Introduction
Over the last couple of decades, rich politicians, public figures, and populist political elites have adopted or advocated populism in Southeast Asia. In Thai politics, business and pluto-populism emerged as a prominent form of political elites’ populism soon after Thaksin Shinawatra established the TRT party in July 1998 and became the Thai Prime Minister on 9 February 2001 (Hewison Reference Hewison2017; Phongpaichit and Baker Reference Phongpaichit and Chris2004, Reference Phongpaichit and Chris2005, Reference Phongpaichit and Baker2008). Additionally, authoritarian populism surfaced in the Philippines soon after President Rodrigo Duterte took office (Curato Reference Curato2017; Juego 2018). Populist actors with authoritarian tendencies have been visible in these countries and Indonesia (Aspinall Reference Aspinall2015; Aspinall and Mietzner Reference Aspinall and Marcus2014; Mietzner Reference Mietzner2020; Ziv Reference Ziv2001). Research specifically focusing on the variability of authoritarian populist mobilisation and media strategies that Indonesian political elites who ran in presidential elections established remains under-developed, however.
Some authors have chronicled the many populisms and populist actors evolving in Post-Soeharto Indonesia (Aspinall Reference Aspinall2015; Hadiz Reference Hadiz2017, Reference Hadiz2018; Hadiz and Robison Reference Hadiz and Richard2017). These authors have systematically examined the structural conditions that paved the way for their development. However, none explored the authoritarian populism that Indonesian political elites adopted, especially those participating in national elections. Some authors reported that a few populist elite candidates in national and local elections in Indonesia received substantial endorsements from Indonesian mainstream media owners (Ahmad Reference Ahmad2017, Reference Ahmad2019, Reference Ahmad2020b; Tapsell Reference Tapsell2015). Yet none explored the authoritarian populist mobilisation and media strategies that presidential candidates in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election wielded.
Therefore, this article raises several questions. What types of authoritarian populist mobilisation and media strategies did Jokowi and Prabowo adopt when they contested the election? To what degree did their tactics impact journalists’ freedom within Indonesian mainstream media, particularly Indonesian private news channels on television? This article focuses on these questions and proposes the following. In Indonesia, a democratic country with a presidential government system, the presidential candidates mobilised not only secular nationalist, but also Islamic authoritarian populists. In doing so, they developed either oligarchic or anti-oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategies. Establishments of such authoritarian populist mobilisation and media strategies made journalistic freedom within mainstream media, especially private TV news channels, declines substantially.
The following sections develop these propositions. The first section clarifies authoritarian populism and its relationship with journalistic freedom. The second outlines four faces of authoritarian populism within Indonesia's democracy: secular nationalist and Islamic authoritarian populist mobilisation and oligarchic and anti-oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategies. The third chronicles the research proposition, method, and design. The fourth and fifth sections report the findings. The last three sections summarise the findings, theoretical implications, and research limitations and recommendations.
Authoritarian Populism and Journalistic Freedom
Social and political science scholars understand populism from diverse perspectives. This article follows the ideational approach and deems populism as “a thin-centred ideology” that “considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, which are ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’” (Mudde Reference Mudde2004: 543). This ideology highlights the importance of attacking the ‘elites’ who jeopardise the sovereignty and interests of the people (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2013: 151).
One variant is authoritarian populism. One may define it as any populism that “contradicts the key principles of modern democratic constitutionalism” (Bugaric Reference Bugaric2019: 391). It is also associated with any populism that “undermines pluralism and constrains political choice” (Adam Reference Adam2018:1). It also denotes “the use of populist strategies to legitimise coercive and exclusionary state practices” (Chacko Reference Chacko2020: 206). Moreover, it signifies authoritarian populist practices carried out by the ruling party (Chacko Reference Chacko2018: 557) that attempt to develop “a new hegemonic bloc through new modes of political and social incorporation” (Chacko Reference Chacko2018: 561).
Many see authoritarian populism as a threat to democracy because it advocates “illiberal and authoritarian overtones” (Reinemann et al. Reference Reinemann, Stanyer, Aalberg, Esser, De Vreese, Reinemann, Stanyer, Aalberg, Esser and De Vreese2019: 3). Authoritarian populist leaders have elitist characters (Magset et al. 2019: 207) and particular authoritarian tendencies (Chacko Reference Chacko2020: 206; Hewison Reference Hewison2017: 437). Such authoritarian tendencies include subverting democratic norms, principles, and institutions (Power Reference Power2018: 335; Mietzner Reference Mietzner2020: 1022), establishing a coercive media management strategy to “undermine the ability of the press to monitor governments” (Waisbord Reference Waisbord2012: 515), or attacking the mainstream media to get its attention (Mazzoleni Reference Mazzoleni, Albertazzi and McDonnell2008: 55–56). Political elites who adopt this strategy are commonly reluctant to admit the “idea of autonomous media” as the fourth estate of democracy (Zweg 2018).
