Introduction
As the United Kingdom (UK) has triggered Article 50, the question of European disintegration is becoming more and more salient. Party leaders in other countries have emphasised their intent to follow the UK's example, most prominently in the Netherlands and France (Lyons and Darroch, Reference Lyons and Darroch2016). The debates centre on right-wing Eurosceptic domestic parties, which limits the scope for a critique of the European Union (EU) that does not seek nationalism but ‘another Europe’.
In this article, I show how EU discourse and the ‘new economic governance’ contributes to the marginalisation of anti-capitalist discourse. Using the example of France, I highlight two aspects often set aside in public but also academic debates: the technocratic, neoliberal character of the European Union that seeks to limit democratic discussion about political economic issues, and the discourse of the much-discussed right-wing parties like the Front National (FN) in relation with the discourse of other public actors. Using this perspective, I add to the debate on the inherent and theoretical/conceptual tension between representative democracy and populism (Taggart, Reference Taggart, Mény and Surel2002) by showing how the ‘new economic governance’ works to increase the democratic problems of the EU by limiting the discursive space. In other words, representative liberal democracy has particularly marginalised anti-capitalism at both EU and national level. My analysis highlights that the EU's discursive strategies when addressing economic and social issues are more aligned to those of governing parties and the employers’ association. Left-wing actors and, with a different quality, the FN oppose the EU's discourse not necessarily for reasons of sovereignty but for political reasons concerning the politico-economic trajectory of France.
The article's structure is as follows: in a first step, I will recall current debates in European integration theory and research on populism and right extremist parties as a ‘political crisis’ or crisis of representative democracy to then sketch my analytical framework based on a discourse-focused reading of Gramsci. In a next step, the EU's technocratic and neoliberal discourse and ‘new economic governance’ will be raised in the context of its democratic problems. In the following section, I discuss the discursive strategies of the socio-economic actors in France in the public domain about questions of politico-economic development and related social policy. In the conclusion, our understanding of the French case allows for a discussion of the more general developments within the EU.
Understanding European integration, ‘right-wing populism’ and democracy
Mainstream approaches have started to discuss the ‘politicisation’ of the EU in more detail (de Wilde, Reference de Wilde2011; de Wilde and Zürn, Reference de Wilde and Zürn2012; Zürn, Reference Zürn2015), including a diagnostic of a retrenchment of the ‘permissive consensus’ to EU integration (Hooghe and Marks, Reference Hooghe and Marks2009). Politicisation in this literature is understood as an obstacle to integration (Schimmelfennig et al., Reference Schimmelfennig, Leuffen and Rittberger2015: 765; de Wilde, Reference de Wilde2011: 565). This limits the integration debate to institutions, the decision-making process, or authority transfer (de Wilde, Reference de Wilde2011; Zürn, Reference Zürn2015) and ignores the political content of integration. In sum, this current debate in European integration theory reproduces a general limitation of mainstream EU integration theory: ‘every dissenting voice [is viewed] as a Eurosceptic threat’ (Manners and Whitman, Reference Manners and Whitman2016: 10). What is more, framing politicisation as potentially problematic reflects a liberal understanding of representative democracy in which rational elites are seen as best placed to make decisions and should not be hindered from doing so. As will be argued below, this is problematic for democratic deliberation and thus democratic quality.
This EU integration yes/no binary can be paralleled with an analysis of ‘populism’ or extremism that frames left- and right-wing approaches as similar in contrast to a rational and democratic centre. Mény and Surel (Reference Mény, Surel, Mény and Surel2002: 3) have characterised this conception of populism as a ‘pathology of democracy’ and have argued:
. . .this definition of populism implies being able to measure its degeneration by reference to an accepted standard. A pathology is meaningful only by comparison with a situation defined as normal, a definition which in this case is, to say the least, problematic.
To underline their point, this ‘pathology of democracy’ conception serves to delegitimise positions deemed too radical and blurs the analysis of the distinctiveness of right extremism: namely, its oppressive perspective and practice against specific societal groups. The binary framing of support or criticism of European integration reifies the parallelisation of ‘extreme’ right and left positions (Leconte, Reference Leconte2015). As criticism of the European Union seems to come both from the right and the left (Taggart, Reference Taggart2004), the yes/no integration binary seems to prove the point that right and left-wing ‘extremism’ are the same.
