Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-mzp66 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-02-11T05:17:45.508Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Students for Freedom and Equality: The Inevitable Return of the Left in Post-Revolutionary Iran

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Peyman Vahabzadeh*
Affiliation:
University of Victoria, Canada
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The emergence and rapid but short-lived presence of Students for Freedom and Equality (SFE; in Persian: Daneshjuyan-e Azadikhah va Barabaritalab or DAB) across major Iranian campuses and their fateful 4 December 2007 protest rally on the campus of the University of Tehran speaks of the return of leftist student activism to Iranian campuses after almost two decades of absence or invisibility within the context of post-revolutionary Iran. SFE was an umbrella democratic organization: its activists came from a plurality of social and political backgrounds and adhered to diverse leftist ideas. But in the context of pro-Reform Movement student activism in Iranian post-secondary institutions in the late 1990s and in 2000s, for a short time the SFE tried to hegemonize student activism and challenge the various pro-government tendencies in university campuses. Before state repression forced the SFE out of operation in 2007, Students for Freedom and Equality brought to campuses candid discussions of social justice issues, critique of Iran’s neoliberal economic policies, and challenges to censorship and lack of freedom.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association For Iranian Studies, Inc 2021

The 4 December 2007 (13 Azar 1386) protest rally to commemorate national Student Day (16 Azar) on the campus of the University of Tehran marked the last public manifestation of the leftist student movement known as Students for Freedom and Equality (aka DAB, acronym for Daneshjuyan-e Azadikhah va Barabaritalab; literally, “Freedom-Seeking and Equality-Demanding Students”). Iranian state security effectively crushed this student movement by arresting its key activists, thus terminating, for the time being, the growing influence of the first generation of “homegrown” and organized leftist students who had come of age after the vast purges of the leftist activists of various communist, socialist, social-democratic tendencies and groups (as well as others) of the previous generation, during the 1980s—those who had participated in the overthrow of the shah and the 1979 Revolution and thus had a living memory of revolutionary action and the Iranian Left’s concerns, issues, and activities before 1979 and also within the first few years after the Revolution. Students for Freedom and Equality (henceforth SFE) generally owes its emergence to the limited social and political liberalization that took place following the rise of the Reform movement to government in 1997, which in effect ended the state monopoly over student organization on Iranian campuses. The SFE’s activism, despite the group’s conclusive demise, effectively nullified the state propaganda about the death of the Left and showed that the postwar “reconstruction period” and the country’s concomitant neoliberal and privatization policies, which have been breeding staggering inequalities and massive impoverishment of the middle class and lower sectors of society ever since, were to be met by resistance from the voices of social justice.

Although short-lived, the SFE stands at a curious conjunction in the history of political development in general and the Iranian Left in particular. It proves that the Left will return to civil society activism every time state control over civil society is somewhat relaxed. This observation leads to another: the traditional concerns and advocacy of the Left for social justice and democratic participation have been simmering within the youth who came of age in the Reform period (1997–2005). This point is sociologically significant: many hold the view of Iranian leftists as primarily party affiliates and members with known ideological inclinations. But the SFE indicates that the concerns of the Left have been socialized underneath the proverbial skin of society and within the existing state-controlled institutions, in this case universities, and these concerns were ready to surface under particular conditions. Moreover, for the most part, the SFE was a democratic student union consisting of the various, even diverging, shades of Marxism. It held together party-minded activists, those interested in scholarly leftism, and culturally oriented individuals while focusing on the particular concerns of students for freedom of expression and against the growing inequalities in Iran. Although it might be argued that the democratic aspect of the SFE was a response to necessity, we nevertheless should call the SFE’s democratic attitude “frontal” (following Mostafa Sho‘aiyan), which refers to a group that consists of different ideological and political tendencies, instead of imposing a strict ideological and political guidelines to which all members are required to adhere. This is, by and large, also different from their leftists predecessors, with the notable exception of Confederation of Iranian Students-National Union (CISNU).Footnote 1

Based on the author’s original study of the SFE, this article situates and maps, in some important detail, the conditions, activities, and politics of the SFE in order to show how a new generation of leftist students experimented with student activism on Iranian campuses and how they acted differently from their predecessors.

A Turbulent Past

Following the 1979 Revolution, university campuses flourished with student activism as many student groups made their advent in that rare historical moment of freedom. The student body has been an unwavering agent of social change in Iran. Therefore, not surprisingly, student groups affiliated themselves with political parties, which rendered impossible the formation of an all-embracing student union or student federation at this time—a national student body that could have been an effective political body for democratization of the society. These emerging student groups included the pro-regime Anjoman-e Eslami-ye Daneshjuyan (Islamic Student Association or ISA; state-sponsored), Anjoman-e Daneshjuyan-e Mosalman (Moslem Students Association; affiliated with the People’s Mojahedin), Sazman-e Daneshjuyan-e Pishgam (Pishgam [Vanguard] Student Organization; affiliated with the People’s Fadai Guerrillas), Sazman-e Daneshjuyan-e Demokrat (Democratic Student Organization; followers of the Tudeh Party), and Anjoman-e Daneshjuyan-e Mobarez (Militant Students Association; affiliated with the Paykar Organization). Smaller student groups, often associated with regional political parties, also emerged at this time—such as the students who followed the Democratic Party of Kurdistan or Rah-e Kargar). By September 1979, when the universities reopened with a new cohort of students admitted, the soaring activities of the student groups outside of the state orbit had largely marginalized the pro-state Islamic Association of Students. The popular support of radical and leftist student organizations by the student body made the regime feel it was losing support in the university. Alarmed by the imminent loss of control over the universities, the Ministry of Interior issued an order “banning ‘activities of all political groups in universities’ [except ISA] and demanding that ‘cultural activities by students’ must conform to the government and university regulations.”Footnote 2 This was a response to the earlier meeting of the representatives of the Islamic Associations of Students with Ayatollah Khomeini.Footnote 3 Then on his televised Nawruz message, the Ayatollah announced: “An Islamic Revolution must be realized in all of the universities across the country, so that the professors who are in line with the West or the East are purged (tasfiyeh gardand) and the university becomes a healthy environment for teaching higher Islamic sciences.”Footnote 4 Finally, a Friday Prayer speech on 18 April 1980 unleashed an attack on Iranian universities.Footnote 5 The university campuses across the country were besieged by the pro-regime mob, before a “Cultural Revolution” was announced.

