Ana Russell-Omaljev’s book, based on her PhD thesis, examines the post-Milošević Serbian political and cultural elites and their role in identity formation. From the outset, the author states that her intention is not to provide yet another book about the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Be that as it may, its ghost cannot but surface on every page of the book. After all, Russell-Omaljev's primary objective is to examine competing narratives appropriated by Serbian intellectuals and other public figures in their efforts to analyze, make sense of, or justify Serbian responsibility for the atrocities committed during the Yugoslav wars of dissolution. The title of the book itself, Divided We Stand, alludes to a post-Milošević period fueled by two radically opposed interpretations of what the new Serbian identity should or might look like. It can tentatively and somewhat artificially be used to define the two prevailing monikers, that of the “the other,” “cosmopolitan,” “rootless,” “treacherous,” pro-European Serbia versus “the first,” “conservative,” “nationalist,” anti-European, pro-Russian Serbia. However, how accurate are those monikers and how successful is Russell-Omaljev in her discourse analysis of those competing narratives?
The book is divided into six chapters. The first chapter provides a methodological and conceptual foundation for the study itself. The second chapter articulates, particularly for a reader without much knowledge of the region, the Serbian political and historical context in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Together, these chapters offer the necessary framework and grounding for the remainder of the book. In the subsequent four chapters, the author identifies and interprets the narrative mechanisms through which Serbian political and cultural elites reimagine a new Serbian identity within a broader European context. Her analysis draws from a wide range of sources, including the writings by prominent Serbian academics, scholars, publicists and journalists appearing in various political monographs, weekly magazines, dailies and online media texts. Here, one can only applaud Russell-Omaljev for her careful choice of authors and texts that she identifies as belonging to Other or First Serbia. One can say that Russell-Omaljev has left no stone unturned in examining the nuances between, but also within, those two discourses that attempt to articulate “the right” role for and position of Serbia in Europe. She also provides an in-depth analysis of the significant texts being published by the authors associated with Peščanik (Hourglass) and Nova Srpska Politička Misao (New Serbian Political Thought), the two journals that are usually perceived by the Serbian public as the representatives of Other and First Serbia.
I found the title of the first chapter somewhat misleading—“Theory and Method.” Russell-Omaljev very quickly glosses over her uses of the discourse and self/other analysis. Instead, the chapter is more about familiarizing the reader with some of the major figures in the debates between two Serbias, along with identifying central themes discussed in the remainder of the book. Her interpretation of Foucault, on the one side, and works by critical international scholars (Waever, Hansen, Der Derian, Shapiro, Neumann), on the other, is an example of the succinct overview of discourse and the self/other analysis that allows the reader to follow the arguments that Russell-Omaljev skillfully weaves into later empirical chapters. Perhaps, the most significant shortcoming in Russell-Omaljev’s approach is an overambitious attempt to review the work of not only intellectuals and other public figures but also principal political actors as representatives of the two Serbias. To a certain extent, such exhaustive description at times detracts from the book’s central arguments.
The description of leading Serbian politicians in the two camps never adequately addresses the extent to which the intellectual discourses of two Serbias are influencing major political leaders in their decision-making or public speeches. Russell-Omaljev recognizes that elements of both discourses are found in the speeches and political decisions of the dominant Serbian politicians (for example, the former and the current Presidents of Serbia, Vojislav Koštunica, Boris Tadić and Aleksandar Vučić). However, she does not adequately address the extent to which their decisions reflect either genuinely held beliefs and opposing images of a post-Milošević’s Serbia or, rather, the regional and international contingencies surrounding the country (the question of responsibility for the Yugoslav wars, the EU accession, and the recognition of Kosovo as an independent state). This leads to another critical question, particularly for those relying on the discourse analysis: what, indeed, is the influence of intellectual discourses of two Serbias on the Serbian public? Moreover, how important are the communications mediums (the print media, TV, internet, history textbooks) in fostering a particular civic or ethnic image that emerges as relatively dominant in the eyes of the Serbian public? Some of these questions are touched upon in the book, but in a rather cursory fashion where a more thorough analysis is warranted.
My critique does not diminish in any way the excellent analysis that Russell-Omaljev provides in her depictions of the contested visions of Serbian national identity. In particular, her emphasis on the fluidity of Serbian national categories currently in circulation along with nuanced description within each of the Serbian discourses is the strength of the book—she aptly avoids presenting a single, unifying Serbian national identity. Instead, the passionate debates over the symbolic interpretations of the Serbian identity are the reflection of the conditions of liminality in which the Serbian state and society find itself in the aftermath of Milošević. In other words, the author has shown that the imagery of both Serbias share a commonality. Even though they offer radically different images, they are both examples of essentializing discourses that represent Serbia as static and monolithic. The book ultimately reveals that the choice between two Serbias is a false one. In Russell-Omaljev’s own words, “[I]t is a choice between absorption of modernity presented as alien by Other Serbia and return to the simulated authenticity of (ethnic and religious) origins as seen by First Serbia (240).”Also, her last two chapters on the competing interpretations of the Serbian responsibility for the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo, as well as the so-called Serbian “auto-chauvinism” debate, are a must read for those wanting to find their way around those complex topics that have dominated Serbia for the past twenty years.
Overall, Russell-Omaljev’s book represents a very reliable introduction to the symbolic interpretations of political and cultural identity debates in Serbia. As such, it will be of particular interest to those new to Western Balkans studies. Equally important, as the author herself emphasizes, the “acerbic debates over national identity and the political misuse of history are of course not a peculiarly Serbian phenomenon (240).” Thus, the book should be on the reading list of all those engaged in broader questions of identity formation in the context of post-conflict development.