Understanding populism as a ‘pathology of democracy’ implies a liberal understanding of democracy. Farrelly (Reference Farrelly2015) discusses two broad models of understanding democracy: liberal (competitive elite democracy, classic pluralist democracy and legal democracy) and broadly Marxist (participatory democracy and democratic autonomy). The former conception focuses on rationality and technological elites as representing a public that might not know what is good for them. Thus, populism is seen as a pathology that undermines ‘rational’ parties. This article builds on democratic models and understanding ‘populism’ from a more critical perspective. This challenges liberal understandings of democracy for trusting in elite rationality and for assuming that a ‘best practice’ or solution to a problem exists and can be identified by decision-makers who set the framework for these solutions, thus limiting the debate and its participants (Wöhl, Reference Wöhl2013). The following analysis centres the importance of the deliberative aspect of democracy, i.e. political debate about social issues (Farrelly, Reference Farrelly2015).
As a result, this article argues that we need to understand the rise of the right in European member states as an effect of representative democracy but without assuming a centrist position as ‘normal’. It adds to the debate on the inherent and theoretical/conceptual tension between representative democracy and populism (Taggart, Reference Taggart, Mény and Surel2002) by arguing that representative democracy is undermined by discursive practices that limit the scope for debate.
In order to map the discursive space on politico-economic development and show its limitations, I propose an analytical perspective based on Antonio Gramsci's work. Using Gramscian insights for an analysis of societal formations highlights the following aspects.
One, Gramsci's conception of hegemony as both coercion and consent (Gramsci and Forgacs, Reference Gramsci and Forgacs1988) deepens our understanding of capitalist democracies. Coercion describes the force and power social groups have over others through e.g. capabilities of exercising physical force but also through limiting material alternatives. The centrality of wage-labour, for example, is part of the coercive side of the hegemony of the capitalist mode of production. When the alternative to doing waged labour is starving because there are no other means of subsistence available, this is a coercive mechanism. Consent, in contrast, describes when parts of the subaltern – that is, the non-hegemonic group – do not resist hegemony. Consent can be active: in the example of waged labour, people can embrace their job and their position as an employee. It can also be passive, so while the employee might not question the general existence of waged labour and their position as an employee, they might be dissatisfied with aspects associated with waged labour. Hegemony can be problematised as potentially undemocratic as it limits the discursive scope. At the same time, as Gramsci highlights, hegemony is a constant struggle, i.e. a process and always incomplete. In other words, the existence of hegemony does not necessarily describe an undemocratic situation.
Two, a Gramscian understanding emphasises that ideology is always collective and social not individual (Hall, Reference Hall1986; Bruff, Reference Bruff2008). This point is particularly pertinent to an understanding of nationalist, racist actors – as any analysis that focuses solely on the racist agent denies racism (van Dijk, Reference van Dijk2016). To elaborate, van Dijk (Reference van Dijk2016) points out that attributing racism to specific actors, regions, time frames, or incidents obscures rather than acknowledges the structural presence of racism in society. This insight will be applied to the domestic context in my analysis. The socio-economic forces behind the European project are put to the side and have been analysed in other research (van Apeldoorn, Reference van Apeldoorn2002; Bieling, Reference Bieling2003; Cafruny and Ryner, Reference Cafruny and Ryner2003). (Discursive) struggles at the European level can also be not included.
Discourse is important to hegemony and the analysis both ontologically and epistemologically. As Fairclough (Reference Fairclough2010) argues, hegemonic struggle often takes a discursive form, thus making it possible to analyse hegemonic struggle through discourse. Further, being able to contain the discursive space is part of hegemonic rule: thus, discourse is co-constitutive of hegemony (ibid.). Elsewhere (Lux, Reference Lux2017), I have developed a discourse-oriented operationalisation of Regulation Theory and a Gramscian understanding of hegemony by distinguishing different discursive strategies. These strategies are linked to social actors and their material positions in the mode of production and development trajectory of their national context. The discursive strategies I have distinguished are non-address, externalisation, positive connotation, questioning, criticising, and the formulation of alternatives. I have argued that the former three can be linked to a hegemonic position in a specified context (in this context, the capitalist mode of production and its country-specific accumulation regimes and modes of regulation), while the latter three are usually tools for advancing a potentially counter-hegemonic agenda. Implications for representative democracy are that the more limited the discursive space – i.e. the more aligned the discursive strategies – the less scope for democratic deliberation.
