On 24 March 1976, representatives from the three military branches in Argentina ousted the democratically elected leader Isabel Martínez de Perón and attempted to pull the nation back from the brink of a leftist revolution. In the 1960s, several guerrilla and student movements had emerged in Argentina, each embracing violence as the means to achieve political, social and economic transformation. Groups such as the Montoneros and Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Army) drew inspiration from the Cuban Revolution; some members even went to the communist island to receive training in co-ordinating a rebellion.Footnote 1 From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, violence wracked the nation as the guerrillas carried out protests, bombings, kidnappings and assassinations. Once in power, the right-wing leaders wasted no time in putting an end to this activity and organized a more violent campaign to end the subversive threat. Known as the Dirty War, paramilitary forces systematically abducted, tortured and murdered members of the guerrilla groups, as well as friends, family members and anyone else accused of dissent.Footnote 2 Between 10,000 and 30,000 individuals lost their lives in this manner.
The Dirty War receives significant attention from scholars, but this overt subversive activity represented only one of the many threats to Argentina's order and stability. The Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (Process of National Reorganization), as this regime came to be known, embraced an expanded notion of national security as did many other Latin American militaries at this time. No longer did armed forces limit their mission to outright martial conflicts. In this Cold War world, weak administration and failing economies also constituted a direct threat to the nation's security.Footnote 3 Poverty and underdevelopment left many citizens dissatisfied, leading some – namely those in the guerrilla movements – to question the effectiveness of liberal government. To many on the right, this disillusionment made Argentina vulnerable to Soviet designs, and the armed forces responded by embracing authoritarianism in the hopes of improving administration and stamping out subversive thought. Paradoxically, the Argentine military justified the overthrow of democracy as necessary to protect it.
Thanks to this sweeping interpretation of national security, Buenos Aires became a central concern for the regime. For too long chaos ruled the city, which grew without a defined plan. Decades of neglect had sullied the glorious façades of turn-of-the-century vibrancy, and in recent years local officials had not completed any significant projects necessary to support this mass of people and activities. Since it controlled the government at all levels, the Proceso dictatorship applied its Cold War mentality to the administration of the capital. The regime enacted a comprehensive urban reform programme that complemented more well-known actions and helped align Argentina with the west.
Urban reforms furthered the cause of national security in many ways. By taking over the municipal government of Buenos Aires, the military could act unilaterally. This rule-by-decree arrangement removed the dialogue and debate of representative government, thus ensuring the swift initiation of projects deemed necessary. What is more, officials’ reliance on private enterprise to complete the reforms ensured that the inertia of the public sector would no longer be a problem. These administrative changes allowed the regime to initiate projects aimed at creating a more efficient, modern metropolis. Better transportation networks would aid in economic development by facilitating the movement of people and goods. Improved sanitation and a significant increase in green space sought to bring Buenos Aires closer to western environmental standards. Overall, this broad agenda strove to provide relatively responsive governance and to improve the overall functionality and image of the city. The Proceso dictatorship actively pursued a faster, cleaner and greener Buenos Aires, which in the minds of the generals would help save the nation from collapse.
The military mindset
In the months following the coup in 1976, the generals addressed the nation on several occasions. They felt the need to justify the ousting of civilian leaders and to present their plans for the immediate future. The head of the Army, General Jorge Rafael Videla, served as titular president and therefore mouthpiece for the Proceso. Videla gave regular speeches assuring the citizens of Argentina that what he and his cohorts did was in the best interests of the nation and that they had a course of action in mind. He tended to focus on one particular issue in these talks: how previous administrations had failed to serve the nation. This emphasis helped the military push its agenda by justifying the need to move quickly and for citizens to welcome the profound and potentially challenging reforms about to take place.
