Introduction
On 2 December 2016, between half a million and a million protesters marched in Jakarta in the so-called second ‘Defending Islam’ (or Aksi 212) rally, demanding that the city governor, Basuki Tjahaja ‘Ahok’ Purnama, be removed from office and put on trial for blaspheming Islam in a campaign re-election speech.Footnote 1 The Defending Islam rallies, held on 4 November and 2 December 2016, were successful in turning most Indonesians – and Jakarta voters in particular – against the governor, resulting in his electoral loss and eventual trial, conviction, and imprisonment. Even more striking, these rallies were organised by a wide range of Islamic intellectuals and activists from multiple Islamic organisations that would not normally collaborate.Footnote 2 The rallies were supported by a large number of upper-middle class Muslims (Mietzner and Muhtadi Reference Mietzner and Burhanuddin2018; Mietzner et al. Reference Mietzner, Muhtadi and Halida2018).
Public-opinion surveys conducted just before the rallies confirm that a growing number of Indonesian Muslims have begun to embrace more conservative interpretations of Islam – supporting a greater role for shari'a law in the Indonesian state and society and adopting less tolerant attitudes towards non-Muslims (particularly in relation to political rights). A survey commissioned by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) has shown that a significant number of Indonesian Muslims support the enactment of shari'a law as a legal code governing all Indonesians at the national level (39 per cent of respondents) and at the local level (41 per cent of respondents). In addition, 36 per cent of Indonesian Muslims agree with the statement: ‘Islam should become Indonesia's only official religion’ (Fossati et al. Reference Fossati, Foong and Negara2017: 24). Another recent survey has qualified these findings, stating that between 2010 and 2016, the number of Muslims who harboured intolerant or radical attitudes actually declined (Mietzner and Muhtadi Reference Mietzner and Burhanuddin2018: 463–464). However, intolerant attitudes – such as the belief that non-Muslims should not hold political office – increased after the rallies, from 42.3 per cent in 2016, before the rallies took place, to 49.6 per cent in 2017, after they happened (Mietzner et al. Reference Mietzner, Muhtadi and Halida2018: 169). These findings reveal the important role played by religious entrepreneurs in shaping intolerant attitudes among Muslims (Mietzner et al: 170). They also highlight the importance of Islamic authority figures and institutions in influencing public opinion among their own groups of faithful followers, whether by encouraging moderation and tolerance or by promoting radicalism and intolerance in the public sphere.
Incidents such as the 2016–2017 Defending Islam rallies, along with an increasing number of violent persecutions of religious minorities, including Ahmadi and Shi'a Muslims, over the past decadeFootnote 3 have created doubts about the prevailing image of Islam in Indonesia as consisting mainly of moderate clerics, activists, and organisations that promote values compatible with democracy, tolerance, and pluralism – the view espoused by prominent academics such as Hefner (Reference Hefner2000).Footnote 4 Previously, scholars tended to focus on moderate Islamic activists and organisations, as exemplified by the Civil Islam thesis introduced by Hefner (Reference Hefner2000)Footnote 5 and other works discussing moderate Islamic groups, activists, and intellectuals in Indonesia (e.g. Azra Reference Azra2006; Bush Reference Bush2009; Latif Reference Latif2008). However, as Indonesian Islam has taken a more ‘conservative turn’ over the past decade (van Bruinessen Reference van Bruinessen2013, Reference van Bruinessen2018), a growing number of studies have begun to investigate the new conservative Islamist groups and activists, treating them as potentially important political actors in Indonesia. Recent studies have explored the way in which groups such as the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) and Muhammadiyah have become increasingly controlled by their more conservative members (i.e. van Bruinessen (Reference van Bruinessen2013, Reference van Bruinessen2018). They have also shown that the ideas expressed by moderate and progressive Islamic activists and groups are increasingly being challenged by more conservative voices (Kersten Reference Kersten2015). Menchik (Reference Menchik2014, Reference Menchik2016) has revealed how Islamic groups that generally subscribe to moderate ideologies, such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, can harbour intolerant views in certain contexts and contingents, especially in relation to groups considered ‘deviant’ in the context of mainstream Islamic teaching, such as Ahmadi Muslims.
Recent scholarship has focused on another growing trend in post-Reformasi Indonesia: the breakdown of traditional Islamic authority, as represented by Islamic clerics (ulama) and the leaders of mainstream organisations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. This breakdown is associated with the emergence of new Islamic authorities, who have acquired popular followings at the grassroots level by promoting their views on television, the Internet, and social media.Footnote 6 Research published before and after the Defending Islam rallies has sought to develop the causal link between rising ‘populist’ Islamism and ongoing socio-political trends in Indonesia (e.g. Hadiz Reference Hadiz2016, Reference Hadiz2018; Mietzner and Muhtadi Reference Mietzner and Burhanuddin2018; Mietzner et al. Reference Mietzner, Muhtadi and Halida2018). However, what is missing from these studies and the others highlighted above is a focus on identifying the causal linkages between rising Islamism and the breakdown of traditional Islamic authorities in Indonesia, as represented by mainstream groups, such as NU and Muhammadiyah. The present article shows that it is crucial to understand the links associated with both phenomena to achieve a more comprehensive picture of the rise in Islamism and growing intolerance in contemporary Indonesia.