For the discourse analysis, newspaper interviews, press conferences and other speech acts of French domestic actors have been analysed for the period 2010 to 2015 as these cover the introduction of the ‘new economic governance’ as well as the euro crisis. These genres of data have been selected as they present direct means of communication with the public. Policy papers and party manifestos have not been included as they are received by a smaller audience and are more ‘polished’ than interviews. For the EU, selected policy papers have been analysed as the EU does not directly intervene in French public debate. The Commission authors and the Council adopt these reportsFootnote 1. The domestic actors selected include political parties and alliances, i.e. the parti socialiste (PS), the conservative party (UMP, in the meantime renamed as Les Républicains), the left alliance Front de Gauche (FdG, in the meantime regrouped as France Insoumise), and the FN, plus socioeconomic actors, i.e. the employers’ association (Medef) and trade unions (CFDT, FO, CGT).
For the data analysis, I first identified passages relevant to the economy, labour and social policy. Second, I highlighted specific codes (like ‘ownership structures’, ‘competitiveness’, ‘purchasing power’) using Atlas.TI. Third, I linked the discursive strategy pertaining to these codes for every individual actor and then compared them across the actors to ensure consistency.
With regards to France, this analysis highlights that our understanding of the success of the FN remains limited when we isolate the FN's positions on European integration from their conceptions about the economy and the social. Ultimately, this isolationist perspective serves to legitimise European integration without any qualification of the kind of integration, thus falling into the traps outlined above.
Europe's ‘new economic governance’ and old democratic issues
The financial, economic, and euro crisis have led to discussions about deeper integration, particularly of the Eurozone. The Commission has labelled the EU's new approach to economic and monetary Union since 2010 ‘new economic governance’. Its building blocks are the European Semester, the so-called Six Pack, the Euro Plus Pact, the Fiscal Compact, and the establishment of the Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, and International Monetary Fund). This mix of agreements, treaties, and regulations introduces the processes and aims of the ‘new economic governance’. The work of the Troika is visible in Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with countries who have sought support through the European Financial Stability Facility or the European Stability Mechanism. The MoU set out the reform programme that member states have to implement in order to receive financial support.
The framework of ‘new economic governance’ has implications for both European policy (guidance) and European politics. Neoliberal recommendations are further enshrined into the aims and instruments of European and member-state economic, labour, and social policy. When it comes to politics, both the negotiations to establish the ‘new economic governance’ (Konecny, Reference Konecny2012) as well as the procedures laid out in it are characterised by a lack of transparency, lack of debate, and lack of involvement of stakeholders (e.g. legislative institutions or social partners). As a consequence, the democratic legitimacy of the ‘new economic governance’ has been criticised (Oberndorfer, Reference Oberndorfer2013; Wöhl, Reference Wöhl2013).
Where European integration in the past decades has focused on economic integration, while disappointing hopes for a ‘Social Europe’ (Platzer, Reference Platzer, Hentges and Platzer2011), the ‘new economic governance’ implies a further attack on the rights of workers, their trade unions, and social security systems (Hyman, Reference Hyman, Natali and Vanhercke2015: 98). That is, the Commission is pushing for reforms that will:
’decrease statutory and contractual minimum wages’, ‘decrease bargaining coverage’, ‘decrease (automatic) extension of collective agreements’, ‘reform the bargaining system in a less centralised way’ . . . introduce/extend ‘the possibility to derogate from higher level agreements’ . . . promote measures that ‘result in an overall reduction in the wage setting power of trade unions’ (cited in Schulten and Müller, Reference Schulten, Müller and Lehndorff2015: 337).
This policy agenda is not new. However, the Commission now has more tools at its proposal to demand the implementation of this agenda. As indicated above, those recommendations come with a strong conditionality attached for countries with MoU. The mechanisms for other countries are less binding (Schulten and Müller, Reference Schulten, Müller and Lehndorff2015).
