I. INTRODUCTION
The detention of non-citizens is one of the most controversial issues on the international displacement agenda. It is increasingly resorted to by many governments in response to national security threats, terrorism, and global irregular migration, in all parts of the world. The constant blurring of the lines between asylum and migration and the difficulty of distinguishing asylum-seekers from other migrants who regularly travel along the same routes or who resort to the same smuggling networks, has seen asylum-seekers and refugees subject to forms of detention usually reserved for other non-citizens. In mass influx situations, some governments impose restrictions on the movement of refugees or confine refugees to camps, commonly in remote or dangerous locations, which may, in certain circumstances, amount to deprivations of liberty. In recent years, a number of proposals to process asylum-seekers extraterritorially have emerged and, in a few cases, been implemented, in which detention has featured as either a specific component of the proposal or has been necessarily inferred by the location or modalities of such arrangements.
In all these situations, refugees and asylum-seekers may face standards of treatment below those required by international law, whether under the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984Footnote 1 (UNCAT), equivalent provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966Footnote 2 (ICCPR) and regional human rights instruments,Footnote 3 or under international refugee law, including the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees,Footnote 4 (1951 Refugee Convention), as amended by its 1967 Protocol.Footnote 5
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) reports annually on the penalization of refugees and asylum-seekers through the use of detention and other restrictions on freedom of movement.Footnote 6 No accurate statistics are available as to the total number of refugees and/or asylum-seekers detained, not least due to disagreement as to whether various restrictions on the freedom of movement of refugees and/or asylum-seekers actually amount to deprivations of liberty as defined by international law.Footnote 7 According to the United States' immigration authorities, more than 230,000 non-citizens were detained in the US in the fiscal year 2003, of which 6 per cent were asylum-seekers;Footnote 8 the corresponding figure for the United Kingdom has been put at approximately 35,000 in 2003 and 32,000 in 2004.Footnote 9 The UNHCR has consistently stated that the detention of asylum-seekers and refugees is ‘inherently undesirable’.Footnote 10 The Organisation's Agenda for Protection calls on governments ‘more concertedly to explore appropriate alternatives to the detention of asylum-seekers and refugees.’Footnote 11 While much international focus has been given to the fact of detention or other restrictions on the liberty or freedom of movement of refugees and asylum-seekers, less attention appears to have been paid to date to the conditions of that detention. The entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or PunishmentFootnote 12 (OPCAT) represents an important opportunity to bolster existing monitoring and supervision mechanisms in the context of refugee/asylum detention. This is not least because the OPCAT is a human rights instrument and thereby offers complementary protection to the minimal guarantees available in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Notably, the 1951 Refugee Convention does not contain express prohibitions against torture or arbitrary detention.Footnote 13
Divided into six parts, this article addresses definitions, situations, and institutions associated with this new inspection regime in the refugee/asylum context. This Introduction is followed by a brief overview of key aspects of the OPCAT in Part II. Part III then examines the operating definitions of the OPCAT and inquires into the extent to which its mandate extends to detention situations commonly faced by asylum-seekers and refugees. In doing so, it explores whether these definitions correspond to definitions and standards already in use in the refugee/asylum context. In the event of a conflict between standards, I argue that the higher standard must apply due to the particular vulnerabilities of asylum-seekers and refugees.
Part IV explores how the OPCAT and its twin inspection bodies – the Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (SPT)Footnote 14 and the national preventive mechanisms (NPMs)Footnote 15—would operate in four types of detention contexts prevalent in the refugee/asylum field, namely: the detention of asylum-seekers upon arrival at airports and other border posts; immigration detention (otherwise referred to as administrative detention), including semi-open (or semi-closed) asylum or refugee centres; closed refugee camps; and extraterritorial processing or holding centres. It draws on some key examples of such practices from a range of countries, while noting that only 34 States have so far ratified the OPCAT.Footnote 16 As a matter of law, I argue that the mandate of the OPCAT mechanisms extends, largely without controversy, to border detention and immigration detention centres, noting that such detention facilities have already been subject to a range of international and regional monitoring efforts. Rather, potential difficulties that may arise in these places are practical rather than legal in nature. Other situations of detention, such as closed refugee camps and extraterritorial processing centres, raise more complex, albeit not insurmountable, definitional, jurisdictional, as well as practical, issues. I argue that the favourable resolution of these issues is vital to safeguard the relevance and effectiveness of the OPCAT mechanisms in the refugee/asylum context.
Part V of this article considers the value of the OPCAT mechanisms given their overlapping institutional mandate with the primary refugee authority, the UNHCR. The UNHCR monitors detention conditions of refugees and asylum-seekers under its supervisory mandate over the international protection of refugees.Footnote 17 Although there are a range of other international and regional bodies and institutions that deal with the detention of asylum-seekers and refugees,Footnote 18 focus in this article is restricted to the UNHCR. Nonetheless, some of the problems and recommendations outlined in this article may also have relevance to other bodies. I highlight a number of situations in which the OPCAT mechanisms may be better placed than the UNHCR to visit and inspect refugees and asylum-seekers in detention, not least because of rights of automatic access contained in the OPCAT. In conclusion, I make a number of recommendations that will hopefully assist the OPCAT mechanisms, at both the international and national levels, in their first forays into preventing torture and other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment in relation to refugee/asylum detention.
This article does not deal with the detention or imprisonment of refugees and asylum-seekers in connection with ordinary criminal charges or penal sentences, although I note that they fall within the mandate of the OPCAT mechanisms. Furthermore, this article does not deal directly with the often different realities facing migrants who are not seeking asylum or who have been rejected for asylum and are awaiting deportation. As it is rarely simple to distinguish between asylum-seekers and other migrants upon arrival or pending their removal and as they are consequently frequently held together in the same facilities and under the same or similar conditions, some of this commentary may equally apply to migrants.
For the purposes of this article, a ‘refugee’ is understood to mean a person who satisfies the definition in Article 1 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, as amended by its 1967 Protocol, namely an individual who is outside their country of origin and is unable or unwilling to return there owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, and who is not otherwise excluded from protection. Expanded definitions of a ‘refugee’ as defined by one of the regional instruments, or obligations relating to subsidiary protection, are equally valid in those regions where they apply.Footnote 19 An asylum-seeker is, by comparison, an individual who has applied for status as a refugee but who has yet to be recognised as such by the applicable national asylum body.