One important factor, which has contributed to the rise of Islamism in Indonesia in recent years, is the increasing challenge to (and gradual decline in) the authority of moderate groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah,Footnote 7 as new Islamic preachers and groups undermine their dominance over Islamic discourses in Indonesia, promoting more conservative and radical interpretations of Islam. These phenomena are interconnected, as Indonesia experienced rapid economic and technological change while undergoing a major democratic transition. This process helped to create a new marketplace of ideas; emerging democratic norms and institutions created a space in which previously suppressed and marginalised groups could promote different interpretations of Islamic theology, using innovative new media outlets.
This marketplace has further fragmented Islamic religious authority and contributed to the slowly but steadily declining influence of groups such as NU and Muhammadiyah. It has also provided opportunities for conservative preachers and groups to take over the space formally occupied by moderate groups, through new forms of propagation (da'wa); these have enabled conservative voices to influence a new generation of young middle-class Muslims. As well as conducting da'wa activities via the Internet and social media, conservative activists dominate propagation activities on university campuses and among small community-based preaching groups (majelis taklim). Gradually, these new Islamic authority figures and organisations have been able develop networks and alliances with established Islamic authorities and members of Indonesia's political elite. As a result, they have been successful in implementing their agenda: to institutionalise intolerance in Indonesian society by restricting the religious expressions of Muslim minorities and limiting the political rights of non-Muslim Indonesian citizens.
The present article will analyse this phenomenon, based on the following outline. It will begin by providing a framework for the concepts, ‘marketplace of ideas’ and ‘new Islamic authority’. It will then analyse the emergence of new Islamic authority figures and groups, who are increasingly contesting and in some cases are replacing the authority of NU and Muhammadiyah clerics – particularly among young Indonesian Muslims.Footnote 8 Third, it will discuss methods of propagation, including the campus preaching organisations and majelis taklim that new Islamic preachers and groups use to win over potential recruits. Fourth, it will analyse the growing alliances between conservative Islamist groups and established politicians and clerics, within the context of a politically democratic and decentralised Indonesia, showing that this cooperation is driven by the latter group's desire to retain political power. The final section contains reflections and suggestions for the future of Islam in Indonesia, in an age of rising Islamism.
The data is derived from my own extensive and ongoing fieldwork on the following topics: Islamic campus da'wa organisations in Indonesia (conducted in 2016–17), new Islamic groups, and the growing political convergence between new and mainstream Islamic groups (ongoing since 2017). I have also explored the existing literature on political Islam in Indonesia, written by social scientists and area-studies scholars (particularly during the past decade) to construct a historical narrative of the changing dynamics between new and established Islamic authorities in post-Reformasi Indonesia.
Framing the Marketplace of Ideas and Islamic Authority
John Stuart Mill defined the ‘marketplace of ideas’ as a sphere in which “all opinions are to be expressed; everyone comes to the market with his or her ideas, and through discussion, everyone exchanges ideas with one another” (Gordon Reference Gordon1997: 236). Mill implicitly assumed that “good and true ideas will triumph and poor and false ideas will be driven out” (Sparrow and Goodin Reference Sparrow and Goodin2001: 46). However, while Mill initiated the metaphor to express his belief in freedom of expression, he also believed in strong protection for:
….the speech of those who are least numerous and/or who have the least power in society at any given time. The beliefs held by the most numerous or the most powerful people tend to suppress the views of others. This he calls ‘social tyranny’ and compares it unfavorably to many other kinds of political oppression (Gordon Reference Gordon1997: 240).
While the original premise of Mill's marketplace derives from the economic idea of free markets (Sparrow and Goodin Reference Sparrow and Goodin2001: 46), in reality, the marketplace does not resemble a perfectly competitive market. Not all ideas are valued equally, and some ideas have more followers and powerful backers than others. Those who adhere to dominant ideas may use their political influence to restrict entry to the market and exclude other ideas that challenge their dominance (Sparrow and Goodin Reference Sparrow and Goodin2001: 49). Alternatively, they may enter into pacts or alliances with new entrants to increase barriers to other entrants, whose ideas are less mainstream. In this way, they may “generate concentration, and ultimately monopoly, with everyone ending up in the same network” (Sparrow and Goodwin Reference Sparrow and Goodin2001: 51).
