The concept of reasonableness has occupied a prominent place in the
history of liberal thought. Indeed, it has been argued that “public
reasonableness is at the centre of liberalism” (Moore, 1996: 167; see also, for example, Macedo, 2000). Such a claim is especially true with
respect to the conception of political liberalism promoted by John Rawls.
References to “reasonable people,” “reasonable
doctrines,” “reasonable pluralism,” “reasonable
disagreement,” and a host of other terms that use
“reasonable” as an adjective abound in Rawls's argument.
More importantly, the tangible significance of reasonableness is evident
even when such terms are absent; the central role it plays in Rawls's
project is, perhaps, best exemplified by the fact that it serves as the
fundamental criterion for judging the acceptability and legitimacy of the
public conception of justice1
As does Rawls,
I will use the terms public conception and political
conception interchangeably (for example, 1985; 1993; 1996).
and all associated
“political” claims and decisions—those that place
demands upon all citizens of the polity. The consequences of such a
position and, more generally, Rawls's understanding of the concept of
reasonableness, are significant and manifest themselves in a number of
ways. In particular, the viability of Rawls's venture is rendered
dependent upon the reasonableness of both the public conception of justice
and the individuals who must live under its constraints.
Not surprisingly, Rawls's reliance on reasonableness, especially
as a mechanism for regulating and adjudicating disputes concerning matters
of political justice, and his related claims and expectations regarding
individual behaviour generate a number of potential difficulties for his
argument. Perhaps most noteworthy and problematic in this respect is the
requirement that individuals freely, willingly and reliably support his
conception of public reasonableness and adhere to its demands. According
to Rawls, only if individuals do so is it possible to secure and sustain
the conditions needed to establish and preserve a genuinely just and
stable—in Rawlsian terms, well-ordered—liberal
democracy. Rawls does not believe that such a demand poses a significant
threat to the viability of his argument. He suggests that all
“reasonable” individuals can reasonably be expected to support
his conception of public reasonableness and defer to its requirements
voluntarily and typically when addressing questions of public import.
However, for a number of reasons, Rawls's conclusions regarding
the extent to which it is realistic to presume the reasonableness both of
individuals and their behaviour seem, at minimum, overly optimistic.
Insofar as such is the case, the validity and viability of his
conception2
Unless specified otherwise, all
references to Rawls's “conception” refer to his
conception of political liberalism.
are brought into question.
Moreover, even if one accepts Rawls's claims, problems remain. The
primary task of this essay is to identify and explain a number of concerns
that render suspect the plausibility of Rawls's conclusions regarding
the reasonableness of individuals and, by extension, the ability of his
conception to create the conditions he contends are necessary to establish
and sustain a just and stable liberal democracy. Prior to doing so, it
will be useful to recount Rawls's understanding of the proper
character of reasonableness and its role in securing a well-ordered
polity. Completing such a review will make available certain information
essential to both gaining a clear appreciation of the basis for the
concerns noted and assessing the validity and significance of those
concerns.
Accordingly, I shall begin by providing a brief description of
Rawls's understanding of the nature and function of reasonableness
and then proceed to present a number of concerns related to his argument.
In concluding, it will be suggested that the only way one can be
assured—to the extent humanly possible—of generating the
conditions Rawls seeks is to adopt a governance framework that publicly
supports and protects the principles embodied in his conception of
reasonableness, rather than relying upon the reasonableness of individuals
to secure and nourish the required environment. In other words, achieving
and sustaining the type of society that Rawls desires necessitates that
the political conception of justice embrace a more
“perfectionist” stance with respect to the legislated limits
of public reason(ableness).3
The principal
point here is that, contra Rawls, the “limits of public
reason” should be “limits of law or statute,” rather
than merely “limits we honour when we honour … the ideal of
democratic citizens trying to conduct their political affairs on terms
supported by public values that we might reasonably expect others to
endorse [voluntarily]” (Rawls,
1996: 253).
Rawlsian Reasonableness
Rawls identifies “reasonable” persons as those who seek
“a social world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with
others on terms all can accept” (1996: 50;
see also, for example, 2001: 6–7). Such
terms are those that all reasonable individuals can support voluntarily
and reliably without having to compromise adherence to their respective
fundamental (which is to say, non-negotiable) beliefs. More
specifically,
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and
equal in a system of social cooperation over generations, they are
prepared to offer one another fair terms of social cooperation (defined by
principles and ideals) and they agree to act on those terms, even at the
cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided that others
also accept those terms. (Rawls, 1996: xliv; see
also 2001: 6–7)
Reasonable citizens will understand that the achievement of the social
world they seek requires that they treat their fellow citizens in a
“reasonable” manner, which necessitates, among other things,
that they recognize the right of others to develop, pursue and (hopefully)
realize their own visions of the good life, and consider how their actions
might affect that right (Rawls, 1996: 49n1).
Satisfying such a requirement in contemporary liberal democracies demands
that individuals freely and willingly accept the ineliminable presence and
public accommodation of (reasonable) views with which they
disagree—in essence, the facts of reasonable pluralism and
reasonable disagreement—and voluntarily refrain from attempting to
use state power to enforce adherence to the dictates of a single
comprehensive doctrine,4
A comprehensive
doctrine is one that “applies to all subjects and covers all values
[political and nonpolitical]” (Rawls,
2001: 14; see also Rawls, 1996:
xxxviiin4)—it is “a moral ideal to govern all of life”
(Rawls, 1985: 245). Rawls offers utilitarianism,
perfectionism, intuitionism, the theories of John Stuart Mill and Kant,
and the belief systems associated with most organized religions, as
examples of “fully comprehensive” doctrines (1996: 13, 175; see also 2001: 14, 198).
or worldview.