II. THE OPCAT IN A NUTSHELL
The OPCAT supplements the UNCAT. Operating as a preventive mechanism, the OPCAT establishes a dual and complementary system of regular inspections or visits to places of detention by a single international body and one or more national organs. The aim of these mechanisms is to prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.Footnote 20 Collectively these bodies are referred to as the OPCAT mechanisms. Having been in process for over 20 years,Footnote 21 the final form of the Optional Protocol resembles, although does not mirror, the system of the Council of Europe.Footnote 22 Distinctively, the OPCAT sets up a dual system in which national preventive bodies supplement the work of an international sub-committee. The addition of these national mechanisms has been heralded as a significant and innovative approach under international law, requiring States to utilize such mechanisms in combating torture ‘as a matter of international legal obligation, rather than as a matter of exhortation.’Footnote 23
The first mechanism established by the OPCAT, the SPT,Footnote 24 has the authority to conduct regular, as well as (arguably) unannounced, visits to places of detention.Footnote 25 States parties may object to a visit of the SPT only on a limited number of grounds,Footnote 26 and this has been interpreted as allowing the postponement, but not the prevention, of a visit.Footnote 27 The SPT is made up of 10 members, to be increased to 25 after the 50th ratification or accession.Footnote 28 These members are to be persons of high moral character, and proven professional experience in the field of the administration of justice, in particular criminal law, prison or police administration, or in the various fields relevant to the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty.Footnote 29 They act in their individual capacity, and must be independent and impartial, and serve with efficiency.Footnote 30 Consideration is to be given to equitable representation on the basis of geography, different forms of civilizations and legal systems, and gender.Footnote 31
The OPCAT provides that the SPT shall cooperate with relevant actors, including UN agencies and institutions;Footnote 32 and offers safeguards for any person or organisation against sanction or penalty for having communicated with the SPT.Footnote 33 Experts ‘of demonstrated professional experience and knowledge in the fields covered by the Protocol’ may be invited to join the members of the SPT undertaking these missions.Footnote 34 A roster has now been compiled, made up of nominees from States parties, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the UN Centre for International Crime Prevention.Footnote 35 Notably the UNHCR is not listed specifically as a nominating body so in order for refugee experts to be included on the roster, the UNHCR would need to communicate any recommendations to one of the nominating bodies.
The outcome of these visits is to make recommendations to the State party ‘concerning the protection of persons deprived of their liberty …’Footnote 36 These recommendations are communicated directly to the State party in confidence, the aim of which is to establish constructive dialogue with the authorities concerned in order to provide guidance on how best to resolve any identified problems.Footnote 37 Guidance can include recommendations for training and capacity building for the national preventive mechanisms.Footnote 38 The SPT's recommendations may be communicated to the NPMs, ‘if relevant’.Footnote 39 The decision as to relevance rests with the SPT, rather than the State party. Short follow-up visits by the SPT ‘may be proposed’ after a regular visit, but it appears that a State party may have an option to object to such visits.Footnote 40
The second aspect of the OPCAT is that States parties are required to ‘set up, designate or maintain’ one or several national bodies for the prevention of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, within one year of ratifying or acceding to the Protocol.Footnote 41 The NPMs are to be functionally independent, to have the necessary expertise, gender balance, and ‘adequate representation of ethnic and minority groups’, and to be adequately resourced.Footnote 42 The principles relating to national human rights institutions are to be given due consideration in establishing an NPM.Footnote 43 Their general functions are regularly to examine the treatment of persons in detention, to make recommendations, and to comment upon existing or draft legislation.Footnote 44 The NPMs are granted the same powers to visit places of detention as the SPT;Footnote 45 and they are to have unhindered access to any place of detention, to related information, and to interview detainees in private.Footnote 46 Similar safeguards are provided for individuals or bodies that communicate with the NPM as those applying in favour of those communicating with the SPT.Footnote 47 Recommendations made by the NPMs are to lead to dialogue with the State partyFootnote 48 and, unlike the confidential communication of recommendations of the SPT, the State party undertakes to publish and disseminate the annual reports of the NPMs.Footnote 49 The SPT's role in respect of the NPMs is to advise and assist, when necessary; and to maintain direct, and if necessary confidential, contact; and offer training and technical assistance.Footnote 50
III. DEFINITIONAL DIALOGUE
In order to determine the applicability of the Optional Protocol in the refugee/asylum context, five definitional questions need resolution. These are dealt with below, while any practical issues arising from them are addressed in the specific refugee/asylum situations in Part IV. These questions are:
A. Who is covered by the OPCAT?
B. What constitutes a deprivation of liberty and a ‘place of detention’ for the purposes of the work of the OPCAT mechanisms?
C. When does a State have jurisdiction and/or control over a place of detention for the purposes of the work of the OPCAT mechanisms?
D. What is meant by torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment for the purposes of the work of the OPCAT mechanisms?
E. What other standards may be applicable to the work of the OPCAT mechanisms in the refugee/asylum context?
A. Who is Covered by the OPCAT?
In spite of the existence of a separate refugee protection regime, refugees and asylum-seekers are entitled to benefit from the protection of other human rights instruments. According to the UN Human Rights Committee, ‘the general rule is that each one of the rights [under international human rights law] must be guaranteed without discrimination between citizens and aliens.’Footnote 51 As the 1951 Refugee Convention does not contain the range of rights available under international human rights law—in particular it does not contain explicit provisions either in relation to freedom from arbitrary detention or from torture—the human rights regime becomes an important complement.Footnote 52 The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme in 1997 ‘reiterate[d] … the obligation to treat asylum-seekers and refugees in accordance with applicable human rights and refugee law standards as set out in relevant international instruments.’Footnote 53 As human beings, refugees and asylum-seekers benefit from international human rights law, including the protections afforded by the UNCAT and via the prevention mandate of the OPCAT.
B. What Constitutes a Deprivation of Liberty and a ‘Place Of Detention’ for the Purposes of the Work of the OPCAT Mechanisms?
Article 4(1) of the OPCAT provides that visits may be conducted to:
any place under [a state's] jurisdiction and control where persons are or may be deprived of their liberty, either by virtue of an order given by a public authority or at its instigation or with its consent or acquiescence (hereinafter referred to as places of detention).Footnote 54
For the purposes of the OPCAT, Article 4(2) defines a ‘deprivation of liberty’ as:
any form of detention or imprisonment or the placement of a person in a public or private custodial setting which that person is not permitted to leave at will by order of any judicial, administrative or other authorityFootnote 55 [my emphasis].
Article 4 is ambiguous in so far as there appear to be two different standards in place between its sub-paragraphs: Article 4(1) focuses on any publicly authorised place of deprivation of liberty compared with Article 4(2), which deals with public or private custodial settings where a person is not permitted to leave at will by judicial, administrative, or other order. The emphasis on the former is on the place of detention, whereas the latter is on the person in detention. The second sub-paragraph appears more restrictive than the first. In resolving this ambiguity, general principles of treaty interpretation require that any interpretation be in good faith and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty.Footnote 56 The object and purpose of the OPCAT is the prevention of torture and this impresses for a generous interpretation.
The UNHCR, in contrast, defines detention as:
confinement within a narrowly bounded or restricted location, including prisons, closed camps, detention facilities or airport transit zones, where freedom of movement is substantially curtailed, and where the only opportunity to leave this limited area is to leave the country.Footnote 57
The key distinction between the OPCAT and the UNHCR definitions is that the latter accepts situations where the freedom of movement of a refugee is ‘substantially curtailed’ and in doing so, it does not require a complete deprivation of liberty as otherwise required by international law. The OPCAT definition, in comparison, focuses more on either the place of detention or whether an individual is being held or is suspected of being held against their will and whether their detention was ordered by judicial, administrative, or other authority, or at its instigation or with its consent or acquiescence. Moreover, the UNHCR definition expressly includes closed camps.
