1. INTRODUCTION
This contribution focuses on the challenges that regional organizations face as they are increasingly confronted with, and need to respond to, transboundary and global environmental problems. Ever more frequently, environmental issues that begin as matters of national concern rapidly become transboundary in scope.Footnote 1 As exemplified by the outbreak of avian flu, integrated national, regional and international efforts are necessary to tackle transboundary environmental issues which, by their very definition, call for a coordinated effort. This article will concentrate on the impact of transboundary environmental challenges on the objectives and functions of the Association of South East Asian Nations (asean).
Established in 1967, asean consists of ten Member States: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.Footnote 2 Over the last decade, asean has confronted a growing range of transboundary environmental challenges, including transboundary pollution, the threat of pandemics from zoonotic diseases (such as sars, avian flu, and h1n1) and climate change, which has brought more frequent and intense storms, floods, and landslides and which threatens biodiversity, ecosystems, food security,Footnote 3 and water resources. Accordingly, asean has developed a number of environmental instruments to deal with such challenges. The organization also takes an increasingly active role in addressing global environmental issues and has strengthened its position as a player in facilitating the implementation of global environmental issues under the relevant multilateral environmental agreements (meas).
However, unlike the European Union (eu), asean does not have a directly elected Parliament to assist it in this task, nor does it have a judicial system to enforce its laws. As a result, the political will of individual asean Member States is just as crucial as action at the sub-regional level in ensuring the success of implementation. Moreover, asean’s organizational structure, laid down in the 2007asean Charter,Footnote 4 operates on the basis of three interdependent, mutually reinforcing pillars: the Political-Security Community Pillar (first pillar), the Economic Community Pillar (second pillar), and the Socio-Cultural Community Pillar (third pillar). Blueprints for each pillar have been developed, detailing concrete targets and cooperative actions to be achieved.Footnote 5 There is scope for environmental issues to be classified under different headings within at least the first and second pillars. The determination of which section under which pillar governs a particular environmental challenge has a serious impact on the range of options available to asean to address the issue.
The paragraphs below examine asean’s expanding role as a player in addressing transboundary and global environmental issues, illustrated in the fields of biodiversity protection, wildlife protection, and climate change. The article then discusses some of the challenges that asean faces as a transboundary environmental regulator through two case studies: the Indonesian Haze and the control of zoonotic diseases. These case studies illustrate the careful balance asean needs to strike between the need for cooperation and transnational action to address transboundary environmental problems, and the need to respect domestic sovereignty. It also shows the impact of the pillar structure, and the different sections within it, on asean’s mandate as a transnational environmental regulator.
2. ROLE OF ASEAN IN ‘ADDRESSING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES’
The role of asean in addressing global environmental issues under Part ii, section d1 of the Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint is quite distinct from its mandate to address ‘transboundary challenges’ under the Political-Security Community Blueprint, although the two pillars are mutually reinforcing. While some environmental issues referred to in Part ii, section d also cross national boundaries (for example, ‘Transboundary Haze Pollution’ under Part ii, section d2.1, and ‘Responding to Climate Change and Addressing its Impacts’ under section d10) and are, hence, ‘transboundary’, the context is different – it is that of not yet reaching a crisis, or is perhaps too politically sensitive (as in the case of the Indonesian Haze, see Section 3.1 below) to be considered under the political-security pillar. If the issue reaches a crisis, there is no reason why the non-traditional approach under the asean Political-Security Community Blueprint cannot be invoked, as the two are mutually reinforcing. The ‘global environmental issues’ are those mainly under the relevant mea, such as illegal trade in endangered species under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (cites),Footnote 6 or the impacts of climate change. These meas are hard laws but are supplemented by soft laws at the international, regional and national levels.Footnote 7 Because of the global nature of meas, they require the cooperation of every nation, regional and sub-regional organization. To this end, asean promotes synergies in the implementation of relevant meas, and strengthens regional cooperation to address thematic clusters of meas, such as those dealing with biodiversity and climate change.
