only in the absence of an overriding public interest and of transitional measures can the host state be held responsible for a violation of the FET standard because of the regulatory change. At least in part, arbitral practice already follows this modus decidendi. The Tribunal in the Blusun case, for example, not only considered that regulatory changes did not abolish incentives for which plant operators had already qualified, but also took into account the grace period of 12 months for grid connection, which was envisaged to preserve the pre-existing tariff level. Deemed reasonable by the Tribunal, the grace period was taken into consideration to exclude that the Italian regulatory changes were in breach of Article 10 ECT.Footnote 72
The outlined rules apparently mirror the case law developed by the European Court of Justice on matters of legitimate expectations.Footnote 73 Thus, reference to these rules by arbitral tribunals arguably has the merit of facilitating the recognition of arbitral awards within the European Union.
Finally, the regulatory change should be shaped in a manner which at least enables the investor ‘to recover its operations costs, amortize its investments and make a reasonable return over time’.Footnote 74 This is even more true where unilateral declarations promising stability were made. In the Total case, for instance, the Tribunal found that the failure to readjust the tariffs according to principles of economic equilibrium and business viability violated FET.Footnote 75 Thus, a reduction of tariffs may be compatible with FET on the condition that business viability is safe.Footnote 76
In the light of the above, an earlier termination of an incentive regulation deserves careful analysis, even if it is not properly retroactive, particularly in respect of those who have an expectation of future acquisition in respect to the incentive, as is the case with those who are yet to meet all requirements for putting a photovoltaic plant into operation at the time of the earlier withdrawal of an incentive. The enactment of Italian legislative decree n. 28 of 2011 and the subsequent approval of the Fourth Energy Account on 5 May 2011, for instance, limited the scope of application of the Third Energy Account through the provision that the Third Energy Account was applicable to the production of electricity from solar photovoltaic plants put into operation before 31 May 2011, and no longer, as originally envisaged, to those put into operation before 31 December 2013. The timeline for the application of the Third Energy Account was therefore reduced by more than two years and the incentive scheme was replaced by a less advantageous regime.Footnote 77
This is neither a case of echte Rückwirkung nor one of unechte Rückwirkung. Photovoltaic plant operators who had already put their plant into operation and therefore acquired the right to the incentive (as contemplated by the Third Energy Account) before 31 May 2011, i.e., after the entry into force of the decree, kept their right for a period of 20 years. Nevertheless, the legal position of the investor should be considered, who, despite not being entitled to the relevant incentives yet, has started the preparation for installing a photovoltaic plant and ascertained its profitability based on the assumption that the incentives set out in the Third Energy Account would remain in place for its entire duration until 31 December 2013.Footnote 78 It is submitted that a balance for such cases is needed between the public interest on the basis of the regulatory change and the private interests likely to be affected. In particular, the absence of an acquired right to the perception of incentives does not seem sufficient for excluding a priori that the principles of FET and legal certainty may provide for a legal protection of investors’ expectations, at least where, lacking an overriding public interest, no transitional measures are adopted.
In the absence of the above safeguards, a loss of confidence in the host state by foreign investors will be difficult to avoid, in addition to the risk of successful claims being made by the latter. The host state will ultimately bear negative consequences, in terms of reduced investments caused by its instable conduct.
6. Final remarks
Along this work, a breach of a specific commitment to stability, previously assumed through a legislative act or contract, was ascertained to automatically constitute a breach of the FET standard.
In the absence of a specific commitment to stability, protection is not a priori excluded. It was attempted to strike a balance between the thesis which derives legitimate expectations from the mere existence of legislation on the subject matter,Footnote 79 and the opposite thesis, according to which, in the absence of a specific commitment, states are free to change a legal framework affecting investments with no limitations whatsoever. In their absoluteness, both theses are unacceptable. The former would be too intrusive against state sovereignty while the latter would leave investors at the mercy of the host states. Arbitral practice is nonetheless enlightening to strike a balance and shows that the FET principle does not prevent a regulatory change per se, but offers specific benchmarks to define the modalities through which such regulatory change should be attained.
A number of safeguards were coherently identified, which may be used as criteria to establish when a regulatory change exceeds the acceptable margin and becomes a breach of the FET standard. In particular, since a sudden and unexpected regulatory change may be detrimental to legitimate expectations of investors, especially when the regulatory change introduces a new or heavier burden, or removes or reduces benefits, the host state should give those potentially affected by the change adequate warning and adopt transitional measures, unless when the regulatory change was per se foreseeable by a prudent investor, or when an overriding public interest requires the immediate application of the new regime. Moreover, the regulatory change should be shaped in a manner which at least enables the investor to recover its operations costs, amortize its investments and make a reasonable return over time.
The translation of the FET principle in the outlined rules, which are obligations of conduct, makes it clear that the FET is an objective standard in the sense that its content is the same for all state parties to an international treaty, regardless of their level of development and of the financial resources at their disposal.Footnote 80
In this regard, it was, on the contrary, maintained that what an investor can reasonably, and thus legitimately, expect, especially in terms of stability or transparency, cannot be the same in a highly developed country as it would be in a developing or emerging economy.Footnote 81 Nevertheless, assuming that developing states are by default bound by lower standards because they are presumably more instable and thus less reliable is dangerous, because it entails a risk of relativism and fragmentation of international law.Footnote 82 It is also detrimental to developing states themselves: if they are legally entitled to breach their commitment to stability simply because of their development status, they will not be able to attract investments. In addition, if it is true that poor development is often correlated with an absence of respect for contractual commitments, changing this by external disciplines is the very function of investment treaties – an instrument of good governance not only in terms of the protection of foreign investors but also in terms of creating a ‘culture of commitment’ as a key component of good governance.Footnote 83 Admittedly, a developing state might be more likely to invoke the defence of necessity to justify a breach of the FET standard, but this is merely a factual consideration and is not related to the primary obligation breached.
It goes without saying that reference by arbitral tribunals to the FET as an objective standard, and to the outlined rules and safeguards, would not completely remove discretion. A certain degree of discretion is unavoidable when legal principles apply to factual reality, which is substantially more complex than law. But there is a limit beyond which discretion becomes arbitrariness. The translation of the FET principle into more specific rules will help to avoid that such limit is overstepped, hopefully making arbitral decisions more foreseeable, and more coherent than they are today.