A Multitude of Theories: Conflict between God and the Keys

Looking carefully at the work of the twenty-five canonists, twenty-two distinct theories about the validity of indulgences emerge. The sheer number of theories is a testament to the great uncertainty of canonists concerning indulgences and the problematic implications they had for the theology and ecclesiology of the medieval church. The main issue was that the power of the keys seemed to challenge divine justice by prejudging what only God could judge. After all, only God has the full knowledge to decide what punishment a sinner deserves, yet an indulgence lessens the punishment not only on earth, but also in purgatory.

Out of these twenty-two theories, eleven try to lessen the indulgence's apparent affront to divine justice and penitential discipline by limiting what kinds of penances indulgences validly remitted. These theories are usually mentioned in passing by canonists, but not explicitly endorsed or denied. The first three of these theories are fairly common in thirteenth-century canonistic texts. Alanus Anglicus was one of the earliest to list these as views circulating among the learned. In his Apparatus on Compilatio Prima, Alanus writes:

These three views also appear in the canonistic works of Vincentius Hispanus, Bernard of Parma, Hostiensis, and Johannes Andreae.Footnote ³² The attraction of these views is that they do not diminish the rigor of penitential discipline nor do they put into doubt the ultimate judgment of God on all sinners. If indulgences only lessen punishment in purgatory, but do nothing to lighten the penitential load in this life, that means that sinners are still obliged to complete whatever satisfaction was enjoined on them by their confessor. God will take into account the good work done to receive the indulgence and shorten the penitent's time in purgatory as a just recompense. Likewise, if indulgences only remit penances on earth that were imposed excessively, the triumph of God's judgement over the faulty judgment of the confessor removes any doubts as to penitential justice. The sinner still has to do everything he deserves to do, from God's point of view, but whatever above and beyond this the priest had imposed on him he is freed from doing through the indulgence. In a similar way, according to the third view, if the priest negligently does not impose some satisfaction that the penitent deserves, that owed debt is paid by the indulgence in the eyes of God. In all three instances, God's judgment is the deciding factor and penitents are still required to do satisfaction despite the indulgence.

The remaining eight less common theories that limit the types of penances that are affected by indulgences have a similar rationale to the first three. Hostiensis notes that “certain people say that [indulgences] are valid with respect to venial [sins], some with respect to disgraceful faults . . . or less discretely chosen and enjoined [penances].”Footnote ³³ Paul of Hungary, an early Dominican canonist, adds several theories to the list, namely that indulgences are valid for forgotten penances or penances not done because of anticipation of death.Footnote ³⁴ Johannes Teutonicus, Paul of Hungary, and the Dominican Raymond of Peñafort all mention the theory that indulgences are only valid for penances for sins done out of ignorance.Footnote ³⁵ Monaldus of Capodistria, a Franciscan canonist, notes the view of some that indulgences remit only penances of those not in mortal sin or only if contrition has sufficiently paid for the mortal sin.Footnote ³⁶ Lastly, Johannes Teutonicus, in the ordinary gloss to Gratian's Decretum, puts forth a rather strange theory that the indulgence remits penances for mortal and venial sins, but “in proportion” rather than “in quantity, and something always remains, even if all silver is spent.”Footnote ³⁷ This means that if an indulgence is offered for giving money, no matter how much one gives, it will never relax all of one's penance, since there is no one to one correlation between the money given and the penances remitted. Seven of these theories try to decrease the seeming affront to God's justice and penitential discipline that indulgences pose by positing that they only work on sins that are not that serious for one reason or another, either because they already have been punished by infamy or contrition, or because the nature of the sin itself is not very grave, such as with venial sins or those done out of ignorance. The problem with all such theories is they seem to undermine the power of the indulgence and of the prelates who grant them, as Huguccio and Johannes Andreae note.Footnote ³⁸ Johannes Teutonicus's theory that they are valid for all sins but never remit so much penance that there is nothing left for God or the church to punish is an interesting way around the problem, but also one that is vague and uncertain. Unsurprisingly, it was not widely cited.

In addition to these eleven theories about indulgences which limit the kinds of penances remitted, there are also four theories that state that indulgences remit all types of penance, but restrict their effectiveness by limiting who they can benefit. These four views are more explicitly supported by canonists than the ones previously mentioned. Drawing from the canon Quod autem, a letter from Alexander III to the archbishop of Canterbury, which states that indulgences of outside bishops are invalid without the consent of the penitent's own judge, the earlier canonists, such as Huguccio, Alanus Anglicus, Vincentius Hispanus, and Bernard of Parma, all prefer the theory that indulgences do decrease the amount of satisfaction penitents have to do in this life so long as they are granted or allowed by the penitents’ own judge (that is, a bishop or perhaps a priest).Footnote ³⁹ Alanus goes on to even state that “if a bishop enjoins on anyone a seven-year penance and does not concede that he can redeem it, although he or another issued a general remission for a bridge . . . penance is not diminished with respect to the church.”Footnote ⁴⁰ The implied corollary is that if the bishop does consent, seven years of penance can be relaxed simply by giving money or helping to build a bridge. This explanation is a close literal interpretation of Quod autem. If indulgences are valid with the proper judge's consent, then they are completely valid for all penances for all types of sin, with respect to both God and the church. Contrary to the aforementioned eleven theories that restricted the validity to only certain types of penances, this preferred theory relies only on the authority and jurisdiction of the episcopate and does not question episcopal indulgences’ applicability to all types of penance. It does, however, limit indulgences’ effectiveness based on the boundaries of an ordinary judge's jurisdiction.

