In Purpose in the Universe, Tim Mulgan makes a convincing case for (what he terms) Ananthropocentric Purposivism (AP) – the view that there is a non-human-centred cosmic purpose. According to AP, human beings are not only irrelevant to the cosmic purpose but God is also indifferent to the fate of humanity. Mulgan's AP God is a consequentialist who responds to comparative evaluations of different possible worlds by creating the best possible world (i.e. a world where value is maximized). Thus, AP appears committed to the following counterintuitive claim: the profuse amount of human suffering in the actual world provides evidence that God does not evaluate a possible world with human suffering as comparatively worse than one without human suffering. For Mulgan, the classic ‘problem of evil’ provides one reason to favor AP over benevolent theism (BT), as theists’ insistence that God cares about each human life seems incompatible with the amount of human suffering in the world. Benevolent theists also posit a human-centred cosmic purpose.

Mulgan offers a vigorous defense of AP, but then boldly extends that argument to Normative AP. In doing so, he argues that the non-human-centred purpose is a source of normativity for human beings (p. 7). For, ‘the cosmic purpose can matter to us, even if we do not matter to it’ (p. 3). Thus, Mulgan believes that we can still recognize objective human values and moral demands in an AP universe. And, in such a universe, human beings may still be able to live meaningful lives. While Mulgan offers a defence of AP in Parts I and II, readers must wait until Part III for his defence of Normative AP.

For Mulgan, the case for AP emerges when we take seriously a combination of familiar arguments and positions – utilitarianism, a non-naturalist moral semantics along with a robust moral realism, and traditional BT arguments and counterarguments. Mulgan presents his utilitarian and metaethical commitments in the first two chapters. In Part I (‘The Case against Atheism’), Mulgan argues in support of the existence of a God who, in creating the universe, promotes objective value. If a reader is convinced by the arguments in Part I, she is then left with a choice between AP and BT. In Part II (‘The Case against Benevolent Theism’), Mulgan canvasses well-known atheist arguments against BT and, based on these arguments, concludes that there are strong reasons to prefer AP to BT. Mulgan provides fascinating arguments and insights far beyond the scope of this review, such as a discussion of his metaethical views in chapter 2.

In chapter 1, Mulgan introduces his utilitarian commitments. First, Mulgan takes seriously the utilitarian emphasis on the suffering of sentient beings as uniquely dis-valuable. Mulgan believes we must view the problem of evil as a formidable challenge to BT. He believes that attempts to dismiss the significance of suffering by viewing it as condition for, or side-effect of, the promotion of other human goods (e.g. freedom) does not do justice to the comparative badness of suffering.

Utilitarians, claims Mulgan, are also committed to temporal impartiality. He states that ‘human welfare matters equally, no matter when it occurs’ (p. 21). As such, Mulgan believes we are obligated to recognize our moral obligations to distant future people. If we are morally required to care about future generations, then we may be required to make significant sacrifices in the present. Mulgan thus believes that morality may be far more demanding of us than is required by common-sense morality.

One of the unifying themes of Purpose in the Universe is the importance placed on objective values. For Mulgan, the only way to make sense of our obligations to future generations is by adopting an objective list theory of well-being (in contrast to hedonism and preference theory). According to this view, our lives go better for us when they instantiate objective values – regardless of our preferences. For example, knowledge, achievements, and/or autonomy may appear on a list of objective values that make our lives go better for us, regardless of our preferences.

At this point, Mulgan's true challenge becomes clear: how can he reconcile the importance of suffering and intergenerational obligations with AP, when AP is committed to the view that God is indifferent to the suffering of human beings and the fate of humanity? Mulgan attempts his answer in chapter 12 (‘Human Well-Being’). While it is well-argued, some may find his account lacking.

Mulgan offers one final utilitarian commitment. According to Mulgan, we live in a religiously ambiguous universe (p. 9). Based on the available evidence, competing interpretations of the universe, and our relationship to it, are reasonable. In adopting one interpretation over another, we must make a ‘leap of faith’ (p. 18). However, through a tendency to adopt self-aggrandizing conceptions of our own significance, Mulgan believes philosophers have almost exclusively ‘leapt’ to either BT or atheism over AP.

