Long before political science emerged as a distinct social scientific discipline, philosophers, historians, and statesmen examined the interplay between the formal rules of governance and the allocation of political power. Going as far back as Plato’s Republic or Aristotle’s Politics, political philosophers assumed the structure of government not only influenced the actors’ behavior, but potentially shaped the balance of influence within political institutions.
The quantitative revolution gave social scientists a host of new tools to examine how formal rules potentially impact governance. Somewhat surprisingly, quantitative studies of governance have, to date, never examined the structure of academic political institutions.Footnote 1 Because the faculty exercise limited control over university resources, colleges and universities cannot be characterized as fully democratic. However, the professoriate often exercises considerable influence on the day-to-day operations of the institution through the traditions of “shared governance.”
Perhaps one reason political scientists have sidestepped a formal study of academia’s constitutions is that, unlike Congress, state legislatures, or local boroughs, faculty representative institutions enjoy a relatively narrow grant of sovereign power. Whereas college and university charters often grant faculty bodies control over promotion, tenure, or the curriculum, other substantive issues like budgets, hiring decisions, enrollment, and compensation are traditionally controlled by the administration and a board of trustees. To the extent that the faculty have any say in non-curricular matters, it is typically through advisory and consultative recommendations, which by their nature are not enforceable.
It would be a mistake, however, to minimize the influence that faculty senates enjoy merely because they exercise a narrow array of formal authorities. Although powerful advisory institutions are rarely utilized in contemporary governance, historically these bodies have played an important role in formal governance. When representative bodies enjoy prestige and legitimacy, even advisory recommendations can have considerable weight, and can influence policies well beyond their formal scope of authority.
LEGITIMACY-CENTERED REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
Modern constitutional governance tends to favor formal authority rather than informal advisory institutions. Yet, sovereign institutions like Congress often take cues from advisory bodies both within and outside of the organization. For example, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) objectives and resources are established by Congress and the president through legislation and appropriations. Although most members of the House of Representatives are not competent to make a truly informed judgment on national space policy, they can rely on the recommendations of their colleagues who sit on the House Committee on Science and Technology and the House Science Subcommittee on Space. Because committee members, working with the executive and the administrative bureaucracy, possess a rudimentary understanding of the policy alternatives, congressional specialists are able to assist the House in establishing the agency’s goals and to provide the resources necessary to achieve them.
Although Congress can draw from internal experts to help formulate policy, most colleges and universities are overseen by a board of trustees with little or no experience in the “business” of higher education. Whether the members of the trustees are elected or appointed, they often lack a deep understanding of higher education’s traditions, practices, and culture (Amaral, Jones, and Karseth 2002). From an organizational theory perspective, typical board members are not familiar with the university’s “core technology,” which Hoy and DiPaola (Reference Hoy and DiPaola2010) describe as an understanding of the institution’s primary objective combined with a knowledge of how that goal is achieved. As trustees rarely include academics (Amaral, Jones, and Karseth 2002), boards are infrequently equipped to make fully informed decisions. Without an understanding of the organization’s core technology, the academic trustees rely on university administrators and faculty representatives to fill the void.
Organized hierarchically, the president or provost is well positioned to provide input on behalf of the administration. By contrast, faculty perspectives are often conflicting and diffuse. Academic constitutions give faculty a means by which to identify and then express their collective judgment. In this manner, mere “recommendations” from faculty representatives can carry considerable weight both with board members and, by extension, the administration.
Academic constitutions give faculty a means by which to identify and then express their collective judgment. In this manner, mere “recommendations” from faculty representatives can carry considerable weight both with board members and, by extension, the administration.
In contemporary governance, the use of non-binding “recommendations” as an instrument of policy making is somewhat unusual. For example, although 24 states have some form of a popular initiative process, the results of the vote are typically binding in at least 23 of these states (Legislatures n.d.).