Another related theory commonly advocated for by canonists such as Innocent IV was that “it seems that indulgences do not benefit those who are in purgatory, since by then they have no judge on earth but are left to the judgment of God . . . if, nevertheless, the Pope does it, we do not deny it, that they are valid for the deceased.”Footnote ⁴¹ Hostiensis, Johannes Andreae, and the Dominican Raymond of Peñafort all argue for this theory, with the latter two repeating Innocent's caveat that if a future pope says indulgences are valid for those in purgatory, they do not dare go against it.Footnote ⁴² Shaffern interprets Innocent's comments as emphasizing the ultimate power of the papacy.Footnote ⁴³ The main thrust of the argument, however, is that episcopal jurisdiction is valid for remitting all penances for the living but not for the dead by virtue of jurisdiction. The caveat about the pope seems to be an afterthought, especially since Innocent himself was pope at the time and had just stated he did not believe indulgences as such benefited the dead. Another related theory states that indulgences are valid for the dead, but only if they had received the indulgence in life and completed the task enjoined by the document. The Franciscan John of Erfurt argues in favor of this theory, writing that God takes an indulgence granted by a bishop and received in life into account when calculating time in purgatory.Footnote ⁴⁴ Since the dead sinner was still under the prelate's jurisdiction when he received the indulgence and fulfilled the task it required, he still benefits from it in purgatory, almost as an aftereffect. A final variation states simply that the pope has authority to grant remissions even to the dead in purgatory; if the form of the indulgence and intention of the pope agrees, one can get an indulgence for one's dead relative. The Dominicans Guillaume de Rennes and John of Freiburg, along with the Summa of the Franciscan Henry of Merseburg and two Franciscan summae based on it (Labia Sacerdotis and the so-called second recension of Henry of Merseburg's Summa), and the summae of Franciscans John of Erfurt and Peter Quesnel all argue for this view, with Henry's Summa and its recensions adding that this only applies if the dead “merited this while living and died in love.”Footnote ⁴⁵ These three theories are grappling with the tension between the plenitude of power that the pope has and the jurisdiction of God over the dead. Innocent upholds God's ultimate judgment, but does not want to rule out that a future pope may say otherwise. John of Erfurt suggests that God takes indulgences into account in his judgment, but still has the ultimate say. And others like John of Freiburg assert that the form of the indulgence is the most important thing. If the pope states the indulgence can help the dead, it can, although Henry of Merseburg makes room for God's judgment by noting that the dead must be deserving. The commonality between these three views about indulgences in purgatory and the view that only subjects of proper judges can benefit from them is that they all try to use ideas of jurisdiction to determine the effect of an indulgence, unlike the first eleven theories which limited indulgences by type of sin or penance to be remitted.

The sixteenth theory is less nuanced. Raymond writes, “indeed another opinion is favorable and more common, and I approve of it, namely that they are valid just as they sound. For when the pope is called in plenitude of power and inferior prelates moreover in part of the solicitude . . . it would be stubborn to dispute against the power of the keys.”Footnote ⁴⁶ While some other canonists mention this view and are ambivalent about it, Godfrey of Trano, Hostiensis, Johannes Andreae, Henry of Merseburg, and the so-called second recension of Henry's work all argue in favor of this simple understanding of indulgences based on the power of the pope's office.Footnote ⁴⁷ This view is opposed to the first eleven theories above, which limited the types of penance remitted by indulgences, since the simple understanding is that they remit all penance they claim to remit. There is no need for further questions about their validity for certain sins or for those in purgatory. This also complements the view of Alanus Anglicus that indulgences remit penance if one's proper judge consents, since one draws on the idea of power while the other draws on the concept of jurisdiction, both of which are usually attached to the episcopal office. This simple interpretation also accords with the view that if the pope's indulgence states that the dead in purgatory have their sins remitted, they do, since the plain reading of the text is upheld in both cases. The problem with this explanation, however, is that it ignores the troubling issue of conflict between God's judgement and that of man, which many of the previously discussed theories tried to address. This is evident from the fact that Raymond himself presents an additional theory about indulgences that is contradictory to this simple reading he himself endorsed.

In response to the hypothetical question of whether a penitent receiving an indulgence allowing him to pay seven coins for the remission of seven years of penance, which seems contrary to divine justice, actually receives such a lessening of penance, Raymond writes, “Neither do I know nor do I believe any mortal knows, unless he is inspired by some divinity,” because to know how much penance is actually remitted requires knowledge of factors such as the level of devotion of the penitent, the number of people doing suffrages for the penitent, and their level of devotion, and “since therefore no one can know the measure, or number, also by consequence no one can know the measure of remission.”Footnote ⁴⁸ Another possible unknown factor to take into account is the faculty of the giver, since one view is that one who is able to more easily give money, or fulfill other conditions of indulgences, receives less remission than one who does it with more difficulty.Footnote ⁴⁹ Raymond's view takes a highly respectful stance on God's justice. Even if a remission states that a certain amount of penance is remitted, God alone has full knowledge of the variables and can actually calculate what deserves to be relaxed; therefore, the actual effect of the indulgence is uncertain to humans. The problem with this, as Guillaume de Rennes, the glossator of Raymond's work, points out is “how therefore are remissions of this kind valid as they sound, as is said above? It seems the Master is contrary to himself.”Footnote ⁵⁰ Despite the obvious fact that these two theories of indulgences are mutually exclusive, Raymond's views are repeated by other canonists.Footnote ⁵¹ The contradiction comes from two competing impulses on the part of canonists: to uphold the unquestionable power of the keys and to acknowledge God's judgment as ultimate. If indulgences are not valid simply as they sound, then the power to bind and loose that lies behind them is in doubt; however, if the indulgences are able to do whatever is written in them, they could be seen as forcing God to make unjust judgments, lessening the punishments of those who do not deserve it.

The last five theories of indulgences try to reconcile this contradiction. The first, put forth by Guillaume in response to Raymond's self-contradiction, is to say that, “indulgences do not nevertheless prejudice divine justice, since any sin will be sufficiently punished, whether here or in purgatory.”Footnote ⁵² In other words, the power of the church makes indulgences remit penance on earth, but if it is unjustly done, God will make things right by punishing the penitent more in purgatory. This is not very comforting for the recipient of an indulgence. Innocent IV gives a more uplifting version of this theory, saying, “God, who moderates all things in number, weight, and measure, beyond the boundaries of the church imposed by prelates, will give more or less grace.”Footnote ⁵³ Prelates are given free rein on earth, but their mistakes will be rectified later. This is not a satisfactory resolution to the problem because it suggests that whatever is bound on earth is not in fact bound in heaven, undermining the power of the keys. An additional theory proposed, but not preferred, by Paul of Hungary is that indulgences “are valid just as any good [deed], nevertheless more so because of the authority of the church.”Footnote ⁵⁴ This view makes indulgences nothing but an amplifier of merit for the good work prescribed in it, but does not solve the issue of God's justice, since the only thing making the good work worth more is the earthly church's approval of it, not any consideration of the merits of the doer in the eyes of God.

Another solution is to say that although indulgences do remit penances on earth, which also can decrease time in purgatory, it makes no practical difference for the way the penitent should conduct himself. He still ought to do all penance enjoined on him by his confessor. This view was almost universal amongst canonists. Hostiensis's explanation is perhaps the fullest, stating:

Many other canonists throughout the thirteenth century echo this opinion, with slightly different reasoning. For example, Vincentius Hispanus says even though penances are remitted, the sinner should still do them all anyway out of a sincere heart, since scorning to do so would be a mortal sin.Footnote ⁵⁶ This approach, although popular among canonists, is extremely damaging to the idea of the indulgence and the power of the keys. If a document issued by a bishop lessens enjoined penance and those who receive it still have to do that enjoined penance or else face more punishment in purgatory or even worse eternal damnation in hell for scorning to do penance, the indulgence has practically no power on earth.