During this violent raid on campuses in major cities including Tehran, Rasht, Ahvaz, and Zahedan (18–22 April, 1980), at least 37 students were killed and hundreds were injured and arrested. Subsequently, all universities were closed for about three years, and the “Islamization project” took off.Footnote 6

The universities were given a short deadline to wrap up the term and forced to close. When they reopened in 1982 (in a careful and partial fashion), student activists and professors from all political shades were expelled. By 1983, Iranian universities had been rendered homogenized, with the student body depoliticized and the Islamic Association dominating campus activities. In the absence of student activism, under the tutelage of the state, the Islamic Associations of universities re-emerged as the nationwide federation of Islamic Associations of university students called Daftar-e Tahkim-e Vahdat (Office to Consolidate Unity, or OCU). As universities reopened, it seems, the state-sanctioned Islamic Associations within the universities needed to converge into a solid nationwide federation in order to act based on a centralized policy in a then strictly controlled university.

New Demographics and the OCU

After the purges and the closure of the universities at the time when the war with Iraq was at its height, many former or potential university students opted to leave the country for higher education. A first demographic shift happened in a country that needed to train the experts loyal to the regime. The number of students from rural and lower classes increased, and members of Basiji militias, war veterans, and family members of prisoners of war and those killed, wounded, or missing in action entered university through allotted quotas. Also, a new admission standard, aside from having high scores in the universal admission exam (konkur), was now imposed: those admitted had to be cleared for their moral and ideological allegiances and have no moral or political records or citations with the authorities.Footnote 7

The origins of OCU go back to September 1979 when a number of key Muslim student activists created a unified body for the Islamic Associations in order for these associations to play a greater role in the diverse university culture prior to the purges.Footnote 8 As a pro-state campaigner, the OCU mobilized the student body for both the war effort and reconstruction effort (Jahad-e Sazandegi). “During 1983–1989, the aforementioned conditions prevailed. There was little opposition or dissidence in the universities. It was actually the first time since 1941 that there was no organized form of activism in Iranian universities.”Footnote 9

By the war’s end, the new “reconstruction effort” was launched by President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. This involved a gradual but visible shift towards neoliberal policies and privatization. The population had increased dramatically, and with it during the 1990s the number of universities increased.Footnote 10 With the founding of private Islamic Azad University in 1982 and its expansion all over the country, the student population increased from 175,000 in 1978 to 1.3 million in 1997, half of them enrolled in state universities whose numbers had increased from twenty-six in 1978 to eighty-seven in 1997.Footnote 11 This force played a significant role in the electoral victory of reformist President Mohammad Khatami (in office 1997–2005).

The new policies of the postwar government, certainly a shift from the promises of the 1979 Revolution, revealed the fragmented nature of the OCU. A new generation of OCU members found the market-oriented policies of President Rafsanjani contrary to the social justice promises of 1979.Footnote 12 The state representatives in the universities remained fragmented and conflicted, and the gap was increased by the presidential victory of Khatami. At this time, the previous screening procedure attached to admissions (that investigated the moral and political backgrounds of the applicants in the 1980s) had been relaxed and a new generation of students was about to enter university.Footnote 13 The new admission requirements, now purely based on academic performance, allowed for a new generation of mostly urban students from middle-class, secular, and intellectually nourishing parents, some of them with leftist proclivities (that they tended to hide during the 1980s) but not exclusively so, to enter state universities. These future university students came from a common experience: not only were they “politicized” as high school students during the first Khatami era, they were now highly energized by such key signifiers as “freedom,” “dignity,” and “pluralism” within the reformist public discourse. They campaigned and voted for Khatami (with the suffrage age being fifteen at the time), hoping the reforms would bring about change.Footnote 14 This generation also became savvy internet users: in fact, blogging became so popular among Iranians that by 2008 Iran was home to about 60,000 blogs.Footnote 15

Similarly, the OCU went through changes. Many Muslim students within the Islamic Associations of different universities, particularly those from rural or humble backgrounds and thus sensitive to issues of social justice, had begun to create a distance between their objectives and the privatization trend within the economy. The Reformists also had a body of supportive students, congregating in the OCU, the most notable being Ali Afshari and Abdollah Momeni. In some universities, though, the OCU proved to be a hub for the students who had gone through the Reform era to emerge as leftists.