In his initial addresses, Videla laid out the basis for intervention. While he referenced subversion as a problem, he also noted issues that extended beyond guerrilla threats. The general stated that the military's actions were ‘to correct excesses, to impede deviations, to reorder and reinvigorate national life fundamentally and to change Argentine attitudes regarding individual and social responsibility in order to facilitate the complete redevelopment of our potential’.Footnote 4 Rather than just call out Marxist agitators, he instead reflected on leaders’ actions in previous decades. ‘Administrative chaos’ and ‘venality’ had taken their toll and needed to be corrected for the sake of the country's future.Footnote 5 Deviant politicians and civil servants had fallen into demagoguery and corruption thanks to partisan politics, according to the general. In addition, the bloated bureaucracy that had swelled since the late 1940s entered an extended period during which, ‘efficiency. . .[was] the exception and deficiency the norm’.Footnote 6 In short, petty, unprofessional behaviour undermined the effectiveness of the state, which threatened the security of Argentina. From the start, the Proceso regime built a case that wayward politicians had weakened the nation.
While such behaviour was deplorable to the generals, Videla also decried the effect this had on the mindset of Argentinians. The lack of responsiveness stemming from a turgid state and weak leadership meant that crucial projects remained either unfinished or unimplemented. This result, in turn, fostered frustration and undermined the citizenry's faith in public servants. Not completing necessary works had its own problems, but losing the people's support was on a far greater scale. According to Videla, as citizens rejected the state for its failures, they also turned their back on national traditions and beliefs. The resulting ‘crisis of identity’ fed subversive activity and shook the foundations of society.Footnote 7 The general and his ilk plainly saw how poor governance could affect more than just day-to-day lives; hapless leadership could arguably be the downfall of the nation. In this way, the quality of administration became a matter of national security.
The armed forces argued that the state had to promote the ‘common good’, but how did they expect to do so? Videla repeatedly pointed to the ‘cleaning, or stabilization of the state’ (saneamiento del estado) to achieve this end.Footnote 8 Getting the government in functioning order required the completion of two main objectives. First, appointed officials had to restructure and reorient state activities. They were instructed to take stock of what needed to be done and prioritize the most pressing needs.Footnote 9 The military wanted to have as immediate an impact as possible so as to convince citizens of the Proceso's responsiveness. Alleviating the most troubling problems would have that effect.
Second, the junta expected its representatives to work closely with private industry and the professional community. These two groups had much to offer to Argentina's ‘financial, technological and economic independence’.Footnote 10 Their skills and expertise would lift the nation out of this quagmire by bringing truly capable individuals. Rather than leave reforms to career politicians, why not contract those with specialized training, modern equipment and ample capital? The military saw this as a way to ensure that this reorganized state pursued the correct responses to its problems.
This inclusion of private industry and professionals also closely followed the junta's desire to implement sweeping neoliberal economic reforms. The dictatorship enacted policies meant to open the nation to greater foreign investment and to privatize state industries. Not only did these policies strive to bring Argentina closer to western nations (who would be the main investors), the generals argued that private initiative brought increased productivity due to competition for these lucrative public works projects.Footnote 11 Naturally, this privileging of neoliberal reforms responded to the perceived threat of socialism and Marxism, as well as to the shortcomings of previous administrations, by opening Argentina to the free market.Footnote 12 These two responses – restructuring and reorientation along with private expertise – would help find suitable solutions to the nation's issues.
With a basic agenda in place, the Proceso regime set out to make it a reality. The military removed civilians from power at virtually every level of government in the months following the coup. At the national level, President Isabel Perón was deposed in the coup along with her cabinet. Below, state governors and mayors also lost their positions. These individuals embodied the corruption and demagoguery that the generals saw as so damaging. In their place, the armed forces appointed active and retired officers to these offices, as well as sympathetic civilians. The dictatorship dissolved democratically elected bodies such as the national congress, and it shuttered the courts.Footnote 13 No previous military regime in Argentina had ever taken over so many administrative positions or so thoroughly controlled government from top to bottom.Footnote 14 In this new arrangement, the military not only removed the perceived worst offenders against national security, but they also set up a system wherein military officials could act quickly and unilaterally, bypassing debate and eschewing accountability. Little stood in the way of the armed forces’ designs for Argentina.