Reasonableness also requires that citizens recognize and voluntarily
accept what Rawls labels the burdens of judgment, “the many
obstacles to the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of
reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life” (2001: 35). These obstacles include 1) the presence of
conflicting and complex evidence that is difficult to assess and evaluate;
2) reasonable disagreement about the primacy of agreed-upon considerations
which, in turn, may generate different judgments; 3) the unavoidable need
to rely to some extent on judgment and interpretation when considering
matters about which reasonable people might disagree; 4) an inevitable
divergence of judgments “on many if not most cases of significant
complexity”; and 5) the presence of different types of normative
considerations that exert varying degrees of influence “on both
sides of a question,” thereby making an “overall”
evaluation of the related case very difficult (Rawls,
2001: 35–36). Reasonable individuals will acknowledge that
the burdens of judgment apply equally to all citizens, and freely and
willingly accept the consequences of such a condition (Rawls, 2001: 197).
Essentially, then, reasonable citizens will believe that
reasonableness must be the “final court of appeal” in relation
to decisions concerning matters of political justice; reasonableness must
be the standard used to judge the validity of all “public”
claims—those that place demands upon all citizens of the polity.
Only by assigning such a primacy to reasonableness can one adequately
respect the human dignity and moral equality of one's fellow
citizens. To employ a different standard, for example, a single
understanding of the “truth,” would be to disrespect and
degrade others' “reasonable” beliefs, and thereby
effectively preclude the achievement of a society in which all citizens
are able to “cooperate with others on terms all can
accept”—the very foundation of a well-ordered liberal
democracy.
It is important to note that in assigning primacy to reasonableness
citizens are not espousing an indifference or skepticism toward the truth
of moral judgments (for example, Rawls, 2001:
36). Rather, they are acknowledging the importance of such matters, but
realize that 1) “while people can recognize everyone else's
comprehensive views as reasonable, they cannot recognize them all as
true”; 2) “there is no shared public basis to distinguish the
true beliefs from the false”; and 3) it is impossible to obtain a
“public” (which is to say, consensual) solution for such
questions (Rawls, 1996: 128). “Certain
truths, it may be said, concern things so important that differences about
them have to be fought out, even should this mean civil war” (Rawls, 1996: 151). Recognizing these facts,
“reasonable” citizens freely and willingly refrain from
publicly passing judgment as to the truth or falsity of moral claims in
order to avoid such conflict and provide the basis for public agreement
(an overlapping consensus5
Simply
put, an overlapping consensus is a free and willing agreement among the
adherents of the various comprehensive doctrines that are likely
to survive in a just modern constitutional democracy (Rawls, 1996: 15; see also 2001: 32). An overlap-ping consensus on a political
conception of justice means that despite the inevitable presence of a
plurality of conflicting and irreconcilable views, citizens of a
well-ordered society are able to agree on a single conception of justice
to regulate society's main political and social
institutions—its basic structure (Rawls,
2001: 4, 7–8).
) on a single conception of
justice—in other words, they act in accordance with the
precept
of avoidance. Such an approach is not, Rawls emphasizes, akin to
exhibiting indifference or skepticism toward the truth of moral
judgments.
Also noteworthy is the fact that, unlike many of his predecessors,
Rawls differentiates between “the reasonable” and “the
rational,” suggesting that they are “two distinct and
independent” ideas and “there is no thought of deriving one
from the other” (1996: 51; see also, for
example, 2001: 6–7). For Rawls, the
“rational” refers to “a single, unified agent (either an
individual or corporate person),” and concerns how the ends and
interests of that agent are adopted and affirmed, how they are given
priority, and the choice of means used to pursue them (1996: 50). In the case of the latter activity, the
rational is guided by familiar principles such as
“adopt[ing] the most effective means to ends, or …
select[ing] the more probable alternative, other things
equal” (Rawls, 1996: 50; see also 2001: 87). In essence, people act rationally when they
use their “powers of judgment and deliberation in seeking ends and
interests peculiarly … [their] own” (Rawls, 1996: 50)—that is, when they develop and
pursue a particular conception of the good intelligently.6
The term intelligently has been
italicized to emphasize that people act rationally not merely by pursuing
their particular ends and interests, but by doing so in an intelligent
manner. As Rawls notes: “knowing that people are rational we do not
know the ends they will pursue, only that they will pursue them
intelligently” (1996: 49n1).
Importantly, according to Rawls, rational agents need not be limited to
means-end reasoning: “they may balance final ends by their
significance for their plan of life as a whole, and by how well these ends
cohere with and complement one another” (
1996: 51; see also 56). Nor need it always be the case
that rational agents act solely in a self-interested manner; they may
pursue interests the realization of which are of benefit not to themselves
but to others—for example, relatives, friends, community, country
(
Rawls, 1996: 51). Indeed, Rawls contends that
“[r]ational agents approach being psychopathic when their
interests are solely in benefits to themselves” (
1996: 51). Accordingly, “[t]he
disposition to be reasonable is neither derived from nor opposed to the
rational but it is incompatible with [pure] egoism” (
Rawls, 1996: 49n1).
Having declared the difference between reasonableness and rationality,
Rawls further adds that, within “the fundamental idea of society as
a fair system of social cooperation,” the reasonable and the
rational are complementary and interdependent ideas (2001: 6–7). They are complementary in that they
work together to specify the terms of fair cooperation; they are
interdependent insofar as neither “can stand without the
other” (Rawls, 1996: 52): “Merely
reasonable agents would have no ends of their own they wanted to advance
by fair cooperation; merely rational agents lack a sense of justice and
fail to recognize the independent validity of the claims of
others”7
More specifically,
“[merely] rational agents lack … the particular
form of moral sensibility that underlies the desire to engage in fair
cooperation as such, and to do so on terms that others as equals might
reasonably be expected to endorse” (Rawls,
1996: 51, see also 51n3).
(
Rawls,
1996: 52).
However, though Rawls contends that reasonableness and rationality are
complementary and interdependent ideas, it is reasonableness that reigns
supreme in his conception and its supporting propositions.8
There are a number of (relatively) recently
published articles the conclusions of which support this claim. See, for
example, Noel O'Sullivan (1997); Michael DePaul (1998); Kai Nielsen (1998);
Jon Mandle (1999); Shaun Young (2001); and David Rasmussen (2004).