The Way to Students for Freedom and Equality

The origins of Daneshjuyan-e Azadikhah va Barabaritalab go back to the emergence of a new generation of leftist university students who had come of age during the Reform movement and presidency of Mohammad Khatami. These future activists entered a new university environment in which, due to the relaxed measures resulting from the Reformist government that led to growing diversity within the OCU ranks, unlike the past fifteen years or so, student activism outside those areas sanctioned by the state had become possible.

One can safely claim that the common denominator of leftist-leaning students in this generation was their belief that the Reformist government had failed as it could not deliver what it had set out to achieve—that is, to democratize society and challenge the dominance of the so-called conservative (osulgara) ruling elite whose objectives and moralistic measures could not be farther from the spirit of the post-revolutionary generation who, in the age of the internet and contrary to their rulers, valued freedom and self-expression. The reader must note that this was the generation that was expected (by the state) to propagate the state-sanctioned Shi‘i values. The turning point in the process that caused the students in question to turn to the Left was the student protest of July 1999 (not initiated or led by the leftist students) and its heavy-handed repression by the state: indeed, by all measures a historic event of greater import than the 16 Azar. “The ISAs and the OCU [had] been at the forefront of many demonstrations, including the massive 18 Tir (July 9) protests in 1999.”Footnote 16

Lasting six days, the July 1999 student protest, whose details have already been documented, was against the closure of reformist newspaper Salaam and in defense of freedom of speech.Footnote 17 The state’s brutal response to it, and the fact that the Reformist government could not stop the attack that was intentionally orchestrated by security forces in order to push back the university students’ pro-reform aspirations, marked the alienation of the students from the so-called reforms. The failure of reforms influenced the turn to the Left among the students.Footnote 18 This alienation became conclusive by 2003 when the University of Tehran student protest against public university privatization was suppressed, and Mostafa Mo‘in, then minister of science, research, and technology (and future presidential candidate) resigned over the affair.

Although these young leftists did not, by and large, look up to the experiences of their (repressed) past generation, many of them came from families with affinities to the pre-1988 leftist organizations.Footnote 19 Others found Marxism in universities, while a few were originally affiliated with the Association of Islamic Students. For instance, Said Habibi (nephew of Hassan Habibi, minister of science and higher education and justice minister under early governments in the Islamic Republic, and first deputy to the president under both Rafsanjani and Khatami), was a leading leftist student figure who came from the ranks of OCU. Habibi came from a religious background and later adopted Marxism. As such, the new Left’s emergence was owed, in part, to the OCU. The term “new Left” is used by SFE activists to distinguish their movement from the former communist and socialist parties. The very first activists of this generation, Habibi, Abed Tavancheh, Morteza Eslahchi, Yashar Qajar, and Majid Ashrafnezhad, were active with the OCU and Islamic Associations of their respective universities.Footnote 20 That being said, however, many others, in particular the activists who entered university in 2001–2, stood apart from the OCU, and in fact, at the University of Tehran, the leftists positioned themselves against the OCU dominated by pro-reform students.Footnote 21

During Khatami’s presidency, the publication industry proliferated, and “eventually there were more than five-thousand [newspapers and magazines] and they discussed subjects ranging from science and literature to politics.”Footnote 22 The universities were no exception. Student publications also flourished across campuses, and one reason for that was the stipends allocated to student publications by the Office of Cultural Programs in each campus.Footnote 23 In the rather relaxed environments of the post-1997 universities, students entering university in the early 2000s found it an ideal place for propagating their newly found leftist ideas, although not all received such funding. This is how many Marxist and leftist publications emerged on different campuses. These included: Puyan (Allameh Tabatabai University); Khak (Soil; University of Tehran); Daneshgah va Mardom (University and People; University of Tehran); Gavan (Astragalus; University of Tehran and Amir Kabir University).Footnote 24 To this list we may add: Arman-e Naw (New Ideal; University of Tehran), Eshterak (Sharing), Pishahang (Vanguard), Pishro (Vanguard; Sharif University of Technology), Aftabkaran (Sun-Planters), Akhgar (Spark), Galugah (Throat), as well as Talangor (Fling; University of Tehran), which had neo-conservative leanings.

While all these publications clearly advocated Marxist or socialist views, they were diverse in their focus: some were more radical and political, while others were more left-leaning social and literary publications). This reflects the diversity of the students that later called themselves Daneshjuyan-e Azadikhah va Barabaritalab. In other words, the SFE was not an ideologically, or even politically, unified group; it was an embodiment of a congregation of young leftist students with different views.