In our contemporary age, ideas spread rapidly through new media, such as television and the Internet. As a result, more and more players can enter the marketplace, as the barriers to entry are low. When it comes to religious ideas, the fact that more preachers and authorities can support a particular idea is no guarantee that an open, tolerant, or pluralist version of the religion in question will ultimately prevail. As Peter Mandaville has cautioned, in the case of Islam, “a widening of the public sphere does not in itself produce more pluralistic – in the sense of being more tolerant or open-ended – knowledge” (Mandaville Reference Mandaville2007: 104). A rapid increase in the number of new Islamic authorities will not necessarily result in a more nuanced or pluralistic interpretation of Islam. Instead, these new authorities may promote ideologically conservative and exclusivist orthodoxies, which are then reinforced by established authorities seeking to retain power and influence within the Muslim community.
Quinn Mecham has defined ‘Islamists’ as individuals or groups with a “self-defined Islamic religious agenda pursued through the engagement with the state” (Mecham Reference Mecham2017: 12). I elaborate on this definition by dividing Islamists into two categories: conservative Islamists and hard-line Islamists. Conservative Islamists are Islamic groups and preachers who support the use of Islamic principles – those enshrined in the shari'a – as a legal foundation for the Indonesian state and society.Footnote 9 However, they largely seek to promote such views through da'wa and other non-violent means, while accepting democratic norms and institutions as a means of promoting these principles in Indonesia's public sphere.Footnote 10 By contrast, hard-line Islamists either reject democratic principles on theological grounds (e.g. groups such as Hizb ut -Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) or Ja'maah Tabligh) or (despite claiming to respect democratic principles) use coercion, intimidation, and violence to accomplish their goals (e.g., groups such as FPI and Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI) - founded by Abu Bakar Basyir).
In countries with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, Islamic authority often rests with a small number of elite clerics who constitute a religious hierarchy, officially sanctioned by the state and closely tied to its official policies on Islam (Mecham Reference Mecham2017: 53). Democratic countries such as Indonesia do not place any major restrictions on who can become Islamic authorities. In this context, Islamic authorities are more likely to be fragmented; two categories of clerics – new and established Islamic authorities – compete with each other for the power to interpret Islamic teachings and to promote their versions to the general public, while serving as gatekeepers and controlling entry into the marketplace of ideas.
The new Islamic authorities conceptualised here are identical to Mecham's definition of religious entrepreneurs: individuals who “try to mobilise others politically within a religious framework” and “promote policy change in the direction of self-defined ‘Islamic’ religious interests” (Mecham Reference Mecham2017: 41–42). He notes that such people have “either a background in politics and in religion” and are not necessarily recognised religious authorities (Mecham Reference Mecham2017: 41). However, I would argue that, in a country undergoing a religious revival, the religious entrepreneurs who aim to become new Islamic authorities tend to have an in-depth knowledge of Islam and to be skilled at articulating it using new technology, such as the Internet and social media.Footnote 11
As the new Islamic authorities – popular Islamic preachers and new Islamist-leaning organisations – successfully grow their groups of followers, they increasingly compete with established religious authorities, what Mecham calls the ‘religious elite’ (Mecham Reference Mecham2017: 42–43). In Indonesia, these include quasi-official Islamic-authority organisations, such as MUI, and mainstream Islamic groups with large grassroots followings, such as NU and Muhammadiyah.
New Islamic Authorities and The Decline of Established Authority
Since the Reformasi, new Islamist preachers and groups have proliferated and successfully gained followers in Indonesia. New Islamic preachers, such as Abdullah Gymnastiar (Aa Gym), Abdul Somad, and Hanan Attaki, are increasingly able to establish themselves as fresh sources of authority among pious middle-class Indonesian Muslims, thanks to their innovative preaching methods and simple, yet literalist, interpretation of Islamic doctrine.Footnote 12 Groups include the Tarbiyah Movement (with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) as its main political arm), Wahdah Islamiyah, Ja'maah Tabligh, FPI, HTI, and the Islamic Forum for Islamic Society (FUI), which was established by disgruntled former HTI activists in 2008 (Munabari Reference Munabari2017, Reference Munabari2018).
The growing popularity of these new preachers and conservative Islamist groups is gradually reducing the authority of NU and Muhammadiyah clerics, who have suddenly found that their ideas are losing relevance within the Indonesian Islamic community – especially among millennial Muslims (aged 20–35) from middle-class backgrounds. The new Islamic authorities are using more attractive and up-to-date communication tools to articulate their religious interpretations; they also use media that suit the needs and expectations of a new generation of Indonesian Muslims (Hew Reference Hew2018; Hoesterey Reference Hoesterey2016; Slama Reference Slama2017). Many mainstream Islamic authorities are losing relevance among millennials primarily because they still rely on older, more conventional ways of disseminating their views – using in-person da'wa, audiotapes, and newspaper columns, instead of the Internet and social media. As an observer who has followed the declining appeal of NU among millennial Muslims in East Java province explains:
NU traditional clerics (kyais) generally utilize three different propagation (da'wa) methods: 1) those that rely on textual memorization, 2) those that utilize print media (books or newspapers), and 3) those that utilize the internet or other online propagation methods. Older kyais tend to utilize the first two propagation methods. However, urban-based Muslim millennials tend to dismiss them as out-of-date and gravitate more towards the latter – as they utilize the Internet and social media as their primary means to gain knowledge and receive information (Interview with Ahmad Inung, 18 September 2018).