Addressing global environmental issues is a strategic objective under Part ii, section d of the Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint. The Blueprint states that asean will act to:
i. Intensify regional cooperation to enhance and strengthen national and regional capacities to address issues and commitments to relevant Multilateral Environmental Agreements (meas) through regional research, promoting awareness, capacity building programmes and informed policy choices;
ii. Promote synergies in the implementation of related meas through strengthening of regional cooperation to address measures related to the thematic clusters of meas on atmospheric issues such as climate change and ozone depleting substances, and meas on chemicals and chemical wastes;
iii. Promote asean common understanding/common position on relevant meas; and
iv. Adopt a holistic approach in fostering regional cooperation on environmental issues, with the participation of all relevant stakeholders including business, academics, ngos and civil society organizations.Footnote 8
The three reviews below illustrate the increasing role that asean plays in addressing global environmental problems, and in facilitating the implementation and updating of environmental laws.
2.1. Reducing Biodiversity Loss
The United Nations (un) Millennium Development Goal 7 calls for the integration of the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes in order to reverse the loss of environmental resources and biodiversity.Footnote 9 Over the last 30 years, asean has focused on conservation efforts, creating terrestrial and marine protected areas in order to give protection to flora and fauna.Footnote 10 While initially asean’s progress in this area was slow and halting, conservation activities have increased over the last few years. Thus, when the asean Declaration on Heritage Parks and Reserves was first introduced in 1984, only five designations were made.Footnote 11 The 1984 Declaration was replaced in 2003 by the asean Declaration on Heritage Parks. Currently, 30asean Heritage Parks (ahps) have been designated.Footnote 12 The ahps are protected areas of high conservation importance covering a complete spectrum of representative ecosystems in the asean region. The asean Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint calls for the further listing and coordinated management of ahps as an effective platform for ecosystem-based protected areas, which will complement the Convention on Biological Diversity (cbd),Footnote 13 the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands,Footnote 14 and the World Heritage Convention (whc),Footnote 15 thus promoting a network of ecosystems not only in asean states but also throughout the world.Footnote 16
In addition to ahps, asean has endorsed the ‘Heart of Borneo’ initiative to create a transboundary biodiversity sanctuary straddling Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia.Footnote 17 The sanctuary would protect the largest remaining contiguous forested area in Southeast Asia – approximately 220,000 km2 – against illegal logging and clearing of land for oil plantations.
asean is also preparing to implement Marine Heritage Areas. One such area, the Sulu Sulawesi Marine Ecoregion, was designated in 2004 during the Convention on Biodiversity Conference of the Parties meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.Footnote 18 This area lies in the coral triangle bounded by the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. It produces some 2.3 million tons of fish annually, but it is under severe threat from destructive cyanide fishing among coral reefs, industrial waste, untreated sewage, and deforestation. Currently, national conservation plans are being put in place in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Another example of transboundary conservation is the 1997 Memorandum of Understanding (mou) on asean Sea Turtle Conservation and Protection, which recognizes the significance of sea turtles and their habitats in asean waters, as well as their migratory nature.Footnote 19 Because sea turtles cross borders, effective conservation efforts cannot be achieved solely at the national level and multilateral efforts are necessary to ensure their long-term survival. Under the mou, the relevant asean countries are to jointly manage, protect and conserve all species of turtle and their habitats in the asean region through unified management, conservation and protection strategies. The mou has been augmented by a bilateral agreement between the Philippines and Malaysia.Footnote 20
Other areas on asean’s biodiversity agenda include forest law enforcement governance,Footnote 21 minimizing the impacts of the transboundary movement of living modified organisms (lmos), and promoting synergies in the implementation of related meas in biodiversity.