The validity of such a conclusion is
reinforced throughout Rawls's argument. For example, he emphasizes
that his conception of justice
9 Unless
specified otherwise, all references to the “conception of
justice” should be understood as referring to the
political/public conception of justice.
is properly
understood as “reasonable,” as opposed to true,
10 This fact is emphasized (in different ways)
throughout the entirety of Political Liberalism (and, indeed,
other of Rawls's texts). For a specific statement to this effect see
Rawls (1996: xxii, 128, 175; see also 2001: 12, 32).
“[presenting]
itself as a possible focus of a
reasonable overlapping
consensus” (
2001: 12, emphasis added).
Indeed, to understand it differently would be to preclude the achievement
of the sought-after overlapping consensus. He also observes that
“the reasonable frames and subordinates the rational” in his
conception (
1996: 339), “it has priority
over the rational and subordinates it absolutely” (
2001: 82; see also, for example, 7n6, and
1996: 48). Further, he acknowledges that the
conception of justice he promotes is concerned almost solely with those
individuals who affirm “reasonable” comprehensive
doctrines—“the doctrines that reasonable citizens affirm and
that political liberalism must address” (
1996: 36; see also, for example, 37–38).
11 Such doctrines accept the burdens of judgment,
do not reject “the essentials of a democratic regime” (Rawls, 1996: xviii) and are not, as is presumably the
case with unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, “simply the
upshot of self- and class interests, or of peoples' understandable
tendency to view the political world from a limited standpoint”
(Rawls, 1996: 37).
“Unreasonable” comprehensive doctrines and their supporters
are of concern only to the extent that both must be effectively managed to
avoid their generating political instability (for example,
Rawls, 1996: xix, 64n19).
In essence, then, Rawlsian political liberalism is concerned to offer
a reasonable public conception of justice that can accommodate
the demands of reasonable comprehensive doctrines and
reasonable citizens situated in an environment of
reasonable pluralism and reasonable disagreement and,
subsequently, provide the basis for a reasonable overlapping
consensus on a single conception of justice to regulate society's
basic structure.
The Willingness to Act Reasonably
As the preceding remarks suggest, the viability of Rawls's
project is inextricably connected to the presence of and deference to
(Rawlsian) reasonableness. In particular, his conception can provide the
framework for the establishment and preservation of a just and stable
liberal democracy only if individuals behave in a “reasonable”
manner, which they do insofar as they freely and willingly accept his
notion of reasonableness as the ultimate standard against which the
validity of all “public” claims is to be judged and reliably
abide by the associated demands. Rawls insists that only by assigning such
a role to reasonableness is it possible to achieve and preserve the type
of overlapping consensus on a single conception of justice necessary to
establish and sustain a well-ordered polity.
According to Rawls, generally speaking, the citizens inhabiting
existing liberal democracies already more than sufficiently exhibit such a
willingness and fidelity; this belief, he contends, is not merely hopeful
conjecture on his part: it is, rather, grounded in empirical fact (for
example, 2001: 5–6; 1996: 13–15, 54, 167).12
This is not to suggest that Rawls believes that the citizens
of existing liberal democracies completely satisfy the requirements of his
understanding of “reasonableness” (though I believe that his
arguments allow for such an interpretation). However, at minimum, Rawls
does suggest that the observed character and behaviour of said
citizens is sufficiently “reasonable” and consistent (and
promising) to justify his claim that it is not unrealistic, or
“utopian,” to imagine a society that is populated primarily by
citizens who are completely “reasonable” in a Rawlsian
sense.
Such being the case, it is neither unrealistic nor
improbable to suggest that in instances of potentially divisive,
destabilizing conflict between the rational (which is to say, the
private good)
13 As already noted,
though it is possible to be rational without being entirely
self-interested (for example, Rawls, 1996: 51),
the rational—as defined by Rawls—is not a “public”
sentiment or entity: it is the pursuit of a particular (that is,
private) conception of the good (for example, Rawls, 1996: 53–54, 62).
and the
reasonable, individuals will voluntarily and typically be willing to
assign primacy to the latter. Arguably, however, Rawls's assessment
of the type of reasonableness that can consistently be expected of
citizens is overly optimistic and, subsequently, he is too sanguine about
the likelihood of citizens voluntarily and reliably acting in the manner
required to secure
and sustain the desired overlapping
consensus.
As George Klosko, among others, has noted, the accuracy of
Rawls's “empirical” claims is, at minimum, extremely
suspect and certainly debatable (for example, Klosko, 1993, 2000, 2004). Klosko observes that a significant volume of
social science research concerning the attitudes of citizens in a number
of contemporary constitutional democracies critically undermines the
validity of Rawls's belief in the “reasonableness” of
said citizens. In particular, citizens' general willingness to
respect the beliefs of others “reasonably” and
voluntarily—that is, to accept the fact of reasonable pluralism and
abide by the constraints of the precept of avoidance—seems to be
much less assured than Rawls suggests. Various studies conducted during
the preceding fifty years reveal that when push comes to shove, many
individuals are publicly willing to declare certain seemingly
“reasonable” views (as such are defined by Rawls) to be
unacceptable and demand actions which abridge many of the “basic
liberties” promoted by Rawlsian political liberalism (Klosko, 1993: 352; see also 2000: 42–115).
Indeed, it has been suggested that somewhere between 20 per cent and
40 per cent of the US population (the principal referent for Rawls's
arguments), for example, affirms doctrines that would be incompatible with
the demands of Rawls's conception (Klosko,
1996: 258–59; see also 2000). (It
is worth noting that 20 per cent of the population of the US translates
into approximately 50 million people.) Further, it has been argued that
while anywhere from 60 to 80 per cent of the US population affirms what
could be labelled “moderate” doctrines—that is,
doctrines that do not generate “unbridgeable gaps” among the
citizenry (for example, Klosko, 1996:
258–59; see also 2000)—when trying
to resolve contentious political questions, the general ignorance of the
members of that cohort “allows extremists and special interest
groups to play on their emotions and so to manipulate them” (Klosko, 1996: 259), thereby enabling (purportedly)
“rational” but “unreasonable” objectives to win
the day.
