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Abstract
A theodicy is shaky if it explains only some evils but not all. For if certain possible evils are inconsistent with the existence of God, then their occurrence would disprove theism. But if a theodicy offers a justification for all possible evils, then it leads into a trap. After all, if God's existence is compatible with every horrible occurrence imaginable, why should belief in God afford any comfort?
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2016
References
Notes
1 Hume, David, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion and the Natural History of Religion (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 96 Google Scholar. Spelling and punctuation updated.
2 Psalms 23:4. The translation is from Tanakh: The Holy Scriptures (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1985)Google Scholar.
3 Swinburne, Richard, Is There a God? (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 96 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 102, 113.
4 Numbers 6:24–26.