Thucydides is claimed by both historians and political scientists. Historians refer to him as the world's first historian and political scientists position him as the original international relations realist. His famous book, The Peloponnesian War, is a classic. Written over 2,500 years ago it analyzes the war between the two Greek city-states of Athens and Sparta. There are numerous insights in the book, which is why it remains widely read today, but the most important was an initial passage: “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable” (quoted by Allison, his emphasis, vii).
Influential Harvard political scientist Graham Allison referred to this as the “Thucydides trap” which provided the title for a cover story in the Atlantic magazine in 2015. Allison documented sixteen cases over 500 years in which a dominant power was confronted by a rising power. In twelve of these cases a major war resulted and in only four of them was there a peaceful resolution. Allison used these historical data to assess the likelihood of a future war between the United States (the established power) and China (the rising power). This magazine article was recently expanded into book form released as Destined for War in 2017.
The book enables Allison to fully flesh out his argument. The opening chapter traces the rise of China (economically, militarily and educationally) since 1980. The most remarkable statistic is that China's GDP was only 7 per cent of the US in 1980 but by 2015 had increased to 61 per cent. And if measured by purchasing power parity, China's GDP has already surpassed the US to become the world's largest economy. This increased economic power is slowly facilitating an expansion of the Chinese military and the formation of a more globally based foreign policy. Subsequent chapters offer full case studies of two examples of the Thucydides trap: Athens and Sparta (500 BC ending in the Peloponnesian War) and Britain and Germany (early twentieth century ending in World War I); the book also contains thumbnail sketches of the other cases. Two of the cases for peace were Britain and the US in the early twentieth century and US and the Soviet Union in the mid- to late twentieth century.
The book's central purpose is to present historical examples of states that have both succumbed to, or averted, the Thucydides's trap in order to assess the future of US-China relations in the twenty-first century. Allison warns of the potential for war: “current confrontations in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and cyberspace, to a trade conflict that spirals out of control” (xix). However, he also makes the case for peace: “If leaders in both societies will study the successes and failures of the past, they will find a rich source of clues from which to fashion a strategy that can meet each nation's essential interests without a war” (xix). Because of the timing of the book, some have interpreted the book's warning in the context of the current US presidential administration; however, this is really a book about the structural aspects of great power relations in an anarchical world. Recent global events have prompted some to herald a return to geopolitics in which the rise of China is the number one foreign policy challenge facing the United States.
Allison has written a very important book that is likely being read not just on university campuses but in the halls of power in both Washington and Beijing. It is meticulously researched, offering 500 years of great power relations using the insights generated from the Peloponnesian War. It also employs both quantitative and qualitative data of the contemporary realities of American and Chinese power. Nonetheless, the book could do more to make its case, notably a more thorough rebuttal of some criticisms of Allison's argument. There is a two-page appendix acknowledging the “seven straw men” that his critics have put forward (287–88). However, these criticisms deserve a more fulsome response than Allison is prepared to offer. As it stands, Allison is dismissive of any criticism of his thesis. Moreover, given the contemporary context, the absence of any substantive discussion about President Donald Trump leaves the reader to draw his or her own conclusions about whether it is possible for the current US leadership to avoid the Thucydides trap. This is because Allison observes that the path to peace relies upon “wise men” who are able to construct a multiyear and multifaceted strategy to avoid the trap. Based upon the first year of the Trump administration, the prevailing wisdom among foreign policy analysists is that the current administration does not possess the necessary experience, knowledge or expertise to avoid it.
Notwithstanding its deficiencies, Destined for War is essential reading for anyone looking to theorize about the current state of the international system and the actors within it. The theoretically rich volume tests the limits of structural realism (the case for war) against the limits of liberal internationalism (the case for peace), all with an eye to predicting, and possibly influencing, the future of US-China relations.