For this reason, two final theories were proposed by the canonists. The first, which was often mentioned and commonly accepted up to the end of the thirteenth century, was that indulgences obligate the granter to do suffrages to make up for the penances remitted.Footnote ⁵⁷ Henry of Merseburg offers a typical wording of this view, writing that indulgences are valid, “because of two things, namely because of the devoted giving, and because it obligates him who made the remission, or rather also the entire church, to make suffrages for him [who received the remission].”Footnote ⁵⁸ The reason for the popularity of this theory seems to be that it negates the possibility of any injustice being done by excessive indulgences given to underserving sinners. If a bishop, or the pope, gives these indiscrete indulgences, all they are doing is binding themselves and their subjects to do more penance to make up for what is remitted. It is important to note that suffrages are not just intercessory prayers. As Thomas Aquinas noted, suffrages are good deeds (satisfactory works) that by the intention of the actor are beneficial for others.Footnote ⁵⁹ This acts as a disincentive for prelates issuing indulgences, but it also means that God's justice is done no matter what. There is still a penalty paid for sin, just not by the penitent. Indulgences are merely tools by which the burden of penance is transferred from the sinners to prelates and their subjects. A similar view seems to have been held by theologians in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.Footnote ⁶⁰ For example, Thomas Chobham notes the view of some, writing “this is the sense of the words [in an indulgence], ‘we relax to you ten days of enjoined penance,’ that is we oblige ourselves and our church to do for you ten days of penance.”Footnote ⁶¹ One can imagine how these obligations could add up if many indulgences were granted, especially with much larger amounts of penance remitted. The obvious disadvantage of this theory is that it likely would not be accepted by many bishops, who both wanted to grant many indulgences and likely did not want to do more penance themselves.

The last theory, which was almost completely ignored or dismissed by canonists, was the idea that the remitted penances are paid for by a treasury of Christ's and the saints’ merits. Before the end of the thirteenth century, only two canonists even mention this theory, Paul of Hungary and Hostiensis; and only Hostiensis seems to give it any credence. Paul notes among other theories that some say indulgences, “are valid just as a certain treasury, so that when other things fail and we cannot be deserving, they receive us into eternal tabernacles, like the iniquitous manager in the gospel.”Footnote ⁶² But he ultimately settles on the competing theory that indulgences are valid because they obligate the granter and his church to do suffrages for the penitent. Hostiensis seems more convinced. In response to the objection that indulgences seem to leave sin unpunished, he writes:

Despite having read and cited Hostiensis frequently, other canonists such as Guillaume de Rennes, Henry of Merseburg and his glossators, and Monaldus of Capodistria, do not mention this treasury. It was not until the end of the century, when the mendicant summists John of Erfurt and John of Freiburg actively began to incorporate theology into the previously canonistic confessors’ handbooks, that the theory reappeared.Footnote ⁶⁴ It is clear, however, from Johannes Andreae, writing years after these two summists, that this idea was still not widely accepted by canonists in the early fourteenth century. In his discussion of whether indulgences benefit the dead in purgatory, he cites Innocent IV's good canonistic opinion that they do not since the prelates of the church have no jurisdiction in purgatory. But then he adds, “Theologians say, which reason does not oppose, that the church cannot communicate its treasure to the dead as to the living.”Footnote ⁶⁵ Although not opposing the idea of a treasury, he does seem to suggest this is a properly theological idea, not a canonistic one.

All twenty-two theories concerning indulgences struggle with the tension between the church's power to bind and loose and God's omniscience and ultimate just judgement. The first eleven, which limit the indulgence's power by claiming they only remit penances for certain less serious sins, preserve God's justice by not allowing for undeserved diminishing of punishment, but undermine the keys by curtailing the power of prelates to loosen penances on earth. The four theories that limit indulgences by jurisdiction, whether on earth or in purgatory, preserve the power of the keys, within legal limits, but are open to the possibility of prelates confounding God's justice by granting undeserved remissions within their jurisdictions. Raymond's theory that indulgences are simply valid as they sound faces the same issue, while Raymond's alternate view that humans can never know how much penance is actually remitted faces the opposite problem, that of rendering the keys powerless. The view that God will adjust for indulgences and punish what needs to be punished in purgatory and the view that penitents ought to still do all enjoined penance despite receiving indulgences also undermine the authority of the prelates issuing indulgences. The only two viable options that preserve God's justice in punishing all sin and the church's power to forgive and remit are the final two theories, that remitted penances are either done by prelates as suffrages or made up for by the treasury of merit.

Many of these views were also circulating amongst theologians in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Alan of Lille, for example, in his late twelfth-century Liber poenitentialis, discusses several relevant theories. Similar to Raymond, Alan suggests that priests and bishops can remit or lessen enjoined penances and accept them on themselves, but the efficacy of this is uncertain. He writes, “For he is a minister of remission. Indeed, if it is asked whether he can accept the penance on himself, we respond: He can humbly say: so that God may have mercy on you, I accept this penance on myself to complete it for you. Whether he will therefore be absolved? God knows.”Footnote ⁶⁶ Alan also has a version of Johannes Teutonicus's theory, in which no matter how much is remitted, some penance always remains: “For some say it is done in this way, namely if a three-year penance is enjoined on someone, that prelate can relax a third of it for him . . . another prelate can relax a third of the remaining penance, and thus infinitely, so that always something remains for the person to do himself.”Footnote ⁶⁷ He also suggests a theory based on suffrages that make up for any injustice in the indulgence, writing, “The church through prayers, fasting, alms, and other salutary works takes upon itself to do this [lacking penance]. Moreover, the members of the supporting church ought to carry each other's burdens and thus fulfill the law of Christ.”Footnote ⁶⁸ But Alan rejects these in favor of the idea that “the church does not remit temporal penalty, but purgatorial.”Footnote ⁶⁹ It would appear that Alan was not concerned with the jurisdictional issues involving purgatory that worried the canonists. But, as Shaffern notes, by the 1250s, theologians had abandoned these early ideas in favor of the treasury of merit, which synthesized many older ideas with relevant analogies.Footnote ⁷⁰

The question that arises is why canonists favored older theories, especially those involving suffrages, over the treasury of merit for so long. Given the fact that the treasury of merit was already adopted in theological circles in the early to mid-thirteenth century and would become the dominant and papally recognized theory of indulgences by the mid-fourteenth century, it is shocking that almost none of the canonists of the thirteenth century supported this view.Footnote ⁷¹ A definitive answer cannot be found, since canonists often do not explicitly explain why they favor one theory over another. To explore this further, it is helpful, therefore, to put this theoretical issue in the context of the other more practical problems surrounding indulgences discussed by the canonists, namely problems involving the church hierarchy.