The UNHCR notes that there is a ‘qualitative difference’ between detention and other restrictions on freedom of movement.Footnote 58 With this in mind, the UNHCR holds that ‘[p]ersons who are subject to limitations on domicile and residency are not generally considered to be in detention.’Footnote 59 Even though arbitrary or unreasonable restrictions on movement that do not meet the threshold of a deprivation of liberty may continue to breach international law, they appear to fall outside the mandate of the OPCAT which concerns institutional or physical confinement.Footnote 60
In addition to the UNHCR definition, the European Council Directive on minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers defines ‘detention’ as ‘confinement … within a particular place, where the applicant is deprived of his or her freedom of movement.’Footnote 61 The UNHCR commentary on this definition notes that the EU's definition does not extend as far as its own.Footnote 62
In spite of these discrepancies between available definitions, and the OPCAT's immanent ambiguity, the OPCAT definition covers a very broad range of places where the option to leave at will is not available, including not only police stations, prisons, or military facilities, but also immigration centres.Footnote 63 It is not necessary that the only option available is to leave the country, as unhelpfully required by UNHCR's definition. In support of this analysis, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the mere fact that an asylum-seeker could be returned to a transit location did not preclude a finding of a deprivation of liberty. The Court has stated that ‘this possibility becomes theoretical if no other country offering protection comparable to the protection they expect to find in the country where they are seeking asylum is inclined or prepared to take them in.’Footnote 64 That is, an ability to leave the place of detention must be more than a mere theoretical possibility.
Under the OPCAT, the detaining institution can be one that is public or private,Footnote 65 or presumably a combination of the two, such as statutorily mandated detention in privately-run institutions, which is increasingly becoming a common detention practice adopted for asylum-seekers and/or refugees in a number of countries.Footnote 66 The OPCAT also applies to refugees confined by judicial, administrative, or other order in closed refugee camps, or who are otherwise restricted to camps with the consent or acquiescence of the State, including arguably by its location in isolated or remote sites. Extraterritorial processing or holding centres also fall within Article 4, provided they are under the jurisdiction or control of the State party, which is addressed below.
C. When Does a State Have Jurisdiction and/or Control Over a Place of Detention for the Purposes of the Work of the OPCAT?
A further element of Article 4(1) of the OPCAT is that ‘any place’ to be visited by the OPCAT mechanisms is to be under the ‘jurisdiction and control’ of the State party. For most detention centres, this additional criterion is unlikely to present any legal difficulties. However, it raises a number of legal issues in the context of extraterritorial detention centres. In particular, can the SPT or the NPMs visit a State party's detention facility if it is located in a non-State party? Can the SPT or the NPMs visit detention centres owned and managed by non-State parties located within a State party? While these questions are also dealt with later in this article under Part IV in connection with extraterritorial detention centres, this section presents some initial insights into the legal issues arising under Article 4(1).
In the sense of Article 4(1), jurisdiction is taken to mean ‘the competence of the State in international law.’Footnote 67 It is well accepted that of the range of bases of jurisdiction—territory, nationality, effect, protection, passive personality, and universalityFootnote 68—territoriality is the least controversial.Footnote 69 Jennings has stated that ‘there is general agreement that a State may not, unless by permission, exercise its power in a physical sense in the territory of another State.’Footnote 70 However, jurisdiction may be concurrent with the jurisdiction of other States or it may be exclusive.Footnote 71
No definitions of ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘control’ are contained in the OPCAT, but arguably any of the heads of jurisdiction available at international law would apply in the context of the OPCAT. This would include the ‘effective control’ principle, namely that a State is responsible for any ‘acts of authorities, whether performed inside or outside national boundaries … [that] produce … effects outside their own territory.’Footnote 72 Put simply, detention facilities under the de facto effective control of a State would fall within the jurisdiction of that State.Footnote 73
The OPCAT Preamble recalls Articles 2 and 16 of the UNCAT, in particular that they oblige each State party to take effective measures to prevent acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment ‘in any territory under its jurisdiction’.Footnote 74 Although the parent treaty emphasises territorial links, other UNCAT provisions acknowledge additional heads of jurisdiction.Footnote 75 The Committee against Torture has also applied the principle of ‘effective control’Footnote 76 and has stated that certain human rights obligations, such as non-refoulement, apply to individuals detained outside a State party's territory.Footnote 77 Likewise, the Human Rights Committee has opined that jurisdiction under the ICCPR extends ‘to anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if not situated within the territory of the State party.’Footnote 78 The same position has been accepted by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights;Footnote 79 while the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has observed that ‘while the jurisdiction of States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory,’Footnote 80 including where military personnel [or other officials] commit human rights violations in another's territory.Footnote 81 The Human Rights Committee has further commented that human rights obligations are not limited to citizens of States parties but must also be available to all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such as asylum-seekers, refugees, migrant workers, and other persons, who may find themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the State party.Footnote 82
On a strict literal reading of Article 4, the place of detention must be under both the jurisdiction and control of the State for the OPCAT to have effect, suggesting some difference in meaning and scope between the two terms, and that both components need to be satisfied. However, the French version of the text uses ‘or’ not ‘and’, thus leading to arguments that the more human rights friendly version ought to be favoured.Footnote 83 Generally, if a State party has jurisdiction, ipso facto it is assumed that control is simultaneously being exercised. As the OPCAT mechanisms possess mandates to visit ‘places of detention’ (rather than incidences of detention), it is unlikely that they will be concerned with situations of an alleged exercise of control not within a particular physical detention space.
Where a detention facility is located within the territory of a State Party, it is widely accepted that it is within that State's jurisdiction and control, whether it exercises that control legally, politically, physically, financially, or administratively. According to the International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, States include all organs and agencies of the government or other persons or bodies exercising governmental authority.Footnote 84 Further included are other persons or entities not an organ of the State but which are empowered by the State to exercise elements of governmental authority.Footnote 85 On this basis, public as well as private prisons and detention facilities would satisfy Article 4(1), the latter to the extent that they are generally granted permission to operate by law or other administrative order of the State. In addition, Article 4(2) explicitly provides that public and private custodial settings are included within the scope of the OPCAT.Footnote 86 Such places of detention were exactly the situations the drafting conference had in mind in preparing the protocol. By analogy, the granting of permission to non-State parties to operate detention centres on a State party's territory would not remove the mandate of the OPCAT mechanisms to inspect them as they would still fall within the territorial jurisdiction of the host State party.
The more complex question concerns detention facilities located outside the State Party in a Non-State Party. This is dealt with in more detail in Part IV. D. At this juncture, it is sufficient to note that although there is nothing in the OPCAT that requires any place of detention to be located within the territory of the State party for its mandate to be activated, detaining asylum-seekers or refugees in other non-State parties is likely to frustrate the Optional Protocol's object and purpose. It is further likely to bring States into breach of their explicit OPCAT commitments. Moreover, general principles of international law that do not allow States to escape their international obligations by exercising jurisdiction outside their national territory continue to apply.
D. What is meant by Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment for the Purposes of the OPCAT?
The OPCAT does not define other relevant terms such as ‘torture’ or ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ The only guidance as to the meaning of these terms within the text of the Optional Protocol is Article 2(2), which provides that the Sub-Committee is mandated to carry out its work ‘within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations and shall be guided by the purposes and principles thereof, as well as the norms of the United Nations concerning the treatment of people deprived of their liberty.’Footnote 87 Similarly, in making recommendations, the NPMs are to ‘tak[e] into consideration the relevant norms of the United Nations.’Footnote 88 One of the roles of the NPMs is to submit proposals and observations concerning existing or draft legislation and, in this way, they can contribute to ensuring that national laws are brought into line with international standards.Footnote 89 These provisions should be interpreted to mean, at a minimum, that the SPT and the NPMs are not at liberty to disregard UN norms in favour of more restrictive national standards.