One of the first outward signs of the manifestation of the new generation of leftist students emerged in 2002 (1381) and in the student periodicals Daneshgah va Mardom (University and People) and Gavan (Astragalus), published by Faculty of Technology and Law students at the University of Tehran.Footnote 25 University and People (circulation 300) was possibly the first leftist university magazine after the Cultural Revolution. Published between February 2001 and September 2007, it was intended as a monthly magazine that published forty issues over six years and more of a literary periodical. Its editorial board included Aras Ahmadi and Parisa Nasrabadi,Footnote 26 and Roozbeh Safshekan joined later. The magazine held seminars on various issues and published the presentations in the magazine.Footnote 27 Seminar topics included Latin America, the US invasion of Iraq, and Confederation of Iranian Students-National Union (CISNU).Footnote 28 Among all the aforementioned leftist student publications at this time Khak (Soil) stood out; it began publication in March 2004 (Esfand 1382) with an editorial board that included Behruz Karimizadeh, Kaveh Abbasian, Kamran Akhshi, Shahu Rastegari, Vahid Valizadeh, and Amin Qazai. Behzad Baqeri, who was invited to join the Khak editorial board later in 2004 (around issues 4 and 5), recalls that the magazine was sold on book tables in different universities. In the University of Tehran alone it sold 300 copies. By 2006 and with issue 21 of Khak, its circulation reached 2,500. Its popularity, however, alerted the security forces. Baqeri notes that the magazine almost never used the subsidies provided by the Office of Cultural Programs for student publications. In any case, President Ahmadinejad (presidency: 2005–13) stopped it.Footnote 29 The pages of these publications contained unmistakably leftist articles: a quick survey reveals articles that range in topic from critique of capitalism and President Ahmadinejad’s “populism” and the failure of the Reformists in Iran, to issues pertaining to working class movements, the Russian revolution, imperialist incursions in Iraq, and theoretical issues pertaining to Marxism and socialism.

Indeed, the student seminars and invited lectures held by the publishers of the leftist magazines across campuses effectively served the purpose of nourishing the growing influence of the “new Left” at this time.Footnote 30 It is not surprising, then, that a number of key activists appeared around these student publications. These constituted the core leftist activists of about 70–100, while a larger number of students supported their activities, distributed the publications, and attended the rallies.Footnote 31 The new student leftist activists managed to call for commemorating major events on campuses, notably Student Day and International Women’s Day. As of 2002 (1381), leftist students appeared at these events and rallies with their own distinct signs calling for freedom, equality, and the congruence of the student movement with those of women and workers, and demanding democratic change.Footnote 32

Further political setbacks in elections for the reformists in the early-to-mid 2000s gave impetus for the formation of a more radical tendency within the New Left SM [social movement]. The core publication of this “Radical Left” was Khak (Soil), a joint venture of UT’s [University of Tehran’s] Faculty of Economics and the University of Art in 2003.Footnote 33

The new leftist students were diverse, and as such there was no student leader or hierarchical structure. Everybody had a specific responsibility, which was a response to the very real threat of security surveillance and repression: it was clear that in this headless group, no one was responsible for running it.Footnote 34 However, by 2003 the need for joint action was felt. Six publications (Khak, Gavan, Daneshgah va Mardom, Puyan, Aftabkaran, and Kar va Andisheh) and those associated with them, along with the Oral History of the Left Association (Anjoman-e Tarikh-e Shafahi-ye Chap), collaborated to create the Rosta (from the Persian verb rostan, to grow) group with the idea of establishing the first student organization. Rosta lasted for about a year and by 2005 it was no more.Footnote 35 But at the same time, the movement was being radicalized in its slogan, objectives, and rhetoric.

During these years, as well, the activists began launching their websites and weblogs as a way of reaching a wider constituency. The key weblogs included Daneshjuyan-e Azadikhah va Barabaritalab (Freedom-Seeking and Equality-Demanding Students) and Daneshjuyan-e Sosiyalist-e Politeknic (Polytechnic Socialist Students).Footnote 36 Khak also launched its website in September 2006 (Shahrivar 1385) and it ran until June 2007 (Khordad 1386) with some 1,100 visitors a month.Footnote 37 Khak published a total of twenty-five issues.Footnote 38

The SFE: Advent and Activities

By 2006, the leftist students in the universities had grown into a visible force. This is when the schism happened in the University of Tehran between the OCU and the leftist and Kurdish students over who to invite for the December 2006 Student Day (to be held on that particular year on Saturday 18 Azar 1385).Footnote 39 “Over time, Radical Left groups formed a nationwide network at a number of universities in 2006, calling itself…DAB [SFE].”Footnote 40 The SFE emerged through regular biweekly meetings of about 30–40 activists. To be precise, by December 2006, the radical Left (as SFE students called themselves prior to 2007), had grown into the second largest group able to bring out students for student rallies on the University of Tehran campus. Along with the radicalization of the leftist students, which led to the formation of SFE, as mentioned, the students felt the need to reach out to other movements. On 1 May 2006, leftist students participated in a rally organized by the Tehran Bus Drivers’ Union. On 8 March 2007, for the first time since 1979, International Women’s Day was held with the help of women activists. In fact, some female leftist students were also activists with various women’s movement campaigns, including the One Million Signature Campaign.Footnote 41 On 1 May of the same year, the students also celebrated Workers’ Day with the workers. During these months, Behruz Karimizadeh delivered some lessons from Das Kapital to the board of Tehran Bus Drivers’ Union.Footnote 42 It was not until November 2007 that the radical leftists called themselves Daneshjuyan-e Azadikhah va Barabaritalab in their leaflets,Footnote 43 in particular in their emblematic communiqué “University Is Not a Barrack!” (dated 7 December 2007). It is important to note that before these leftist students named their coalitional group as SFE, they called themselves the “radical Left.” The SFE solidly upheld two defining principles: first, to act distinctively from those groups representing the regime as well as the Reformists in universities, and second, to take a strong stance against foreign military intervention and economic sanctions (imperialism, monarchists, Mojahedin-e Khalq).Footnote 44 It should also be noted that at this time right-wing students on Iranian campuses advocated foreign intervention as a solution to the country’s unyielding autocracy. These principles were outlined in an influential editorial of Khak (No. 25, April 2007), written by Karimizadeh and titled “The Key Features of Radical Left.” It highlighted the agency of the proletariat and an “emphasis on movements from below and social radicalism,” as it rejected instrumental and reformist approaches to movements (such as the One Million Signature Campaign) and viewed the radical leftist student movement as part of an emerging leftist movement in the country.Footnote 45 In a way, this article constituted the manifesto of the future SFE. “By 2007, the SFE became dominant within the New Left, being active and influential on university.”Footnote 46