If it is unrealistic not to expect a significant (problematic)
percentage of the citizenry to be unable or unwilling to adhere to the
demands of public reasonableness voluntarily and reliably, then Rawlsian
political liberalism cannot “reasonably” be expected to secure
the type of “substantial” overlapping consensus it requires
(Rawls, 2001: 34). To the extent that such a
conclusion is valid, Rawlsian reasonableness seems to impose a
condition—namely, that all citizens freely, willingly and typically
defer to the demands of public reasonableness in instances of conflict
between the reasonable and the rational—that significantly
jeopardizes the ability of Rawls's conception to secure the type and
degree of public support and subsequent political stability needed to
establish and sustain a well-ordered liberal democracy, the raison
d'être of Rawlsian political liberalism.
It might be argued that Rawls has anticipated this evidential
problem—the existence of numerous concrete examples of
individuals' willingness to act unreasonably—and effectively
confronts it via his use of, and emphasis upon, the notion of
fundamental ideas. According to Rawls, there exist within the
public political culture of all (or, at least, almost all) democratic
societies certain fundamental ideas, a “shared fund” of
accepted foundational beliefs and norms that are innate to and guide the
public realm of a society (2001: 2–38; see
also, for example, 1996: 14–15). In the
case of Rawlsian political liberalism, these fundamental ideas are
represented by the notion of “society as a fair system of
cooperation” and the conception of persons as free and equal beings
(Rawls, 2001: 5). Rawls argues that the presence
of, and existing support for, these fundamental ideas justify his
claim that, in general, citizens of a Rawlsian well-ordered society can
typically be expected to accept the notion of reasonable pluralism and
adhere to the demands of the precept of avoidance voluntarily and
reliably.
Importantly, Rawls believes that individuals' affirmation of the
aforementioned fundamental ideas and, by extension, their free and willing
acceptance of both the concept of reasonable pluralism and the demands of
the precept of avoidance, can and often will be implicit or unrecognized
(for example, 2001: 5–6; 1996: 13–15). Such being the case, he suggests
that it is possible for an individual to support publicly a claim that
conflicts with both the notion of reasonable pluralism and the dictates of
the precept of avoidance and yet still remain committed to the tenets of
these concepts. Hence, an overt display of “unreasonable”
behaviour does not necessarily represent a fundamental rejection of, or
even a withdrawal of support for, either the concept of reasonable
pluralism or the precept of avoidance. Moreover, the lack of a predictable
correlation between one's behaviour and one's level of
commitment also means that the maintenance of a stable overlapping
consensus does not require that individuals explicitly or even knowingly
support either the concept of reasonable pluralism or the precept of
avoidance. Thus, according to Rawls, individuals can publicly pursue
claims that conflict with the notion of reasonable pluralism and/or
violate the precept of avoidance—in other words, they can act
“unreasonably”—without having to withdraw their support
for either, and without seriously undermining the stability of the
overlapping consensus.
However, whether it is possible, either in theory or in practice, to
accomplish such apparent contradictions is irrelevant: what matters is how
people act. For example, if a judge rules that the suppression of
communist propaganda or the rejection of the practice of legislated
affirmative action is justifiable and legal, then it hardly matters
whether he unknowingly or otherwise supports principles that conflict with
these decisions. Indeed, a penetrating self-analysis or Socratic
interrogation may reveal that the judge's decision does not coincide
with her fundamental beliefs; but this revelation changes nothing. The
presence of an underlying yet dormant support for certain principles does
nothing to alter the consequences of the judge's decision. If the
judge's ruling incites a riot, a post facto recognition of
the “unreasonableness” of her decision will not undo the
damage resulting from the riot. The point is this: the stability of the
overlapping consensus cannot be adequately safeguarded by the implicit or
unrecognized affirmation of guiding principles and concepts such as
certain “fundamental ideas” and, by extension, the notion of
reasonable pluralism and the precept of avoidance. If citizens are
publicly (if unknowingly) allowed to reject the concept of reasonable
pluralism and violate the dictates of the precept of avoidance, then
surely the likelihood of “unreasonable” behaviour dramatically
increases and with it so does the fragility of the overlapping consensus
and, subsequently, the viability of Rawls's conception.
An alternative defence of Rawls's empirical claims respecting the
reasonableness of individuals might be that he is not primarily or even
significantly concerned with the ability of his conception to provide a
viable solution to the problems currently troubling existing
liberal democracies. Such being the case, the value of criticizing the
inability of his conception to resolve such problems, and the damage
wrought by such criticism, is questionable. If Rawls has (at least to some
extent) accepted that the viability of his conception is dependent upon
the presence of circumstances that may not currently exist—either in
character or in degree—in any actual society, then what purpose is
served by noting that empirical evidence suggests the absence of those
circumstances? Arguably, such a fact is damaging to the viability of
Rawls's argument only if one assumes that he meant to address the
concrete difficulties currently distressing contemporary liberal
democracies.