Restructuring and reorienting Buenos Aires
It was in this Cold War milieu that the urban chaos of Buenos Aires received new notice. The generals’ appointed mayor, General Devaldo A. Cacciatore, readily accepted his new position. Cacciatore was a native of Buenos Aires, born there in 1924, and had dedicated his life to service in the Air Force. He never attained positions of great power nor achieved significant notoriety. However, he did have a solid career and a preferred political orientation. Cacciatore played a minor role in a failed coup against Juan Perón in 1951. He also served on the Joint General Staff of Interim President General Alejandro Lanusse in 1972.Footnote 15 Cacciatore's credentials as politically conservative and compliant with commanding officers made him a good choice for the regime.
At Cacciatore's swearing-in ceremony, the top officials in attendance – including General Videla – made clear the importance of this post in the national order. The minister of the interior, General Albano Eduardo Harguíndeguy, specifically stated:
By putting into your hands the government and administration of the capital city of the Republic, the National Executive Branch trusts in your capacity and in the apt diligence and experience of all with whom you will collaborate, military and civilian. The capital of the Republic is in essence the synthesis of the country, and in her we shall achieve the results and rationality that should be sought throughout Argentina. The National Executive Branch extends its most fervent support for its successful growth. The responsibility of the Municipal government is yours.Footnote 16
By accepting this position, the new military mayor not only needed to see to Buenos Aires’ transformation, but by extension that of Argentina. The capital was home to 11 million people, approximately one third of the national population. This metropolitan mass of people was divided politically and geographically between the Capital Federal (the federalized urban core) and Greater Buenos Aires (the surrounding suburban municipalities inextricably linked to the federal district).Footnote 17 The city served as the seat of federal power, as well as the cultural and economic centre. Reforms here had repercussions beyond municipal borders and required the co-ordination of many autonomous entities. Yet with the support of his superiors, Cacciatore took on the daunting task with aplomb and zeal.
Cacciatore faithfully followed the regime's vision in his reorganization and control of the capital. He dismissed the Hall of Representatives, the representative body for the municipality of Buenos Aires. Cacciatore also dissolved the neighbourhood councils that acted on behalf of the different barrios in the city. These local actions clearly echoed those undertaken at the federal level. He then filled municipal positions with like-minded, eager professionals such as engineers and architects, thus welcoming technical expertise in the city's management. With his newly appointed officials, Cacciatore started to assess the current state of affairs in the capital and decide on a plan of action.
Key to this process was the mayor's secretary of public works, Guillermo Domingo Laura. Laura was neither an architect nor an engineer, but he still acted as the principle designer of Cacciatore's reforms. He had trained as a lawyer at the University of Buenos Aires, and upon graduation in 1960, he served as a legal assessor for multiple hydroelectric projects in Argentina. This experience piqued his interest in major development schemes. During his time working on a dam in Neuquén, Laura saw the promise of such large-scale transformations. He remarked, ‘I remember when they began the project [El Chocón] in 1967, the backwardness of the city of Neuquén was so great that there was not a single hotel with private bathrooms. Now there are dozens.’Footnote 18 The project brought more than electricity and jobs. In Laura's eyes, the project had a ripple effect that helped the interior city to modernize in indirect ways. Such was the promise of these massive undertakings.
These experiences led Laura to return to his hometown of Buenos Aires and to promote reforms aimed at improving the capital. He wrote two highly acclaimed books proposing major renovations. The first, La ciudad arterial (1970), tackled the problem of transit in Buenos Aires. According to Laura, the rapidly growing population and increasing individual car ownership had completely overwhelmed existing infrastructure. The previous municipal governments had not undertaken any significant road projects since the 1940s. In fact, in some areas of the city, the narrow streets more closely resembled the old colonial layout, hardly sufficient for millions of commuters. Antiquated streets provided clear evidence that previous municipal governments had failed to keep up with the capital's explosive development.