The Tension Between the Pope and Bishops

In 1215, at the Fourth Lateran Council, the canon Cum ex eo was promulgated. It stated:

This canon deals with several issues that were seen to undermine Christianity and the church, namely the veneration of doubtful saints, the proliferation of fake relics, the monetary demands of quaestiarii (alms seekers), and lastly the proliferation of indulgences. As Stephan Kuttner notes, the emergence of papal canonization of saints was a long process, largely originating in local episcopal desire for papal approbation of local saints, rather than an imposition from the papacy.Footnote ⁷³ Likewise, as Christine Oakland points out, synodal statutes, like that promulgated by Bishop Robert Courson of Paris in 1215, show that there was a great deal of concern amongst local prelates about fraud, abuse, and shameful treatment of relics.Footnote ⁷⁴ Indulgences were related to these other issues because the quaestiarii would often collect money using fake indulgences promising remission for the veneration of a saint in a specific local church. The monetization of indulgences was a side-effect of a broader tendency to count and valuate penitential acts.Footnote ⁷⁵ Indulgences themselves underwent a transformation in the late twelfth century, becoming more precise and arithmetic in the amount of remission offered.Footnote ⁷⁶ These trends facilitated the abuse of indulgences that the council opposed. After the Lateran council, however, the reception of the canon was inconsistent at best. Oakland notes, “different diocesan synods adopted one or more of these elements, and sometimes none . . . the four principal points addressed in Lateran IV's Cum ex eo . . . failed to be represented together as originally intended.”Footnote ⁷⁷

The reception of the canon by canonists was no different. They tended to break up their discussions of the canon into different sections and address them separately. Thus, in commentaries on the Decretales and in Summae, the section of Cum ex eo that deals with indulgences is addressed within the context of penance, and there is never any mention of saints or relics. Innocent IV's Apparatus is typical of this way of discussing canons. He addresses them as they appear in the Decretales, with the relevant section of Cum ex eo grouped with other canons related to penance and indulgences under the rubric de poenitentia et remissionibus. Along with theoretical musings about the way indulgences work, Innocent then discusses specific canonical issues raised by textual details in the canon.Footnote ⁷⁸ And these issues were primarily about the relationship of different members of the church hierarchy with regard to penance and indulgences. Thus, although canonical limits on indulgences may not have been issued with issues of hierarchy in mind, canonists’ discussions of these restrictions came to focus on those very issues.

The canonistic views concerning this limit on episcopal indulgences relate to the tension between the pope's jurisdictional power over bishops and the rights of the episcopal office. These tensions threatened to upset the carefully balanced order of the church, the status ecclesiae.Footnote ⁷⁹ According to canonical norms, the pope had a plenitude of power, but the bishops also had rights; and these were often in tension. Kenneth Pennington notes many canonical issues in which this tension emerged, for example translations, depositions, abdications, granting of benefices, and exempting clerics from ordinary jurisdiction. With regard to exemptions, the idea that the pope could prohibit a bishop from judging those in his own diocese seemed to detract from the bishop's rights, and thus canonists and eventually even popes limited the situations in which exemptions could be applied.Footnote ⁸⁰ In general, canonists appealed to the idea that the hierarchical order of the church was established by Christ, just as the papacy was, and therefore the pope could not disregard the status ecclesiae. But this idea always had to be balanced with the pope's plenitudo potestatis.Footnote ⁸¹ Given the ubiquity of this issue, it is no surprise that canonists discussing indulgences were also concerned about how they might impact the delicate balance between the pope and bishops.

Early on, canonists like Vincentius Hispanus noted that the pope is not subject to jurisdictional restrictions, such as those imposed by Quod autem, which states that a bishop's indulgence is only valid for his own subjects unless the penitents’ own bishop consents.Footnote ⁸² Because he has universal jurisdiction, every Christian is the pope's subject, and he is everyone's ordinary judge. Similarly, there is no limit on the amount of remission the pope can give. Peter Quesnel notes that for bishops’ indulgences that relax a finite amount of penance, the effect is better reserved for purgatory, and enjoined penance should still be done on earth; but “concerning enjoined penance we relax it differently with respect to the general or universal [remission] through which all satisfaction is remitted, which is accustomed to be granted only by the pope.”Footnote ⁸³ Peter is speaking of plenary indulgences, usually given to crusaders but also issued for pilgrims visiting various churches, such as the Portiuncula outside of Assisi and St. Peter's Basilica in Rome.Footnote ⁸⁴ Anyone from any diocese can get these papal indulgences and afterwards be freed from all enjoined penances on earth, and from all purgation for past sins in purgatory. This is quite problematic. In claiming that the pope is immune from Cum ex eo's restrictions on the amount of penance remitted because of his plenitude of power and jurisdiction, canonists left the door wide open for papal action that could cause the keys to be scorned and penitential satisfaction to be weakened. If local clerics could abuse indulgences, so could popes. Cum ex eo states that the pope is accustomed to moderation in indulgences, but canonists must admit that there is nothing stopping the pope from being excessive in them.

This contradiction becomes even more apparent when canonists try to explain why the pope can restrict the ability of bishops to grant indulgences. Innocent IV notes that “The pope can make this restriction because lesser prelates all have this power from him, and he only from God . . . also he can because he rules and has jurisdiction over all . . . and he does this with just cause, since they abuse this power.”Footnote ⁸⁵ Guido de Baysio elaborates on this, writing, “For such power is not given for abuse . . . he [who abuses indulgences] deserves to be deprived of it . . . from this he does not deprive himself of power with respect to truth, but he is seen to deprive [himself of it].”Footnote ⁸⁶ Guido cites a canon by Gregory the Great included in Gratian's Decretum, which states that “He deprives himself of the power to bind and loose who for his own wishes and not for the morals of his subjects exercises it.”Footnote ⁸⁷ He is implying that bishops who grant indulgences of over a year for a dedication of a church, or over forty days for an anniversary of a dedication, are doing so for their own selfish motives and thereby seem to deserve to lose their power to bind and loose using indulgences. Although they do not actually deprive themselves of this power, they deserve to be deprived of it, which is why the pope places limits on their power. The problem with this is that the pope is still seen to possess unlimited power to grant indulgences beyond the limits he sets on others, meaning that he could also abuse that power and deserve to have it taken away; but there is no one to deprive him of it. Doublier notes that in many ways, indulgences were the concrete manifestations of papal claims to universal power.Footnote ⁸⁸ They could also undermine that power, however.