In the ancient world, however, the practice of giving guidance to elected leaders through resolutions was quite common. In fact, the use of non-binding resolutions was an important feature of constitutional governance in the Roman Republic (Jolowicz and Nicholas Reference Jolowicz and Nicholas1972). Although Hollywood depicts the Senate as the sole representative body controlling legislation at the height of the Roman Republic, the truth is far more complex. Prior to the collapse of the Republic in 27 BCE, elections and formal legislation were controlled by the Comitia Centuriata (Centuriate Assembly) and the Concilium Plebis (Plebeian Assembly). The executive functions of government were controlled by elected magistrates like consuls (chiefs of state), aediles (city managers), quaestors (treasury officials), etc. (Jolowicz and Nicholas Reference Jolowicz and Nicholas1972). At the height of its power, the Senate’s considerable influence was exercised through the senatus consultum, an ordinary resolution that expressed the opinion of the members. Although only advisory, the opinions of the Senate carried tremendous weight; elected officials were strongly inclined to carry out their duties and interpret the law in a manner consistent with the views of Rome’s political elites (Jolowicz and Nicholas Reference Jolowicz and Nicholas1972; Lintott Reference Lintott1999). The power of the senatus consultum varied as the Senate vied for influence with the popular assemblies in the late republic. Even as the republic transitioned into the empire under the leadership of Caesar Augustus, the Senate’s acquiescence to the consolidation of political authority served to legitimize the growing influence of the early Roman emperors.
The Romans understood the link between constitutional structure and government function and were extremely protective of their prestige-centered representative body, which wrote legislation that would both protect the independence of the senate while at the same time ensuring it was sensitive to popular willFootnote 2. The fact that the Senate was unable to pass formal legislation was irrelevant. Even with a narrow grant of sovereign authority, its indirect influence in the formation of legislative and executive policies made the Senate an important force in Roman politics.
The example of the Roman Senate is instructive in that it provides a clear example of why, even for prestige-based or legitimacy-centered advisory bodies, rules matter. If members obtained their position in the Senate merely as a function of birth, rather than through election to high office, it seems probable that magistrates and the public at large would view the resolutions of the body quite differently. Although the Senate was undoubtedly an elite institution, its membership was tied, at least in part, to the people of Rome. This electoral nature likely contributed to its authority and legitimacy.
Returning to governmental structures within academia, it is no accident that many of the professoriate’s representative bodies are named “senates.” Given their vital role in advising administrators—the modern equivalent of Roman magistrates—it is perhaps natural that faculty representative bodies tend to look more like the Roman Senate than the United States Senate. As with the Roman Senate, non-binding resolutions emanating from the faculty senate often play an important role in the formation of university policy. Whereas scholars have conducted qualitative examinations of the link between structure and political influence (Minor Reference Minor2004), it appears that the question has never been examined quantitatively.Footnote 3
Although virtually all colleges and universities have some form of faculty advisory bodies, there are, nonetheless, a dizzying variety of representative schemes that provide researchers with a unique opportunity to test whether the formal rules which govern faculty representative bodies are associated with faculty influence within the institution. Put another way: recognizing that faculty representative bodies play an advisory role in setting non-academic policies, do the rules of faculty governance predict whether the professoriate believes it has more or less influence in university decision making?
FACULTY GOVERNANCE AS A LEGITIMACY-DEPENDENT REPRESENTATIVE MODEL
This presumption that rules and institutional structures profoundly influence an organization’s behavior is deeply rooted in the study of governance by scholars of both political science and public administration.
One illustration focuses on the emergence, evolution, and effects of structuring – both in and across organizations. What Hult and Walcott (Reference Hult and Walcott1990) called a “governance model” (but is better labeled an approach or framework) spotlights structuring in and between organizations…. Most simply, structures refer to recurring interactions. Governance structuring helps individuals and groups as they seek to make decisions and take (or decline to take) particular actions. (Hult Reference Hult2014, 14)
Whereas researchers have carefully examined the interplay between form and function in corporate, local, state, national, and international contexts, there is precious little quantitative research on how the structure of faculty-representative institutions potentially impact governance of American colleges and universities. Unlike corporations, which are administered by owners or shareholders, American universities are remarkably democratic, guided by principles of “shared governance” wherein the faculty have considerable influence over the operation of their institutions (Burgan Reference Burgan2006; Tierney and Minor Reference Tierney and Minor2003; AAUP 1966; Birnbaum Reference Birnbaum1991; Tierney and Lechuga Reference Tierney and Lechuga2004).