This article defines authoritarian populism as populism that political actors and elites develop based on ideational elements that constitute populism (Mudde Reference Mudde2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2012, Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2013, Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2017) and authoritarianism (Morelock and Narita Reference Morelock, Felipe N. and Morelock2018: 139). These actors and elites are committed to performing authoritarian tendencies (Chacko Reference Chacko2020: 206; Hewison Reference Hewison2017: 437), seeking “social homogeneity through coercion” (Morelock Reference Morelock and Morelock2018: xiv), and establishing coercive media management strategy (Waisbord Reference Waisbord2012; Zweg 2018) to undermine democratic values, norm and principles (Mietzner Reference Mietzner2020: 1022; Power Reference Power2018: 335).
Advocates of authoritarian populism are usually “charismatic leaders that seek to increase governmental force to combat difference” and centralise authority (Morelock Reference Morelock and Morelock2018: xiv). To do so, they may exploit oligarch-owned mainstream media (Winters Reference Winters2013) to protect their populist image (Kenny Reference Kenny2019). Second, they may attack the mainstream media using populist political messages and narratives (Canovan 2004; De Vreese et al. Reference de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann and James2018).
Therefore, this article argues that authoritarian populism is compatible with diverse ideological orientations, social bases, and political regimes (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2012, Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2013, Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2017). Regardless of the social bases and political regimes informing it, it likely undermines mainstream media's journalistic freedom. This freedom incorporates two dimensions: freedom from something, somebody, or external forces, and the freedom to do something (Koltay Reference Koltay and Koltay2015: 58). This tendency is likely to occur in Indonesia under the following four faces of authoritarian populism.
The Four Faces of Authoritarian Populism within Indonesia's Democracy
This article contends that the following four faces of authoritarian populism are likely to grow within Indonesia's democracy. They are secular nationalist and Islamic authoritarian populist mobilisation and oligarchic and anti-oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategies. (Populist) political elites in Indonesia are likely to adopt such populist mobilisation and media strategies when they want to win presidential elections. The two points below detail structural conditions that pave the way for these four aspects to emerge.
Political Elites’ Secular Nationalist and Islamic Authoritarian Populist Mobilisation in Post-Soeharto Indonesia
In contrast to European, United States, and Latin American political populism, which left- or right-wing ideological orientations determine (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2012, Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2013, Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2017), secular nationalist and Islamic ideological orientations drive populism within Indonesia's democracy (Hadiz Reference Hadiz2017, Reference Hadiz2018; Hadiz and Robison Reference Hadiz and Richard2017). Since the country's independence, Indonesian civil society organisations and its political parties and their leaders have adopted these ideological orientations. Followers oriented toward a secular nationalist ideology strongly advocated Pancasila Footnote 1 (the Five Principles) as a primary ideological foundation and “a principle of religious pluralism” (Epley and Jung 2016: 55). Advocates of Islamic ideology accepted Pancasila as a primary ideological foundation, but promoted Islamic values much more (Hadiz Reference Hadiz2017, Reference Hadiz2018; Hadiz and Robison Reference Hadiz and Richard2017).
Such trends evolved during the Old Order Soekarno and New Order Soeharto eras. During the Old Order Soekarno era, the leader strategically used secular nationalist-populist appeals to mobilise mass support, neutralise his political opponents, and promote a concept of national unity (Hadiz and Robison Reference Hadiz and Richard2017: 491). The leaders of Islamic organisations, such as Daarul Islam, developed Islamic populist appeals to establish an Indonesian Islamic state (Hadiz Reference Hadiz2018).
In 1966, the Soekarno regime collapsed dramatically, and Soeharto's New Order government replaced it. Unlike Soekarno, Soeharto, in the name of purifying the meaning of Pancasila, launched an anti-Communist campaign and banned the Indonesian Communist Party (the PKI) (Buehler 2009, 2013). As a result, the left-wing tradition of Indonesian nationalism weakened, and the conservative tradition of nationalism, especially the armed forces elites, turned into dominant political actors (Hefner Reference Hefner2002: 756). More importantly, after this regime established “a tightly controlled three-party system” in 1973, the role of the right-wing secular nationalist Golkar Party evolved significantly (Fionna and Tomsa 2017). However, as this regime accommodated conservative Islamic groups during the 1990s (Van Bruinessen Reference Van Bruinessen2002, Reference Van Bruinessen and Bruinessen2013), the role of Islamic groups in Indonesian politics increased substantially (Hefner Reference Hefner2002).
Within the last five decades, the roles of liberal-reformist and social democratic or leftists in Indonesian politics weakened (Hadiz and Robison Reference Hadiz and Richard2017: 500). Although these trends still prevailed, mainstream discourses of Islamic morality and hypernated nationalism evolved substantially (Hadiz Reference Hadiz2017: 269–271). They encouraged prominent political organisations in Indonesia to develop populist rhetorical ingredients based on secular nationalist and Islamic ideologies (Hadiz Reference Hadiz2017, Reference Hadiz2018; Hadiz and Robison Reference Hadiz and Richard2017).