Second, many millennial Muslims currently entering university are disenchanted with the two mainstream organisations because their university affiliate groups tend to recruit new cadres from within their own organisational networks. While these affiliates – the NU-linked Indonesian Islamic Youth Association (PMII) and the Muhammadiyah University Students Association (IMM) – usually have a strong presence in large public universities, due to the brand name of their ‘mother’ organisations, the students most likely to participate on campus have pre-existing relationships with NU and Muhammsadiyah through family connections or junior or senior high-school youth groups. According to a former Gadjah Mada University (UGM) student, young Muslims without pre-existing ties to NU and Muhammadiyah tend to be drawn towards campus preaching organisations affiliated with conservative Islamist groups:
We know NU and Muhammadiyah have an extensive presence on [the UGM] campus,
yet we hardly felt their presence. Their campus affiliates operate like a ‘club’ which is only open to students with familial ties with either NU or Muhammadiyah. Their activities tend to be exclusivist and open to members only. On the other hand, other campus preaching organizations tend to sponsor da'wa activities that are open to everyone. Anyone can become members, regardless whether or not their family members are also affiliated with them. Needless to say, my friends were more attracted to the latter groups rather than to either PPIM or IMM (Interview with Satrio Dwicahyo, 23 August 2017).
Lastly, some millennial students feel dissatisfied with NU and Muhammadiyah because they see both groups as part of the establishment, given that their national leaders and senior activists have developed close ties with Indonesian government officials, especially under the Jokowi administration (Fealy Reference Fealy2018a). Younger people often choose to join more conservative campus da'wa groups to express their disappointment with the public sphere. This approach is well illustrated by the following remarks from my interview with a former HTI university cadre in Surabaya, Indonesia:
I think NU and Muhammadiyah represent great Indonesian Islamic organisations from the past. Since the Reformasi period, both have become too cosy with the political elite. Many of their leaders are receiving state patronage, while forgetting the everyday problems faced by their followers (umma) at the grassroots level (Anonymous interview, 1 December 2017).
Taking advantage of increasing disenchantment with established authorities among the Indonesian umma, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, some clerics and activists have broken away from both institutions and established their own organisations, designed to challenge the authority of senior leaders from both groups and to issue what they see as ‘proper’ interpretations of Islam. In the case of Muhammadiyah, several new Islamic groups that are growing rapidly in the outer islands (Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and West Nusa Tenggara) were originally set up as affiliates, but later broke away to form their own organisations.
One example is the Salafi-oriented group, Wahdah Islamiyah, headquartered in South Sulawesi and expanding to other parts of Indonesia. Originally launched as a small campus preaching organisation by a group of Muhammadiyah activists, it broke away when the parent organisation decided to accommodate the demands of the Suharto regime and to accept the national ideology Pancasila as its sole foundation (Chaplin Reference Chaplin2018: 213). Formally incorporated as a separate Islamic organisation in 1988, Wahdah grew to become the largest Salafi organisation in the country; it currently has approximately 120 branches throughout Indonesia (Chaplin Reference Chaplin2018: 212–213). Its exclusivist outlook on citizenship places pious Muslims ahead of non-pious Muslims and non-Muslims in a hierarchy. By developing extensive networks that include national and local politicians and security officials, Wahdah has managed to become a leading Islamic organisation in Sulawesi, a major educational and social service provider, and an organisation with significant national and local political support (Chaplin Reference Chaplin2018: 213–214).
Another group that has become a new Islamic authority is the Jogo Kariyan mosque group, founded in the early 1990s in the Jogo Kariyan mosque in Yogyakarta. Originally a part of Muhammadiyah, it now promotes more conservative interpretations of Islam, influenced by the thoughts of Ikhwanul Muslimin (the Muslim Brotherhood) from the Middle East. Jogo Kariyan clerics formed their own association because they believed that Muhammadiyah's theology had become too moderate, deviating from ‘true’ Islamic teachings (Interview with Farhan Jufri, 25 February 2018). They also believed that Muhammadiyah's city schools and hospitals had become ‘too expensive’, forgetting their original mission: to provide affordable education and health care for Yogyakarta residents, particularly those affiliated with Muhammadiyah (Interview with Farhan Jufri, 25 February 2018).