In fact, Rawls has made public statements that suggest that his
proposed conception can properly be understood as an attempt to respond
successfully to the problems that imperil the survival of “a
reasonably just and effective” constitutional democracy in the US
(for example, see Prusak, 1998). Yet, even if it
were true that Rawls is relatively unconcerned with the ability of his
conception of justice to resolve the problems of stability that currently
trouble existing liberal democracies, there nevertheless remains an
inextricable and crucial link between the sociopolitical realities of such
societies and the theoretical viability of his conception. Given that he
has premised the credibility of a number of his central claims—for
example, that certain fundamental ideas are inherent in the public
political culture of nearly all democratic societies and widely supported
by the citizens of such societies—upon their empirical
verifiability, any retreat from emphasizing the correspondence between the
circumstances confronting the theoretical society presented by Rawls and
the reality of existing contemporary liberal democracies makes little
difference in terms of the significance of the inability of Rawlsian
political liberalism to address adequately the problems posed by empirical
evidence that contradicts said claims. That is to say, if the viability of
Rawls's conception is dependent upon the validity of, for example,
certain claims about the capacities and behaviour of the citizenry of
existing societies, claims that, on investigation, prove questionable,
then merely disavowing any desire to resolve the actual problems
confronting existing societies does not eliminate the difficulties that
related contradictory empirical evidence poses for Rawls's
conception. It would seem that if it is to maintain its theoretical
viability, Rawlsian political liberalism must abandon its claim to an
empirical basis, at least in regards to certain of its animating ideas,
and present an alternate justification for its use of such ideas and the
precise character or status that it attributes to them.
Resolving Conflict between Reasonable
Demands
Even if one were to accept Rawls's “empirical” claims
concerning the type of behaviour that can consistently be expected from
“reasonable” individuals, difficulties remain. For example,
though Rawls (not surprisingly) devotes significant attention to
explaining how it is possible to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable
demands and satisfactorily resolve conflicts between the two, no similarly
detailed explanation is offered respecting the effective adjudication of
disputes between competing “reasonable” claims. Yet, his
arguments would seem to suggest the need for such an explanation. To
illustrate: Rawls readily acknowledges that “the reasonable”
is not a “uniform” entity. Indeed, he emphasizes that there is
and must be room for diversity within the realm of the reasonable
(for example, 1996: 174). In turn, the existence
of a plurality of reasonable views and, consequently, a number of
different reasonable answers to any particular question (Rawls, 1996: 240; see also 243), would seem to
guarantee that there will be conflicts between different reasonable
demands. Rawls acknowledges the potential for such conflicts, conceding
that “[i]t is unreasonable … not to recognize the
likelihood—indeed the practical certainty—of irreconcilable
reasonable disagreements on matters of the first
significance” (1989: 240; emphasis
added).
So, for example, I may petition the government for a legislatively
mandated and enforced programme of affirmative action, believing it to be
necessary to ensure that the least advantaged members of society secure
the economic wherewithal needed to realize meaningful individual freedom
and self-fulfilment. Concurrently, my neighbours may seek the passage of
legislation that requires that hiring practices treat all individuals
equally insofar as no special consideration can be given to members of any
particular group or segment of society, claiming that allowing (or worse,
requiring) such consideration precludes equal treatment. Arguably, the
fundamental principles underlying both positions satisfy the standard of
Rawlsian reasonableness; yet, obviously, both proposals cannot be
simultaneously or equally accommodated.14
Other issues that could produce similar predicaments (and,
indeed, have already done so) are abortion, physician-assisted suicide and
the provision of welfare/social assistance—issues that Rawls
himself acknowledges as a source of both reasonable disagreement and
potentially intractable, divisive conflict that could threaten social
stability (for example, see Prusak,
1998).
However, if it is impossible to accommodate conflicting demands
equally—as it must surely be—then one is confronted with the
following dilemma: there is an expectation that all reasonable demands can
be accommodated, but it will be impossible to offer such accommodation.
Rawls's observation that not all reasonable views can survive could
be understood as a response to this problem (for example, Rawls, 2001: 36n26, 154, 155n30). Yet, such a response
does nothing to alleviate the problem; it merely suggests that life is not
always “reasonable” and those who present reasonable demands
which fail to be accommodated should not react unfavourably to such
decisions. But if individuals are told or led to believe that the
particular comprehensive doctrine which they affirm is
“reasonable,” then it does not seem unreasonable to suspect
that they will likely also believe that all demands arising from
adherence to that doctrine are reasonable and therefore deserving of
public accommodation.
Thus it could be argued that conflicts between competing reasonable
demands might often be more difficult to resolve than conflicts
between reasonable and unreasonable demands, and insofar as the former
type of conflicts are likely to concern “matters of the first
significance,” they are potentially more threatening to the
stability of the overlapping consensus. Hence, it is not enough merely to
explain how to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable demands and
suggest how we might resolve conflicts between the two; it is also
necessary to explain effectively how we are to resolve conflicts between
different reasonable demands. Arguably, providing a satisfactory scheme
for the resolution of conflicts between competing reasonable demands is a
task that possesses, at minimum, an importance equal to that assigned to
detailing the means by which to mediate conflict between reasonable and
unreasonable demands.
Rawls does suggest that when we are confronted with a number of
competing reasonable demands, we should endorse the demand that best
reflects the “most reasonable understanding of the public conception
and its political values of justice and public reason” (1996: 236). However, it would seem that before it is
possible to make such a determination it is necessary to possess a clear,
“thick” definition of “reasonable.” Though Rawls
presents a number of statements that provide a general description of the
realm of the reasonable, arguably, little in the way of any detailed
explanation of the specific parameters of the reasonable is
offered. Essentially, a political conception of justice, such as
justice as fairness, is meant to exemplify the significant
boundaries and features of public reasonableness. Yet, Rawls also
acknowledges that within his proposed overlapping consensus, there will be
several competing political conceptions of justice, each “no doubt
favored by different interests and political strata” (1996 164; see also, for example, xlviii, 227).
The presence of multiple, competing political conceptions of justice,
coupled with the existence of a plurality of associated reasonable
doctrines and a number of different reasonable answers to any particular
question, generates a situation which renders extremely problematic (if
not impossible) any effort to identify consensually which political
conception is the most appropriate, or “reasonable.”