This article argues that such secular nationalist and Islamic populism could evolve into competing populism (Hadiz and Robison Reference Hadiz and Richard2017) and authoritarian populism as well. The latter could occur once political elites who adopted populism's ideational elements advocate anti-pluralist and liberal views (Hadiz Reference Hadiz2018: 566–567; Hadiz and Robison Reference Hadiz and Richard2017: 498), adopt illiberal and authoritarian methods to undermine democratic norms, principles, and institutions (Mietzner Reference Mietzner2020: 1022; Power Reference Power2018: 335), and establish authoritarian populist campaign narratives and themes to win elections (Aspinall Reference Aspinall2015: 20; Aspinall and Mietzner Reference Aspinall and Marcus2014: 347).
Thus, this article assumes that Indonesian political elites who contested Indonesia's 2019 presidential election want to adopt secular nationalist or Islamic populism to formulate an authoritarian populist political mobilisation. While doing so, they may establish either an oligarchic or anti-oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategy, as we will see below.
Presidential Candidates and Oligarchic and Anti-Oligarchic Authoritarian Populist Media Strategies in Post-Soeharto Indonesia's Presidential Election
Within the last two decades, the Indonesian political landscape and Indonesian media system have changed substantially (Ahmad Reference Ahmad2021a, Reference Ahmad2021b). Soon after the post-Soeharto-regime democratic media system evolved, most of Indonesia's mainstream media turned into profit-making institutions (Nugroho and Syarief Reference Nugroho and Sofie2012; Tapsell Reference Tapsell2015). The media serves the business interests of its oligarch owners, while these oligarchs affiliate themselves with particular political parties or politicians.
In 2011, Hary Tanoesodibjo, an oligarch who owned the MNC Group (RCTI, Global TV, SINDOnews, and Okezone), joined the Nasdem Party, a political party Surya Paloh, an owner of Media Group (Metro TV, Media Indonesia and Lampung Post), established. Two years later, he left this party to join the Hanura Party. Nevertheless, Dahlan Iskan, owner of the Jawa Pos Group, and Chairul Tanjung, owner of Trans Media Corp (Trans TV, Trans7, CNN Indonesia TV and Detik.com), remained close to President SBY. They were even appointed as the SBY government's Minister of State-Owned Enterprises and Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, respectively (Tapsell Reference Tapsell2015: 33).
Subsequent oligarchs who owned Indonesian mainstream media also publicly endorsed Jokowi, a populist presidential candidate, ahead of Indonesia's 2014 presidential election. His public supporters included the Jawa Pos Group owner Dahlan Iskan; Surya Paloh, the owner of Metro TV who established the Nasdem Party; and James Riady, owner of Berita Satu TV, Jakarta Post, and Jakarta Globe. In contrast, Aburizal Bakrie, owner of TV One and one-time chairman of the Golkar Party, supported his rival, Prabowo Subijano (Tapsell Reference Tapsell2015: 32).
While supporting prominent Indonesian politicians during elections, most oligarch-owners of mainstream Indonesian media also engage in determining newsroom policies. For example, when Jokowi ran in Indonesia's 2014 presidential election, Aburizal Bakrie, an influential oligarch who owned TV One, publicly endorsed his rival, Prabowo Subijanto. Bakrie's TV channel covered Prabowo positively and frequently, framing him as a populist presidential candidate (Tapsell Reference Tapsell2015: 46). In contrast, mainstream media outlets owned by Surya Paloh, Dahlan Iskan, and James Riadi gave substantial space to Jokowi's presidential campaign events and rallies and reported him positively (Tapsell Reference Tapsell2015: 47).
In the wake of the downfall of Soeharto's regime, the oligarchic media ownership model and the owners’ partisanship within the Indonesian mainstream have been increasingly visible in Indonesia. Their roles in Indonesian politics have escalated substantially. These oligarchs owned “the vast majority of Indonesia's print, television, radio, and online media outlets” (Winters Reference Winters2013: 25) and interfered in their media's journalistic practices by controlling the media's management system and editorial policy directly (Tapsell Reference Tapsell2015). Consequently, their media and those who work for them must “provide the venues or vehicles for challenging this particular form of oligarchic domination” (Winters Reference Winters2013: 33).
These developments prompt the following proposals. First, oligarchic media ownership and its partisanship increased substantially in Indonesia's democracy. As a result, populist presidential candidates attempted to establish an oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategy by approaching these oligarchic media owners to spread their populist messages, build their populist images, and mobilise voters (Kenny Reference Kenny2019: 2). They wanted to exploit the media as a tool to mobilise and captivate a substantial number of electoral endorsements that went “beyond what the party they associated with might achieve” (De Vreese et al. Reference de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann and James2018).