There is considerable debate over the proper role of the faculty under the traditions of shared governance (Birnbaum Reference Birnbaum1991). Critics of shared governance like Fisher and Koch (Reference Fisher and Koch1996) argue that faculty involvement in the formation of university policy is an impediment to presidential authority. The Association of Governing Boards argues for streamlining, or outright limiting, faculty governance institutions, as restrictions on presidential authority complicate efforts to reform colleges and universities, particularly in periods of austerity (Reid and Strickland n.d.; AGB Commission 1996).
Even supporters of strong senates would acknowledge that faculty involvement in university governance impedes presidential authority and complicates efforts at reform. This is not a bug; it is a feature. Indeed, the Roman Senate’s involvement in governmental affairs often slowed, or in some cases impeded, efforts to consolidate political authority or enact reform. Much like the Roman Republic, faculty senates potentially enhance policy making by facilitating an open dialogue about proposed policies, thoroughly vetting university initiatives and conferring legitimacy on administrative reforms.
Even supporters of strong senates would acknowledge that faculty involvement in university governance impedes presidential authority and complicates efforts at reform. This is not a bug; it is a feature.
There is little doubt that the board of trustees of most colleges and universities possess the legal authority to enact unilateral institutional reforms—limiting faculty input and thereby streamlining the governance of the university (Tierney and Lechuga Reference Tierney and Lechuga2004). Nonetheless, universities are reluctant to take unilateral action because it might be seen as an illegitimate usurpation of traditional faculty prerogatives. Such action could potentially undermine the institution’s educational mission.
Yet there are several reasons to believe that any unilateral actions to change the faculty role in shared governance would not be accepted, regardless of the promised effects on the institution or the exact nature of the new faculty role. Aside from the issues of academic freedom that affected faculty would almost surely raise, such changes would violate principles of procedural justice, diminish faculty status, and reduce institutional social capital. (Tierney and Lechuga Reference Tierney and Lechuga2004)
Setting aside concerns that streamlining institutional governance might result in a backlash from faculty, some scholars assert that higher education’s cumbersome traditions of shared governance might constitute needed reform (Bess and Dee Reference Bess and Dee2014; Benjamin and Carroll Reference Benjamin, Carroll and Tierney1998).
The ways in which administrators solicit input from the faculty varies from institution to institution. The constitutional structures that are established to provide formal input into the governance of the institution should, theoretically, have an impact on the faculty’s influence—or at least perceived influence—on university policy.
Scholars of higher education are seemingly aware that structures of governance can have an impact on the effectiveness of university leadership (Trakman Reference Trakman2008). There is relatively little discussion of what specific structures of academic governance are conducive to either inclusiveness or effective leadership. Indeed, Trakman (2008, 76) argues against a one-size-fits-all model of governance, paying particular attention to the ability “to steer a governance course that recognizes the reasons behind competing interests in governance and [does not] endorse any one interest over others on arbitrary grounds.” He provides few specifics about what governance structures are conducive to this sort of inclusiveness. Trakman concludes that, “Good university governance also does not simply happen. It is usually the product of painstaking efforts to arrive at suitable governance structures, protocols, and processes [emphasis added].”
The absence of research about the ideal structures of governance raises an interesting and potentially important question: Does the structure of a university’s governance alter the faculty’s assessment of their influence in university affairs?
THEORY
We theorize that perceptions of faculty influence (relative to the administration) will be greatest at institutions of higher education wherein the faculty advisory bodies operate under democratic, rather than deliberative, rules and procedures.
We differentiate between democratic rules and deliberative rules by assessing whether particular electoral procedures tend to limit the discretion of the faculty representatives or give them the authority to make independent judgments, notwithstanding the views of the professoriate. We use the structural distinctions between the House of Representatives and the Senate as one model for what differentiates a democratic body from a deliberative body. Whereas the House of Representatives, with its smaller constituencies, shorter terms of office, and the ability to elect its own leadership, is a democratic body created to reflect popular will, the deliberative US Senate was designed to have some distance from popular opinion. Similarly, academic constitutions vary in both form and function, providing faculty with varying degrees of direct control over their own representative institutions.