To fix this problem, Laura proposed a system of 10 elevated urban highways superimposed on the city. No stoplights, pedestrians or idling buses meant that cars and trucks could drive without interruption. The highways would connect virtually every corner of the Capital Federal to the outlying suburbs, where 8 million people resided and the majority of industries were located. Buenos Aires contained 40 per cent of the nation's factories, which produced 60 per cent of Argentina's finished goods. Approximately 50 per cent of imports came through the city, and the municipality consumed more than half of the nation's energy.Footnote 19 Laura argued that individuals and businesses would greatly benefit from being able to circulate through the capital with ease and at a steady speed so as not to hinder productivity.
Advocating such an approach to urban transit came from Laura's desire to emulate western projects, namely those of the United States. He repeatedly referred to the Interstate Highway System as an example to follow and drew statistics from studies of US highway construction.Footnote 20 Laura also quoted Dewitt C. Greer, a former Texas Department of Roads engineer, to emphasize the promise of such an undertaking. According to Greer, ‘The United States doesn't have magnificent roads because it is a rich country. The United States is rich because it has the vision to construct such roads.’Footnote 21 The soon-to-be-secretary of public works made the case that an efficient network of roads would improve economic activity and help make Buenos Aires a wealthier city on par with more developed nations. The professional community lauded La ciudad arterial, and Laura received a gold medal from the National Science Academy for his vision.
In 1974, Laura turned his attention to the urban environment and green space. His next book, El cinturón ecológico, showed a city that had lost its balance and connection with nature. Buenos Aires averaged only a few square metres of green space for each resident, which paled in comparison to western cities. Household refuse also posed a serious threat. Since the turn of the century, municipal and private incinerators had burned the majority of accumulated refuse. Open-air landfills dotted the metropolis as well, and together these systems spewed large amounts of noxious odours and pollutants into the environment. Without ample green space, the city lacked oxygen-producing vegetation to clear the air of contaminants. Laura applauded Buenos Aires’ growth but lamented the ill effects on the health of local residents.
Laura proposed that Buenos Aires follow the example of other western cities and employ sanitary landfill methods. He recommended that the city close down the incinerators and open-air dumps. Instead, garbage would be gathered and sent to specially selected lands in the suburbs. Workers would inter the refuse, and once it reached a certain height, it would be capped with clay and parks built on top. Laura once again cited many western examples of sanitary landfills, as well as notable parks that defined the image of developed cities.Footnote 22 From these experiences, he drew inspiration and aspired to their level. However, none was on the same scale as those proposed by Laura. The project he outlined would create a vast green belt covering up to 50,000 hectares and form a verdant wall around the metropolis.Footnote 23 The completion of such an ambitious programme would reset the scales, restoring equilibrium between growth and environment, between industry and health.
Cacciatore knew of Laura's publications and embraced him as a like-minded individual. The ideas proposed by the new secretary of public works echoed the basic objectives and concerns laid out by the Proceso regime. He understood the promise of major developmental projects and the role they could play in the aggrandizement of Argentina. Laura also privileged western examples as models for Buenos Aires to follow. He especially favoured projects completed by the United States, a fact demonstrative of his desire to achieve the same level of development. Finally, he chastised the inaction of previous officials and their inability to respond to local needs. This critique clearly echoed those made by junta leaders like Videla, who blamed Argentina's failures on poor governance as much as on leftist guerrillas. Taken together, Laura wanted the same for Buenos Aires as the generals wanted for Argentina: to save the nation by shoring up the foundations of government and resolving long-standing issues.