Second, some prominent populist political actors in Indonesia fail in approaching these oligarchs. These populist actors denigrate these oligarchs as “established elites” (Jagers and Walgrave Reference Jagers and Stefaan2007) who deploy their media to serve their political interests. Thus, they are likely to attack the oligarch-owned mainstream media to get its attention (Mazzoleni Reference Mazzoleni, Albertazzi and McDonnell2008: 55–56) and secure a populist image for themselves (Kenny Reference Kenny2019). They also promote these media outlets as unreliable sources (Hemeleers 2018: 2175) that are unlikely to “represent the ordinary people and their needs.” This article assumes that such tendencies took place in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election.
Research Propositions, Method, and Design
There were two presidential candidates in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election: Jokowi and Prabowo. This article maintains that both wanted to develop secular nationalist and Islamic populism as an authoritarian populist political mobilisation. Each attempted to establish an oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategy as well. However, having failed to do so, they advanced an anti-oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategy. This article assumes that the more they promoted authoritarian populist mobilisation and authoritarian populist media strategies, the more journalists working for Indonesian mainstream media, especially the Indonesian private TV news channels, lost their journalistic freedom throughout the presidential campaign cycle.
This article adopts Cresswell's qualitative method (Reference Cresswell2014) to evaluate its propositions. The researcher collected data from related news reports and conducted in-depth interviews with four senior journalists employed by Kompas TV, CNN Indonesia, TV One and INews TV. The study selected these journalists to be key respondents, together with a journalist who chaired the Indonesian Journalist Alliance (AJI). These journalists are labelled J1, J2, J3, J4, and J5. Finally, the researcher supplemented the data with personal observations and confidential interviews with two senior journalists associated with Indonesian mainstream media owned by influential oligarchs.
The reasons for selecting these TV news channels and senior journalists are as follows. First, society widely acknowledges these TV channels as the most influential TV news channels in Indonesia. Ahead of Indonesia's 2019 presidential election, Kompas TV, CNN Indonesia, and TV One represented independent mainstream media. Their owners lacked political affiliation with any party and did not publicly endorse a presidential candidate (Ahmad Reference Ahmad2019: 506). In contrast, INews TV was partisan since Hary Tanoesudibyo — its owner and chair of the Perindo Party — publicly supported Jokowi in Indonesia's 2014 presidential election (Tapsell Reference Tapsell2015) and ahead of Indonesia's 2019 presidential election. Second, the interviewed senior journalists connected to these TV news channels are professional journalists with over five years of experience. They are familiar with contemporary Indonesian political issues and the Indonesian Press Council and Indonesian Broadcasting Commission's professional journalistic norms and ethics.
I verified and triangulated news reports and the in-depth interview data via personal observations. These observations resulted from being a political commentator for political talk show programs organised by such TV channels several months before the electionFootnote 2 and talking to producers who organised political talk shows when off-air. I then extracted the data using traditional qualitative content and thematic analyses by becoming familiar with data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes, and producing reports (Boyatzis Reference Boyatzis1998; Braun and Clarke Reference Braun and Clarke2006; Butler-Kisber Reference Butler-Kisber2010).
Jokowi's Authoritarian Populist Mobilisation and Media Strategy and Their Consequences on Journalistic Freedom in Indonesia's 2019 Presidential Election
Indonesia's 2019 presidential election race was a rematch between Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subijanto. In contrast to Indonesia's 2014 presidential election, Jokowi was the incumbent and had substantial political resources in the 2019 presidential election. Unlike his rival, many secular nationalist and Islamic parties supported him. This number was even larger than the number of political parties that endorsed him in Indonesia's 2014 presidential election. The secular nationalist parties that endorsed him in 2014 — PDIP, Nasdem Party, Hanura Party and PKPI — still supported him in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election. Moreover, the Golkar Party and PPP, which nominated his rival in 2014, supported Jokowi in 2019. The new secular nationalist political parties, the PSI and Perindo Party, backed him in this election as well.
In this election, Jokowi favoured secular nationalist-populist rhetoric to captivate Indonesian voters resistant to Indonesian radical Islamic groups. He wielded it at campaign events and rallies that his campaign teams and loyal supporters organised throughout the presidential election cycle and during Indonesian General Election Commission and TV news channels’ presidential debates between January and April 2019. He highlighted the importance of following Pancasila as the Indonesian Unitary State's foundation and the need to secure harmony from diverse influences, especially conservative Islamic narratives advocated by radical Islamic groups in Indonesia.Footnote 3
A few months before the election, Islamic identity-based political campaign narratives increased substantially in the Indonesian political sphere and triggered political polarisation (Ahmad Reference Ahmad2019, Reference Ahmad2020b). Thus, Jokowi chose Makruf Amin as his running mate, an influential Islamic cleric and former Supreme Leader of Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Islamic organisation. This influential organisation continuously advocated moderate Islamic values and pluralism (Hamayotsu Reference Hamayotsu2011; Ziv Reference Ziv2001). However, some of its influential leaders, especially Markruf Amin, promoted conservative Islamic values.