But there is more than meets the eye in the formation of the SFE: throughout their struggles, the radical leftists gradually leaned toward the ideas of Mansoor Hekmat, the late exile theorist of the Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WCPI). This they owe to the development of the internet under President Khatami, who removed previous restrictions on the growth of the industry. Behzad Baqeri, who was Khak editor at some point, recollects that before the internet, he had access to some old materials of Marxist groups like the Tudeh Party, People’s Fadaiyan, or Rah-e Kargar (Workers’ Path). The obsolete ideas of the old Marxists, he asserts, were not attractive to a young Marxist in 2001. The internet allowed him to search for the ideas he could relate to and he found Hekmat: “His literature was modern, and did not smack of Marxism-Leninism or Maoism or the Eastern Bloc,” he avers. Hekmat’s theoretical positions against the Islamic Republic stood out as he defended modern values and culture and personal and political freedoms. Within the SFE, in general, there was a tendency toward Hekmat’s ideas.Footnote 47 In the eyes of these activists, Hekmat’s appeal lay in his rejecting the “traditional Left” (Tudeh Party or Fadaiyan) that he called “populist socialism” and knowledge of western Marxism. Hekmat had announced the failure of the Reformists, arguing that as a national bourgeoisie, the Reformists could not be democratic.Footnote 48 Other SFE activists confirm similar sentiments.Footnote 49

Mansoor Hekmat (Zhubin Razani; 1951–2002) was a Marxist who co-founded (with Hamid Taqvài) in December 1978 Ettehad-e Mobarezan-e Komonist (Union of Communist Militants; UCM) and wrote “Iranian Revolution and the Role of the Proletariat” (1978) and “The Myth of National, Progressive Bourgeoisie” (1979). Against the backdrop of populist Marxism, championed by the People’s Fadai Guerrillas, the UCM advocated a strictly proletarian and socialist strategy.Footnote 50 This position was based on the (inapplicable) theoretical assumption that the key conflict in Iranian society is the one between labor and capital (which actually applies, in Marxist theory, to advanced capitalism, and not to yjr capitalist periphery) instead of the then presumed conflict between the people and imperialism advocated by the Fadaiyan, among others. In 1983, the UCM joined Komala (Sazman-e Zahmatkeshan-e Kurdistan-e Iran; Organization of Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan) and created the Iranian Communist Party.Footnote 51 In 1991, Hekmat and his followers, known as worker-communists, split from the party and founded WCPI. In 2004 (after Hekmat’s death), a number of key members of WCPI split from the party and founded the Worker-Communist Party of Iran-Hekmatist (WCPI-H). Theoretically, WCPI-H is a relic of 1978, albeit with more liberal and modern views regarding social issues, when some activists reverted to classical Marxism-Leninism in reaction to the New Communist Movement (embodied by the People’s Fadai Guerrillas) and its national liberation model of socialist revolution. This is analytically important because it shows that the few SFE activists that contacted the WCPI-H had chosen a party with a radical and modern rhetoric but old ideology, instead of searching for new sources of the Left in the post-communist era.

The influence of Hekmat’s ideas on the SFE’s radical leftism soon became apparent. In early 2007, some leftist activists made a departure from the growing radical views. Pages of Khak reflected radical views not entirely applicable to the realities of Iranian society at the time. For instance, Mehdi Geraylu’s rejection of populism clearly shows Hekmatist influence.Footnote 52 Moreover, activists around Khak began to contact WCPI-H outside the country. Interestingly, recalls Baqeri, WCPI-H did not give anything to the SFE; in fact, it was the SFE that actually fed them with information. Of all SFE members, about 30–40 regarded themselves Hekmatists but they were not WCPI-H members.Footnote 53 Iranian security was closely monitoring the leftist student activists and was alarmed by these developments. But then the unthinkable happened: key Khak activists began having organizational contacts with the WCPI-H.Footnote 54 Karimizadeh and Ali Kanturi were allegedly recruited by the Kurdistan committee of WCPI-H to participate in kidnapping the son of a capitalist in Kurdistan for ransom, along with three members of WCPI-H (no further information is available).Footnote 55 The alleged affair coincided with Iranian security’s crackdown on the SFE, leading to mass arrests.Footnote 56 In any case, a few key activists contacting a subversive émigré group compromised the precarious position of leftists students: instead of thinking of the long-term interests of students and trying to create groundwork for a sustainable leftist student organization that would take initiatives in regard to the concrete demands of students and their connection with other democratic movements, a few radical leftists had succumbed to adventurism, damaging the precarious growth of the Left on Iranian campuses.Footnote 57