Once in office, Cacciatore and his officials surveyed the state of affairs in the city and began to set priorities for a new urban agenda. Three main reforms stand out in this period as prime examples of the Proceso regime's vision for the city and for responsive governance. These projects – urban highways, a green belt and reorganized trash collection and disposal – would break from the past by resolving persistent problems. This transformation would be achieved by pursuing efficiency in design and execution and crafting a modern image for the nation. Private enterprise played a key role in this process by supposedly bringing in expertise, using the latest technology and reducing the overall cost of the projects. The military felt assured in its approach to urban planning and argued that a more stable, secure Buenos Aires would emerge.
Faster: the Highway Plan (Plan de Autopistas)
The Highway Plan, which Cacciatore quickly approved in 1977, closely followed Laura's proposal in La ciudad arterial.Footnote 24 The version passed by the municipality called for a total of seven elevated highways to be built. The network would connect virtually every corner of the city, with the highways terminating at major thoroughfares in the suburbs. The new roads would not take the place of existing streets; instead, planners placed the highways in the middle of city blocks. Officials argued that this design would not disrupt traffic during construction, though it did necessitate the expropriation of thousands of properties. Upon completion, drivers could expect to move through the city in a fraction of the time it currently took.
This pursuit of rapid transit heeded the call for efficiency. Millions of commuters poured into the Capital Federal on a daily basis, and new connections with suburban networks would ease access to the city centre for this regular influx of workers and visitors. In addition, commercial interests made extensive use of existing roads. Trucks hauled over 95 per cent of overland freight.Footnote 25 Considering that most products produced in Argentina or imported into the country passed through the ports of Buenos Aires, officials surmised that the highways would speed up the movement of goods as well. Wasted time in traffic meant higher costs and lost productivity. The municipal administration argued that the highways significantly contributed to economic improvement, thereby reducing poverty and unrest according to the military's logic.
The desire for efficiency also came through in the design of the highways. Since the roads were elevated, officials wanted to make sure that they put the space below to good use. In a pamphlet promoting the highways, the municipality included a picture imagining how it would use that open area underneath. The colourful depiction showed people milling about and interacting in a clean, brightly lit place, thus giving the impression that this would be an active place for social engagement.Footnote 26 City officials planned to fill the space with shops, offices, police commissaries, parking lots, recreation facilities and cultural centres. Laura steadfastly maintained that the highway would ‘create functional diversity, rich and agile like the city that it traverses’.Footnote 27 By filling the area with services and activities, city planners hoped that the highways fostered community connections rather than created a wall cutting off neighbours and bringing blight.Footnote 28
A more efficient use of space also emerged through a related project: subway expansion. In addition to not adding or improving roads, previous administrations did not pursue significant renovations to the subways.Footnote 29 Existing lines needed updates and proposed additional routes remained simply ideas on paper. However, digging and working underground accounted for a major portion of the building costs, and authorities proved hesitant to approve these expenditures. Since workers had to dig up land in order to build the highways, Secretary Laura figured that this would be an excellent opportunity to extend a branch of the existing system. Doing so would reduce the cost of lengthening the line by 70 per cent.Footnote 30 Officials incorporated this idea into the final design, demonstrating their commitment to making the most of every sum spent.
With an approved plan, municipal officials had to decide how to fund and build the project. Eight elevated highways would come at a high price. City officials followed the neoliberal agenda established by the junta and turned to private companies to complete the work. The national minister of the economy, José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, promoted privatization as a viable option for virtually any service or industry, provided that activity did not interfere with public order.Footnote 31 Authorities decided that allowing private companies to build the highways and complete subsequent urban reforms posed no significant threat and provided substantial benefits. The companies that received contracts covered the major costs while the municipality paid for the project or service in small increments over time. Martínez de Hoz and like-minded officials also believed that contract winners brought with them expertise and technology, meaning the projects were completed with the highest level of competency. They poured their faith into private initiative since they felt that public administration had fallen so short over the past few decades.