Established approximately three decades ago, the Joko Kariyan mosque is now considered one of the main centres of Islamic learning in Yogyakarta. Prospective followers come from as far away as Sulawesi and Molucca Islands to learn Islam from the preachers. Thanks to its promotional use of social media, including Facebook and Instagram, the organisation has significantly expanded its membership; its reputation has spread far beyond Yogyakarta. Membership growth was accelerated through a strategy of regularly inviting popular conservative preachers (uztadz) with large followings among millennials – for instance Bachtiar Nasir and Abdul Somad – to speak at the mosque and preach to its followers (Interview with Farhan Jufri, 25 February 2018).
As the Jogo Kariyan ulama are descended from families with long histories of service in the court of the Sultan of Yogya (abdi dalem), the mosque enjoys a close relationship with the Sultan and his inner circle. This relationship has influenced the Sultan to adopt a more accommodating position towards conservative Islamist groups, which increasingly dominate Islamic da'wa activities in the city (Interview with Farhan Jufri, 25 February 2018). The informal alliances between local groups such as Jogo Kariyan, conservative Islamic preachers, and the Yogya court have led to growing accusations that the Sultan's government has been inconsistent in its treatment of recent cases of religious intolerance (Tempo.com 2018). The city was recently named by the Wahid Foundation as Indonesia's second most intolerant city (CNNIndonesia.com 2016).
The crisis in mainstream Islamic authority is also affecting NU. The emerging ulama gaining broad popular followings within the organisation tend to be young, Middle Eastern-educated kyai with conservative theological ideas, who reject the moderate, pluralist, and inclusivist principles advocated by the late Abdurrahman Wahid and other moderate-leaning kyai within the organisation.Footnote 13 They include Idrus Ramli, Buya Yahya, and Abdul Somad, who founded NU Garis Lurus (‘True Path NU’) – a faction within the organisation that seeks to roll back the progressive and pluralist theology promoted by the current NU chairman, Said Aqil Siradj, commonly referred to as Islam Nusantara (Arifianto Reference Arifianto2017). Given their immense popularity among grassroots NU members, new ulama like Ramli and Somad could become future leaders of the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia within the next decade or so. Their growing prominence is a sign of trouble for the future prospects of NU, especially after Said Aqil steps down from his chairmanship position in August 2020. If he is replaced by a cleric from the Garis Lurus faction, this scenario could trigger a move away from the moderate, pluralist Islamic ideals the organisation is widely known for today (Arifianto Reference Arifianto2018c).
New Propagation Mechanisms: Campus Da'wa and Majelis Taklim
Another propagation mechanism used by hard-line groups to effectively win over new recruits involves campus da'wa organisations. Islamist da'wa organisations sponsored by the Tarbiyah Movement (the predecessor to PKS) and HTI rapidly grew during the 1980s and 1990s, when their small size and secretive nature helped them escape surveillance from Suharto's security apparatus. They gained popularity when young Muslims from relatively secular or non-pious Islamic backgrounds began to seek a deeper understanding of Islam by attending da'wa events sponsored by these organisations. In the post-Reformasi period, Islamist campus da'wa groups increasingly use their dominant position within state universities as a vehicle to change the mindsets of young Indonesian Muslims, in favour of a more exclusivist interpretation of Islam.
There are several reasons why the campus da'wa groups sponsored by conservative Islamist groups have taken off during the post-Reformasi period. First, they are known for their superior organisational skills, especially at top state universities like the University of Indonesia, Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), and Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), which have long been the centre for campus da'wa groups like KAMMI or HTI (Arifianto Reference Arifianto2018a: 7). In addition, da'wa groups sponsored by more mainstream Islamic groups like PMII (Nahdlatul Ulama), IMM (Muhammadiyah), and the Islamic University Students Association (HMI) have shifted their primary focus from propagating ideas towards effectively becoming the youth wings of political parties affiliated with their mother organisations.Footnote 14 As a result, da'wa groups affiliated with conservative Islamists are attracting students who are primarily interested in deepening their own religious knowledge, rather than engaging in politics (Arifianto Reference Arifianto2018a: 7–8). The small, family-like atmosphere of most campus da'wa groups, their instructors’ in-depth knowledge of both Islamic scriptures and the contemporary politics of Indonesia and the Islamic world, and their lively discussion-oriented study sessions have made membership more attractive to students. As a member of a campus da'wa group sponsored by HTI explained:
The way [HTI] presents these issues always engages our curiosity. Few fellow students want to learn about Islam from hour-long lectures delivered by an old cleric (kyai). Instead, they prefer to learn about it from HTI activists, as they are only a few years older than themselves yet their Islamic knowledge is very up-to-date (Anonymous interview, 15 January 2018, quoted in Arifianto Reference Arifianto2018a: 8).