To test our theory that rules of academic governance influence perceptions of faculty power, we merged survey data from the North American Academic Survey (NAAS)Footnote 4 with a database of faculty constitutions at corresponding academic institutions.Footnote 5
VARIABLE OVERVIEW
Dependent Variable
Using question 4.2—“In your view, compared to administrators, how much say do professors have in how this institution is run?”—from the NAAS study as a measure of perceived power, we examined how faculty assess authority and how this varies depending on other independent variables, detailed below. We constructed additional models using administrators’ responses to a similar question—“In your view, compared to professors, how much say do administrators have in how this institution is run?”—in order to determine if university administrators are similarly sensitive to the basic characteristics of the college’s academic constitution.
Independent Variables
Party ID and Ideology
Although faculty partisanship tends to favor the Democratic Party, there is considerable variation in the professoriate’s ideological disposition (Lazarsfeld and Thielens Reference Lazarsfeld and Thielens1958; Ladd and Lipset Reference Ladd and Lipset1975; Lipset Reference Lipset1982; Rothman, Kelly-Woessner, and Woessner Reference Rothman, Kelly-Woessner and Woessner2011). Partisan and ideological self-placement often correlates with career objectives, perceptions of problems in higher education, and views of administrative power (Woessner and Kelly-Woessner Reference Woessner, Kelly-Woessner and Maranto2009; Rothman, Kelly-Woessner, and Woessner Reference Rothman, Kelly-Woessner and Woessner2011). Sensitive to their position as political minorities within higher education, it is possible that Republican faculty will judge administrators who, like the faculty, hold views to the Left of the general population (Rothman, Kelly-Woessner, and Woessner Reference Rothman, Kelly-Woessner and Woessner2011) as more powerful than would their Democratic counterparts.
Tenure
Faculty who have earned tenure enjoy far more job security than those on the tenure track or those working on fixed-term contracts. Less concerned with job security, it is possible that tenured professors will judge administrators as less powerful relative to the faculty than their untenured counterparts.
Are the faculty represented by an assembly rather than by a senate?
Though representative bodies go by many names—senates, assemblies, advisory councils, etc.—they typically operate under two distinct schemes of representation. In a democratic model, the faculty participate directly in deliberations and debate. As they speak and vote, the group’s members provide a perspective that, depending on attendance, tends to reflect the true views of the faculty. In a representative model, the faculty select others to speak and vote on their behalf. Particularly when faculty representatives enjoy long terms of office, they are free to set aside or overlook the demands of their constituents. Much like the US Senate, faculty representatives can engage in more deliberative decision making.
By and large, advisory bodies that constitute elected representatives of the faculty are called “senates.” Advisory bodies wherein all or most of the full-time faculty appear in person are called “assemblies.” Although the terminology varies by institution, for the purpose of this paper, we will adopt the common usage of the terms. We will refer to representative systems as senates and councils made up of the faculty as a whole as assemblies. In some cases, colleges have both a senate and an assembly. We refer to these as hybrids (see online appendix B). Consistent with our theory, we expect that professors who are represented by assemblies, which are by definition more democratic, will perceive that faculty have more “say” in how the institution is run.
Does the senate or assembly elect its own chair?
Virtually all faculty constitutions designate one person to serve as chair or president of the senate or assembly. In most instances, institutions adopt a democratic method of selecting the chair, permitting the position to be filled either by polling the senate or assembly, or by polling the faculty as a whole. In other instances, the faculty constitution designates the university president or university provost as the presiding officer (president) of the senate or assembly, thus limiting the faculty’s opportunity to designate their own leadership. Based on our theory that democratic procedures tend to heighten perceptions of faculty power, we presume that the inability to elect the chair of the senate or assembly will reduce perceptions of faculty authority.
Is the chair of the senate or assembly a rotating post?
When chairs are elected by a senate, an assembly, or the faculty as a whole, frequently the executive does not immediately assume office. Rather, chairs commonly serve for one year as chair-elect, followed by a year as chair, and sometimes they complete one additional year as former chair. Although the rotating system promotes continuity, it precludes reelecting effective leadership and prevents executives from immediately assuming office. Theorizing that democratic procedures tend to heighten perceptions of faculty power, we presume that a rotating system of executive leadership will tend to reduce perceptions of faculty power.
Can the senate or assembly chair stand for reelection?
Some faculty constitutions bar senate or assembly chairs from running for reelection, even when they are not subject to a rotating executive system. Such prohibitions ensure turnover in the executive office; however, like the rotating system, they reduce the incentives to respond to constituency demands by foreclosing the possibility of reelection. We theorize that barring chairs from seeking reelection will be negatively correlated with perceptions of faculty power.