On 6 October 1977, Cacciatore opened up a competition for the contract to build the first two highways, Perito Moreno and 25 de Mayo.Footnote 32 National and international companies eagerly submitted their bids for the concession. What made the project appealing for investors was the fact that drivers would have to pay to use these roads. The winning company would receive all toll receipts for 25 years, and they would collect rents on the spaces beneath the highways.Footnote 33 And if receipts fell short of projections, then the municipality covered the deficit. With such favourable terms, 11 consortiums entered bids, and in January 1978, Cacciatore chose Autopistas Urbanas, SA (AUSA), a conglomerate of Spanish and Argentine firms. AUSA had until June 1980 to complete the first two highways, with an additional year to finish the extension of subway Line E and facilities underneath the roads.Footnote 34
Despite being completed six months behind schedule, the opening of Autopistas 25 de Mayo and Perito Moreno involved significant fanfare and celebration. The inauguration ceremony took place at Chacabuco Park on 6 December 1980. Municipal officials, junta members and other distinguished guests attended the festivities, which included a blessing from the archbishop of Buenos Aires, Juan Carlos Aramburu.Footnote 35 A steady stream of articles appeared in local newspapers, the pieces detailing the construction process, calculating the amount of materials used to complete the highways and explaining the various design and safety features.Footnote 36 Advertisements placed by corporations associated with the construction – car manufacturers, steel producers, industrial lighting and the like – joined the festivities by noting how their products were a part of this fantastic undertaking.
Coverage of the event not only prepared residents for life with the highways, but also allowed the regime to laud the construction as a glowing achievement of their stated goals. As hundreds of cars poured onto the roads for the first time, Cacciatore declared that the project ushered in the beginning of a new era.Footnote 37 He had seen what the city needed and took the steps necessary to make the highways a reality. The idea did not remain on paper or stuck in endless debates between squabbling political interests. Cacciatore seized the full authority of the Proceso regime and bypassed the usual obstacles. He thus made the highways a permanent part of the urban fabric of Buenos Aires, a very visible break from a past characterized by tepid intentions and inertia.
Cleaner and greener – trash collection and the green belt
The military also turned its attention to the environmental health of Buenos Aires. As with the highways, city officials opted to make Laura's green belt proposal a reality. A metropolis of 11 million people necessitated ample green space for the overall mental and physical health of residents. Parks also provided a crucial service since vegetation helped clear the air of carbon dioxide, an abundant byproduct in this city filled with cars, trucks and buses. As for trash, Laura saw it as an equivocal demonstration of the capital's high level of development. Refuse meant that people had disposable income and access to a plethora of products, but too much garbage became unsightly, as well as a health and environmental threat.Footnote 38 Under the Proceso regime, municipal officials searched for balance between markers of progress and natural needs. The main objectives of efficiency and modernization came to overlap in this radical effort to clean and green Buenos Aires.
As the city began work on this undertaking, officials had to recognize that the green belt involved not just the federal district but also the surrounding suburbs. This required authorities throughout the metropolitan area to co-ordinate their efforts and work together. Never had the municipality of Buenos Aires (the federal district) explicitly co-ordinated with provincial authorities in the suburbs. This lack of communication and joint action meant that problems common to both divisions frequently had remained unresolved, thus hindering metropolitan development.
To promote co-operation, the military junta approved of a new state entity to oversee the green belt's construction. The agency, Cinturón Ecológico Área Metropolitana, Sociedad del Estado (CEAMSE), set to work in May 1977. Various representatives from the Capital Federal and provincial government filled out its board of directors.Footnote 39 CEAMSE's organization offered a clear break from the past as both entities were directly charged to communicate and co-operate. Cacciatore and the governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, General Ibérico Saint-Jean, both praised the shared benefits of this co-ordinated effort.Footnote 40 Success could only be assured through collaboration.