Makruf Amin is an Islamic leader who endorsed the anti-Ahok campaign. Some radical Islamic groups, such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), organised this campaign to protest Basuki Tjahaya Purnama's allegedly blasphemous comments. Basuki Tjahaya Purnama was an incumbent ethnic Chinese Christian gubernatorial candidate in 2017's Jakarta election and Jokowi's running mate in Jakarta's 2012 gubernatorial election (Power Reference Power2018: 310). Jokowi's willingness to make Makruf Amin his running mate in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election was a typical Islamic populist political strategy to tackle negative campaign attacks that Prabowo's Islamic conservative supporters launched throughout this presidential campaign. This strategy also developed his brand as a devoted Muslim to capture Indonesian Islamic voters that his rival, Prabowo, targeted (Ahmad Reference Ahmad and Jamil2020a).
Jokowi stands outside the oligarchic club, which has influenced Indonesian politics since the New Order Soeharto era (Mietzner Reference Mietzner2015: 58). As a candidate in Indonesia's 2014 presidential election, Jokowi was reluctant to deal with Indonesian oligarchs, especially those who wanted to benefit from his presidency if he won (Aspinall Reference Aspinall2015). However, like most Indonesian politicians with limited campaign funds but expected to win local and national elections, he relied upon them (Winters Reference Winters2013: 17). Furthermore, he was not immune from “oligarchic forces that dominate Indonesia's political life” (Muhtadi Reference Muhtadi2015: 350). This tendency emerged during Indonesia's 2014 presidential election's candidacy stage. Some oligarchs asked Jokowi to make Jusuf Kalla his running mate. At the time, Kalla was an influential oligarch who was vice president during the first term of SBY's government (2004–2009) (Ahmad Reference Ahmad2017).
Before Indonesia's 2019 presidential election, Jokowi secured endorsements from Surya Paloh and Jusuf Kalla, oligarchs who supported him in Indonesia's 2014 presidential election. Nevertheless, he approached several other oligarchs who had not endorsed him during Indonesia's 2014 presidential election: Aburizal Bakrie, Hary Tanoesudibyo, and Erick Thohir. Aburizal Bakrie, an owner of TV One, was a chairman of the Golkar Party. Hary Tanoesudibyo, an owner of the MNC group (RCTI, MNC TV and INews) and a chairman of the Perindo party, endorsed Jokowi's rival in 2014. However, in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election, neither of these oligarchs supported his rival.
Erick Thohir, one of the wealthiest persons in Indonesia, owns Jak TV and Republika, an Islamic segmented-newspaper and led Jokowi's presidential campaign team (Apinino Reference Apinino2018; Hadi Reference Hadi2018; Ihsanuddin Reference Ihsanuddin2018). The oligarch-owners of Indonesian mainstream media who endorsed Jokowi in 2019 were more numerous than in the previous presidential election.
When approaching oligarchs who owned the Indonesian mainstream media, particularly those reluctant to endorse him in the 2019 election, Jokowi deployed three authoritarian strategies. First, he, through his clandestine team, offered to help these oligarchs resolve legal issues confidentially when dealing with Indonesian judicial institutions. Second, he prohibited oligarchs who already commited to support him in this election to buy advertising in the mainstream media owned by any oligarch who was unwilling to back him up on winning in this election. Third, he forbade top officials in his government to allocate and spend their annual advertising budgets within such mainstream media.Footnote 4
Throughout this presidential election cycle, oligarchs affiliated with Jokowi directly controlled their newsrooms. Those who owned commercial TV channels intervened, directly or indirectly, to select and prioritise political issues and events related to the presidential candidates’ campaigns and activities. Therefore, the journalists linked to these TV channels lost their journalistic freedom throughout the election campaign cycle. In general, they could not implement journalistic norms and professional principles when covering and broadcasting campaign events and rallies that Jokowi's campaign teams or loyal supporters organised. J4, a senior journalist, stated,
I fully noticed that the owner of this medium is one of Jokowi's supporters. My colleagues and I had to stick to its organisational and editorial policies, directed directly by its editor-in-chief and indirectly by this media owner. Those who were reluctant to follow such policies were posted to non-social and political desks that could not influence newsroom policies.Footnote 5
J5, a senior journalist who chaired the Indonesian Independence Journalist Alliance (AJI), confirmed these practices. He stated that the intervention of oligarch-owners of Indonesian mainstream media, such as private TV news channels, constrained the journalistic freedom of those working for these media companies. He explained,
The media owners who endorsed a particular presidential candidate, such as Jokowi, had a detrimental effect on journalistic freedom within the Indonesian media. It undermined journalists’ professionalism and autonomy in managing newsroom and editorial policies. Throughout Indonesia's 2019 presidential election campaign cycle, journalists who worked for the media owned by partisan media owners (oligarchs) encountered such problems.Footnote 6
During this presidential election, Jokowi successfully exploited the country's oligarchic media ownership. Compared to Prabowo, he succeeded much more in approaching influential oligarchs who controlled the Indonesian mainstream media, especially Indonesian commercial TV news channels. Because of his efforts, journalists associated with these media lost their journalistic freedom while covering political events and news concerning Jokowi throughout the campaign.
