Morsella et al. argue that we should understand conscious perception via the interplay between (1) conscious content created through a conflict of action options, and (2) the chosen action after the conflict is resolved. The proposed passive frame theory (PFT) situates consciousness in the context of action-related decision-making, rather than in the context of purposeful symbol manipulation. It is passive in the sense that it is a low-level mediator between different action opportunities. Such action-based consciousness departs from traditional views of consciousness, which typically attribute it to high-level planning and executive function, and moves it down to the level of actions.
There are many strengths in this approach, including its compatibility with embodied cognition and the idea that action-based processes drive the experience of conscious content (Juarrero Reference Juarrero1999; Thompson & Varela Reference Thompson and Varela2001). It is also in line with advances in non-linear dynamics, including the idea that consciousness gives rise to a multi-stable system characterized by self-organized criticality (Bak Reference Bak1996; Werner Reference Werner2007). Most importantly, the proposed PFT is compatible with modern complexity theory, specifically the idea that conflict drives the emergence of a novel structural organization (Swenson Reference Swenson1997). Here we focus on this latter idea and suggest that conflict needs to be expanded to include not only conflict between action options, but also between action and perception.
There is a large body of research that provides evidence for a discrepancy between actual action capabilities and beliefs about such actions capabilities (e.g., Kozhevnikov & Hegarty Reference Kozhevnikov and Hegarty2001; Krist et al. Reference Krist, Fieberg and Wilkening1993). The traditional explanation is that such discrepancy is due to two encapsulated systems: an action system, which guides the movements, and a judgment system, which predicts actions. Such dichotomy of structures not only runs counter to PFT, but also is overly simplistic, as illustrated in a preliminary study we carried out to investigate the ability of children to predict how far they can throw balls after feedback.
Participants were 12 children from a Midwestern daycare serving middle-income families. The children ranged in age from 4 to 10 years, half of them being younger than 72 months (M = 5.04 years), and half of them being older than 72 months (M = 7.94 years). A hallway at the daycare, approximately 16 feet long, was taped off to create an area in which to throw medicine balls. Three medicine balls that differed in heaviness were used. The heaviest medicine ball weighed 6 pounds, the middle ball weighed 4 pounds, and the lightest ball weighed 2 pounds. A yellow square at the end of the hallway acted as a place for the children to stand while throwing the different balls. The researcher prompted each child to “guess how far you can throw the ball.” The child was then instructed to stop the researcher, who was walking backwards towards the end of the hallway, in order to indicate how far they thought they would be able to throw the medicine ball. After the child stopped the researcher, the distance between the researcher and the yellow square was measured and recorded. Finally, the researcher left the hallway, and the child was told to “throw the ball.” As needed, the researcher reminded the child to throw underhand if the child tried to gain momentum by throwing the ball from the side. The spot where the medicine ball landed was marked, measured, and recorded. This procedure was repeated twice for a total of three trials for each of the balls.
The absolute difference between the predicted distance thrown and the actual distance thrown was determined for each throw and then averaged across trials and children. Figure 1 shows the results obtained. Although the older children were better able than preschoolers to perceive the distance they could throw a ball, there was an interaction between accuracy and ball weight. Specifically, the improvement with age was only for the lightest balls, not the medium and heaviest balls. Their ability to accurately adjust their predictions for how far they could throw the medium and heaviest balls was not statistically different from younger children. Thus, for the heavier balls, older children were no better than younger children at self-correction.
Figure 1. Average absolute difference between children's predicted distance thrown and the actual distance thrown, separated by age group and ball weight. Error bars represent standard errors. Measures are in centimeters.
Our results add to the list of findings showing a discrepancy between perceived action capabilities and actual capabilities, even after feedback. Although perception and action can align after experience (e.g., Zhu & Bingham Reference Zhu and Bingham2010), and although there can be a positive relationship between preschoolers' self-perceptions of the physical ability and fundamental motor skills (Robinson Reference Robinson2010), this is not always the case (cf. Kloos & Amazeen Reference Kloos and Amazeen2002). Our results show that such a discrepancy does not fit a theory of independent action and judgment systems. This is because the heaviness of the ball actually matters. To accommodate such context effects, a dichotomous model of action and perception would have to be expanded ad hoc to take into account object weight. Instead, we propose that prediction, as well as action, results from intricate interaction of idiosyncratic constraints, which differ not only as a function of the task (“predict” vs. “throw”), but also as a function of perceptual features (ball heaviness).
The PFT would suggest that older children are better at predicting their “throwability,” given that they have had more experience in using conscious information to inform behavioral outputs than preschoolers. Finding that there are circumstances in which predictability does not improve with experience requires expanding PFT. It needs to incorporate not only conflict among potential actions, but also conflict between perception/judgment and action. We conclude that, while compatible with PFT, developmental studies open up the approach to new ways of investigating its tenets.