Completion of this project also required that residents change how they disposed of their trash. Since 1894, the people of Buenos Aires had primarily burned their refuse.Footnote 41 Large buildings had their own incinerators, and the municipality operated three public incinerators. Open-air landfills became a final destination for garbage as well. In December 1976, the municipal government passed Ordinance 33.291 calling for the cessation of all incinerators in the city. This order was complemented by another that closed all open-air landfills. CEAMSE's directors then turned to private companies to complete this dirty work. They granted concessions to private corporations to collect trash and deliver it to lands selected in the suburbs. The contract winner would find the opportunity lucrative since the municipality and suburbs paid per ton of garbage collected. Residents were instructed to put their trash in bags and place those bags on the curb. Six nights a week, trucks came around and gathered up that garbage. In this way, the green belt authority gained complete control of the city's refuse and therefore had the means for constructing parks.
The reclaimed green spaces contained extensive recreation facilities as well as relatively undeveloped natural areas. The parks that made up the belt tended to follow a similar design. For example, the Bancalari Experimental Area in the northern suburb of San Fernando covered 407 acres and contained football fields, tennis courts, roller skating zones, playgrounds, refreshment stands, a sport equipment store and other support facilities.Footnote 42 In the natural areas, authorities pursued a policy of reforestation, which sought to make this project truly ‘green’. CEAMSE worked closely with the National Forestry Institute (IFONA) in planting trees throughout the reclaimed lands.Footnote 43 In 1980, they planted 16,000 trees in the northern part of the green belt and 7,000 in the south-east arc.Footnote 44 Workers and volunteers added more than 37,000 additional trees in 1981.Footnote 45 The green belt, with its modern facilities and a seeming dedication to the environment, helped create a progressive image for the city.
As with the highways, officials appreciated the role that private enterprise could play in public services. In this case, CEAMSE's directors particularly welcomed the new technology the concessionaires brought to the task. The green belt authority contracted the North American company, Waste Management International, Inc., to secure necessary equipment, including 160 new trash compacting trucks, 25 street sweepers-vacuums, 5 dump trucks, 2 street washers and 2 storm-drain cleaners.Footnote 46 They eventually added more compacting trucks to the fleet, bringing the total up to 330. These particular vehicles were integral to CEAMSE's plans. Officials wanted to keep operation costs down, so the trucks had to be able to collect large quantities without having to unload frequently. The compacting action allowed them to do so and therefore complete fewer runs. Private enterprise brought the latest equipment necessary to help the project proceed at a steady pace.
CEAMSE also strove for efficiency in the way it processed trash for interment. The city demolished the public incinerators and in their place built three transfer stations, which were completed in 1979.Footnote 47 These stations employed a minimum number of workers who diligently separated recyclable materials from the non-reusable refuse, the latter being sent to the sanitary landfills. According to CEAMSE's estimates, each station processed 1,000 tons of trash each day, taking 15 minutes to unload, sift through and reload the trash onto trucks. The directors noted that while the old incinerators employed 2,800 people, the new stations functioned smoothly with 1,000. Taken together, better technology and fewer employees, trash collection only cost 50 dollars a ton whereas before it cost 100 dollars a ton.Footnote 48 Streamlined collection and processing represented a vast improvement over the labour-intensive and time-consuming methods employed by previous administrations.
Officials certainly had much to brag about with the design and construction of the green belt, as nothing of the sort had been attempted before in Buenos Aires. They adopted an efficient system for not only disposing of waste, but also adding substantial green space to a metropolitan area severely lacking in that resource. This approach sought to provide multiple benefits, including alleviating atmospheric pollution and providing a place where urbanites could find respite in nature. Privatization did much to help CEAMSE reach these goals. By taking services out of public and putting them into private hands, authorities acted in a way counter to past actions. Corporations vying for these lucrative contracts promised to complete the work quickly and at a reduced cost. They also brought with them equipment that modernized the disposal of trash. With the skies clearing and a green wall steadily surrounding the city, the military promoted a new image of Buenos Aires. The capital seemed to be transitioning from a state of inertia to a dynamic metropolis on par with the most developed urban centres of the world.