These circumstances indicated that Jokowi lacked the commitment to preserve the mainstream media's autonomy as the fourth estate of democracy (Kenny Reference Kenny2019: 2). He was reluctant to acknowledge the “idea of autonomous media” as democracy's fourth estate (Zweg 2018). Instead, he exploited the mainstream media as a tool to mobilise and captivate significant voter endorsement. His efforts typify authoritarian populist media strategies that populist actors utilise (De Vreese et al. Reference de Vreese, Esser, Aalberg, Reinemann and James2018; Kenny Reference Kenny2019; Mazzoleni Reference Mazzoleni, Albertazzi and McDonnell2008), confirming Jokowi as an authoritarian populist.
The evidence did not imply that Jokowi or his campaign team intervened in the Indonesian mainstream media's newsroom policies. However, it confirmed that oligarchs who supported him in the 2019 election interfered indirectly in their media's journalistic practices through an authoritarian media management system. Moreover, they directly controlled their media's editorial policies to secure his populist political image. Thus, journalists associated with such oligarch-owned media lacked freedom because of what Koltay (Reference Koltay and Koltay2015: 58) called “external interference.” They also lost the freedom “to do something,” rendering them unable to cover and broadcast political issues and events related to Jokowi throughout the presidential campaign according to journalistic principles.
Prabowo's Authoritarian Populist Mobilisation and Media Strategy and Their Consequences on Journalistic Freedom in Indonesia's 2019 Presidential Election
Like Jokowi, Prabowo favoured propagating secular nationalist rhetoric and maintained a secular leadership style (Aspinall Reference Aspinall2015; Hadiz and Robison Reference Hadiz and Richard2017). He developed these characteristics before Indonesia's 2019 presidential election. However, unlike Jokowi, he established an Islamic authoritarian populist mobilisation.
Prabowo and his campaign team intensively exploited Islamic populist rhetoric and narratives. Prabowo, his campaign team, and radical Islamic supporters claimed that Jokowi's government's policies between 2014 and 2018 benefitted Indonesian oligarchs and foreign investors rather than the country's population, especially Indonesian Islamic people. He continuously employed such rhetoric and narratives during a series of presidential campaign events and rallies that his campaign team or radical Islamic supporters organised. He also used it throughout Indonesia's 2019 presidential debates organised by Indonesian General Election Commission and broadcasted publicly by the Indonesian TV news channels between January and April 2019.Footnote 7
Meanwhile, Prabowo's campaign team and radical Islamic supporters launched negative campaign attacks on his rival, Jokowi. They characterised Jokowi as a disloyal Muslim and a presidential candidate who did not truly represent Indonesian Islamic people. They did so to attract conservative Indonesian Islamic voters who perceived Jokowi as a puppet of politically influential oligarchs and a secular presidential candidate whom secular political elites disrespectful to Indonesian Islamic clerics endorsed (Ahmad Reference Ahmad and Jamil2020a).
Additionally, Prabowo criticised the oligarch-owned Indonesian mainstream media that endorsed his rival and the journalists working for these media. He disseminated conservative Islamic campaign narratives and rhetoric to gain endorsements from conservative Islamic voters and leaders of radical Islamic organisations and groups at presidential campaign events and rallies organised by his campaign team or radical Islamic supporters. For example, while attending a presidential campaign event on 5 December 2018, he asserted that Indonesian media and journalists lied while covering the 212-reunion rally organised by Indonesian Islamic middle-classes at Monash Jakarta on 2 December 2018. In turn, they replied that they are objective and responsible for defending Indonesia's democracy. However, in reality, they attempted to manipulate facts, turning them into manipulators of (Indonesian) democracy (Putri Reference Putri2018). Prabowo highlighted these points in the months leading up to the presidential election (Nasution Reference Nasution2019).
Unlike his rival, Prabowo failed to get endorsements from oligarchs who owned Indonesia's mainstream media, especially private TV news channels. Before this election, he could not convince two oligarchs who supported him in Indonesia's 2014 presidential election, Aburizal Bakrie and Hary Tanoesudibjo, to back him in 2019. The former was reluctant to endorse him publicly, while the latter became a loyal supporter of his rival (Ahmad Reference Ahmad and Jamil2020a). Moreover, around four months before the 2019 election, Jokowi successfully approached Erick Thohir, an influential oligarch who owned Jak TV, an influential private TV news channel in Jakarta, and Republika, a leading newspaper serving most Indonesian Islamic readers and appointed him the head of his campaign team. Jokowi also gained Hary Tanoesoedibjo's support, the influential oligarch, founder, and chairman of the Perindo Party and the MNC group (RCTI, Global TV, INews TV, and Sindo newspaper). Additionally, Jokowi had the backing of the powerful oligarch Surya Paloh, a founder and chairman of the Nasdem Party and an owner of Media Indonesia, a leading mainstream Indonesian newspaper, and Metro TV (Apinino, Reference Apinino2018). Because these oligarchs supported Jokowi in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election, their media allocated substantial positive coverage to his campaign events and rallies. They also framed Prabowo's profile and proposed public policies negatively.Footnote 8
As a result, Prabowo fiercely attacked the Indonesian mainstream media owned by these oligarchs throughout his election campaign. He also publicly criticised Indonesian mainstream media owned by other oligarchs that shied away from reporting on his campaign events and rallies.Footnote 9 One such event was the 212-reunion rally. Prabowo's loyal supporters — the Indonesian middle classes and urban Islamic communities — set up the rally at Monash Jakarta on 2 December 2018. The candidate condemned the media, which refused to cover this rally, and publicised the idea that such media were no longer guardians of Indonesian democracy. At other events and rallies, he even accused most of these media of manipulating facts and Indonesian democracy (Putri Reference Putri2018).