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Morsella et al. argue that we should understand conscious perception via the interplay between (1) conscious content created through a conflict of action options, and (2) the chosen action after the conflict is resolved. The proposed passive frame theory (PFT) situates consciousness in the context of action-related decision-making, rather than in the context of purposeful symbol manipulation. It is passive in the sense that it is a low-level mediator between different action opportunities. Such action-based consciousness departs from traditional views of consciousness, which typically attribute it to high-level planning and executive function, and moves it down to the level of actions.
There are many strengths in this approach, including its compatibility with embodied cognition and the idea that action-based processes drive the experience of conscious content (Juarrero Reference Juarrero1999; Thompson & Varela Reference Thompson and Varela2001). It is also in line with advances in non-linear dynamics, including the idea that consciousness gives rise to a multi-stable system characterized by self-organized criticality (Bak Reference Bak1996; Werner Reference Werner2007). Most importantly, the proposed PFT is compatible with modern complexity theory, specifically the idea that conflict drives the emergence of a novel structural organization (Swenson Reference Swenson1997). Here we focus on this latter idea and suggest that conflict needs to be expanded to include not only conflict between action options, but also between action and perception.
There is a large body of research that provides evidence for a discrepancy between actual action capabilities and beliefs about such actions capabilities (e.g., Kozhevnikov & Hegarty Reference Kozhevnikov and Hegarty2001; Krist et al. Reference Krist, Fieberg and Wilkening1993). The traditional explanation is that such discrepancy is due to two encapsulated systems: an action system, which guides the movements, and a judgment system, which predicts actions. Such dichotomy of structures not only runs counter to PFT, but also is overly simplistic, as illustrated in a preliminary study we carried out to investigate the ability of children to predict how far they can throw balls after feedback.
Participants were 12 children from a Midwestern daycare serving middle-income families. The children ranged in age from 4 to 10 years, half of them being younger than 72 months (M = 5.04 years), and half of them being older than 72 months (M = 7.94 years). A hallway at the daycare, approximately 16 feet long, was taped off to create an area in which to throw medicine balls. Three medicine balls that differed in heaviness were used. The heaviest medicine ball weighed 6 pounds, the middle ball weighed 4 pounds, and the lightest ball weighed 2 pounds. A yellow square at the end of the hallway acted as a place for the children to stand while throwing the different balls. The researcher prompted each child to “guess how far you can throw the ball.” The child was then instructed to stop the researcher, who was walking backwards towards the end of the hallway, in order to indicate how far they thought they would be able to throw the medicine ball. After the child stopped the researcher, the distance between the researcher and the yellow square was measured and recorded. Finally, the researcher left the hallway, and the child was told to “throw the ball.” As needed, the researcher reminded the child to throw underhand if the child tried to gain momentum by throwing the ball from the side. The spot where the medicine ball landed was marked, measured, and recorded. This procedure was repeated twice for a total of three trials for each of the balls.
The absolute difference between the predicted distance thrown and the actual distance thrown was determined for each throw and then averaged across trials and children. Figure 1 shows the results obtained. Although the older children were better able than preschoolers to perceive the distance they could throw a ball, there was an interaction between accuracy and ball weight. Specifically, the improvement with age was only for the lightest balls, not the medium and heaviest balls. Their ability to accurately adjust their predictions for how far they could throw the medium and heaviest balls was not statistically different from younger children. Thus, for the heavier balls, older children were no better than younger children at self-correction.
Figure 1. Average absolute difference between children's predicted distance thrown and the actual distance thrown, separated by age group and ball weight. Error bars represent standard errors. Measures are in centimeters.
Our results add to the list of findings showing a discrepancy between perceived action capabilities and actual capabilities, even after feedback. Although perception and action can align after experience (e.g., Zhu & Bingham Reference Zhu and Bingham2010), and although there can be a positive relationship between preschoolers' self-perceptions of the physical ability and fundamental motor skills (Robinson Reference Robinson2010), this is not always the case (cf. Kloos & Amazeen Reference Kloos and Amazeen2002). Our results show that such a discrepancy does not fit a theory of independent action and judgment systems. This is because the heaviness of the ball actually matters. To accommodate such context effects, a dichotomous model of action and perception would have to be expanded ad hoc to take into account object weight. Instead, we propose that prediction, as well as action, results from intricate interaction of idiosyncratic constraints, which differ not only as a function of the task (“predict” vs. “throw”), but also as a function of perceptual features (ball heaviness).
The PFT would suggest that older children are better at predicting their “throwability,” given that they have had more experience in using conscious information to inform behavioral outputs than preschoolers. Finding that there are circumstances in which predictability does not improve with experience requires expanding PFT. It needs to incorporate not only conflict among potential actions, but also conflict between perception/judgment and action. We conclude that, while compatible with PFT, developmental studies open up the approach to new ways of investigating its tenets.