Subsequently, it would seem that the most that can be determined is that
something is “reasonable” if it can “reasonably”
be expected that it will be endorsed by a majority of
“reasonable” individuals. Unfortunately, such a definition is
both empirically debatable and much too vague to provide a viable standard
of judgment. In the final analysis, then, Rawls fails not only to provide
an effective elaboration as to how one might acceptably identify the
“most reasonable understanding of the public conception” and
who will decide such matters, but also to demonstrate clearly how one
might both “reasonably” and effectively resolve conflicts
between reasonable demands. If it is possible that conflicts between
competing reasonable demands will be as numerous and more difficult to
resolve than those between reasonable and unreasonable demands, then it
would seem that providing for a stable overlapping consensus necessitates
that Rawls offer a scheme by which to adjudicate disputes between the
former type of demands effectively. If he is to do so, he needs to present
a definition of the reasonable that meaningfully distinguishes between
different degrees of reasonableness. However, no such definition is
readily available in Rawls's argument.
One possible response to the above criticism would be to argue that
Rawls's explanation of the features and role of public reason will
help provide the means by which we can define the proper content and
boundaries of the reasonable in a manner that will effectively control the
emergence of potentially divisive conflicts and allow for the peaceful
resolution of any disagreements that may arise. In essence, public reason
is citizens' reasoning regarding “the good of the public: what
the political conception of justice requires of society's basic
structure” (Rawls, 1996: 213); it
identifies the “guidelines of inquiry that specify ways of reasoning
and criteria for the kinds of information relevant for political
questions” (Rawls, 1996: 223; see also,
for example, 1989: 132–38; and 2001: 89). Examples of such guidelines are “the
general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the
methods and conclusions of science, when not controversial” (Rawls, 2001: 89–90). By delineating the
boundaries of what constitutes a legitimate consideration when discussing
matters of fundamental public import, public reason helps to define the
proper parameters of the reasonable and thereby sufficiently reduces the
likelihood of divisive conflict.
However, once again the relative generality of Rawls's definition
of “reasonable” would seem to jeopardize the viability of his
argument. The ability of public reason to help isolate the specific
parameters of the reasonable is based upon the assumption that
Rawls's distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental political
matters—constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice,
such as “who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be
tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity”
(1996: 214; see also 2001: 28)—will be acceptable to all reasonable
individuals and therefore uncontroversial. Yet, as many theorists have
observed, reasonable people “with different values will identify
… [the political culture's] most salient elements
differently according to their values and beliefs” (Klosko, 1993: 352; see also, for example, Bohman, 1995: 268). Subsequently, the definition of
what constitutes a “fundamental matter” will itself be a
source of controversy and conflict. In turn, when adherents of different
world-views attempt to realize their values in the public realm the
resulting conflict over matters of supreme importance “makes public
reason itself essentially contestable” (Bohman,
1995: 255). Thus, one could accept, for example, Rawls's
definition of what constitutes a fundamental matter as an adequate
explanation of the distinction between essential and non-essential
matters, and still be effectively unable to preclude divisive conflict
over the appropriate “standards of public reason and hence its
limits in deliberation” (Bohman, 1995:
264).
Rawls concedes that, even given a consensus on a conception of public
reason, there will still be instances when an appeal to public reason is,
by itself, insufficient to resolve conflict. Though he argues that claims
concerning constitutional essentials and questions of basic justice can
usually be settled by an appeal to public reason alone, he also
acknowledges that this is not always possible (for example, 1996: 240, 246). Political questions will arise that
involve issues—such as public policies on abortion, gay rights,
assisted-suicide and capital punishment, to name a few—that generate
such emotion and controversy that an appeal to public reason alone is
inadequate to resolve any disputes which emerge. Hence, even in a
well-ordered society founded upon Rawlsian political liberalism, there
will be instances when everyone appeals to public reason “but
agreement is lacking and more than marginal differences persist”
(Rawls, 1996: 240). Rawls recognizes that in
such circumstances, citizens may often believe it appropriate and
acceptable to “invoke principles appealing to nonpolitical values
[which is to say, nonpublic reason]” to resolve the
conflict “in a way they find satisfactory” (1996: 240; see also 230).12
Of course, to allow individuals to appeal unqualifiedly to
nonpolitical values would be to undermine unacceptably public reason and,
by extension, the overlapping consensus. Rawls attempts to resolve this
seemingly irreconcilable conflict by including the option that citizens
may appeal to nonpolitical values, “provided they do [so]
… in ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason itself”
(1996: 247). Yet, such a proposal is problematic
for two reasons. First, the reasonableness of such appeals can be
determined only via due reflection—that is, one must first
speculate as to the (un)reasonableness of an appeal and then wait to have
one's conclusion vindicated. However, if an appeal had initially been
accepted as reasonable, but upon due reflection proved to be unreasonable,
then that would suggest that the prevailing understanding of
reasonableness could be unreasonable. Second, it remains unclear as to who
is to decide when it is reasonable to invoke nonpolitical values and
exactly which nonpolitical values it is reasonable to invoke. Surely the
question of who determines such matters will itself be a source of
significant debate and conflict. By failing to provide a more detailed and
concrete definition of reasonable(ness), Rawls allows for such
uncertainties and in so doing further impedes efforts to identify the
proper content and boundaries of the reasonable. Subsequently, even if one
accepts Rawls's claims concerning the appropriate content and
application of public reason, such an understanding does not seem able by
itself to ensure the absence of irreconcilable, divisive conflict to the
degree required by his conception.
Remaining Reasonable
The ability of Rawls's conception to prevent divisive,
destabilizing conflict is further jeopardized by his failure to recognize
or acknowledge and provide for the critical interdependence between the
preservation of an overlapping consensus and the maintenance of a single
understanding of reasonableness. He concludes that an overlapping
consensus requires the participation of a “substantial
majority” of reasonable individuals (for example, 2001: 34; and 1996: 38)15
Though Rawls does, in places, add the
qualification “politically active citizens” (for example,
2001: 34; 1996: 38),
he fails to elaborate as to what exactly constitutes a “politically
active” citizen. Furthermore, I believe that my omission of this
qualification is justified by Rawls's use of other less specific
statements (for example, 1996: xviii). For an
interpretation that supports this argument, see Klosko (1993: 349, 350).