2.2. The asean Statement on cites and the asean Wildlife Law Enforcement Network
Illegal trade in endangered species is a serious problem in Southeast Asia. While all asean Member States have ratified cites,Footnote 22 the 13th Conference of the Parties meeting of cites, held in Bangkok, Thailand, in October 2004, noted that illegal trade in endangered species was still rife in Southeast Asia.Footnote 23 In response, asean issued its ‘Statement on cites’ on 11 October 2004, which highlighted six key areas of cooperation.Footnote 24 The following year, asean launched its Regional Action Plan on Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora 2005–2010Footnote 25 (Action Plan).
Pursuant to the Action Plan, the asean-Wildlife Law Enforcement Network (asean-wen)Footnote 26 was established to promote networking amongst enforcement authorities in both asean and non-asean regions to combat the illegal wildlife trade. The asean-wen Programme Coordination Unit (pcu) was set up in Bangkok to facilitate and coordinate technical support for asean-wen at regional and global levels, including support through intelligence sharing, reviewing and amending the relevant laws on cites that are currently considered to be inadequate or incomplete, and coordinating enforcement action.Footnote 27asean-wen has since become the largest wildlife law enforcement network in the world and includes governmental, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations in both asean and non-asean countries. asean-wen has also developed links with Interpol, the World Customs Organization (wco), the cites Secretariat, the wildlife trade monitoring network traffic,Footnote 28 and WildAid,Footnote 29 as well as asean customs, police, prosecutors, specialized governmental wildlife law enforcement organizations, and other relevant national law enforcement agencies. asean-wen also actively engages with civil society by raising awareness of issues of legality and sustainability.Footnote 30
From the viewpoint of environmental governance, asean-wen has achieved a number of milestones. The asean-wen Support Program Assessment Report (10 April 2008) noted increased support from civil society to stop illegal trade.Footnote 31asean-wen also provides an example of cooperation and coordination at the regional and state level of environmental governance amongst asean countries. Finally, asean-wen enjoys international cooperation – making it a global network for the enforcement of illegal trade in endangered species.
2.3. Climate Change and Energy
asean is involved in a number of initiatives to tackle climate change. At its 13th Summit Meeting in 2007, asean adopted the Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment (Singapore Declaration).Footnote 32 Amongst the measures called for in this Declaration are:
• the development of adaptation and mitigation strategies;
• increased access to safe drinking water, basic sanitation and the promotion of integrated water resource management; and
• the development of solutions to the environmental challenges posed by rapid urbanization.
asean is currently formulating a climate change initiative,Footnote 33 and is collaborating with the un and other international organizations in various other initiatives, including the Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change.Footnote 34 This Programme aims to assist developing countries and small island states in understanding the adverse impacts of climate change. asean also collaborates with a number of countries, supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (sida) and the un Environment Programme (unep). It is a member of the Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network (funded by the Rockefeller Foundation),Footnote 35 and is connected with the Regional Climate Adaptation Knowledge Platform for Asia (rcakpa).Footnote 36
At its recent 19th Summit held in Bali, Indonesia, from 17 to 19 November 2011, asean made a declaration to:
[u]rge all Parties to the unfccc[Footnote 37] and to work together to secure balanced, comprehensive, and legally binding agreements under the two-track process established under the Bali Roadmap and the Bali Action Plan of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (awg-lca) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol [Footnote 38] (awg-kp), with a view to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2ºc.Footnote 39
It also calls for enhanced cooperation and collaboration among asean states in the area of climate change.