Prabowo frequently mocked journalists associated with the oligarch-owned media who endorsed Jokowi as non-objective and uncredible journalists. He considered these journalists to be the servants of their oligarch bosses. He continually warned journalists who reported on his statements, campaign events, and rallies to follow journalistic norms and principles properly. He asked them to report his campaign objectively and quote his and his campaign team's statements accurately. His requests worked to some degree, stimulating some journalists to stick to journalistic norms and principles. Nevertheless, his loyal supporters regarded Indonesian media and journalists who did not cover Prabowo's statements and activities positively as enemies.Footnote 10
Some Indonesian journalists realised that such circumstances potentially jeopardised the safety of any journalist who covered Prabowo's campaign events and rallies. Moreover, journalists who worked for these media felt insecure about freely reporting on campaign rallies under professional journalistic norms and principles.Footnote 11 J1 explained:
I heard quite frequently that Prabowo propagated the media as a manipulator of facts regarding his campaign events and rallies. It influenced how his loyal Islamic supporters considered journalists who covered his campaign events and rallies. Some of them really worried that we framed such rallies negatively. They were also bothered by reports made by some journalists who wanted to downgrade Prabowo's political image. Therefore, they treated any journalist who covered his campaign events and rallies and statements throughout his presidential campaign as unfriendly. This situation forced my colleagues and me to be cautious while covering his campaign events and rallies and quoting his statements.Footnote 12
Prabowo himself respected and sometimes thanked journalists who covered his campaign events and rallies.Footnote 13 However, some radical Islamic groups that supported him in this election prohibited some journalists who wanted to report on campaign events that his loyal Islamic supporters organised. They even forced journalists to delete the pictures and videos they recorded while attending such campaign events. J2 stated:
To my knowledge, Prabowo never attacked any Indonesian journalist physically or psychologically. He even advocated that journalists should get a better salary from the media owners. However, some radical Islamic groups that intensively endorsed him in this election threatened my colleague and me badly while reporting the 212-reunion rally at the National Museum of Jakarta (Monas) that his loyal Islamic supporters organized. Though we showed them our journalist ID cards, they persistently prohibited us from taking pictures and videos related to the campaign rally. Some of them even attacked us physically and forced us to erase some pictures and videos from our smartphones and cameras. These incidents would not have occurred if Prabowo had not condemned the media as a manipulator of facts.Footnote 14
Still, Prabowo tactically addressed Indonesian journalists at his campaign events and rallies using anti-oligarchic populist narratives and rhetoric. He announced that most Indonesian journalists were low-paid workers and repeatedly asked media-owning oligarchs to double these journalists’ monthly salaries. He highlighted that these oligarchs were unwilling to pay their journalists decently and exploited journalists to achieve their business and political interests. Although many journalists noted that Prabowo's anti-oligarchic populist narratives and rhetoric were reasonable,Footnote 15 they did not become his supporters (Abdi Reference Abdi2019).
Prabowo sympathised with journalists working for Indonesian oligarch-owned mainstream media for low salaries. Paradoxically, some of his radical loyal Islamic supporters threatened most of these journalists relentlessly. While reporting on the 212-reunion rally at the National Monument of Jakarta organised by the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), an Islamic organisation that endorsed Prabowo's candidacy, some journalists from Detik.com and CNN Indonesia TV found themselves severely intimidated by members of this organisation (Raharjo Reference Raharjo2019). FPI followers also persecuted kumparan.com and detik.com journalists via social media platforms (Instagram and Facebook) who failed to respect FPI's leader, ‘Habib’ Rizieq Shihab, or use his full name properly (Duillah Reference Duillah2018). Between 21 and 22 May 2019, 20 journalists associated with seventeen Indonesian mass media outlets received threats and violent attacks from Prabowo's Islamic endorsers in protest against the Indonesian General Election Commission's declaration that Jokowi-Makruf won the 2019 presidential election (Haryanto Reference Haryanto2019).