What is the length of the senate or assembly chair’s term?
The length of the senate or assembly chair’s term varies from institution to institution. Many restrict the chair to a single year term. Some provide the chair with a term of three or more years between elections. Presumably, executives who enjoy a longer term of office are less sensitive to the demands of his or her constituencies. We hypothesize that longer terms for senate or assembly chairs will be negatively correlated with perceptions of faculty power.
What is the length of the senate representative’s term?
Similar to the length of the chair’s term, a long gap between senatorial elections provides a representative with enormous leeway to pursue policies that might well vary from the expressed will of the faculty constituency. Just as long electoral terms in the US Senate tend to encourage deliberative decision making rather than representative decision making, we believe that longer terms of office in a faculty senate will undermine perceptions of faculty influence in university governance.
Although we presumed that perceptions of faculty power should be tied to constitutional features that promote accountability rather than deliberative decision making, administrators believe they have less power when senate or assembly chairs have longer terms of office.
RESULTS
The results of the NAAS survey show that, in 1999, faculty felt they had at least some influence in college or university affairs. Overall, 17% of faculty felt they had a “great deal of say” in how the institution is run. More specifically, 39% at baccalaureate institutions, 19% at masters institutions and 13% at doctoral and research institutions rated their level of influence as high. Although some scholars argue that faculty influence has steadily declined over the last generation (Ginsberg Reference Ginsberg2011), here we are concerned with whether the relative difference in the perceptions of power between institutions are correlated with the constitutional structure of the faculty representative institutions.
The fact that faculty at baccalaureate institutions perceive they have considerably more influence than masters and doctoral and research institutions is hardly a surprise. Peterson and White (Reference Peterson and White1992) find that at liberal arts colleges, which are classified in the baccalaureate grouping, enjoy a “strong agreement on the purpose, culture, and climate patterns” between members of the faculty and college administrators. Additionally, these smaller baccalaureate institutions are more likely to be represented by a faculty assembly, which the results of table 1 suggest is associated with perceptions of greater faculty influence.
Table 1 Regression Model: Respondent View of “how much say do professors have in how the institution is run?”
* Admin Variable notes how ADMINISTRATOR view of how much say administrators have in how the institution is run.
Table 1 provides the results of four regression models from faculty and administrative responses to the question: “In your view, compared to administrators, how much say do professors have in how this institution is run?” The highest value (4) denotes that faculty have “a great deal” of say, where the lowest value (1) denotes that faculty have “none.”
The individual, respondent-specific independent characteristics—tenure and party ID—play a relatively unimportant part in the overall models. Party ID is insignificant in all variations of the model. A respondent’s tenure status predicts perceptions of faculty power. However, when comparing senate constitutions with assembly and hybrid constitutions, the results are inconsistent. In assembly and hybrid systems, tenured faculty feel they have more power, whereas in senatorial systems having tenure is correlated with the belief that faculty have less influence.Footnote 6
Of the three institutional variables, two are statistically significant when estimating the impact on all institutions: Carnegie classificationFootnote 7 and general funds per student. However, when senate-based constitutions are examined independently, we find that institutional factors remain significant. In assembly and hybrid systems, the variables are not significant.
Looking to the structural variables, it is exceedingly noteworthy that faculty who operate under an assembly and hybrid constitution feel that they have significantly more “say” in how the institution is run than faculty at institutions with senatorial representation. Whereas the mean professorial respondent from a college with an assembly rates their faculty influence at a 3.0 (on a 1–4 scale), respondents from a college without an assembly rate faculty influence at 2.6. As faculty with more democratic structures (i.e., an assembly) feel they have more authority than those with a representative structure (i.e., a senate), the variable runs consistent with our overall theory.