Weakening the labour movement and demanding neoliberal reforms affects social policy. And, while the impact of the crises is very palpable in many European countries, social policy is still not an overly active area for the European Commission. The issue of social inclusion and poverty is deemed less important than the aim of fiscal consolidation (Leschke et al., Reference Leschke, Theodoropoulou, Watt and Lehndorff2012: 275). There are few social indicators and they are not attached to an alert mechanism – in contrast to macroeconomic indicators that can trigger intensified monitoring and even sanctions when they are deemed to be at an undesirable level (Jolivet et al., Reference Jolivet, Lerais and Sauviat2013: 47). As a result, recommendations in this area focus on increasing incentives for labour market participation (Leschke et al., Reference Leschke, Theodoropoulou, Watt and Lehndorff2012: 257). While labour market participation is seen as the key mechanism to prevent material deprivation and social exclusion from the EU's perspective, critics have argued that this approach fails to deliver significant outcomes (Daly, Reference Daly2012).
In the case of France, recommendations also include the use of income support schemes rather than raising the minimum wage to tackle in-work poverty (Lux, Reference Lux2016: 9). Policy changes in line with neoliberal restructuring are commended. Attempts to strengthen or preserve social achievements are usually criticised (ibid.). The EU discourse on social policy thus supports domestic actors who are pushing for a neoliberal restructuring of economy and society. This has implications for the democratic debate in France.
France's ‘political crisis’, the Front National and social policy
In other words, it contributes to a ‘political crisis’ in France. Amable (Reference Amable2017) highlights the following symptoms of political crisis in France: incumbent governments failing to get re-elected, the number of ‘outside’ candidates increasing significantly, the rise of the Front National, and the dissatisfaction of citizens with their government. He then argues the root of these problems is that a ‘dominant social bloc’ cannot be aggregated through existing institutions. In this analysis, he focuses on the role of institutions to mediate conflicting interests within the supposed dominant social bloc. This institutionalist reading of Gramsci's concept of the historic bloc glosses over the antagonism between workers and capitalists by focusing on somewhat individualised societal groups and parties as well as existing institutions. In the following, I will link the debate about the success of the FN to my analysis of the discursive space in France and the role of the EU. This allows me to highlight issues of democratic deliberation on capitalism and anti-capitalism and I contend that the limitations of the debate on socio-economic development present a crucial problem for liberal representative democracy.
The surge of the Front National in surveys and elections as well as the change in leadership has led to increased interest by scholars. In order to explain the success of this extreme right party, the leadership strategy of ‘dédiabolisation’ (toning down the extremist rhetoric) has been in focus (Almeida, Reference Almeida2013; Stockemer and Barisione, Reference Stockemer and Barisione2017). Analyses of the French electorate have highlighted the people ‘left behind’ in a globalised France (Goodliffe, Reference Goodliffe, Mammone, Godin and Jenkins2013; albeit not a new phenomenon, see Surel, Reference Surel, Mény and Surel2002). Scholars have also observed a change in the FN's programme, from a neoliberal economic policy stance to a more protectionist and often termed ‘left-wing’ position (Goodliffe, Reference Goodliffe, Mammone, Godin and Jenkins2013; Shields, Reference Shields2014; Ivaldi, Reference Ivaldi2015). Research further investigated the motivation and characteristics of FN adherents and small-scale organisers (Stockemer, Reference Stockemer2014). The FN's hostile view of the EU is seen as a ‘unique selling point’ in France's political spectrum (Goodliffe, Reference Goodliffe, Mammone, Godin and Jenkins2013, Reference Goodliffe2015).