Campus da'wa are just one means by which hardliners have spread exclusivist ideas to potential followers. Another form of da'wa, which is increasingly controlled by Islamist-oriented clerics and organisations and politicised to promote their agenda, involves community religious discussion forums (majelis taklim). Conservatives find majelis taklim well-suited to their agenda because these forums tend to be non-denominational, with followers who cross the old sectarian lines between traditionalist and modernist Muslims and between NU and Muhammadiyah. Majelis taklims often bring in popular new Islamic authority figures, such as Bachtiar Nasir, Abdul Somad, and Yusuf Mansur, because their name recognition and popularity are high among the upper-middle class Indonesians who sponsor these forums.Footnote 15
A prominent majelis taklim group in Surabaya, East Java, is sponsored by the Al Falah mosque, which was founded in 1974 and is one of the oldest mosques in the city. While it has historically affiliated itself with Muhammadiyah, over the past few years, this mosque has distanced itself from the organisation. The mosque elders believe that Muhammadiyah has become “too moderate in a number of its positions and accepted values that are not compatible with Islamic principles. Mosque leaders have now declared Al Falah as an independent mosque unaffiliated with any Islamic organisation” (Interview with Nina Mushoffa, 12 October 2017).
Al Falah mosque's majelis taklim has sponsored visits from popular preachers, including Bachtiar Nasir and Abdul Somad. These guest preachers often advocate hard-line, intolerant ideas, and the mosque appears to tacitly support them. For instance, they were sympathetic towards the Defending Islam rallies and their chief sponsor, Habib Rizieq Shihab:
Our own mosque imam thinks that when it comes to political issues, Habib Rizieq “thinks like an eel.” Therefore, he cautions his umma to be neutral when it comes to the Defending Islam [411 and 212] rallies. However, many of the mosque worshippers, myself included, went to Jakarta to participate in the rallies. We want to show our solidarity to Pak Habib and support his statement that Ahok has indeed blasphemed Islam (Interview with Nina Mushoffa, 12 October 2017).
Increasingly, majelis taklims are being used as venues to promote the efforts of particular political candidates. For example, in the Tanjung Pinang mayoral election held in 2018 (pilkada serentak), prominent hard-line cleric Tengku Zulkarnain attended a number of majelis taklim gatherings, where he accused the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) of supporting LGBTQ rights. This contributed to the PDIP-backed mayoral candidate Lis Darmansyah losing his re-election bid (Wanto and Dinarto Reference Wanto and Dinarto2018). Majelis taklim also played a significant role during the Jakarta gubernatorial election, when an association of women's majelis taklims in Jakarta endorsed Anies Baswedan's candidacy (Kompas.com 2016).
In summary, while the moderate ideas promoted by mainstream Islamic authorities within NU and Muhammadiyah are still followed by a large number – perhaps the majority – of Indonesian Muslims, new Islamic authorities have succeeded in changing the public discourse on Islam. These authorities are able move such discourses in more orthodox and conservative directions, especially among Muslims from upper-middle-class backgrounds, by using social media, campus da'wa, and majelis taklim groups. As Martin van Bruinessen has noted, discourses promoted by new Islamic authorities are prevailing over the moderate and inclusive Islamic discourse that dominated the late Suharto and early Reformasi periods:
Many members of the new Muslim middle class that had emerged in the last decades of Suharto's rule found the Arab-centered discourses of the transnational Islamist movements more ‘authentic’ than the liberal's discourse of Islamic hermeneutics, tolerance, and human rights. Within a few years, the latter was marginalised and the very ideas of liberal Islam stigmatised (van Bruinessen Reference van Bruinessen2018: 14).
Alliances between ‘New’ and ‘Old’ Islamic Authorities
Increasingly, these conservative and hard-line groups are developing alliances and ‘informal coalitions’ with established clerics who sympathise with the conservative agenda, at both the national and regional level. Established clerics want to retain their power and authority, in the face of the growing influence of new entrants into the marketplace of ideas (Hamayotsu Reference Hamayotsu2018: 2). Their ability to build alliances with sympathetic senior clerics from moderate organisations is considered the reason why small hard-line groups like FPI and HTI have managed to gain influence within the wider Indonesian Islamic community. They have been successful in implementing their agenda, enacting perda shari'a, and marginalising religious minorities (Hamayotsu Reference Hamayotsu2018). Such alliances have raised the stature of new Islamic leaders and the organisations they lead, incorporating them into the formal structure of established Islamic institutions, such as MUI.Footnote 16 Muhammad Zaitun Rasmin, leader of Wahdah Islamiyah, has been promoted to the role of deputy secretary general of MUI (Chaplin Reference Chaplin2018). Tengku Zulkarnain, another conservative Islamic preacher who has made controversial statements about non-Muslims, ethnic Chinese, and LGBTQ people,Footnote 17 also serves as a MUI deputy secretary general.