Though the significance of the faculty assembly variable was consistent with our initial theory, table 1 provided a tantalizing hint that, although structure matters, the link between constitutions and faculty power is more nuanced than we originally appreciated. Theorizing that the ability to elect their own leadership was an important component of faculty authority, we presumed that institutions which designated an administrator as head of the senate and assembly would feel that administrators were more influential. The results listed in table 1 show that the variable labeled “Is university administrator head of faculty representative body?” runs directly counter to our hypothesis. Like the assembly variable, the administrative executive variable is highly statistically significant. The model provides evidence that when representative institutions are overseen by unelected university administrators, faculty believe they have more say in how the institution is run. Substantively, the difference of means between respondents in administrator headed senates or assemblies (2.9 on a 1 to 4 scale) is not dramatically different than those wherein the senates or assemblies elect their own leaders (2.7 on a 1 to 4 scale). Even while controlling for other variables, the fact that faculty feel they have more say in the institution when they cannot elect their own chair suggests that our theory is incomplete. The importance of an administrator serving as the head of the faculty body appears to be limited to senatorial systems, as the variable is statistically insignificant in assembly and hybrid structures.
Consistent with our initial theory, a rotating executive is negatively correlated with perceptions of faculty power. However, the correlation only holds in assembly and hybrid systems. Outside of a senatorial system, the ability to elect an executive who immediately assumes office is positively associated with perceptions of faculty power.
It is interesting to note that assembly and hybrid systems have a much higher R2 than the senatorial systems. The explained variance of the assembly and hybrid model (0.173) is nearly four times higher than in the senatorial systems (.044). This may suggest that, at least as far as faculty perceptions of power are concerned, rules are more important. However, comparing the two models, this has less to do with difference in the structural variables and more to do with the power of the Carnegie Classification variables and student expenditures on the overall model.
The final model listed on the far right, labeled “Admin Perceptions,” examines administrators’ views of administrative power relative to the faculty. The basic model is the same as the ones listed to the left, except the administrative questionnaire did not include a question about whether the respondent was tenured.
With one exception, the model of perceived administrative power has very little explanatory power. It is potentially noteworthy that “The length of the executive’s term” is statistically significant. The negative correlation for the senate or assembly executive’s terms and perceptions of administrative power provide modest evidence that shorter terms are associated with perceptions of more administrative influence. When the chair of the faculty assembly enjoys a three-year term of office, administrators feel that they have slightly less influence than administrators at schools where the chair has a one-year term. Judging from the near-zero value of R2, the constitutional feature has no substantive link to perceptions of administrative power among administrators.
It is worth noting that the single correlation in the Admin Perception model runs contrary to our initial theory. Although we presumed that perceptions of faculty power should be tied to constitutional features that promote accountability rather than deliberative decision making, administrators believe they have less power when senate or assembly chairs have longer terms of office.
Looking to the literature on state legislatures, the correlation between shorter executive terms and perceptions of power should hardly be a surprise. Executives and legislators with longer terms are in a position to make difficult decisions, even at the risk of temporarily alienating their constituencies. From the faculty point of view, shorter terms may have given them a sense of control over their elected leaders. The exact same attribute that keeps senate executives on a shorter leash might reasonably make them appear less effective to the administrators with whom they work.
Although the R2 for the administrative model is small, this unexpected result highlights the importance of considering faculty perceptions of influence and administrative perceptions of influence separately. As each group may perceive its influence differently, the power relationships between the competing groups are not necessarily a zero-sum game. It is possible that if a faculty senate chair had a four-year term, the administrators would think the faculty are more influential by virtue of the fact that the leadership cannot disengage from the senate and wait out the executive’s term of office. At the same time, faculty might perceive that a chair with a four-year term is not responsive to their views and will thus act more independently.
Finally, the results of the administrative model highlight a blind spot in our initial conceptualization of the faculty–administrative power relationship. Although a highly influential faculty senate or assembly might signify a less influential administration, it might also signal a disengaged board of trustees. We initially viewed academia as a bipolar power struggle, when accounting for a board of trustees; however, we realized that many faculty senates and assemblies compete in a tripolar world. Constitutional structures that promote a stronger faculty senate or assembly might also enhance the influence of the administration if, in doing so, the representative body checks the board of trustees. Unfortunately, the NAASS dataset on which this study is based does not account for the influence of the board of trustees. Future examinations of faculty governance structures should attempt to account for the influence wielded by the board of trustees relative to the other political actors.