In addition to the freedom to possibly abuse the keys given to the pope, there is an additional issue with Cum ex eo that essentially makes the entire restriction void and gives bishops free rein to defy papal wishes. It seems most canonists believed that if a bishop violated the norm and issued an indulgence beyond a year or forty days, it was still valid, despite being against the wishes of the pope and the general council. Bernard of Parma writes, “I believe that it holds, although they do it against that command, since it does not add here that if they do it contrarily, we command it not to be valid.”Footnote ⁸⁹ Vincentius Hispanus and Abbas Antiquus give another possible way the canonical limit on episcopal indulgences can be circumvented, stating that as long as the penitent does what is required in the indulgence, he gets the remission. Vincentius writes, “as often as he gives the coin, can it be that so often he will receive forty days? I believe so, as long as the time or predetermined days of remission last.”Footnote ⁹⁰ In this way, bishops exceeding the limit of forty days is not that much of an issue, since anyone can receive more than forty days just by doing what the indulgence asks multiple times. The Franciscan canonists in particular latched on to Bernard's reasoning, repeating the claim that the lack of a specific clause invalidating excessive indulgences means that they remain valid.Footnote ⁹¹ We cannot assume, however, that Bernard or the Franciscans necessarily wanted to encourage bishops to exceed canonical limits, since they also all state that bishops ought to be discrete about indulgences. This loophole in Cum ex eo was finally resolved nearly eighty years after the Fourth Lateran Council, with Boniface VIII's Indulgentiae, which stated that “indulgences conceded by one or multiple bishops in dedications of churches or other cases do not keep their strength if they exceed the statute of the general council.”Footnote ⁹² But even then, some canonists, such as Peter Quesnel, were prevaricating, stating “but if a bishop or archbishop concedes indulgences beyond the aforesaid [limit] will they at least be valid for the number of days up to the number of days that bishops can give? . . . Yes.”Footnote ⁹³ Shaffern notes that John of Dambach, by the mid-fourteenth century, even went as far as to claim that Indulgentiae did not immediately invalidate excessive indulgences at all but merely reserved for the pope the right to invalidate them on a case-by-case basis, and even then, only for indulgences granted after Indulgentiae was promulgated.Footnote ⁹⁴

In contrast to these loose readings of the text, Hostiensis, Johannes Monachus, and Guido de Baysio seek to uphold the intention of Cum ex eo. Hostiensis says that if multiple bishops grant up to the limit, it does not exceed the limit because each only grants to his own subjects. Thus no one gets more than a year or forty days of remission. He also notes that, to be safe, bishops ought to divide the year or forty days between them, so the total amount they remit reaches the limit. He does ominously admit, however, that “many things ought not to be done, which nevertheless hold when done.”Footnote ⁹⁵ Guido repeats Hostiensis's argument, while Johannes Monachus, writing after Indulgentiae, claims that bishops granting indulgences that exceed the limit “are seen to commit fraud against the said council” and their indulgences are “in no way valid,” in contrast to Peter Quesnel who asserts they are valid up to the limit.Footnote ⁹⁶

The tension between papal and episcopal power that arises in these discussions of indulgences is not surprising, given the importance of the status ecclesiae in canon law as a whole. Although discussions of the hierarchy are not often interwoven with the aforementioned theoretical discussions about how indulgences work, there are some hints that the preference for the suffrage theory of indulgences relates to the hierarchical tensions pervading the canonical discussions of specific canons about indulgences. In his discussion on whether indulgences are valid in purgatory, Guillaume de Rennes brings up the difference between papal and episcopal power, stating that, “the pope can obligate the entire church and bishops their particular churches to pray for those [in purgatory].”Footnote ⁹⁷ Prayer for the dead, as mentioned earlier, is a type of suffrage. If indulgences are merely documents that obligate the church to do suffrages for the recipients, the violation of canonical limits does not really pose much of a problem to the status ecclesiae. When a bishop defies the pope and general council and issues an indulgence remitting more than forty days, all he is doing is hurting himself and his diocese, since he is burdening himself and his church with the duty of doing more suffrages to make up for the remitted penances. This interpretation lessens the tension in the hierarchy caused by the Cum ex eo loophole. It also gives an incentive to both pope and bishop to grant indulgences only discretely, while the treasury of merit would give the pope free rein to be as excessive as he wanted, since he would be drawing from an infinite source and would not be obligating himself or the entire church to make up for the remissions, and give bishops no reason not to exploit technicalities that allowed them to violate the general council's restrictions. I do not mean to argue that the absence of one theory and the prevalence of another in the writings of canonists in any way caused the canonical restrictions on indulgences in the first place, only that it may have alleviated some of the tensions that the canonists themselves mention when discussing those limitations.

The Rights of Archbishops over Suffragan Bishops

In addition to the conflict between God and the church, and the pope and his fellow bishops, there was another tension between the archiepiscopal and episcopal jurisdictions. The origins of this tension lie in a decretal written by Honorius III to an unknown archbishop, Nostro postulasti, which states that “we therefore briefly respond to you that you can freely concede letters of this kind through your province, nevertheless you should not exceed the statute of the general council.”Footnote ⁹⁸ In other words, an archbishop can freely give indulgences up to a year or forty days to anyone in his suffragans’ dioceses, in addition to those in his own diocese. This ability is mentioned with some uncertainty by some thirteenth-century canonists, such as Vincentius Hispanus, Godfrey of Trano, and Henry of Merseburg. Vincentius asks, “but how can he grant [an indulgence] when he cannot engage in a case with respect to the subject of a suffragan? . . . concerning these ‘letters’ there are diverse opinions.”Footnote ⁹⁹ Godfrey elaborates, “But a metropolitan can concede letters of indulgence or remission throughout his whole province . . . which is special since generally he cannot otherwise exercise his jurisdiction over subjects of his suffragans except in eight cases.”Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Canon law strictly forbids an archbishop from meddling in the dioceses of his suffragan bishops except when an appeal is brought before him, his consultation is sought, the suffragan is negligent, there is disagreement among suffragans, or disagreement between a suffragan and his subject, when a suffragan diocese is without a bishop, when a suffragan diocese's episcopal election is disputed, or in other cases in which ancient custom allows.Footnote ¹⁰¹ Therefore, Godfrey concludes that Nostro postulasti is a special privilege granting archbishops the power to issue indulgences, rather than an alteration of the status ecclesiae that favors archbishops over bishops. Henry of Merseburg echoes this uncertainty, noting that “concerning this it was once doubted, since otherwise the metropolitan in the diocese of his suffragan could neither concede a privilege nor dispose of anything.”Footnote ¹⁰²

Bernard of Parma introduces a new view, stating that “although the archbishop is not the ordinary judge of all in his province . . . and does not have contentious jurisdiction in his province except in certain cases . . . he does not have contentious but voluntary jurisdiction.”Footnote ¹⁰³ Bernard cites civil law, Dig. 1.16.2, which states that the proconsul, when he leaves his city, does not have contentious jurisdiction, but only voluntary, “so that thus both free and slave can be manumitted and make adoptions in his presence.”Footnote ¹⁰⁴ The connection is tendentious. Although, as Alphonse Popek notes, the institution of metropolitan archbishops and provinces had its origin in the Roman provincial system, the purpose of its adoption was to facilitate administrative and judicial functions of the church.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ Archbishops are not proconsuls, and granting an indulgence is not the same as freeing a slave. In addition, the norms of canon law and civil law are different since they derive from different authorities. There really was no equivalent to the penitential forum in Roman civil law, as this forum was based on the sacramental power of the church.