3. CONFRONTING TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES
To understand how asean has responded to transboundary environmental issues originating within its region, it is necessary to consider the organization’s current structure. In 2007, forty years after its founding, asean was at a critical turning point: to move forward as the driving force in regional cooperation, it needed an effective institutional framework, including a strong reporting system and an effective Secretariat with monitoring powers. To this end, the 2007asean CharterFootnote 40 restructured its organization around the three pillars referred to in the introduction to this article: the Political-Security Community Pillar (first pillar), the Economic Community Pillar (second pillar), and the Socio-Cultural Community Pillar (third pillar). The Charter also established Ministerial Councils for each of the three Communities, as well as a Coordinating Council to coordinate them. The aim of these changes has been enhanced policy coherence, efficiency and cooperation amongst Member States. Blueprints for each pillar were developed, detailing concrete targets and cooperative actions to be achieved.Footnote 41
The restructuring of its institutional framework will enable asean to deal more effectively with transboundary and other (including environmental) issues. The Charter establishes a different regime for global environmental issues on the one hand, and transboundary environmental challenges on the other. As illustrated in Section 2 above, global environmental challenges typically fall within Part ii, section d1 of the Socio-Cultural Community Pillar. Transboundary environmental challenges, however, are deemed to be of greater urgency than global environmental issues, and are generally dealt with under the Political-Security Community Blueprint rather than the Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint.Footnote 42 For environmental challenges under the Political-Security Community Blueprint, the non-traditional security (nts) approach under Part ii, section b4 applies.Footnote 43 The nts approach is based on the idea of comprehensive security, which refers to those security threats that fall outside the traditional definition of security involving military intervention. ‘Non-traditional security’ challenges include issues such as drug trafficking, transnational crimes (such as terrorism), transboundary challenges such as pandemics, and climate change disasters that spill over national boundaries. Part ii, section b4 requires asean to respond to nts issues effectively and in a timely manner, in accordance with the principles of ‘comprehensive security’.Footnote 44
By classifying transboundary environmental issues as nts issues, asean could elevate them to an enhanced cooperation in terms of priority. For example, under Part ii, section b5 of the Political-Security Community Blueprint, asean agrees to enhance joint effective and early response at the political and operational levels in activating the asean disaster management arrangements to assist affected countries in the event of major disasters, and to enhance civilian–military coordination in providing effective and timely response to major natural disasters, as agreed to by the asean Defence Ministers’ Meeting (admm).Footnote 45 Under Part ii, section b6 of this Blueprint, asean will convene special meetings at the Leaders or Ministerial levels in the event of crisis or emergency situations affecting asean members, and develop arrangements to address such situations in a timely manner.
Indeed, the idea of framing transboundary environmental challenges as human security issues is gaining ground. In his Keynote Address at the launch of the rsis Centre for Non-Traditional Security in Singapore on 6 May 2008, asean Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, made the following plea for a change of approach: ‘Human security needs a new mindset, requires a new look at the issue of security’, noting that some kinds of transboundary environmental issues, such as the Indonesian Haze, amounted to threats to human security.Footnote 46
The following sections will consider two case studies: the asean response to the Indonesian Haze and to the threats posed by zoonotic diseases. Notwithstanding asean Secretary-General Pitsuwan’s observations regarding the Indonesian Haze, the problem was not classified under the Political-Security Community pillar, but was instead dealt with under the Socio-Cultural Community pillar and governed by that Community’s Blueprint. The case study invites us to reflect on the potential advantages that a classification under the Political-Security Community Blueprint would bring. However, the second case study on the control of zoonotic diseases indicates that not all challenges faced by asean as a transboundary environmental regulator are reducible to its complex pillar structure. Zoonotic diseases, too, are governed by the Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, yet in this area asean was able to respond with far greater alacrity.
3.1. The Indonesian Haze
‘Haze pollution’ is defined under Article 1(6) of the 2002asean Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (athp)Footnote 47 as:
smoke resulting from land and/or forest fire which causes deleterious effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and ecosystems and material property and impair or interfere with amenities and other legitimate uses of the environment.