The arrests came around the 16 Azar (7 December) demonstrations of 2007. In order to avoid their action to overlap with that of the OCU and thus cause confusion, Daneshjuyan-e Azadikhah va Barabaritalab decided to held its event on 4 December in University of Tehran with its unique red banners and the key slogan of “University Is Not A Barrack!” Following the rally, Mehdi Geraylu, Said Habibi, Victoria Jamshidi, Behrooz Karimizadeh, Peyman Piran, and dozens of others were arrested during the first wave of arrests. The second wave came a month later with a dozen arrested. In total, some thirty SFE activists in Tehran and another twenty in other cities were arrested.Footnote 58 About thirty activists were taken to Ward 209 (under Ministry of Intelligence) in Evin prison.Footnote 59 They were pressured to confess their connections with the subversive group (WCPI-H) abroad. The interrogators used the alleged Kurdistan affair to create distrust among SFE arrestees.Footnote 60 A team of four conducted long interrogations that lasted from 7 am to 10 pm.Footnote 61 The interrogators put the students under a lot of psychological pressure.Footnote 62 The objective was to force them into videotaped confessions.Footnote 63 The activists eventually received various prison terms; they were all released by 2009.Footnote 64

Upon release, some activists left the country, while others stayed and tried to continue with their lives. A few decided to stay and create new study circles but harassment and arrests also forced them out of the country. Self-imposed exile caused SFE activists to reflect and debate their past through the internet. It is here that the opportunistic approach of WCPI-H was flagged by former SFE activists.Footnote 65 In exile, Qazai, Abbasian, Baqeri, Karimizadeh, Hamed Kiai, and Nasim Roshanai published a new series of Khak between January 2011 to April 2012, a total of seven issues. The publication was closed due to conflicts within the editorial board.Footnote 66 At this time key SFE activists Abbasian and Karimizadeh also announced their departure from the SFE. Most SFE activists returned to university in Europe, Australia, and North America, and continued with their intellectual lives.

Conclusions

The new and radical leftists on Iranian campuses that culminated in the SFE in the mid-2000s marked the first serious attempt at reviving the leftist student movement in Iranian universities (and by the same token, the Left) after the heavy-handed repression of the post-revolutionary leftist and other activists in the 1980s. Regardless of its at times questionable actions, the SFE, as a culmination of leftist student movement, must be credited for being a “homegrown” leftist, democratic movement—homegrown in the sense that these students did not emerge as student affiliates of political parties in exile, and the later identification with the WCPI-H by some key activists was indeed an outcome of their search for new sources of Marxist ideas that they deemed related to their experiences. There is no doubt that many of the leftists in universities came from leftist families.Footnote 67 However, the SFE and its constitutive student circles, grouped around publications, must be credited for bringing the leftist social discourse back to Iran after a long hiatus.

What was damaging for the SFE was indeed its connection with WCPI-H, an expatriate party that exploited the student movement for its aggrandizing propaganda about its influence within the country.Footnote 68 I call this damaging not because the SFE was eventually raided due to the connection of a few activists with WCPI-H; more fundamentally, by “damaging” I mean that the SFE’s potential for growing at its own pace in response to its situation—as it had reached out to the women’s and workers movements and opposed foreign intervention and sanctions, all noble intentions and ideas—was undermined and aborted by some members reaching out to a sclerotic expatriate party, whose key ideological dogma, unfit for the Iranian reality, was as old as the 1979 Revolution and not fit for the post-communist world, in order to express their quest for ultra-radicalism. In their search for theories that would provide them with answers to their complex conditions, instead of continued search and study, which would require perceiving of Daneshjuyan-e Azadikhah va Barabaritalab as a prolonged project (notwithstanding the plans of security apparatus to repress them), some members of Students for Freedom and Equality took the already tested and failed path of connecting to a Marxist group in exile. Because the SFE had declared itself to embody a “new Left,” the eventual turn of some members to the “old Left” was rather surprising.

The new leftist students, mesmerized by the increasingly radical leftist discourse they had adopted, could not see the student movement and thus their activism in a sustainable and enduring way, in spite of the fact that they were totally capable of doing so, thanks to their organizational skills and potential for cultural impact. In other words, the new leftist students did not have an organic relationship with the university.Footnote 69 Without a doubt, the SFE must be commended for reaching out to the growing women’s and workers’ movements, and it must be credited for a counter-hegemonic movement against the dominant pro-state discourses on university campuses, for reflecting the society’s plights within post-secondary institutions, and for creating a new tradition of leftist student activism that still continues to this day, albeit in different ways. The SFE also experimented with a “frontal” and democratic model of activism—a rare tendency not only within the Iranian Left but also within Iranian politics in general (aside from the National Front and the short-lived post-revolutionary National Democratic Front). Interestingly, the only other leftist organization that functioned (for over a decade) on a frontal and pluralist platform was CISNU. As Afshin Matin-Asgari notes, “Despite its shortcomings, the CISNU experience was considerably more democratic and pluralistic than the authoritarian and sectarian norm of Iranian politics.”Footnote 70 The SFE was too short-lived and “experimental” in approach to have enacted a sophisticated model of democratic governance, but it certainly did function on the principle that recognized internal pluralism. Yet, instead of cultivating these social relations and, more importantly, focusing on student grievances (such as tuitions, dormitory, curriculum, transportation) that would have caused the “new Left” to permeate student life in a lived fashion and thus emerge as an organic student body with enduring legacy, its core activists’ wholesale rejection of the “reformist approach” (of the women’s movement, for instance)—which reflects their bitter disillusionment with the Reform movement inaugurated by President Khatami, a movement to which ironically SFE owes its existence—pushed them towards an unnecessary clash with the state, a direction they could have avoided, at least in the way the events unfolded. Radicalism hurt the movement beyond imagination. But in the end, it was the heavy-handed repression by the state that spelled the SFE’s demise.Footnote 71 Had it not been for their repression, history might have given them a chance to re-envision their movement and bypass their youthful, unsustainable, and uncalled-for radicalism.