He also suggests that only
reasonable people can be relied upon to maintain their commitment to the
political values comprising the conception of justice. If the
establishment and preservation of a viable overlapping consensus is
dependent upon its securing and sustaining the free and willing support of
a “substantial majority” of the citizenry, and if only
reasonable individuals can be relied upon to maintain their support for
the conception of justice voluntarily, then the perpetuation of a viable
overlapping consensus would seem to require that the majority of the
population be reasonable in the sense understood by Rawls. Recall, Rawls
believes that the necessary foundation for such a condition already
exists,
16 and
thus this criterion is not considered an obstacle to the achievement of an
enduring overlapping consensus.
However, he (purposely or otherwise) neglects to acknowledge a
corollary demand: namely, that all reasonable citizens maintain
the same definition of “reasonable”—specifically, that
propounded by Rawls. Only by ensuring such an enduring homogeneity of
belief can one be assured of securing the type of unwavering public
support required to guarantee the continuation of an overlapping
consensus. Yet, Rawls acknowledges that “reasonable” people
will affirm different understandings of what constitutes
“reasonableness” (for example, 1996:
lvi, 61, 226, 243, 253). Even if one were to argue that a certain general
understanding of reasonableness is supported by a “substantial
majority” of the citizenry, such a fact is no guarantee that the
necessary number of citizens will faithfully continue to support that
understanding of reasonableness. Surely history demonstrates the fluid and
essentially contested character of “reasonableness” and
suggests that it is too dynamic and fickle a basis upon which to premise
citizens' continued support for the prevailing public
definition of “reasonable.” As was observed long ago by
Machiavelli, “People are by nature inconstant. It is easy to
persuade them of something, but it is difficult to stop them from changing
their minds” (1995: 20). Given the
unavoidable heterogeneity and fluidity of reasonableness, it seems
improbable and, indeed, implausible to suggest that all (or even the
majority of) reasonable people will voluntarily endorse and
remain faithful to any single definition of “reasonable” and
its associated demands.
Similarly, if, as Rawls argues, the degree of political stability
provided by the overlapping consensus directly corresponds to the depth of
its members' moral affirmation of the conception of justice (for
example, 2001: 195; 1996: 147–48), and if we are to believe that the
strength of this affirmation will not diminish following a change in
members' personal circumstances or shifts in the distribution of
political power (for example, Rawls, 2001: 193,
195; 1996: 148), then it would seem that
ensuring the necessary political stability requires that members of the
overlapping consensus unfailingly support the conception of justice with
an equal or greater conviction than that which they maintain for the most
valued aspects of their respective comprehensive doctrines. However,
Rawls's insistence that the conception of justice need be affirmed
only as “reasonable” would seem to render unlikely the
achievement of such support.
In the absence of such unfailing support, individuals may find
themselves confronted with a situation in which they believe it to be
either morally appropriate or necessary to abandon their support for the
overlapping consensus, and in so doing unacceptably compromise its
stability and that of their society. Rawls acknowledges the
possibility—indeed, the likelihood—of such a situation when he
concedes that, “For many the true, or the religiously and the
metaphysically well-grounded, goes beyond the reasonable” (1996: 153). Indeed, surely an individual “will
be moved by the appeal to reasonableness … only to the extent that
he values reasonableness [more than he values the truth]”
(Huemer, 1996: 382), and there seems to be
little reason to be convinced that a “substantial majority”
will do so. Certainly there exists no persuasive evidence to suggest that
individuals will voluntarily and reliably subordinate their fundamental
“truths” in favour of “reasonable” propositions,
even if requests to do so are restricted to issues within the domain of
the political. If anything, empirical evidence would seem to suggest that
it is at least equally as likely (if not more so) that in such instances
of value conflict, individuals will usually opt to act in accordance with
their understanding of the truth as defined by their respective
comprehensive doctrines. If such a conclusion is correct, then it would
seem that unless the majority of citizens unfailingly support the public
conception of justice with a conviction equal to or greater than that
which they maintain for the most valued aspects of their respective
comprehensive doctrines, the type of overlapping consensus being sought by
Rawls is impossible to achieve.
While it might be argued that the percentage of the population either
willing or “required” (according to their comprehensive
doctrine) to behave unreasonably—that is, to obey the
“truth” of their comprehensive doctrines rather than assigning
primacy to “reasonable” propositions—is relatively
small, arguably, the potential impact of that cohort is still significant
enough to jeopardize sociopolitical unity and stability problematically.
James Hunter, for one, has suggested that the existing moral-political
division between the different extremist segments of the US population
represents “a possible prelude to the outbreak of large-scale
political conflict” (Klosko, 1996: 261;
see also Hunter, 1994, 1990). Remember, according to some estimates, between
20 and 40 per cent of the US population affirms “unreasonable”
comprehensive doctrines (Klosko, 1996:
258–59). Moreover, as Rawls acknowledges, the threat “of
large-scale political conflict” need not be present before the
stability of a society is unacceptably threatened: “That subversive
advocacy is widespread enough to pose a live political question is a sign
of impending crisis rooted in the perception of significant groups that
the basic structure is unjust and oppressive. It is a warning that they
are ready to entertain drastic steps because other ways of redressing
their grievances have failed” (1996: 346).
Is the US likely to witness a civil war in the foreseeable future? No.
However, such a fact does not negate the theoretical problem generated by
a seemingly significant unwillingness or inability on the part of many
individuals to adhere to the demands of Rawls's notion of
reasonableness.