The Indonesian Haze is the result of extensive land-clearing fires for oil palm plantations and the practice of swidden agriculture, particularly on peat land. The Haze has been recurring since 1982 and affects Indonesia’s neighbours, particularly Singapore, Malaysia, and southern Thailand.
asean waited some 20 years before taking action on the Haze, indicating that environmental issues historically have not been high on its agenda, arguably because of their sensitive political implications.Footnote 48 Only in 2002 did asean formulate a hard law instrument on the issue – the athp.Footnote 49 Although generally applicable to all asean states, the athp was, in fact, specifically formulated to target the Indonesian Haze. However, although the Agreement entered into force on 25 November 2003 with the ratification of nine asean Member States, Indonesia has yet to ratify it. This has rendered the Agreement essentially ineffective. In October 2006, in light of Indonesia’s failure to ratify the athp and the continuing impact of the Haze on the region’s environment, Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, decided to raise the issue at the un General Assembly (unga) to seek international assistance in addressing the problem. This was a permissible move under Article 2 of the athp, which specifically states that the Agreement’s objective is to prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution through ‘concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international co-operation’.Footnote 50
However, when Prime Minister Lee approached Indonesia’s representative, Adiyatwidi Adiwoso Asmady, to issue an asean statement on the Haze, she responded by invoking the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs.Footnote 51 Asmady stated that the Haze was a domestic problem and characterized Singapore’s call for international assistance as ‘badgering’ – ‘tantamount to interference in the domestic affairs of Indonesians’.Footnote 52 Asmady also suggested that there might be ‘some malice’ behind Singapore’s actions, stating that other ‘issues related to environmental degradation … also needed to be addressed – such as […] sand mining’.Footnote 53 She went on to say that Singapore should ‘cease to give protection, safety and sanctuary for corruptors and their ill-gotten wealth’.Footnote 54
Many observers regarded the Indonesian representative’s remarks as startling. As journalist Janadas Devan commented of Asmady’s reaction, ‘[a]ll this … merely for suggesting that the haze is a staggering problem, that Indonesia and asean cannot cope with it themselves, and that international assistance is urgently needed?’Footnote 55 Devan then drew a comparison with the 2004 tsunami disaster, during which Indonesia had no difficulty with accepting assistance from the international community. He pointed out: ‘The haze is a man-made catastrophe, for which many Indonesians can be blamed. Though its “scale and severity” are such that Jakarta cannot solve the problem without international help, some Indonesians find it difficult to accept that fact’.
Singapore, in turn, maintains that it did not intend to place blame on Indonesia for the Haze. The former Second Foreign Minister of Singapore, Raymond Lim, had earlier stressed that there is ‘no reason for the haze problem to affect relations between the two countries’.Footnote 56 Rather, Lim explained that Singapore had to make a statement at the un because the Haze had global implications. It was driving away foreign investors and contributing significantly to global greenhouse emissions. Lim added that Singapore had urged asean to make a joint statement, but the Indonesian representative in the un did not want the haze issue mentioned at all. He said:
We made a factual statement which acknowledged the commitments and efforts made by Indonesia and other countries. Our statement also aimed to present a comprehensive and balanced appraisal of the issue, including pointing out some of the more problematic issues that remain.Footnote 57
However, Indonesia’s Asmady responded that:
[w]here there is already a bilateral and regional arrangement for addressing a problem, let us make full use of them instead of misusing the un forum in a frenzy of naming and shaming.Footnote 58
Singapore assured Indonesia that it had raised the matter at the un not to shame its neighbour but to mobilize the international support that was needed. Singapore felt strongly that the asean countries had to identify and address this serious, long-term environmental problem in Southeast Asia.