Similar alliances exist in numerous localities throughout Indonesia, where relationships are forming between hardliners and elite ulama from particular regions who are willing to lobby for Islamic (shari'a) regulations. In many cases, these efforts have been successful. Campaigns are often launched during local election cycles, indicating that the regulations are part of organised campaign platforms produced as a consequence of political pacts between local leaders, councillors, and Islamic groups, who turn out grassroots support in exchange for seeing their agendas advanced.Footnote 18
One example involves the Pamekasan District in Madura Island, East Java. In 2003, the first shari'a regulation was enacted in this area, declaring it to be a district based on Islamic principles (Gerbang Salam). The regulation was enacted after an extensive lobbying campaign by a group of local ulama. They united under the banner of the local branch of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), with support from local branches of mainstream Islamic groups, such as NU, Muhammadiyah, Al Irsyad, and Sarekat Islam (SI), as well as more hard-line Islamist movements such as FPI and HTI (Interview with Ustadz Dwiyanto, 14 October 2017). The NU branch of Pamekasan supported the regulation because it was endorsed by Kyai Haji Kholil-ur-Rahman, the most senior NU cleric in the region and the head of the district MUI council (interview with Deputy Chairman, NU Pamekasan District Branch, 14 October 2017).
The regulation was enacted unanimously by Pamekasan's legislative council, due to united support from these Islamic organisations, all of which argued that it was important to reflect the strong Islamic tradition present within the regency and Madura Island. Uztadz Dwiyanto, the current deputy chairman of MUI Pamekasan branch, has said that no DPRD councillors were willing to oppose the measure because the ulama would have “campaigned to vote them out of office” if they had expressed any opposition to the regulation (Interview with Ustadz Dwiyanto, 14 October 2017). Kholil-ur-Rahman, then the local NU and MUI leader, was later elected as the regent (bupati) of Pamekasan from 2008 to 2013. After Pamekasan enacted the Gerbang Salam perda in 2003, the regency enacted at least five additional regulations; these included requiring women to wear headscarves (hijab) while appearing in public places, requiring all primary school graduates to be tested on their Qur'anic reading proficiency, and prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages and the establishment of nightclubs or other forms of entertainment (Arifianto Reference Arifianto2018b).
In Cianjur District, an alliance formed between local clerics, politicians, and a local Islamist movement called the Islamic Reform Movement (GARIS). The movement was established by Anwar Haryono, who headed the hard-line group Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII) in the 1990s. Several senior DDII figures, including K.H. Kholil Ridwan and Ahmad Sumargono, were members of its executive board (Buehler Reference Buehler2016: 134). It has an estimated membership of 28,000 and is affiliated with a number of prominent local Islamic schools (pesantren), including Pesantren Ashabul Yamin and Pesantren Darul Alam (Buehler Reference Buehler2016: 135, 139). The movement is considered so hard-line that locals refer to it as an ‘anti-vice organisation’ willing “to bulldoze any bad behaviours committed by people” (Lukito Reference Lukito2016: 400). The organisation has launched raids on local nightclubs, massage parlours, and members of the Ahmadi minority (Buehler Reference Buehler2016: 162–164; Lukito Reference Lukito2016: 415).
In the early 2000s, GARIS developed an alliance with elite clerics linked to Cianjur's local MUI branch to pressure the local bupati to adopt shari'a regulations within the district. The MUI clerics were also affiliated with the NU and courted by the Cianjur Bupati for political support (Buehler Reference Buehler2016: 164–165). The bupati, Wasidi Swastomo, was a pious Muslim who adhered to a literalist interpretation of Islam and shared the group's desire “to demolish many practices in society seen as transgressing the principles of Islamic beliefs” (Lukito Reference Lukito2016: 397). The first regulation – issued in 2001– established a Centre for the Assessment and Propagation of Islam (LPPI), with a board that included GARIS and local MUI leaders (Buehler Reference Buehler2016: 161). Another six regulations were issued by Swastomo during his five years in office. These promoted readings of the Qur'an and religious music, outlawed spirit cults and tomb pilgrimages, and, most controversially, banned the activities of the Ahmadi minority in Cianjur (Buehler Reference Buehler2016: 161–163). The regulations endured after Swastomo lost his re-election bid in 2006, instilling fear among non-Muslims living in the region (especially Christians) and making them unwilling to speak openly about the regulations to external observers (Lukito Reference Lukito2016: 401).
The cases of Pamekasan and Cianjur clearly show how emerging alliances between new Islamist activists, established clerics, and local politicians have diminished the marketplace of ideas available to Indonesian Muslims (especially the Ahmadi and Shi'a minorities). Such cases have called into question the future of religious tolerance and moderate, civil Islam in Indonesia. Nor are they isolated phenomena, as increasing numbers of regions have adopted Islamic regulations over the past decade. Today, approximately 442 local shari'a regulations are in force in Indonesia (Pisani and Buehler Reference Pisani and Michael2017).
At the national level, similar alliances have caused an increase in new regulations on public morality at the national level - for instance, the passage of the 2006 Anti-Pornography Law, the introduction of clauses targeting Indonesia's LGBTQ community, and the upcoming revision of the Indonesian Criminal Code (KUHP), which the DPR is expected to pass before its current term ends in summer 2019 (Peterson Reference Peterson2018). Lastly, these alliances have contributed to growing persecution and violence against Ahmadis, Shiites, and other religious minorities across Indonesia (e.g. Buehler Reference Buehler2016; Hamayotsu Reference Hamayotsu2018; Menchik Reference Menchik2014, Reference Menchik2016; Miichi Reference Miichi2019; Schäfer Reference Schäfer2018; Soedirgo Reference Soedirgo2018).