But which international standards ought to apply? The preventive role of the OPCAT mechanisms calls for a broad definition of torture and other forms of ill-treatment. There is no express limitation in the OPCAT that the definition of torture as defined in the UNCAT and as interpreted by the Committee against Torture is to be the accepted definition for the purposes of the work of the SPT or the NPMs.Footnote 90 In fact, there is no mention of any official relationship between the Committee against Torture and the SPT, with the exception of Article 16(3) and (4).Footnote 91 On the one hand, it may be argued that interpretations elaborated by the Committee against Torture should be prioritised in order to ensure schematic consistency between the parent and subsidiary treaties. After all, the standards developed by the Committee against Torture are authoritative statements of what it considers best practice (or, at least, minimum standards).
On the other hand, it may equally be argued that the broadly phrased statement in Article 2(2) of the OPCAT is to be interpreted as implying that the mandates of the SPT and the NPMs are not strictly limited to the meaning of torture and ill-treatment as understood by the UNCAT or the Committee against Torture.Footnote 92 Even Articles 1(2) and 16(2) of the UNCAT state that the definitions therein are ‘without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider application.’ The SPT and the NPMs can and should borrow interpretations of torture and other forms of ill-treatment from a wide range of international and regional bodies in the hope that it may prevent torture to the highest possible standards. Malcolm Evans has argued that definitions in other jurisdictions are better suited to the prevention function than the definition in the UNCAT.Footnote 93 In particular, he asserts that the ‘relatively flexible and open-textured approach’ of Article 3 of the ECHR (equivalent to Article 7 of the ICCPR) ‘makes it easier to “ground” prevention recommendations’,Footnote 94 than the criminal law style definition of the UNCAT. Adopting the most flexible definition of torture to guide the work of the OPCAT mechanisms would further be important in the refugee/asylum context due to their particular vulnerability to non-traditional forms of torture or ill-treatment.
Clearly, refugees and/or asylum-seekers may be tortured in detention within the sense of Article 1 of the UNCAT. However, they may also be subjected to torture and other forms of ill-treatment that are not pursued for interrogation purposes or to force a confession, or which are not committed at the hands of public officials, or with their consent or acquiescence. For example, they often face torture or torture-like injuries committed by State and non-State actors, such as rape, sexual violence, human trafficking, sexual and economic exploitation, forced recruitment into armed groups, or deprivation of economic dignity, which do not always meet the criminal law style definition in the UNCAT.
A second reason why the OPCAT mechanisms are encouraged to utilise standards of treatment and definitions of torture beyond Article 1 of the UNCAT is because, unlike the UNCAT, the Optional Protocol has an explicit mandate over ‘private custodial settings’ and although arguably such settings could fall within the mandate of the UNCAT where they operate under order or with the acquiescence of the State, many may not.
E. What Other Standards May Be Applicable to the Work of the OPCAT Mechanisms in the Refugee/Asylum Context?
In addition to protection from torture and arbitrary detention under international human rights law and specific guarantees against penalisation for illegal entry or presence or other restrictions on freedom of movement in the 1951 Refugee Convention,Footnote 95 other protection standards relevant to asylum-seekers and refugees have been developed by the international community. These standards should be used as supplementary materials to guide the work of the OPCAT mechanisms in the refugee/asylum context. The UNHCR states that there is a need to distinguish between standards of treatment owed to refugees and/or asylum-seekers held in connection with criminal offences or detained in respect of expulsion orders for national security or public order grounds, and those standards where detention is based merely on illegal entry or presence.Footnote 96 In the latter situation, the UNHCR advocates that the treatment should be ‘as humane as possible’ and that the detention should not have ‘the “punitive” character associated with detention or imprisonment [in the former situation]’.Footnote 97 Whether individually or cumulatively these conditions of detention amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or inhumane conditions, is a question of both law and fact.
The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme has expressed the opinion that ‘in view of the hardship which it involves, detention should normally be avoided [for refugees and asylum-seekers].’Footnote 98 This view is reflected in UNHCR's Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers.Footnote 99 In particular, the Executive Committee in 1986 stated that the permissible reasons for detention should be limited. Detention should only be resorted to if it is considered necessary, and only on grounds prescribed by law in order to verify identity; determine the elements of an asylum claim; to deal with persons who have destroyed their travel and/or identity documents or who have used fraudulent documents in order to mislead authorities; or to protect national security or public order.Footnote 100 UNHCR in its revised guidelines refers to these grounds as ‘exceptional grounds for detention’.Footnote 101
The 1986 conclusion further stressed that conditions of detention must be humane, including that refugees and asylum-seekers shall, wherever possible, not be accommodated alongside common criminalsFootnote 102 or be located in areas where their physical safety is endangered;Footnote 103 that any detention measures be subject to judicial or administrative review;Footnote 104 that access to the UNHCR be granted;Footnote 105 and that detention ought not be unduly prolonged.Footnote 106 Earlier and subsequent resolutions have criticised the arbitrary or unjustified detention of children;Footnote 107 have discouraged detention or custody in connection with an expulsion order except for reasons of national security or public order;Footnote 108 and have dealt with detention within the context of voluntary repatriation.Footnote 109
In 1985, the UN adopted a Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live, which included rights not to be arbitrarily or unlawfully detained,Footnote 110 or subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.Footnote 111 This was followed by the insertion of similar provisions in the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 1990Footnote 112 (Migrant Workers' Convention). Even though refugees are expressly excluded from the coverage of the Migrant Workers' Convention, it may apply to asylum-seekers.Footnote 113
The Executive Committee in 2002 adopted a conclusion on reception conditions, making specific mention of the importance that any reception measures ‘respect human dignity and international human rights law and standards.’Footnote 114 Although the earlier Conference Room Paper on reception standards, drafted as part of the Global Consultations on International Protection in 2001, referred in an annex to the general principle that asylum-seekers should not be detained, this language did not make its way into the Executive Committee Conclusion the following year.Footnote 115 The Conference Room Paper set out a number of standards of treatment for asylum-seekers in detention, namely that they have rights to be informed of the reasons for their detention and of their corresponding rights in a language and in terms they can understand; to legal assistance; to conditions of detention that are humane, with respect for the inherent dignity of the person, and prescribed by law; and access to the UNHCR or non-governmental organizations.Footnote 116 Many of these standards have also been recognised by the UN Human Rights Committee in relation to asylum-seekers.Footnote 117
In terms of specific references to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment outside the context of refoulement,Footnote 118 the Executive Committee in 1981 stated that asylum-seekers should, even if temporarily admitted to the territory pending arrangements for a durable solution, be treated in accordance with ‘basic human standards,’ including treatment ‘as persons whose tragic plight requires understanding and sympathy.’ This same paragraph went on to state that ‘[t]hey should not be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.’Footnote 119
At the European level, the EU Council Directive on minimum reception standards provides that: ‘When it proves necessary, for example for legal reasons or reasons of public order, Member States may confine an applicant to a particular place in accordance with their national law.’Footnote 120 The UNHCR in its annotated commentary on the directive pointed out that such national legislation would benefit from the inclusion of provisions on the conditions of detention in order to ensure humane treatment with respect for the inherent dignity of the person.Footnote 121 In addition, the UNHCR listed a number of other factors that ought to be considered, including the particular situation of children, pregnant women, and asylum-seekers affected by trauma and other psychological illness.Footnote 122