The dearth of quantitative studies on the impact of academic structures of governance means that political scientists have a potentially new and exciting vista of exploration. Based on these results, it appears that constitutions matter, even in the governance of academic affairs.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Even before the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, political observers recognized the links between the structure of governance and the distribution of political power. Indeed, political scientists have examined the interplay between constitutional design and constitutional function in every conceivable facet of governance, from the corporate, local, state, national and international contexts. Until recently, there has been no systematic effort to quantitatively examine how academic constitutions influence the balance of power between the faculty and college administrators.
Under their traditions of shared governance, a vast majority of American colleges and universities provide some form of representation to the faculty in the form of an advisory council, faculty assembly, or university senate. We theorized that faculty at academic institutions that emphasize democratic rather than deliberative forms of representation would perceive themselves as having more say relative to administrators in governing the university.
Consistent with our theory, four constitutional factors were, in some variation of the regression model, correlated with the perception of faculty power in the colleges and universities included in our sample. The most important of these was the use of direct forms of representation—typically referred to as a faculty assembly.
The most surprising finding, which ran directly counter to the expectations of the original theory, centered on a peculiar feature of some faculty constitutions, which designates a university administrator—typically the university president or the university provost—as the head of the faculty representative body. We presumed that, because this automatic designation deprives the faculty of the opportunity to elect their own leadership, this constitutional feature would make the faculty respondents feel less powerful. Instead, based on the results provided in table 1, there is strong evidence that the faculty feel they are more influential overall when university administrators preside over the faculty representative bodies.
This counterintuitive finding begs an important question: Are faculty perceptions of institutional power a reflection of true influence within the university? Is it probable that having a university administrator preside over the meetings of the faculty actually increases faculty influence in the governance of the institution? It is entirely possible that these measures of perceived influence are just that: perceptions. Having the president or provost regularly preside over meetings of the faculty representatives gives the illusion of faculty influence, if only because faculty leaders have a regular opportunity to interact with the leadership of the college. It is also possible that having to regularly preside over meetings of the faculty senate or assembly encourages university administrators to be more accommodating to the perspective of the faculty. This might be the case because it gives administrators a better insight into faculty views, or it may demonstrate a concern that failing to respond to faculty input will lead to a public break with the members of the senate or assembly.
The very fact that university administrators do not perceive differences in faculty power based on the institution’s academic constitution highlights how measures of perceived power are imperfect proxies for power itself. Since faculty and administrators collectively reach different conclusions about variations in the university’s balance of power, they cannot both be correct. Without concrete measures of power and influence, it is difficult to know if the professoriate is simply sensitive to their influence relative to the rules of faculty governance or if administrators are correct in observing that constitutional structures make little difference in determining faculty power.
As to whether the NAAS dataset regarding faculty and administrative influence measures true influence or merely perceptions of influence, we must remember that each group exercises varying degrees of control over different facets of governance. For example, most faculty senates and assemblies exercise inordinate influence over proposed curriculum changes or rules governing promotion and tenure. We presume that faculty feel they have less influence in principally administrative spheres like facilities management and budgeting. Although the results provide some evidence that, from the faculty’s perspective, academic constitutions enhance the professoriate’s “say” in the institution, it is difficult to know if this perceived influence extends beyond curriculum and tenure. Future studies might examine different components of perceived influence to determine if particular features of academic constitutions potentially enhance the faculty’s influence in the general operations of the university.
Finally, it is important to note that, even if constitutional features such as faculty assemblies, short senatorial terms, and administrative-chaired meetings do enhance faculty power within the institution, this does not axiomatically lead to more effective institutional governance. Indeed, one of the key features of the Articles of Confederation was the tendency to favor state power over national authority. Although the preservation of state power did enhance local control and effectively guard against excessive national authority, it also precluded the formation of coherent national policy on trade, economics, military preparedness, and the national debt. Similarly, whereas configuring academic constitutions to enhance faculty participation, input, and loyalty has potentially positive consequences, doing so will undoubtedly come at a cost to efficiency in university administration. Like the American founders, university stakeholders should approach systems of university governance conscious that constitutional schemes of representation come with both costs and benefits.
The dearth of quantitative studies on the impact of academic structures of governance means that political scientists have a potentially new and exciting vista of exploration. Based on these results, it appears that constitutions matter, even in the governance of academic affairs.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096517002530
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Meredith Bush, Matthew Robinson, Amanda Thompson and the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable contribution to this project. This research was funded in part by a grant from the Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation.