The SFE had a short lifespan in universities, but after its repression the Left did not leave campuses; on the contrary, it actually grew back stronger. But its return is another story, one of yet a newer generation of activists who had more objective views about the potentials and limitations of the student movement, realistic understanding of activism in Iran, and the need to reconstruct the movement theoretically and practically—and with a lot more patience.

Footnotes

The author thanks Sara Naderi for her assistance with the research. Thanks also to Roozbeh Safshekan and Sara Naderi for providing feedback on an earlier version of this paper.

1 Matin-Asgari, Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah.

2 Mahdi, “The Student Movement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 8.

3 Vahabzadeh, “Farhang-e Enquelabi,” 162.

4 Quoted in Vahabzadeh, “Farhang-e Enquelabi,” 162.

5 Mahdi, “The Student Movement,” 8. See also Safshekan, “An Unfinished Odyssey,” 244–5; Rezamand, “Justice Interrupted,” 135–6.

6 Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 292.

7 Mahdi, “The Student Movement,” 14; Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 292.

8 Mahdi, “The Student Movement,” 10.

9 Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 292–3.

10 Mahdi, “The Student Movement,” 14.

11 Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 287.

12 Ibid., 293; Safshekan, “An Unfinished Odyssey,” 248.

13 See Mahdi, “The Student Movement,” 14–15.

14 Afshari and Underwood, “Iran’s Resilient Civil Society,” 81. The voting age was changed to eighteen in 2007 (ibid.).

15 Kelly and Etling, Mapping Iran's Online Public, 2.

16 Afshari and Underwood, “Iran’s Resilient Civil Society,” 91.

17 Mahdi, “The Student Movement,” 17–21; Mashayekhi, “The Revival of the Student Movement,” 284–5.

18 Momeni, “Bar ma cheh gozasht?”

19 Baqeri, interview with author.

20 Tavancheh, “Daneshjuyan-e chapgara.”

21 Safshekan, interview with author.

22 Afshari and Underwood, “Iran’s Resilient Civil Society,” 87–8.

23 Ibid., 87.

24 Ranjbaran, Barresi-ye Jarryan-e Marksism-e Daneshjui dar Iran, 75. This source must be consulted with caution: it appears to be a graduate thesis, and a biased one, whose target audience seems to be the security apparatus of the country. It contains some unfounded claims and distorted and incorrect information.

25 Momeni, “Bar ma cheh gozasht?”

26 “Tarikhcheh-ye mokhtasar-e Daneshgah va Mardom.”

27 Safshekan, interview with author.

28 Baqeri, interview with author.

29 Baqeri, interview with author.

30 Momeni, “Bar ma cheh gozasht?”

31 Baqeri, interview with author.

32 Momeni, “Bar ma cheh gozasht?”

33 Safshekan, “An Unfinished Odyssey,” 249.

34 Baqeri, interview with author.

35 Safshekan, interview with author.

36 Ranjbaran, Barresi-ye Jarryan-e Marksism-e Daneshjui dar Iran, 101–5.

37 Ranjbaran, Barresi-ye Jarryan-e Marksism-e Daneshjui dar Iran, 98.

38 Baqeri, interview with author.

39 Ibid.

40 Safshekan, “An Unfinished Odyssey,” 250.

41 Mohammadi, interview with author.

42 Baqeri, interview with author. In general, since the Reform era, leftist intellectuals have often been invited by union leaders to attend their meetings and deliver lectures to workers and board members. Karimizadeh’s lessons should be seen in this context.

43 Pourabdollah, interview with author.

44 Momeni, “Bar ma cheh gozasht?”

45 Karimizadeh, “Khotut-e omdeh-ye,” 1.

46 Safshekan, “An Unfinished Odyssey,” 250.

47 Baqeri, interview with author.

48 Pourabdollah, interview with author.

49 Safshekan, interview with author.

50 See Mansoor Hekmat website, available at: http://www.m-hekmat.com/ (accessed February 18, 2019) and Hekmat Archives, available at: http://hekmat.public-archive.net/ (accessed February 18, 2019).

51 See Behrooz, Rebels with a Cause, 131–2.

52 Geraylu, “Ritm-e taslim-e dowlat-e popolisti.” This article was originally published in Khak.

53 Baqeri, interview with author.

54 Safshekan, interview with author.

55 Karimizadeh expressly rejects these allegations in a recent interview with Radio Hambastegi in Sweden, available at: http://radiohambastegi.se/sounds/b.karimizade_mostanadsokhte190126.mp3?fbclid=IwAR14dCvfidKvN3QOJGXtPiFz-RQcmFfYNphID-JZLblnYecbidSpk5×0hSg (accessed March 2, 2019).

56 Baqeri, interview with author. According to Baqeri, a WCPI-H member was arrested in this case and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.

