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Broome's Argument against Value Incomparability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 July 2004

ERIK CARLSON
Affiliation:
Uppsala University
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Abstract

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John Broome has argued that alleged cases of value incomparability are really examples of vagueness in the betterness relation. The main premiss of his argument is ‘the collapsing principle’. I argue that this principle is dubious, and that Broome's argument is therefore unconvincing.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
© 2004 Cambridge University Press