Reactions
The military's perception did not match that of the residents of Buenos Aires, however. From their perspective the reforms ignored local needs and negatively impacted communities throughout the city. Without traditional democratic bodies and practices in place, locals had to find alternative ways to make their opinions heard by municipal officials. The letters to the editor section of local newspapers became an active arena for dissent as individuals throughout the city used this space to express their discontent.Footnote 49 Citizens detailed the realities of the projects and how the highways and trash collection in particular did not live up to the hype. Whether the military actually provided responsive governance and resolved long-standing issues became a point of intense debate.
The highways arguably received the greatest amount of criticism. Consistently throughout the Proceso period, readers griped about the noise and pollution coming from the construction.Footnote 50 Many individuals denounced the roads as ‘pharoanic’, simply grandiose projects in service of Cacciatore's ego.Footnote 51 Others complained of the exorbitant price tag attached to this supposedly efficient, modern infrastructure.Footnote 52 Professionals, namely engineers and architects, added to the debate. They used their expertise to label the reforms as retrograde, out of step with planning trends around the world and at the expense of public transit.Footnote 53 The sum of such denouncements indicated that citizens saw the highways as a poor use of resources that did not categorically improve life in the city.
Revised trash ordinances received their fair share of criticism, though people debated who was at fault when problems arose. Residents regularly noted streets and corners where trash remained piled up, releasing fetid odours and attracting vermin.Footnote 54 Generally in these letters, people pointed to failure of concessionaires to complete their work diligently and so expressed dissatisfaction with the supposed improvements private enterprise provided. On the other hand, other residents regularly denounced neighbours who openly defied the new disposal regulations. Even after burning refuse was banned, people wrote about seeing smoke coming from incinerators and soot covering their balconies.Footnote 55 In the realm of trash, new practices had a hard time taking root among locals. This lack of compliance for whatever reason sullied CEAMSE's visions of capable, responsive service.
Interestingly, the green belt did not garner much attention at the time. Residents may have been frustrated by trash collection, the basis for the sanitary landfills, but they did not explicitly connect garbage to increasing green space. This limited view could suggest that residents of the Capital Federal had no objection to the parks themselves; rather, they took issue with the immediate failures they saw every day in their neighbourhoods. This lack of criticism could also stem from the fact that the green belt was located a great distance from the central core of the metropolis. The physical separation between the urban core and the green belt pushed the projects far from locals’ minds.Footnote 56 In both cases, the immediate presence of the highways and trash collection drew people's attentions, leading locals to challenge the official rhetoric of efficiency and modernity.
Conclusion
The military's broad vision of national security made even the most quotidian areas of public administration a battleground in the fight against communism. Upon taking control of Argentina, the generals blamed previous leaders for the nation's downward spiral. Petty partisan squabbles and inertia created widespread disenchantment among citizens, leaving the nation vulnerable to leftist subversion. As head of the junta, General Videla set a course where the regime would make responsive governance a priority. He vowed to act quickly and to implement changes long overdue. This transformation, according to the military, would restore peoples’ faith in the state and therefore prevent Argentina from falling to the left.
Buenos Aires’ urban development became an opportunity to demonstrate this new commitment, but the Proceso did not necessarily get the results it wanted. Decades of municipal inaction led to chaotic growth of the capital as traffic slowed the movement of goods and people and unsanitary conditions threatened the quality of life for residents. As the city's appointed mayor, Brigadier Cacciatore initiated several projects meant to improve the city and modernize it. The military wanted citizens to see the steady pace of construction with the highways and the green belt as a sign of the regime's dedication to change. However, the people of Buenos Aires did not see the projects in the same light. Instead, they decried the highways’ destruction of neighbourhoods and their massive price tags. People also pointed to the failure of concessionaires to complete the work for which they were contracted. While the military saw a faster, cleaner and greener Buenos Aires emerge, residents still saw a state unable to provide for its people.