Despite this, Bernard's more generous reading of the archiepiscopal powers was advocated by later jurists. Hostiensis writes simply, “the subjects of the archbishop are understood to be not only those who live in his diocese but in his whole province.”Footnote ¹⁰⁶ He is making the claim that the archbishop is in some sense the ordinary judge of all in his province, quite a dramatic empowerment compared to Henry's statement that an archbishop cannot usually intervene outside his diocese. Abbas Antiquus, Guillelmus Durantis, and Guido de Baysio all note that archbishops can grant indulgences throughout their province, but they give no opinion on what this means for their power over suffragans.Footnote ¹⁰⁷ Guillaume de Rennes, on the other hand, argues that,

This is a bold statement. Guillaume is claiming that in all matters of penance, the archbishop is the ordinary judge over and above the penitents’ own bishop. All the bishop's subjects are the archbishop's subjects as well, and he can impose or relax any penance on them. But the canonical proof Guillaume gives is Nostro postulasti, which makes his argument quite circular. The issue of the archbishop's power arose because Nostro postulasti seems to grant archbishops a special privilege that extended their power beyond what was traditionally accepted. And Guillaume uses this special privilege to show that archbishops always had that power, which is tendentious. Nevertheless, the same argument is repeated by later canonists, such as John of Freiburg and Monaldus of Capodistria.Footnote ¹⁰⁹

This uncertainty and debate were not new. As Robert Benson notes, the episcopate was a rather vague concept. In one sense, the pope, archbishops, and bishops were all consecrated bishops with the same sacramental power. But with respect to jurisdictional power, they differed, with the pope, patriarchs, and metropolitans being above simple bishops. But the debate over what kind of power archbishops had over suffragans was a complex one, with Gratian and early decretists claiming it was severely limited based on various rationales, including that of archiepiscopal abuse.Footnote ¹¹⁰ Popek notes that this decrease in the power of archbishops was brought about by conciliar decisions in the East and by the weakening of the Carolingian Empire and growth in the unitive role of the papacy in the West.Footnote ¹¹¹ Pennington's discussions of papal and episcopal power also suggest that the decline in the archbishop's power over his suffragans is related to the rise of the pope's power over all bishops. For example, twelfth-century canonists including Gratian seemed to assume judging, deposing, and translating bishops were the responsibilities of either provincial synods or archbishops, but later canonists such as Huguccio stated that papal approval for such decisions was required.Footnote ¹¹² With regard to episcopal elections, Popek notes that by Innocent III's pontificate, papal confirmation of bishops was increasing, but archbishops still normally participated in nominating, confirming, and consecrating suffragan bishops. For example, in 1200, the Archbishop of Canterbury refused to confirm an archdeacon as bishop of Worcester upon hearing in his private confession that he was illegitimate. Papal confirmation was not required until the pontificate of Clement IV (1265–1268), and papal nomination not until the eighteenth century.Footnote ¹¹³ Despite this, the marked decline of the power of metropolitans in the judicial forum is undeniable. However, based on the commentaries, glosses, and summae discussed above, it seems that within the limits of the penitential forum some canonists were more willing to broaden the scope of archiepiscopal jurisdiction, with indulgences being the key justification for this increase in metropolitan power. While they state explicitly that all in an archbishop's province are his subjects in the penitential forum, they do not elaborate on what the practical implications of this are, which makes their claims somewhat vague.

Again, the canonists do not explicitly intertwine their theoretical discussions about how indulgences work with their discussions of issues of hierarchy, so it cannot be definitively proven how they relate. The theories do, however, have clear logical implications on the issues of hierarchy being discussed. If, as many canonists postulated, remissions must be compensated for by the suffrages of the granting prelate and those under his jurisdiction, and if, as the canon Nostro postulasti states, the archbishop can grant indulgences to everyone in his province, then the archbishop's indulgence is essentially an act obligating all of his and his suffragans’ subjects to do suffrages for those receiving the indulgence. The archiepiscopal province is essentially normalized along the model of a diocese, in which the prelate has power to relax and impose acts of satisfaction on all. This interpretation harmonizes with Hostiensis, Guillaume de Rennes, and Monaldus's view of the archbishop's power in the penitential forum.

If the treasury of merit theory is accepted, the logical implications for the debate about the archbishop's power would be different. The keys to the treasury were seen to belong to bishops, but first and foremost to the pope. For example, Bonaventure uses the analogy of a wedding, in which keys to the treasury belong to the pope as husband of the universal church, and bishops as husbands of their local churches.Footnote ¹¹⁴ The pope's power to grant indulgences universally, and without limits, stems from his place as Peter's successor and vicar of Christ, the husband of the entire church. In fitting with this position, the pope had all sorts of extraordinary power over other bishops and their subjects in the judicial and penitential forums. The archbishop, however, has no such special status. Thus, granting him the power to dispense from the treasury of merit in his suffragan bishops’ dioceses makes little sense, especially since in most other respects he has no more power than a normal bishop. While we cannot say for certain that their concerns about the ambiguity of the archbishop's power had any influence on the decision of the canonists to leave out the treasury of merit in their treatments of indulgences, it does seem that the theory would contribute little to the discussion, unlike the theory of suffrages.

Tension Between the Penitential and Public Forums

The clearest tension raised by indulgences regarding the hierarchy of the church was between the priest's power in the penitential forum (also known as the private forum, voluntary forum, forum of conscience, and after the Council of Trent, the internal forum) and that of all prelates, whether they be the pope, bishops, or archbishops, in the public forum (also known as the contentious, judicial, or external forum). The idea that the ministers of the church judge according to two forums was a relatively new concept in the thirteenth century, emerging gradually only after Gratian had already written his Decretum.Footnote ¹¹⁵ In the penitential forum, the priest was judge, the penitent was the judged, and the judgment was voluntary, since the penitent was not forced to confess; his conscience had to be moved by contrition to do so willingly. This forum also was private and secret, since things confessed could not be revealed by the priest. The public forum was the realm of the ecclesiastical courts, where higher prelates like bishops judged, and the judged were compelled to appear under the threat of ecclesiastical censure. It was usually reserved for public and notorious crimes, or crimes whose nature required public resolution, such as unlawful marriages.Footnote ¹¹⁶ The important thing to note is that these two forums were interrelated and often the boundaries between them were porous. Such is the case with indulgences.