IV. REFUGEE/ASYLUM DETENTION SITUATIONS
A. Airports, Seaports, Border Posts, and ‘International Zones’
In spite of efforts by some governments to exclude the application of international law from airports, islands, or other border territory, it is not permitted by the rules of treaty interpretation. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 makes clear that international legal obligations apply to the entire territory of a State party, unless specified otherwise.Footnote 123 Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has stated that it is irrelevant that an airport zone (or by analogy border or other territory) is called an ‘international zone’; it is still part of the territory of the State and human rights obligations continue to apply.Footnote 124
Detention facilities located in so-called ‘international zones’ or in other locations that have been purportedly ‘excised’ or removed from the application of national asylum or immigration laws,Footnote 125 therefore, continue to fall within the mandate of the OPCAT mechanisms. These facilities ought to be visited regularly by the OPCAT mechanisms, regardless of their status under national law. There is precedent for this in the work of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which regularly visits airport holding cells.Footnote 126
Any difficulties in visiting such locations are likely to be practical, rather than definitional or legal in nature, although discrepancies between national and international definitions of detention may well impact on the ability to achieve the desired aims of any investigation. Although periodic and ongoing visits to border detention facilities would be possible by the SPT or the NPMs, asylum-seekers and refugees subject to detention at land borders, seaports, or airports are often only in such zones for limited periods, their existence there is not always known or acknowledged by governments, and failure to register individuals upon arrival is not uncommon in some countries.Footnote 127 Moreover, they may be expelled or transferred without access to appropriate judicial or administrative procedures, including refugee status determination. Thus, fully-functioning national preventive mechanisms could become an important first line of defence, including by alerting the SPT to new situations of detention. Key issues to be investigated in the context of asylum-seekers and/or refugees in detention facilities at border zones ought to include ensuring humane conditions of detention, access to asylum procedures and UNHCR if requested, and importantly, protection against refoulement to threats to life or freedom, or torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.Footnote 128 It is at these earliest stages of entry that potential violations of international and customary non-refoulement obligations are most at risk.
B. Immigration or Administrative Detention
A large number of industrialized countries detain asylum-seekers for part or the duration of asylum procedures, with a wide spectrum of policies in existence.Footnote 129 Policies range from mandatory and non-reviewable detentionFootnote 130 to temporary and initial detention for the purposes of initial registration and health and security checks of periods of seven to 10 days, or discretionary detention upon the authorization of immigration officers.Footnote 131 Other countries operate ‘semi-open’ detention centres for the duration of the asylum process, in which an asylum-seeker needs leave permission to be granted by centre officials for specific periods of time.Footnote 132 Still other countries have adopted policies of selective detention, in which asylum-seekers originating from particular countries are singled out for detention.Footnote 133 Many of these policies do not conform to the requirements of international law prohibiting arbitrary detention, including the right of asylum-seekers to an individual assessment as to the necessity and proportionality of detention, the right to periodic review before a court, or general prohibitions against discrimination.
The UNHCR reported in 1999 on some of the commonly identified deficiencies in relation to administrative detention, including serious overcrowding; failure to provide separate quarters for men and women; and living spaces which lack appropriate furniture and sanitary and other facilities, such as proper bathing or washing areas or outdoor space for recreational purposes. In some cases, the UNHCR has argued that such inadequate living conditions may amount to breaches of human dignity, privacy, or inhuman and degrading treatment.Footnote 134 Similar concerns have been identified in Europe by the Jesuit Refugee Service.Footnote 135 Still other reports document the serious negative psychological and developmental effects of detention on children.Footnote 136
The issue for the OPCAT mechanisms is whether these types of immigration control measures constitute a deprivation of liberty and thereby invoke its mandate to inspect them. I would argue that many of these facilities amount to deprivations of liberty or places of detention within the meaning of Article 4 of the OPCAT. Even the ‘semi-open’ centres operate in effect as places of detention for the purposes of the OPCAT, the right to leave at will not being available. As noted in Part III, adopting a broad approach to Article 4 matches the prevention purpose of the OPCAT.
C. Closed Refugee Camps
The majority of the world's refugees are located in developing countries and are housed in camps. The US Committee on Refugees and Immigrants estimates that approximately 8.8 million refugees are housed in refugee camps for five years or longer.Footnote 137 Frequently the living conditions in such camps are difficult, if not deplorable.Footnote 138 Opening up some of these camps to additional scrutiny, such as by the OPCAT mechanisms, could reduce acts of torture and ill-treatment occurring within them. Three questions need to be addressed in order for the OPCAT mechanisms to visit and inspect such locations. First, are closed refugee camps places of detention? Secondly, what would constitute torture or other forms of inhuman or degrading treatment in such locations? Are there any special standards? Thirdly, given the role of the UNHCR in the day-to-day management of many such camps, is the State party or the UNHCR responsible for the conditions in these camps, including any violations, and for instituting prevention practices? These questions will be dealt with in turn below.
First, refugees that are assigned to camps by way of judicial, administrative, or other orders under so-called camp confinement policies are within detention for the purposes of the OPCAT.Footnote 139 Closed refugee camps deny refugees the right to leave at will. Even where camps operate under only informal confinement policies, their location in remote, inhospitable, and/or semi-arid areas, away from transport links and close to borders, can mean that refugees are effectively restricted to those areas.Footnote 140 In its definition of ‘detention,’ the UNHCR distinguishes between deprivations of liberty and designation to live in particular locations; suggesting that the latter may implicate freedom of movement rightsFootnote 141 or constitute a penalty within Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention (depending on the location and/or conditions), but that such dispersal policies are not equivalent to detention. Closed refugee camps operate as de facto (as well as de jure, subject to the particular situation) detention centres. Likewise, dispersal programmes that transfer refugees to remote or isolated locations may similarly amount to detention under Article 4 of the OPACT. Whether a refugee camp constitutes a de facto place of detention is a question of fact and degree, regardless of its name or label.
Secondly, in assessing the standards of treatment to be enjoyed by refugees in such camps, minimum standards adopted by the Executive Committee in 1981 are of useful guidance. In relation to the protection of asylum-seekers and refugees in large-scale influx, the Executive Committee recommends that they be located by reference to their safety and well-being, as well as the security of the country of refuge; that they be provided with basic necessities of life; that the principle of family unity be respected and that assistance be provided to trace relatives; that minors and unaccompanied children be adequately protected; that the sending and receiving of mail, and receipt of material assistance from friends, be allowed; that access to UNHCR be permitted; and that, where possible, appropriate arrangements be made for the registration of births, deaths, and marriages. In other words, the Conclusion calls on States to treat such persons with ‘special understanding and sympathy’.Footnote 142 Of course, these minimum standards are not the full range of rights enumerated in the 1951 Refugee Convention to which the majority of the prima facie refugees in the developing world do not have access.Footnote 143 Under the OAU Convention, countries of asylum in Africa shall, for reasons of security, as far as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin.Footnote 144 Again, this is not always respected in practice.