In summary, Prabowo, like his rival Jokowi, advanced secular nationalist authoritarian populist mobilisation. However, he much preferred Islamic authoritarian populist mobilisation more. More importantly, having failed to secure the support of Indonesian media oligarchs who instead endorsed his rival, Prabowo wielded an anti-oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategy throughout his presidential campaign. Although he never publicly refuted the ‘idea of autonomous media’ as democracy's fourth estate (Zweg 2018), his radical Islamic supporters perceived the media as their enemies. Therefore, Indonesian journalists, especially those working for these media outlets, felt unable to cover Prabowo's campaign events and rallies freely using professional journalistic norms and principles. These journalists lost two journalistic freedoms: freedom from external interference and the freedom to do something journalistically (Koltay Reference Koltay and Koltay2015: 58).
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated how both Jokowi and Prabowo adopted secular nationalist-populist mobilisation. However, Prabowo favoured Islamic populist mobilisation much more, while Jokowi advanced an oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategy. He did so by exploiting oligarchic Indonesian media ownership and approaching oligarchs who owned the Indonesian mainstream media, particularly the private TV news channels, to secure his populist image. In contrast, Prabowo failed in his attempts to convert these oligarchs, encouraging him to adopt an anti-oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategy by denigrating the oligarch-owned media's credibility. Although he respected journalists associated with these media, the radical Islamic groups who supported him in 2019 undermined the freedoms of journalists covering his campaign events and rallies.
The authoritarian populist mobilisation and media strategies that the 2019 presidential candidates advanced are obviously dissimilar. Nevertheless, the consequences of their strategies on journalistic freedom are surprisingly similar. Both candidates subverted journalistic freedom within the Indonesian mainstream media, particularly those working for Indonesian commercial TV news channels at the time. These freedoms include freedom from external interference (Koltay Reference Koltay and Koltay2015: 58) and the freedom to do something journalistically.
Therefore, this article proposes the following. First, authoritarian populism is likely to advance in democratic countries when (populist) political elites adopt the ideational elements of populism (Mudde Reference Mudde2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2012, Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2013, Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2017) and authoritarianism (Morelock and Narita Reference Morelock, Felipe N. and Morelock2018: 139), undercutting liberal democratic values, principles, and norms (Adam Reference Adam2018:1; Bugaric Reference Bugaric2019: 391). Such authoritarian populism is compatible with any ideology on the political spectrum and within diverse social bases and political regimes (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2012, Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2013, Reference Mudde and Kaltwasser2017). Populist political actors in government or representing the opposition are most likely to adopt authoritarian populism (Chacko Reference Chacko2018, Reference Chacko2020; Hewison Reference Hewison2017; Pongpaichit and Baker Reference Phongpaichit and Baker2008), as are those running in presidential and local elections (Aspinall Reference Aspinall2015; Aspinall and Mietzner Reference Aspinall and Marcus2014).
Second, in democratic countries that share similarities with Indonesian politics, four faces of authoritarian populism are likely to take shape: secular nationalist and Islamic authoritarian populist mobilisation and oligarchic and anti-oligarchic authoritarian populist media strategies. Those who established authoritarian populist mobilisation and media strategies advance anti-liberal views (Hadiz and Robison Reference Hadiz and Richard2017: 498; Hadiz Reference Hadiz2018: 566–567) and authoritarian methods to undermine democratic norms, principles and institutions (Mietzner Reference Mietzner2020: 1022; Power Reference Power2018: 335). Furthermore, they develop authoritarian populist campaign messages and rhetoric (Aspinall Reference Aspinall2015: 20; Aspinall and Mietzner Reference Aspinall and Marcus2014: 347) based on secular nationalist and Islamic narratives (Hadiz Reference Hadiz2017, Reference Hadiz2018; Hadiz and Robison Reference Hadiz and Richard2017). When (populist) political elites, especially presidential candidates, establish these four faces of authoritarian populism in these countries, they jeopardise the media's autonomy (Zweg 2018). They also undermine the media's role as the fourth estate of democracy (Kenny Reference Kenny2019) and journalistic freedom within the mainstream media, especially those owned by oligarchs. Journalists are unlikely to enjoy freedom from the interference of external powers and the freedom to do something (Koltay Reference Koltay and Koltay2015: 58). The latter denotes the freedom to cover presidential campaign events and rallies freely in these countries based on professional journalistic norms and principles.
This article focused on authoritarian populisms evolving in Indonesia's democracy. It did not examine and compare the variability of the authoritarian populisms that political elites in Asian democracy embraced within election or non-election contexts. It also did not explore the ways political elites in Asian democracy who adopted an authoritarian populist style took power in government, managed governmental or parliamentary institutions and voters, or deal with social media users and journalists who worked for the mainstream media.
Nevertheless, the research exposes secular nationalist, Islamic, oligarchic and anti-oligarchic authoritarian populisms as the four faces of authoritarian populism in Indonesia's 2019 presidential election. In democratic countries similar to Indonesia and its politics, such as Turkey, presidential candidates are likely to wield these four faces of authoritarian populism. Thus, further research needs to explore the ways and degrees to which these four faces of authoritarian populism evolved and the structural factors and conditions that allow their development in democratic countries. Subsequent research also needs to examine the impacts of such developments on the sustainability of the liberal democratic system, society, and the role of the media as the fourth estate of democracy.