One of the earliest canonistic statements on indulgences, that of Huguccio, already uses ambiguous language to describe indulgences. In response to those who doubt the efficacy of indulgences, he writes:

In Huguccio's description, although it is the prelate who grants the indulgence, the priest (sacerdos) is described as having the power of the keys to bind and loose and forgive sins. The penance, whether it should be tightened or relaxed, is completely up to the priest's discretion. Therefore, the power of the indulgence only benefits penitents whom the priest allows to benefit from them. In this case, what the prelate does in public (granting an indulgence) the priest can frustrate in private (by prohibiting a penitent from benefiting from the indulgence). Although the prelates have other prerogatives in the penitential forum, such as hearing confessions and absolving in cases reserved for bishops or the pope, it seems from Huguccio's statement that, at least with respect to remitting penances, the final say in the penitential forum lies not with the bishops, archbishops, or even the pope who grant remissions, but with the simple parish priest.

Bernard of Parma takes this idea up with some uncertainty. In his gloss to the part of Quod autem that states that indulgences only benefit if issued or consented to by the penitents’ proper judge, Bernard writes:

Here Bernard is not sure whether iudices in the text of the canon refers to bishops granting indulgences or parish priests, because the priest (or confessor) is the one with the ultimate say in the penitential forum and without the priest's consent no sinner can benefit from indulgences. Innocent IV similarly notes that only bishops can grant indulgences, but “others say that any priest can do this, for one is the general liberty of indulgences, which is of jurisdiction, the other is in absolution of penitents, to provide diverse ways to be liberated from penances, which belongs to the priestly office.”Footnote ¹¹⁹ Innocent does not comment on which position he endorses, but there is a clear tension here between the priestly sacramental office and the jurisdictional power of prelates.Footnote ¹²⁰ Bernard cites Accendentibus (X.5.31.12) to back up the first statement that bishops, and not inferior prelates, have the power of granting indulgences. This canon condemns certain abbots and other prelates inferior to bishops who “extend their hand to those things which are of the episcopal dignity, investigating marriage cases, imposing public penance, issuing letters of indulgence, and similar things.”Footnote ¹²¹ He nevertheless, without citing any canons, offers the second view immediately after, without saying which is correct. The ambiguity arises because the canonists use the same terms, remissiones and indulgentiae, to refer to both the documents issued by prelates, presumably in the public forum, and the relaxations of penances done by priests, in the penitential forum. If indulgences were considered strictly a matter of the public forum, like marriage cases and public penances mentioned in Accendentibus, the second opinion would be invalid. But canonists nevertheless offer priests as a valid alternative to bishops when discussing who can grant indulgences.

This uncertainty is quickly replaced by certainty in the writings of other canonists. Godfrey of Trano writes, “It should be known that priests can make private remissions in the judgment of souls . . . moreover qualities and times of penances are committed to the discretion of priests.”Footnote ¹²² Here he gives priests the right to grant indulgences but simply calls them “private” to contrast them with the documents issued by bishops. Hostiensis echoes this, writing, “Private [remissions] which are in confession any priest having care, or any other priest with his license . . . can grant.”Footnote ¹²³ He notes, “The priest therefore remits satisfaction of sins, whether in whole or in part, with respect to the displeasure of God and the church, although he burdens himself if he does this incautiously.”Footnote ¹²⁴ Furthermore, Hostiensis even states:

This statement pushes the logic of Huguccio and Bernard to a strange conclusion, namely, that a simple priest can grant the equivalent of a plenary indulgence whenever he wants while a bishop can only grant a year or forty day's remission, and even then, it will have no effect if the penitent's parish priest refuses to let him receive it. Indulgences as a whole seem to be pointless in this case. The prelate's power of remission in the public forum is far more restricted than the priest's in the penitential forum. Therefore, it would seem better for the overly burdened penitent to petition his confessor for leniency, rather than seeking out a bishop's indulgence. The tension here is between the power of remission in the two forums, not necessarily between the priest and bishop per se, since the bishop can also be a confessor in the penitential forum in certain cases.

Some canonists moderated their views on this matter. Abbas Antiquus said that anyone in the penitential forum, priest or bishop, could give indulgences to his subjects, while Guillelmus Durantis notes that priests can give seven years’ remission by saying that it can be remitted through indulgences.Footnote ¹²⁶ Neither stated that plenary indulgences could be granted privately in the way Hostiensis did. But the early fourteenth-century Franciscan jurist Peter Quesnel had no problem endorsing the most extreme formulation of the priest's relationship to indulgences, stating that archbishops and bishops were limited to a year or forty days, “nevertheless, [indulgences] are not restricted in the penitential forum, so that a priest can grant indulgences of years and days as he wishes, while he does it discretely.”Footnote ¹²⁷ It seems canonists had little recourse but to admit that, with respect to remitting sins, the power of the simple priest in the penitential forum was greater than that of the prelate, and even the pope, in the public forum. As Guido de Baysio notes, while arguing against bishops having their own penances remitted by granting indulgences, “if the pope or a bishop subjects himself to a priest, he cannot remit himself of the penance of the priest.”Footnote ¹²⁸ In other words, in the penitential forum, the confessor's authority is absolute. Thus, a pope must submit himself to a simple priest and cannot even benefit from an indulgence he himself issues.

There are two canonical contexts behind the power of the confessor. One is the idea that he is one's own priest, proprius sacerdos. The other is that the penitential forum itself, according to canonists, operates according to principles that are often independent of the strict hierarchy of the church. According to Canon 21 of the Fourth Lateran Council, Omnis utriusque sexus, all the faithful must confess at least once a year to their own priest, proprio sacerdoti.Footnote ¹²⁹ As Atria Larson notes, the language of one's “own priest” in this canon echoes discussions in Gratian's de penitentia. The original meaning of “proprius” had to do with jurisdiction. Bishops had power over their own churches, that is their dioceses. The designation “proprius,” then, denoted the person with rightful jurisdiction over someone. The cleric's own bishop was the one who ruled the diocese in which the cleric lived. As an extension, the layperson's own priest is the priest who shepherds the parish in which the layperson lives and has rightful jurisdiction over him or her.Footnote ¹³⁰ By this definition, however, anyone with jurisdiction over a penitent could be his or her own priest, including a parish priest, bishop, archbishop, and the pope. Why then, did the “simple priest,” as the canonists refer to him, have the final say to negate the effect of a bishop's indulgence for his penitents?