Concluding Remarks
The present article has outlined the interconnected mechanisms underpinning the rise of Islamism in Indonesia by taking an in-depth look at the phenomenon of growing conservatism, which is affecting Islamic preachers, activists, and organisations. To better understand this phenomenon, we must examine the connections between ongoing changes in the political ideologies within Indonesian Islam, the breakdown of traditional Islamic authorities, and the mechanisms that link them together. The ‘marketplace of ideas’ concept can help us better understand rising Islamism and the breakdown of Islamic authority in Indonesia. This article shows how the marketplace has been used by new Islamic preachers and groups, able to exploit new tools, such as the Internet, campus preaching organisations, and majelis taklim groups, to promote their interpretations of Islam in Indonesia in recent decades.
Three mechanisms explain the growing popularity of conservative and hard-line Islamism in Indonesia and the decline of moderate Islamic expressions in the public sphere. First, the post-Reformasi marketplace of ideas has helped to facilitate a breakdown of established Islamic authority. Specifically, it has eroded the authority of mainstream Islamic groups, such as NU and Muhammadiyah. New information and communication technologies are empowering a rising group of Islamic authorities, including popular ustadz and online preachers, who promote more conservative interpretations of Islam. Gradually, these new Islamic authorities are shaping the opinions of their audiences – largely young middle-class Indonesian Muslims, who are starting to embrace the exclusivist teachings of these conservative groups and preachers.
Second, new Islamic authorities are using the marketplace to promote more conservative interpretations of Islam to the general public. In this, they have been more successful than their moderate counterparts. Over the past two decades, they have managed to effectively control new channels of Islamic communication, such as Internet da'wa, campus da'wa at public universities, and community-based public opinion via majelis taklim. Conservative and hard-line groups are gaining popular followings through these outlets because the mainstream Islamic authorities rarely use them to propagate more moderate viewpoints. The success that these groups have had in promoting their interpretations of Islam helps to explain why more Indonesian Muslims – especially millennials – are adopting more conservative interpretations of Islam than their predecessors.
Lastly, the growing popularity of conservative and hard-line Islamic groups has made them more attractive to established clerics and politicians as potential allies. Such alliances help political and religious elites retain influence over the way in which Islam is interpreted within Indonesian society and reflected in national legislation and local regulations. Consequently, elite groups are increasingly developing alliances with Islamist groups and preachers to retain political power. In this way, rising Islamic authorities have gained influence in elite circles, ensuring that the policies they favour – such as local shari'a regulations -- are enacted. Some regulations have effectively excluded the voices of Muslim minorities, such as Ahmadi and Shi'a Muslims, from the marketplace of ideas. They are marginalising both non-Muslims and moderate Muslims in the public sphere.
Using the three mechanisms outlined above, we can explain the phenomenon of rising Islamism and the breakdown of Islamic authority in contemporary Indonesia. The ‘marketplace of ideas’ that opened in post-Reformasi Indonesia during the past two decades has upset the balance between new Islamic authorities and more established ones. To remain relevant to average Muslims, who are gravitating towards the activities of new Islamic preachers and conservative organisations, established authorities have abandoned their traditional stances and adopted conservative theological positions, aligning themselves with the conservative agenda promoted by more popular newcomers. In doing so, they have restricted the religious freedoms of Ahmadi and Shi'a Muslims and limited the political participation of non-Muslim politicians, such as Ahok.
These alliances and shifts in Islamic doctrine have contributed to the growing ‘conservative turn’ that Indonesia is currently experiencing. While the prospect of conservative and radical Islamist groups achieving their ultimate objective – an Indonesian state based on Islamic legal principles – is still very remote, their success in staging the Defending Islam rallies shows that they have become a force that can no longer be ignored in contemporary analyses of Indonesian Islamic politics. The political aspiration of the Islamists encountered a major setback during the 2019 Indonesian presidential election, when Prabowo Subianto was defeated by incumbent president Joko Widodo, backed by a coalition of moderate Muslim activists from NU and Muhammadiyah and non-Muslims. Nevertheless, the moderates cannot afford to become complacent. Without new visions from new authority figures, with the skills to persuasively communicate moderate Islamic ideas to millennial Muslims, the conservative Islamist authorities will make a comeback in the Indonesian public sphere within a short period of time.
Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this article was presented at the conference, “Civil Islam Revisited: Indonesia and Beyond,” at the National University of Singapore's Asia Research Institute on 23 October 2017. I want to thank the conference participants and anonymous reviewers for this journal for their feedback and suggestions.