Whether conditions of detention below these standards constitute torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment is a technical, legal question. However, in the light of the prevention purpose of the OPCAT, it is relevant only that individually or cumulatively conditions in these camps may fall below international standards. There is case law to provide content and meaning to the terms in issue. For example, the United Kingdom House of Lords has ruled that concurrent denial of both work rights and social security benefits amounts to degrading treatment;Footnote 145 while the South African Supreme Court of Appeal has ruled that issuing a blanket prohibition on employment for asylum-seekers, without offering social benefits, violated the constitutional right to dignity.Footnote 146 Following these cases, it is arguable that reductions in food rationing below the World Health Organization's minimum standards could also amount to inhuman or degrading treatment; likewise the prolonged nature of these camps or their isolated location, leading to serious psychological and other health problems.Footnote 147 Given the prevention framework of the OPCAT—rather than a focus on violations—all such issues ought to be taken into account during inspection missions.
In addition to these standards of treatment, some refugee camps are notorious for violence,Footnote 148 such as rape, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, abduction, intimidation, forced military recruitment, and physical assaults. Many of the perpetrators of such violence are non-State actors, such as other refugees, armed groups, government officials, UN peacekeepers, or UN or NGO humanitarian workers.Footnote 149 International law has increasingly recognised such acts as torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including when perpetrated by non-State actors in situations where the State has failed to protect or prevent such acts. Taking up such issues renders the OPCAT mechanisms relevant to detention in all its forms. It is the view of the Human Rights Committee, for example, that rape and sexual violence, domestic violence, female genital mutilation, lack of access to abortions for rape victims, and forced abortion or sterilisation, constitute either torture or a lesser form of ill-treatment.Footnote 150 The European Court of Human Rights has similarly held that rape, including outside State custody, is a form of torture.Footnote 151 Likewise, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has treated rape and sexual violence as either torture or inhuman treatment.Footnote 152 Within the framework of State custody or consent or acquiescence, the Committee against Torture has incorporated within its torture definition rape and sexual violence, both inside and outside State custody, female genital mutilation, domestic violence, and punishment for having transgressing social mores.Footnote 153
The third issue for the OPCAT mechanisms in the context of refugee camps is the fact that such camps are often under the direct management of non-State actors, such as the UNHCR. Many refugee camps are managed and staffed by the UNHCR (and its implementing partners) by virtue of its 1950 Statute or various General Assembly resolutions, primarily due to lack of resources or political will of host governments, including particularly in countries not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention. The traditional view is that while the UNHCR may be exercising de facto sovereignty, it is ‘de jure merely an invited guest, assisting in the host State's performance of its obligations in a manner wholly governed by the terms of the invitation’.Footnote 154 This is consistent with UNHCR's own position that the primary responsibility for international protection rests with the host government, and only secondarily with the UNHCR.Footnote 155 According to the International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, a State's responsibility extends to actions or omissions attributable to the State under international law and that constitute a breach of an international obligation.Footnote 156 Thus, where a State fails to prevent torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment committed by non-State actors, including by the UNHCR or its partner agencies, it continues to bear international responsibility by way of omission.
However, even UNHCR's position does not exclude concurrent or exclusive responsibility of an international organisation for human rights violations. In practice, the State may have delegated day-to-day management to the UNHCR. Andrew Clapham has argued that international organizations are capable of bearing international responsibility, even as States retain their own liability.Footnote 157 The UNHCR's Statute provides that ‘[t]he [UNHCR], acting under the authority of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope of the present Statute …’.Footnote 158 Moreover, under the ILC's draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations, the UNHCR would be responsible for any acts or omissions that are attributable to the organisation and which constitute a breach of an international obligation.Footnote 159 The International Court of Justice has held that the United Nations ‘is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties …’Footnote 160 Thus, the UNHCR can be said to possess duties under international human rights law, including international obligations not to commit as well as to prevent acts of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.Footnote 161 However, as Ralph Wilde has noted, a balance needs to be struck between the obligations of the State and those of UNHCR, in view of the fact that the latter is not a sovereign State.Footnote 162
Despite political and legal difficulties, it is important that the UNHCR and other international organisations operating in such locations are held accountable for human rights violations, including failures to institute systems to prevent torture and other sub-standard treatment. Refugees, as first and foremost human beings, must be entitled to the same rigour of investigation and inquiry as other individuals in detention. Although problematic, this is so even though it may result in one UN body, albeit an independent treaty body (the SPT), technically investigating another UN agency (the UNHCR); or alternatively, internationally mandated NPMs inspecting the standards of care of international agencies. This in no way absolves, however, the concomitant responsibility of the State party for the care of those within its jurisdiction or under its control [or for that matter, the international community under responsibility-sharing principles].
D. Extraterritorial Processing or Holding Centres
Removing asylum-seekers to other countries for processing is a threat to the underlying humanitarian spirit of the international refugee protection regime, not to mention broader principles of international solidarity and responsibility-sharing. The idea has appeared in several forms, including national and regional ‘safe third country’ programmes,Footnote 163 bilateral and regional readmission agreements, domestic ‘first country of asylum’ policies or other more rudimentary schemes that involve the simple transfer of asylum-seekers to other countries under bilateral agreements. Madeleine Garlick asserts that although some extraterritorial initiatives are supported by neither the vast majority of EU States nor the UNHCR, there are some ‘lingering’ fears that they could resurface or that current EU Regional Protection Programmes in regions of origin could be extended for more dubious purposes.Footnote 164 Moreover, such proposals have not been removed permanently from international or regional dialogues, but occasionally re-appear in various fora.
External asylum processing became particularly popularized in the early 2000s, following the Tampa incident in 2001. The Australian government transferred 433 Afghan intercepted asylum-seekers, who had entered Australian territorial seas and others who were later picked up by the Australian coastguard floating in international waters, to Nauru and Papua New Guinea in exchange for foreign aid.Footnote 165 Subsequently, the European Union, led by the United Kingdom, put forward a proposal for the transfer of asylum-seekers to transit processing centres, to be located outside the EU.Footnote 166 The proposal also included the idea of ‘regional protection areas’ that envisaged the removal of rejected asylum-seekers to these areas pending return to their countries of origin. In 2004 the German Interior Minister Otto Schily advocated more far-reaching proposals to set up ‘safe zones’ or ‘camps’ in North Africa with the financial assistance of the EU. The Austrian Minister of the Interior similarly suggested that such a scheme might be applied also to the EU's eastern borders.Footnote 167 Although these proposals have been shelved amid widespread criticism from the UNHCR and NGOs, and in spite of disapproval from the European Parliament,Footnote 168 Italy has entered into secret bilateral negotiations with Libya to accept ‘irregular migrants’ arriving on the former's territory.Footnote 169
The UNHCR's State of the World's Refugees 2006 clarifies that the main problem with external processing centres is the ‘necessity of barbed wire’; or in other words, detention.Footnote 170 Under the ‘Pacific Solution,’ asylum-seekers were housed in fenced and isolated camps on remote island-nations that were not parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention.Footnote 171 Asylum-seekers deemed not to be refugees and unable to repatriate to their countries of origin were, for a range of legal and practical reasons, left to languish in such places for extended periods.Footnote 172 While not explicit within the UK/EU proposal, the UNHCR and Amnesty International accepted that detention, even temporary detention, would be a necessary feature of these arrangements.Footnote 173 Similar concerns are raised in relation to the Italy-Libya agreement, which apparently includes the construction of holding or transit centres in Libya, which may be closed (ie detention) or with some movement restrictions.