This has to do with the way in which authority and hierarchy are often irrelevant in the penitential forum. Because the confessor hears the confession of penitents and knows their circumstances and spiritual needs best, he has ultimate responsibility to care for the penitents’ souls. This holds regardless of the confessor's rank in the hierarchy. So even if the penitent is the pope and the confessor a simple priest, the priest's power as judge is supreme in that forum. This seeming inversion of the hierarchy was not lost on the canonists. Hostiensis writes, “Thus also in the penitential forum, the pope is made lesser, and the confessor greater.”Footnote ¹³¹ He cites Gratian, who puts it this way: “Whoever sits well on the throne accepts the honor of the throne, whoever badly sits, does injury to the throne . . . just as he appears greater than all, so he seems to be inferior to all, since he who is greater in honor is not thereby more righteous, but he who is more righteous, he is greater.”Footnote ¹³² Hostiensis's point in citing Gratian is not to claim that the pope is actually a worse sinner than those beneath him, but that in the penitential forum, the pope's status is irrelevant, he is but a sinner, a penitent, and therefore accepts the position inferior to his confessor, even if he is a simple priest. By this logic, it seems acceptable that indulgences granted by prelates in the public forum should be able to be checked and hindered by confessors in the private forum. But not all canonists were comfortable with this idea.

Johannes Andreae resisted pushing this too far with respect to indulgences. He writes, “If a penitent wishes to use a remission not granted by his own judge, he ought to obtain license from his bishop or his confessor. Therefore, if he wishes to use a remission of the pope, legate, archbishop, or [his own] bishop, it seems enough that in this case he can do so without the special license of his confessor.”Footnote ¹³³ Johannes tries to make a distinction between one's own judge and another. Since the pope, the archbishop of the province one lives in, and the bishop of the diocese one lives in, are all one's ordinary or proper judges, one can accept their indulgences without permission from one's confessor. It is only when trying to obtain an outside bishop's or archbishop's indulgence that this is necessary. Aside from the importance of ordinary jurisdiction, Johannes may also have been worried that one might be forced to reveal sins and imposed penances of superior ordinary judges (the pope, or one's own archbishop or bishop) to a simple priest confessor in order to obtain license to use an indulgence, which he admits one can do for outside prelates.Footnote ¹³⁴ The key difference here is that, as noted above, other canonists following Bernard of Parma asserted that the confessor's license was necessary even if the bishop granting the indulgence was one's own bishop. The important thing was that one's confessor had the final authority in the penitential forum. This view seems to have been inherited from some earlier theologians writing prior to the rise in popularity of the treasury of merit theory. Alan of Lille notes, disapprovingly, that some interpret indulgences in this way, stating, “The prelate implies this [in the indulgence]: whoever contributes money or a coin for the building of this church, may be absolved from a third of his enjoined penance at the discretion of his priest, who knows more fully his subjects’ consciences . . . but according to this opinion they seem to be deceived whose penances are relaxed.”Footnote ¹³⁵ Perhaps Johannes Andreae had a similar reason for rejecting this view as Alan did. It seems though, that few canonists before this had tried to limit the confessor's power in the way Johannes did. Instead, most insisted on the confessor's sacerdotal power in the penitential forum as final with respect to the efficacy of indulgences, although Raymond and some of his fellow Dominican jurists largely ignored the issue altogether.

One possible solution to the tension, alluded to by Abbas Antiquus above, was that anyone in the penitential forum could grant as much remission as he saw fit, whether he be a priest, bishop, archbishop, or pope. This is because all of them have the priestly sacramental office that allows them to carry out the sacrament of penance. As Swanson suggests, in terms of order, a bishop was nothing more than a priest.Footnote ¹³⁶ In practicality, however, the tension remains because the vast majority of laypeople would not be confessing to prelates but to parish priests. Seeing the priests’ power as delegated power, as Swanson notes, is another possible solution.Footnote ¹³⁷ But it does not eliminate the tension between the confessor's power in the penitential forum and the prelate's power in the contentious forum with regard to indulgences, since that delegated power would be used in one forum to undermine the efficacy of the action of the delegator in the other forum.

The theory of indulgences as drawing on suffrages seems to mitigate the problem somewhat. As noted above, Hostiensis took the most extreme position, saying a priest could even grant the equivalent of plenary indulgences for all sins to his parishioners in the penitential forum. But he moderated this with the warning that the priest who does so “burdens himself.”Footnote ¹³⁸ Hostiensis states this several times, also with respect to prelates, writing,

Hostiensis is rejecting Raymond's confusing statement that no human can know the amount of remission granted in an indulgence because it relies on unknowable factors, such as the number of people doing suffrages for the penitent and the amount of their devotion. But he does not seem to reject the idea that indulgences work somehow through the mechanism of suffrages, because he admits right afterwards that prelates burden themselves by indiscrete indulgences and then elaborates by stating how prayers, alms, and other good works of holy people benefit sinners. He seems, then, to be rejecting the suffrage-based unknowability of remission but defending the general linkage between indulgences and suffrages in order to warn prelates not to issue too many indulgences. As noted above, many canonists, in discussing various theories of indulgences, preferred the theory that the granter of the indulgence obligates himself to do suffrages to make up for what is remitted.Footnote ¹⁴⁰ This obligation can be seen as sharing the burdens or labor of the penitent, language that echoes both twelfth-century theologians like Alan of Lille and Gratian.Footnote ¹⁴¹ The knowledge of the burden one acquires when granting indulgences, whether private or public, could have a moderating effect. Perhaps this is why canonists largely ignore the treasury of merit theory while supporting the suffrage theory. Oddly enough, Hostiensis was also the exception to this. He seemed to believe that the two theories could be valid at the same time, since he mentions both approvingly in different contexts. The treasury of merit seemed to be the best solution to the issue of God's ultimate judgment, but the suffrage theory seemed to be the best warning for prelates and priests not to grant excessive indulgences in either forum. In conclusion, many canonists throughout the thirteenth century took up the issue of indulgences in their summae and commentaries on Gratian and the Decretales. Most of them discuss a number of competing theories about how indulgences work, seeking to find a balance between the ultimate justice of God and the power of the church to bind and loose on earth. However, unlike the theologians, who were already embracing the treasury of merit theory by the mid-thirteenth century, canonists mostly ignored the theory, instead favoring a combination of other theories, chief among them the idea that the granter of remission and his church were obligated to do suffrages to make up for any penance unjustly remitted. In addition to these theoretical treatments, canonists also tended to focus on more practical questions regarding indulgences, questions mainly centering on tensions between the various jurisdictions, forums, and members of the hierarchy involved. While the theoretical and practical aspects are often discussed separately, there are hints that the two are related, because the burden of suffrages is invoked by some, like Hostiensis, to warn against the main cause of indulgence-related tension within the hierarchy, the excessive and abusive granting of indulgences. The treasury of merit's conspicuous absence may then be due it its limited usefulness in the context of the canonists’ jurisdictional concerns.