Conclusion
As the above review suggests, the notion of
“reasonableness” functions as a Hobbesian-style sovereign in
Rawlsian political liberalism, demanding the unqualified subordination and
obedience of all other components of Rawls's conception. In doing so,
it renders the viability of Rawls's project conditional upon the
willingness of individuals to ensure that their goals and related
behaviour voluntarily and reliably adhere to the requirements of the
public conception of reasonableness. However, for a number of reasons
(many noted above), the satisfaction of such a condition seems unlikely
and certainly impossible to guarantee; in particular, it would seem to
require a homogeneity and continuity of belief and behaviour that cannot
reasonably be expected in a society characterized by the type of diversity
present in contemporary liberal democracies. Yet, even if one were to
accept Rawls's claims regarding the generally reasonable behaviour
that can be expected from “reasonable” individuals, his
conception remains troubled by a number of difficulties which suggest that
in the (unlikely?) event that the sought-after overlapping consensus is
secured, it remains improbable that it could perpetually maintain the kind
of support necessary to sustain a well-ordered society, at least as such
is understood by Rawls.
In essence, Rawls's conception embodies a paradox with respect to
reasonableness. The success of Rawlsian political liberalism is dependent
upon its respecting the reasonableness of citizens; however, in doing so,
it allows for the emergence of unreasonableness to a degree that
critically undermines its ability to sustain the conditions Rawls deems
essential to ensure the political stability required to establish and
preserve a well-ordered society.
It would seem that the only way one can be (relatively) assured of
establishing and sustaining the conditions needed to achieve the political
stability sought by Rawls is to develop a conception of justice that
publicly supports and protects the principles in question, rather than
relying upon the reasonableness of individuals to secure and nourish the
required conditions. As Judith Shklar, among others, observed, a cursory
review of contemporary history reveals the potentially horrific
consequences associated with merely presuming that the majority of
citizens will reliably act in a “reasonable” manner—that
is, freely and willingly subordinate their fundamental aspirations to the
demands of public reasonableness in order to obtain and maintain a
“just” sociopolitical environment (for example, Shklar, 1989). If we are to avoid the dangers
associated with such an expectation, we must be more proactive in terms of
ensuring adherence to certain values and safeguarding their primacy in the
public realm.
Accordingly, what is needed is a public conception of justice that
forcefully supports and protects the liberal values embodied in
Rawls's notion of reasonableness. If it is true that there is
“no social world without loss” (Rawls,
2001: 36n26, 154, 155n30),17
Paraphrasing Isaiah Berlin, Rawls notes that “there is
no social world without loss: that is, no social world that does not
exclude some ways of life that realize in special ways certain fundamental
values” (2001: 154; see also
36n26).
and if it is also true that many of the citizens of
contemporary liberal democracies already significantly support the values
embraced by Rawlsian political liberalism, then taking the additional step
of publicly and actively endorsing and protecting such values should not
constitute an unacceptably onerous or offensive imposition on those
concerned. The only notable difference between such an approach and that
advocated by Rawls is that the former is willing to declare publicly the
value of what the latter requires to achieve its goals but is explicitly
unwilling to demand of its adherents. The operationalization of such an
approach would seem to require that the liberal belief in the justness of
the principles of toleration and equal respect
explicitly guide
all public policy and, subsequently, the activities of all public
institutions, including the public education system.
In many important respects such a position has previously been
advocated by “perfectionist” liberals such as William Galston
(1992), Stephen Macedo (1990), Joseph Raz (1986),
George Sher (1997) and Steven Wall (1998). These individuals have argued that the
establishment and preservation of a just and stable liberal society, a
society that will provide the opportunity for all of its citizens to
realize their full potential and achieve their freely chosen goals,
requires the inculcation, continued affirmation and purposeful
“elevation” of specific virtues and values—namely,
liberal virtues and values such as toleration and autonomy. This
conclusion is premised upon the belief that when given little direction
and left largely to their own devices (in essence, the approach attributed
to Rawlsian political liberalism), citizens cannot be relied upon to
develop naturally the personal qualities and beliefs that will convince
them to support the type of public policies and programmes that are
necessary to establish and sustain a just and stable liberal society.
Human behaviour is considered too unpredictable and mistake-ridden a basis
upon which to premise such an expectation.
Accordingly, contra Rawlsian political liberalism, the public
conception of justice should not seek to remain “neutral” in
relation to judgments concerning the value and desirability of certain
conceptions of the good. Rather, it should publicly support, protect and
promote those conceptions of the good that affirm and assign primacy to
liberal values and virtues. In other words, the government has a duty to
“act with discrimination to encourage the good and the valuable
[i.e., the liberal] and to discourage the worthless and the bad
[i.e., the illiberal]” (Raz,
1989: 785). From this perspective, Rawlsian political liberalism is
not nearly aggressive enough in its public endorsement, elevation and
defence of liberal values and virtues; it is deficient to the extent that
it refuses to “‘take … [its] own side in an
argument’” (Neal, 1994: 26).
Though the regulatory framework produced by the above-recommended
approach transgresses the boundaries of neutrality advocated by Rawls,
arguably, it is no more illiberal or exclusionary in its practical
effect than is the framework produced by his conception. Hence, the
proposed alternative approach offers a paradigm that is able to provide
greater certainty with respect to generating and sustaining the type of
public behaviour necessary to secure and preserve the sought-after
sociopolitical conditions, while maintaining an actual degree of
accommodation equal to that available from Rawlsian political liberalism.
Both in terms of its practical consequences and its fundamental character,
then, the proposed alternative does not represent a significant departure
from the approach promoted by Rawls. However, insofar as the
above-recommended approach more fully acknowledges and responds to the
frailties of human nature and in so doing secures greater protection
against unreasonable public behaviour, it presents a more practical and,
by extension, useful response to the problem of political stability than
does that offered by Rawls's conception.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank George Klosko, George Crowder, Janet McIntyre,
Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, Leah Bradshaw and the two anonymous
reviewers for the Journal for their very helpful comments and
suggestions on an earlier version of this essay. The standard disclaimer
regarding errors and omissions applies. The financial support received
from a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
postdoctoral fellowship is also gratefully acknowledged.