Following this episode at the un, on 23 January 2007 Indonesia banned the export of sand to Singapore. Indonesia emphasized that sand mining on Indonesian islands had caused environmental degradation, and also affected its maritime boundaries. Singapore responded that the price of sand had been adjusted such that some proceeds were ploughed back into environmental reconstruction, and assured Indonesia that its reclamation works using Indonesian sand would not affect maritime boundaries. Indonesia also wanted to renegotiate the current extradition treaty between Singapore and Indonesia, signed in 2007, to enable the return of Indonesian crime suspects residing in Singapore. Singapore responded that it would always support the Indonesian government’s efforts to return Indonesian crime suspects residing in Singapore provided the latter could provide enough evidence to charge them.Footnote 59 One month later, Indonesia backtracked on the claim that the ban on sand exports to Singapore was linked to the extradition treaty, but maintained that the reason for the ban was to prevent future damage to the environment. The ban is still ongoing.Footnote 60
This controversy illustrates the complex political and economic dimensions of the Haze problem, as well as the conflict between ‘national interests’ and ‘regional interests’ confronting asean. On the one hand, the successful adoption and ratification of the athp attest to asean’s growing stature as a transnational environmental law-maker. On the other hand, the Haze controversy painfully illustrates the obstacles in asean’s path towards environmental regulatory effectiveness. Indonesia’s refusal to ratify, obviously, clips the wings of the instrument to the point of ineffectiveness, but it is not the only factor to challenge asean’s ability to contend with environmental issues. The choice to house the athp under the Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint, rather than under section b4 of the Political-Security Community Blueprint – which would have allowed it to invoke the non-traditional security approach – reveals asean’s need for circumspection in areas of high political sensitivity. Yet, taking a deferential approach to the internal affairs of Member States may lead to violations of Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, which provides that states have a common responsibility to protect the integrity of the Earth’s ecosystems.Footnote 61
The time has come for asean to take a strong stand that the principle of sovereignty be calibrated in the context of environmental law.Footnote 62 Far from undermining state sovereignty, enhanced cooperation in the area of the environment will strengthen states’ sustainable development.Footnote 63 By adopting a ‘flexible engagement’ approach to transboundary environmental issues qualifying under the Political-Security pillar, asean Member States could discuss complex problems, such as the Indonesian Haze, without being accused of interfering with the internal affairs of the country.
3.2. Zoonotic Diseases Affecting the asean Region and the World
Zoonotic diseasesFootnote 64 are both an asean and a global problem. The outbreaks of sars and avian flu between 2003 and 2004 not only raised issues of human security, but also challenged animal health protection, the protection of biodiversity and ecosystems (in the destruction of habitats and wetlands in the course of culling), and the pursuit of sustainable development (such as the sustainability of the chain of animal food production).Footnote 65 The outbreaks claimed a number of lives in Thailand and Vietnam. They also affected other parts of Asia, namely Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan – raising fears of a pandemic.Footnote 66
asean cooperated with the World Health Organization (who), the Food and Agriculture Organization (fao) and the World Organization for Animal Health (oie) in formulating guidelines and taking measures to manage the outbreaks. These initiatives included vaccine production, stockpiling medicines, and making plans for disease containment. asean and its member countries also coordinated their efforts through institutional linkages and partnerships amongst stakeholders in civil society and the public and private sectors. Some of the significant initiatives undertaken included those by the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (hpai) Taskforce, the asean Expert Group on Communicable Diseases, and the Regional Framework for Control and Eradication of hpai. The various initiatives and guidelines developed aimed to establish a common approach to combating the problems.
The experience gained from the sars and avian flu outbreaks made asean well placed to tackle the subsequent outbreak of swine flu (h1n1), which originated from Mexico in April 2009. On 4 May 2009, asean Health Ministers met to discuss their response to the outbreak, and a Coordinating Centre was established by the asean Secretariat to monitor developments related to h1n1 in the region. On 8 May 2009, the ‘asean Plus Three’ Dialogue Partners (China, Japan, and South Korea) met in Bangkok.Footnote 67 Delegates at the meeting pledged solidarity and cooperation, not only within the region but also worldwide, to prevent the spread of the disease. Among the measures discussed were enhancing the stockpiling of the medication for h1n1, and implementing and observing the national pandemic plans that had been drafted for the avian flu and sars outbreaks. The asean Plus Three partners expressed concern that most of the vaccine production capacity was located in Europe and North America, and was therefore inadequate to respond to a global pandemic. Japan said it would donate to asean’s existing stockpile 500,000 doses of anti-viral medicine plus 750,000 sets of personal protection equipment, to be shared across the region. Participants also agreed to put in place ‘exit screening’ as a cross-border disease control strategy.