A discussion at the First Annual Conference on the OPCAT in 2007 called for access to these facilities,Footnote 174 although access is far from a straightforward issue. As noted above in Part III, extraterritorial detention or holding centres fall under the purview of the OPCAT mechanisms where either jurisdiction or control is exercised by the State party. Clearly, where both the sending and the receiving States are parties to the OPCAT, the SPT and the NPMs are authorized to visit any such places of detention. A more challenging issue in this context for the SPT and the NPMs will be to determine which State actually exercises jurisdiction or control over such centres, or whether concurrent jurisdiction is being exercised. If, as a matter of fact or law, both countries exercise jurisdiction or control simultaneously, the SPT and the NPMs would need to take this into account in directing their recommendations. Relevant questions to determine the extent of the jurisdiction or control might include whether the facility in question is either financed or managed by the sending State or its agents. Are officials or agents of the sending State active in the facilities, either in relation to oversight or day-to-day operations? What are the terms of any agreement between the sending and receiving State?
Where a deal has been struck between two States in relation to the inter-country transfer of asylum-seekers and/or refugees, the general position at international law provides that such agreements cannot lead to the release of responsibility for the sending State if it is aware of or can prevent mistreatment in the receiving State (such as within a detention facility), even if it plays no subsequent role in the day-to-day or oversight operations there. At a minimum, non-refoulement obligations would apply.Footnote 175 This position is based on the principle that it would be unconscionable to permit a State party to perpetrate human rights violations on the territory of another State [or allow those violations to occur by omission], such violations it could not perpetrate on its own territory.Footnote 176
The ICJ, for example, has clarified that the drafters of the ICCPR (and, therefore, other human rights instruments) did not intend to allow States to escape their obligations by exercising jurisdiction outside their national territory. They only intended to prevent persons residing abroad from asserting, vis-à-vis their State of origin, rights that do not fall within the competence of that State, but that of the State of residence.Footnote 177 In this way, it should be considered impermissible for States to circumvent their responsibilities under international law simply by transferring asylum-seekers and refugees to other States and detaining them there. This would be antithetical to basic understandings of treaty interpretation and underlying human rights principles. Moreover, Chapter II of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility provides that responsibility for the same conduct may be attributable to several States at the one time.Footnote 178
But the real issue in such situations is one of access. Can the OPCAT mechanisms visit and inspect facilities located in non-State parties? As a non-State party has no obligations to cooperate with the OPCAT mechanisms, the ability to visit such locations will be at the discretion of the non-State party. In fact, only the State exercising territorial jurisdiction would be in a position to grant or deny access to its territory to the SPT or the NPMs. Even though the sending State may as a matter of international law retain full or partial international responsibility for the acts or omissions carried out at those places of detention, only the State exercising territorial jurisdiction is in a position to grant entry rights and visas under national immigration laws.
In essence, such detention facilities directly undermine the prevention purpose of the OPCAT. Specifically, the act of sending asylum-seekers or refugees by a State party to the OPCAT to detention in a non-State party may bring the State party into breach of its explicit obligations under the OPCAT. First, such schemes prevent the OPCAT mechanisms from accessing such places automatically in breach of a number of provisions of the OPCAT.Footnote 179 Whether national preventive mechanisms are able to visit such detention facilities is likely to be dependent on the bilateral or multilateral agreement underpinning the arrangement, but, again, any lack of access would bring the sending State into breach of its obligations under the OPCAT. Secondly, such schemes undermine the object and purpose of the OPCAT and breach treaty principles to act in good faith.Footnote 180 Extraterritorial detention in non-State parties constitutes a male fides observance of the OPCAT in agreeing to its terms and then purposefully depriving individuals of their liberty in locations inaccessible to the OPCAT mechanisms.
E. Additional Issues Relevant to all Four Refugee/Asylum Situations
In addition to the situation-specific issues outlined above, there are two further issues that are likely to arise as the OPCAT mechanisms engage in the refugee/asylum field. The first is whether the OPCAT mechanisms should comment on the legality of the detention (as judged according to international standards), in addition to the conditions of that detention. As preventing individuals being unlawfully or arbitrarily detained in the first place directly contributes to obviating torture or other forms of ill-treatment in those settings, I would argue that the OPCAT mechanisms must engage with both these facets of detention in order to fulfil their mandate.Footnote 181
A second question for the OPCAT mechanisms relevant to the effectiveness of their interventions for the lives of individual asylum-seekers and/or refugees is the extent to which they will document and ensure follow-up in relation to particular individuals or groups of individuals in detention, rather than focusing only on places of detention. Many of the UN monitoring bodies and special rapporteurships have developed the practice of recording the names of individuals brought to their attention during visits, with some success in terms of release or improved conditions. The public listing of names plays a preventive role in reducing the ability of the State party to clandestinely engage in ill-treatment.Footnote 182 Such an approach also recognises that although prevention is a global objective, it has an individual face. As the language in Article 4(2) of the OPCAT is drafted in terms of preventing ‘persons’ from being subjected to torture, it is open to the OPCAT mechanisms to similarly list individuals in situations of need in any reports. The international focus of the SPT makes it better placed in this regard, although its reports are confidentialFootnote 183 so it may well be the NPMs that will ultimately be able to secure release of or improved conditions for specific persons.
V. THE UNHCR AND THE OPCAT MECHANISMS: INSTITUTIONAL OVERLAP OR COMPLEMENTARITY?
The UNHCR has supervisory responsibility over the implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention,Footnote 184 and it exercises its mandate functions of international protection and the pursuit of durable solutions for refugees under its 1950 Statute.Footnote 185 In spite of the absence of explicit guarantees to liberty (excepting Articles 26 and 31) or freedom from torture in either the 1951 Refugee Convention or regional refugee treaties,Footnote 186 the UNHCR has attained a general mandate over detention issues in view of its wide international protection responsibilities, which are increasingly being defined by international human rights law. In 2000, the Sub-Commission on Human Rights recommended to States in which detention is employed that they provide information to the UNHCR, pursuant to Article 35 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, on how detention policies and practices conform to relevant international standards, including the UNHCR Revised Guidelines.Footnote 187 As far as I am aware, this has not developed into general practice, although a number of reports have been conducted by the UNHCR on this, including with the cooperation of some States.Footnote 188 Under its mandate functions, the UNHCR engages with the issue of detention, including through the production of authoritative guidelines.Footnote 189 Its staff pursue access to places of detention where asylum-seekers and refugees are being detained, regularly visit such locations, and advocate for improved standards of detention and/or release.
So what would the OPCAT mechanisms add to the role of UNHCR in relation to investigating and monitoring the detention conditions of asylum-seekers and refugees?