57 Momeni, “Bar ma cheh gozasht?”

58 Safshekan, interview with author.

59 Baqeri, interview with author.

60 Pourabdollah, interview with author.

61 Baqeri, interview with author.

62 “Gozareshi az raftar-e Vezarat-e Ettela’at.”

63 The forced confessions of Karimizadeh have recently been released by intelligence authorities on the internet. See: shorturl.at/nqORS (accessed October 27, 2020).

64 Pourabdollah, interview with author.

65 Khaki, “Daneshjuyan-e Azadikhah.”

66 Baqeri, interview with author.

67 Ibid.

68 Safshekan, interview with author.

69 Baqeri, interview with author.

70 Matin-Asgari, Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah, 163.

71 See Baqeri’s remarks in “Chap-e daneshjui.”

References

Afshari, Ali, and Graham Underwood, H.. “Iran’s Resilient Civil Society: The Student Movement’s Struggle.” Journal of Democracy 18, no. 4 (2007): 8094.Google Scholar
Baqeri, Behzad. “Chap-e daneshjui: Goftoguy Eshterak ba haft tan az daneshjuyan” [The student Left: Eshterak’s interview with seven students]. Ofoq-e Rowshan, November 25, 2009. http://www.ofros.com/mosahebe/eshterak_mosahebeha.htm (accessed February 19, 2019)Google Scholar
Baqeri, Behzad. Skype interview with author, October 4, 2013.Google Scholar
Behrooz, Maziar. Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran. London: I.B. Tauris, 1999.Google Scholar
Geraylu, Mehdi. “Ritm-e taslim-e dowlat-e popolisti” [The rhythm of stabilizing a populist government], January 7, 2007. http://16azar1385.blogspot.ca/2007/01/blog-post_6720.html (accessed February 12, 2019).Google Scholar
“Gozareshi az rafter-e Vezarat-e Ettela’at ba daneshjuyan-e zendani-ye teyf-e chap” [A report of Ministry of Information’s treatment of leftist students]. Khabarnameh, March 15, 2008). https://bit.ly/2EkcEp8 (accessed February 19, 2019).Google Scholar
Karimizadeh, Behruz. “Khotut-e omdeh-ye chap-r radical” [The key features of radical left]. Khak 25 (2007): 1.Google Scholar
Kelly, John, and Etling, Bruce. Mapping Iran's Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian Blogosphere. Cambridge, MA: Berkman Center Research Publication, 2008. https://cyber.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/Kelly&Etling_Mapping_Irans_Online_Public_2008.pdf (accessed March 2, 2019).Google Scholar
Khaki, Hamed. “Daneshjuyan-e Azadikhah va Barabaritalab hanuz vojud darand” [Freedom-seeking and equality-demanding students are still here]. Kargaran-e Iran, April 12, 2009. http://www.kargaran-iran.com/Maqale/2009/04/post_874.html (accessed April 26, 2013).Google Scholar
Mahdi, Ali Akbar. “The Student Movement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis 15, no. 2 (1999): 532.Google Scholar
Mashayekhi, Mehrdad. “The Revival of the Student Movement in Post-Revolutionary Iran.” International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 15, no. 2 (2001): 283313.Google Scholar
Matin-Asgari, Afshin. Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2002.Google Scholar
Mohammadi, Rozhin. Skype interview with author, June 10, 2013.Google Scholar
Momeni, Mohsen. “Bar ma cheh gozasht? Tarikh-e kutahi az zayesh-e chap-e daneshjui” [What happened to us? A short history of the birth of student Left]. Ashti, November 30, 2009. http://www.ashti.se/nov09/09-11-30d.htm (accessed February 12, 2019).Google Scholar
Pourabdollah, Mohammad. Skype interview with author, June 7, 2013.Google Scholar
Ranjbaran, Davoud. Barresi-ye Jaryan-e Marksism-e Daneshjui dar Iran [Review of Iranian University Students’ Marxist Group]. Tehran: SAT, 1388.Google Scholar
Rezamand, Ardalan. “Justice Interrupted: The University and the Imam.” In Iran’s Struggles for Social Justice: Economics, Agency, Justice, Activism, ed. Vahabzadeh, P., 127–44. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.Google Scholar
Safshekan, Roozbeh. Interview with author. Edmonton, April 23, 2013.Google Scholar
Safshekan, Roozbeh. “An Unfinished Odyssey: The Iranian Student Movement’s Struggles for Social Justice.” In Iran’s Struggles for Social Justice: Economics, Agency, Justice, Activism, ed. Vahabzadeh, P., 237–54. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“Tarikhcheh-ye mokhtasar-e Daneshgah va Mardom” [A short history of University and People]. Daneshgah va Mardom, March 6, 2005. https://dvmardom.blogspot.com/2005/03/blog-post.html (accessed February 19, 2019).Google Scholar
Tavancheh, Abed. “Daneshjuyan-e chapgara va jonbesh-e sabz” [Leftist students and the Green Movement]. Gooya News, June 22, 2010. https://news.gooya.com/politics/archives/2010/06/106764.php (accessed February 12, 2019).Google Scholar
Vahabzadeh, Peyman. “Farhang-e Enqelabi va Enqelab-e Farhangi” (Revolutionary culture and Cultural Revolution). Arash 104 (2010): 162–4.Google Scholar