It is interesting to compare asean’s response to the threat posed by zoonotic diseases with its response to the Haze. The threat of a pandemic drove asean to act with alacrity, with no less than 25asean instruments covering sars, avian flu, and h1n1. Possibly, asean’s response to zoonotic diseases was more successful as a result of the threat of a pandemic, and because most of the asean region, as well as many other parts of the world, were affected. Moreover, the economic stakes were high. Finally, the classification of communicable diseases under section b5 of asean’s Socio-Cultural Community Blueprint (‘Improving Capability to Control Communicable Diseases’) arguably gave asean more freedom to act than it had with regard to the Haze controversy. Section b5 outlines strategies to enhance regional preparedness and capacity through integrated approaches to prevention, surveillance, and timely response to communicable and emerging infectious diseases. Under this Blueprint, asean can ‘promote multi-sectoral coordination and planning on Pandemic Preparedness and Response at the regional level including development of a regional Multi-Sectoral Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plan’.Footnote 68 When a pandemic occurs, the issue can be elevated to the non-traditional security approach under the asean Political-Security Blueprint; the two Blueprints are mutually reinforcing.
3.3. Lessons from the Case Studies
The Indonesian Haze experience underscores the importance of recognizing global environmental risks as security threats, so that regional organizations such as asean can respond to the threats they pose with a greater degree of swiftness and decisiveness than has thus far been the case. This is a particularly pressing concern for health and environmental risks that have a divisive (the Haze) rather than uniting (zoonotic diseases) impact.
But reframing transboundary environmental issues under the Political-Security Community Blueprint is not sufficient; the traditional asean way of non-interference must also be recalibrated to tackle growing environmental threats and a form of ‘flexible engagement’ must be employed. The notion of flexible engagement was first raised by Surin Pitsuwan, then Foreign Minister of Thailand, in the late 1990s. He said that asean members should be more open with each other and have frank discussions on domestic issues which have implications for the destiny of other members and of the group. In effect, he called for a review of the asean way of doing things by stating that asean members ‘no longer [could] afford to adopt a non-committal stance and avoid passing judgment on events in a member country simply on the grounds of non-interference’. Footnote 69 Rather, ‘if domestic events in one member’s territory adversely impact on another member’s internal affairs, not to mention regional peace and prosperity, much can be said in favour of asean playing a more proactive role’.Footnote 70 In fact, the first pillar does modify the asean way in that it requires a political process to deal with such ‘transboundary challenges’.Footnote 71
Though this approach was ultimately rejected by asean Member States (with the exception of Malaysia and the Philippines), its application to transboundary environmental issues remains pertinent and should be reconsidered. As Pitsuwan notes, while ‘flexible engagement’ would indeed be a new departure for asean, it is not wholly incompatible with the reigning principle of non-interference. Rather, flexible engagement is an attempt to delimit the range of situations in which individual Member States would be justified in appealing to non-interference to ward off outside involvement in their so-called internal affairs. As serious threats to sustainable development and human security more broadly, transboundary environmental issues would be classified as beyond the scope of ‘internal affairs’ and would be subject to regional governance.
4. CONCLUSION
asean has taken a robust stand on non-traditional security challenges but its efficacy in dealing with transboundary environmental challenges has yet to be fully tested. As for the ‘traditional’ global environmental issues, it would also be interesting to see the extent to which they can be morphed into transboundary issues. Furthermore, continuing and emerging environmental challenges may add new dimensions and complexities to the docket of transboundary environmental issues, such as climatic migration, food and water security, and disaster management. No country can deal with these challenges alone. asean must continually identify common regional priorities to deal with transboundary environmental issues. It must enhance coordination within the region and with the global community, and it must challenge the dichotomy between regional and national interests, re-examining principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the context of environmental challenges. However, asean needs the political will and cooperation of its Member States to effectively move forward.