In spite of its broad mandate, the UNHCR regularly experiences problems of gaining access to detainees. It also faces political, administrative, and/or judicial barriers to following up on individual cases. In its favour, the size of the UNHCR is to be compared to a single sub-committee established under the OPCAT made up of 10 members, who may add specialist experts to its team for particular visits.Footnote 190 The UNHCR operates in 111 countries and has over 6,000 staff.Footnote 191 Clearly, the SPT's capacity to engage with all the various forms of detention will be limited, and a prioritising exercise will have to be undertaken by the SPT, not only in relation to which countries to visit but also the particular types of detention facilities to be visited once there.Footnote 192
In view of this, the NPMs are likely to play a much greater role in torture prevention due to their ability to conduct visits regularly and to be ‘on the scene’ speedily. The effectiveness of any national mechanisms will be dependant on such factors as resources, expertise, and their independence and impartiality.Footnote 193 Because of these limitations on the work of the OPCAT mechanisms, it is envisaged that the UNHCR will remain the primary international monitor of both the legality of detention policies as well as general conditions of detention of asylum-seekers and/or refugees, not least in the short-term due to the low number of OPCAT ratifications from major refugee-hosting countries.Footnote 194
However, the UNHCR has faced situations in which it has been unable to negotiate access to sites of detention, or where access has been temporarily denied.Footnote 195 With the capacity to carry out unannounced inspections and without requiring pre-departure permission, the SPT could potentially step in and act as an advance team aimed at preventing, at a minimum, acts of refoulement. Permanent or unreasonable withholding of visas for SPT members would contravene both the letter and spirit of the OPCAT.Footnote 196 Similarly, an effective and independent NPM could act as an early response mechanism, not least because it would already be in-country.
There are other situations where the UNHCR is not able to exert sufficient pressure locally to improve the detention conditions of refugees and/or asylum-seekers. This can be due to local politics, government blockage, inaction, or corruption. Unlike other international bodies that similarly monitor detention, the UNHCR, as noted above, is often directly involved in service delivery in relation to some detention places, such as closed refugee camps, and must balance competing political priorities. It also faces threats of the expulsion of its officials or closure of its offices, which can hinder it acting assertively.Footnote 197 Similarly, the security of refugees and its staff can be factors in dealing with host governments. Writing prior to the entry into force of the OPCAT, Rachel Brett and Eve Lester argued that these factors were exactly the reasons why an independent treaty-monitoring body with fact-finding powers and a complaints mechanism was needed.Footnote 198
Whether the OPCAT mechanisms will be able to step in to bolster the international protection regime for refugees and asylum-seekers will depend on a number of factors. These factors might include access (as noted above, theoretically the State party cannot deny access to the SPT entirely and only delay it for specific reasons);Footnote 199 the ability to put together a delegation when necessary and quickly; and to ensure safeguards are in place for the security of its own inspection teams. Fundamentally, the OPCAT mechanisms will only be effective complements to the UNHCR if the number of ratifications increase.
Although the OPCAT is an independent regime, it would be prudent in most situations to coordinate such missions with the UNHCR (or at least to inform it of such missions). This is not least because the UNHCR, potentially in conjunction with any NPM, will be the body that remains in the territory to follow up on any recommendations. Having said this, the confidentiality provision in Article 16 of the OPCAT may undermine the ability of the SPT to cooperate fully with other international bodies.Footnote 200 In fact, the confidentiality provision appears to conflict with the mandatory obligation of the SPT to cooperate with international bodies in Article 11(c). Arguably, the latter must take priority in view of the overarching prevention purpose of the Optional Protocol. Confidentiality could consequently be interpreted to apply to those outside, but not those inside, this inner circle of international bodies. Additionally, the UNHCR might take advantage of the OPCAT arrangements by informing them of particular detention facilities that need inspection. In the interests of asylum-seekers and refugees, a two-way dialogue between the UNHCR and the OPCAT mechanisms ought to be established.Footnote 201
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: THE WAY FORWARD
The OPCAT represents an important complement to the international refugee and human rights regimes. However, its relevance and effectiveness in the refugee/asylum context is likely to be dependent on a number of factors. First, the OPCAT mechanisms must take account of refugee standards, in particular those developed by the UNCHR and the Executive Committee that reflect the special situation of asylum-seekers and refugees. Where there is a clash between standards, the highest applicable one must prevail.
Secondly, the OPCAT mechanisms would be encouraged to apply a broad interpretation of what amounts to a deprivation of liberty and a place of detention. This would ensure that detention situations specifically applicable to asylum-seekers and refugees fall within their operating mandates. Broad interpretations match its prevention purpose. Adopting an interpretation of jurisdiction and control compatible with the general position at international law, and beyond the narrow view of national territory, is also imperative to be able to keep up with the changing realities of States' approaches to refugee protection and migration management. States parties to the OPCAT cannot be allowed to remove the possibility of being scrutinized by the OPCAT mechanisms by transferring asylum-seekers and others to detention centres beyond their territorial borders. As a preventative mechanism, at a minimum, the OPCAT mechanisms must engage with the issues of direct and indirect refoulement.
Thirdly, cooperation between the UNHCR and the OPCAT mechanisms must be fostered, especially as the Offices of the UNHCR and the NPMs would be in situ to follow up on any recommendations of the SPT. In doing so, the OPCAT mechanisms would need to balance the responsibility for any actual violations committed either wholly or concurrently by the UNHCR and/or the State party, and their respective roles in implementing any prevention recommendations. One facet of cooperation should involve ensuring that refugee experts are included on visits to refugee/asylum detention facilities.
Fourthly, the OPCAT mechanisms are urged to accept a broad interpretation of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, taking account of the range of international instruments, decisions, general comments, and authoritative papers available. Only then will some of the worst grievances committed outside of the context of interrogation and State custody be addressed, including particularly violence perpetrated by State and non-State actors against refugees and/or asylum-seekers.
Fifthly, the SPT must be prepared to comment upon not only the conditions of detention, but also the legality of detention, giving consideration to both international human rights law as well as international refugee law.Footnote 202 In this context, the SPT ought to take account of whether alternatives to detention are available in a given context. Meanwhile, NPMs should actively review existing and draft legislation in order to detect any inconsistencies with international standards and to advocate for their removal. Sixth, the OPCAT mechanisms should consider documenting and addressing the situation of particular individuals in detention.
As noted throughout this article, the OPCAT and its preventive mechanisms represent a positive opportunity to bolster existing monitoring or supervisory mechanisms in relation to the prevention of torture generally, including in the refugee/asylum context. In particular, the unhindered access to detention sites and information is one of their greatest strengths. However, the impact of this new instrument in the refugee/asylum context will be contingent upon such situations being prioritised (by both the SPT and the NPMs), that any visits and follow-up be well-managed and coordinated with other international and regional bodies, such as the UNHCR, and that they are sufficiently resourced so that they are able to undertake their work effectively and independently. In particular, the capacity of the OPCAT mechanisms to respond to urgent or emergency situations by virtue of the possibility to undertake spontaneous visits or because the NPMs are already on the ground with unhindered access, has the capacity to add value to existing monitoring bodies but certainly should not (and is unlikely to) usurp or replace them.