While the FN's attitude to the EU is characterised by hostility (Vassallo, Reference Vassallo2012; Goodliffe, Reference Goodliffe, Mammone, Godin and Jenkins2013), their practical relationship with it is ambivalent. The party has profited massively from being in the European Parliament in terms of both the professionalization of its leaders as well as material resources (Reungoat, Reference Reungoat2015). With the change in leadership from Jean Marie Le Pen to Marine Le Pen, two processes have taken place: the anti-elitist rhetoric has increased with regards to both European and national (political) elites (Stockemer and Barisione, Reference Stockemer and Barisione2017: 105) and
. . . anti-immigrant appeals are interwoven with the main concerns of large part of the French public, such as wages, purchasing power and social and public security. As such, the FN's anti-immigration platform is no longer presented as an end in itself but rather as part of a holistic solution; a solution which stresses that unemployment, social security and France's cultural and intellectual history can only be preserved if immigration is efficiently curbed (Stockemer and Barisione, Reference Stockemer and Barisione2017: 107)
In a second argumentative step, the membership of the EU is then given as an explanation for ‘increased’ immigration (Stockemer and Barisione, Reference Stockemer and Barisione2017: 108). In other words, the FN shifts the ‘blame’ of immigration to the European level and uses existing racism to target the EU.
While this is certainly important for our understanding of the recent success of the party, two connected aspects are overlooked in the scholarly discussion of the FN. One, the FN is rarely discussed in relation to other parties and/or actors in the public sphereFootnote 2. Two, the FN's anti-elitism and anti-EU claims are explained by an inherent Euroscepticism that is normatively discarded as wrong. In this way, the literature on the FN parallels critique of the EU and nationalism. While this is certainly true for the FN, it also delegitimises a left critique of the EU and limits the responsibility of European and political elites for the rise of right-wing nationalism.
Looking at the discursive strategies of the Front National in context with other actors in French public discourse, Table 1 shows selected findings from a comprehensive analysis of public debate over the period 2010–2015. When it comes to the different codes, I have selected those most relevant to the mode of production and social policy. Ownership structures signify the concentration of ownership of the means of production. Power relations encompass the power that the owners of the means of production have both at the sites of production but also in the political structures more generally. Wage labour reflects the centrality of wage labour in society and its normalisation.
Table 1 Discursive strategies in France on selected codes
Source: Adapted from (Lux, Reference Lux2017)
The symbols illustrate that the EU's position on most of these important codes are in line with the employers’ associations and the governing parties, in particular the conservative UMP. It is important to keep in mind that while in terms of columns, there seems to be balance in the debate but when the political and socio-economic standing of the actors in the columns is considered, the discursive space is skewed towards the big parties, the employers’ organisation and the EU.
With regards to the three codes relating to the mode of production, it becomes apparent that, wage labour remains unquestioned but the other aspects are also discussed in a limited manner. Hegemonic actors do not even positively connote the concentration of ownership but can just not address it. This makes it more difficult for subaltern actors to get into a debate about it. Le Pen cautiously criticises the concentration of ownership when she states:
Je crois que l'entreprise, réellement sur le fond, n'appartient pas uniquement au capital. Nous avons réfléchi à un système qui permettrait de faire une réserve légale de titre de 10% qui appartiendrait . . . aux salariés de l'entreprise . . .Footnote 3 (Le Pen and Lamy, Reference Le Pen and Lamy2011)
At the same time, this proposal to make employees shareholders in their company is not connected to a further increase in control or cooperation. Stopping at 10 per cent also makes it limited in its reach. The FdG and some of the trade unions have much more far-reaching proposals in this regard.
It also becomes visible that competitiveness is a contested term as it is used to cut social security contributions of employers and limit wages. The different symbols for the trade unions on the right hand side of the table show some of the development over the years. At first, trade unions tried to not address competitiveness but the term then became so pertinent in the debate that they needed to engage with the term and ultimately, the CGT and others tried to introduce the concept of capital cost as a counter-discourse to labour cost into the debate – albeit with limited success.
The FN prioritises the positive role of internal demand, purchasing power, and public investment, while it questions competitiveness. Furthermore, the party celebrates not just workers and the employed but also criticises other actors for individualising responsibility for unemployment (for a more detailed discussion see Lux, Reference Lux2017: 209–210).