Mulgan thereby recommends that we adopt the utilitarian's aversion to ‘caprice’. For Mulgan, if we are convinced that there is a God, but do not know if there is a human-centred purpose (BT) or a non-human-centred purpose (AP), we should be wary of our attempts to leap directly to BT. Interestingly, Mulgan believes that many atheists may be as guilty of caprice as theists. Atheists are often convinced that there could not possibly be a God because a perfect God would not create our actual world with its magnitude of human suffering. However, this conclusion presupposes that a perfect God would necessarily care about humanity.

Mulgan's aversion to caprice motivates many of his arguments for AP in Parts II and III. At times, it feels that Mulgan may be taking this commitment too far. While it seems wise to be mindful of how self-serving biases may influence our interpretations of the universe, it seems unreasonable automatically to favour interpretations of the universe that view human beings as insignificant. For example, in chapter 7 (‘Arguments from Scale’), Mulgan argues that we are guilty of exaggerating our own significance when we assume that we are either the only rational beings in the universe or when we deny the possibility of superior rational beings (to humans). Furthermore, he insists that, if God creates the best possible world, we thereby have reason to believe that God created superior rational beings (to human beings). In this case, human beings are just not awesome enough to be the best that God can create.

Mulgan points out that the case for BT is diminished by knowledge of the existence of other superior, rational beings in the universe. As an example, let us imagine that Star Trek's Vulcans exist. They are unique in their ability to purge themselves of strong emotions, thereby enabling more fully realized rational and logical capacities. Mulgan would suggest that once we are made aware of the existence of Vulcans, we must admit the possibility that there is a Vulcan-centric cosmic purpose as opposed to a human-centred view. Given that Vulcans are assumed to be superior rational beings to humans, it seems more likely that God would privilege Vulcans over humans in creating the universe. However, since we do not know if Vulcans exist, some readers may object to the assumption that human beings are just not all that impressive.

Additionally, it is unclear how to reconcile Mulgan's utilitarian commitment to impartiality with the suggestion that God could care about the welfare of superior rational beings while being indifferent to the welfare of human beings. If we make a moral mistake in discounting cow pain because it is not human pain, God would also make a mistake in discounting human pain because it is not Vulcan pain. Mulgan does not address this issue. Perhaps we should assume that an AP God is indifferent to suffering, more generally.

For Mulgan, we can get an idea of what an AP God might value by examining features of our actual universe. In Part I, Mulgan examines cosmological, teleological and ontological arguments for God's existence. Mulgan argues that if we examine our universe we will find that:

• S : there is something rather than nothing (p. 65).

• M : our universe is governed by ‘beautiful, elegant, [and] simple mathematical laws’ (p. 106).

• I : ‘at least some of its inhabitants are capable of comprehending the laws by which it is governed’ (p. 106).

• FL : ‘our universe is friendly-to-life’ (p. 110).

Given Mulgan's commitment to objective values, he believes that the best explanation for why M, I and FL are true of our universe is that God created the universe because these features are objectively valuable. Cosmic purpose is therefore integrally related to cosmic values. It may be, for example, that God created a universe that is ‘friendly-to-life’ so that rational beings could emerge who can comprehend the laws governing that universe. Of course, Mulgan believes we may be guilty of caprice in assuming God created the universe so that human beings (and not other, superior rational beings) could comprehend it.

In Part III, Mulgan rewards us with his ultimate goal: an expansive view of AP that includes Normative AP as well. He delineates between two views–‘to be valuable is to be loved by God’ and ‘to be valuable is to resemble God’ (p. 360). While BT is committed to the former, AP may be committed to the latter. Mulgan's defence of Normative AP is intriguing and worth the wait, though perhaps not entirely convincing.

Interestingly, Mulgan appears hesitant to embrace AP's full implications for human lives. Early on, he argues that it may be impossible for human beings to produce anything cosmically significant on their own. However, Mulgan later insists that ‘the individual accomplishments of the scientist or artist or philosopher draw much of their value from the contribution to larger intergenerational human enterprises’ (p. 361). This implies that humans may indeed have the capacity to promote cosmic value through their large-scale intergenerational projects, in contradiction to his earlier claims. AP is committed to the view that God is indifferent to the fate of humanity. Yet, if this is the case, and it turns out that humanity can promote cosmic value, then an AP God should not be indifferent to our fate.

At times, reading Purpose in the Universe felt like tackling a maze: we know where we want to end up, but have no idea how we will get there. To that end, Mulgan serves as an expert guide. He deliberately and confidently steers the reader through a comprehensive, if at times demanding, discussion and defence of AP. Working through Mulgan's tome may seem a daunting task, but his skill and insight is sure to reward many a reader.