Those discursive strategies advance the FN's social policy programme, which promotes a racist, nationalist solidarity. Within this setting, however, this programme challenges the neoliberal transformations in labour and social policy that France has seen in recent years. Doing so helps Le Pen criticise both France's government and the EU, even though she seldom attaches the word ‘neoliberal’ to her critiqueFootnote 4. Concrete proposals for social policy include taking back the Loi El Khomri – which decentralised collective bargaining and deregulated labour law (Pernot, Reference Pernot, Lehndorff, Dribbusch and Schulten2017) – reducing the retirement age to sixty with a contribution period of forty years; raising the basic pension rate and disabled persons support; providing a monthly prime of 80€ to be paid to low income-earners; increasing housing support for under twenty-five year olds; and making family allowance universal for ‘French’ families (Le Pen, Reference Le Pen2017; Vie publique, Reference publique2017).
This social policy programme promises to mitigate social issues that the financial and economic crisis as well as the transformations in the French mode of regulation in recent years have exacerbated (Lux, Reference Lux2017). In just a few indicators those social issues include a high level of unemployment (6.1 per cent in 2016) and youth unemployment (24.6 per cent in 2016) and at least eleven million people at risk of poverty (Eurostat, no year). In addition, as French political and economic elites have reshuffled during the crisis years, it is the accumulation strategy of small and medium enterprises that has mainly been undermined by the attack on purchasing power of French people (Lux, Reference Lux2015). Le Pen sees herself fighting for this capital fraction as she embraces it in her nationalist agenda. She regards small and medium enterprises as ‘truly French’ enterprises that need to be protected from ‘savage globalisation’ and ‘disloyal international competition’ (Vie publique, Reference publique2017). In other words, the electoral success of the Front National not only reflects racialized fears and economic anxieties but also the struggle among capital fractions where the existing rift between small and big firms in France has intensified.
In democratic discourse, racism, islamophobia, homophobia, transphobia, and misogyny need to be rejected as ‘bad arguments’ (Reisigl and Wodak, Reference Reisigl and Wodak2001: 265)Footnote 5 and as harmful. The opposite is true for the resistance to neoliberalism and capitalism more generally. However, a look at the discursive space in France shows that the latter is marginalised at this level of analysis, i.e. highly visible public debates. The alignment of the EU position with neoliberal actors in France demonstrates how opposition to neoliberalism let alone capitalism is an effect of the EU's discursive practice, thus severely limiting democratic discourse by closing the discursive space even further. Importantly, this effort to marginalise anti-capitalism does not remain discursive but has been systematically institutionalised in both policy recommendations and the dynamics of the European economy more broadly.
Discussion
As a starting point for my analysis, I have placed the importance of democratic deliberation that covers a wide range of ideas. While this does not apply to ideas that are inherently oppressive and harmful to groups of people, it is particularly important to discussions about political-economic development. I have shown how the EU contributes to skewing domestic debates by strengthening (neo)liberal, capitalist reformers against anti-capitalist transformers.
At the European level, this effect is linked to the debate about EU integration that remains binary, thus limiting the discursive scope and setting aside political contents of debates about EU integration. This might not be an issue for liberal conceptions of representative democracy but in line with a more participatory and deliberative understanding, the current institutions and discursive practices of the EU need to be problematised for their limiting of the discursive space.
The case of France can be illustrative for other member states. The democratic implications of the Troika have been documented and criticised (Fisahn, Reference Fisahn2014). The discursive impact, as the case of France shows, is important for big member states without Troika involvement. This becomes even more salient as many effects of the crisis and the European crisis management linger.
The rise of right extremist parties and the social aftermath of the economic crisis processes (and their management) challenge and deteriorate the democratic quality of the EU and member state political systems. As a result, ‘the social after Brexit’ in the EU and its member states continues to be subordinated to a neoliberal mode of integration and the human costs this entails. As long as the crisis symptoms of neoliberal integration at the European level are not met with a progressive, internationalist challenge, those symptoms are likely to continue to fester and morph.
As representative democracy has met severe limitations throughout the course of the crisis processes, the question remains how progressive forces can overcome these limitations. One strategy has been highlighted by intriguing research on anti-austerity, radically democratic movements that try to find new ways of resisting and organising thus reflecting and addressing the need for a new quality of democracy (Bailey et al., Reference Bailey, Clua-Losada, Huke and Ribera-Almandoz2017).
Acknowledgments
I am very thankful for the helpful comments and suggestions received on earlier versions of this article from John Jordan, the editors of this themed section (particularly Steve Corbett), those received in the context of the anonymous review process, and the editors of this journal.
