One could reasonably argue that the title of Paul D'Anieri's book is perhaps somewhat misleading. Although it does in fact track the troubled relations between Ukraine and Russia beginning shortly before the collapse of the USSR and throughout the ensuing years—and in the process provides a very useful treatment of Ukraine's post-Soviet politics, both domestic and foreign—it also focuses on Ukraine's role as a perpetual bone of contention between Russia and the west after what was thought to be the end of the Cold War.

The stated goals of the book are twofold and seen as interconnected. The first is to explain “how and why this [Ukrainian-Russian] conflict came about” (2), and the second is to offer an account of the Ukraine, Russia, US, and Europe relationship from the end of the Cold War through the so-called Minsk II agreement (February 2015) on ending the fighting in the Donbas. Moreover, the author makes it clear that one of the book's primary contentions is that “the problems that exploded in 2014 emerged at the beginning of the post-Cold War period” (2) and grew more pronounced thereafter.

The story unfolds over six chapters that offer a chronological narrative addressing the two objectives and a concluding chapter that both summarizes the analysis and offers some thoughts on whether or not the Ukrainian-Russian war was inevitable, Russia's motives, the prospects for peace, and what Russia's relations with the west might look like down the road.

Chapter 1, titled “The Sources of Conflict over Ukraine,” serves as an introduction to the book and outlines the three “analytical themes” that the author argues were consistently in play in the triangular dynamics between the west, Russia, and Ukraine. First, the security dilemma, which in its simplest form boils down to an action-reaction scenario—what one side (the west and Ukraine) considers positive and desirable for its security (NATO expansion) the opposite side (Russia) perceives as negative and a security threat. Second, the interplay between democratization in post-1989 eastern Europe and geopolitics: the new democracies, including Ukraine, assert their desire to join the “civilized” and democratic west by seeking membership in NATO and the EU, which in turn exacerbates the security dilemma. And lastly there are the internal political constraints and incentives that were at work in the decision-making processes of each of the players in this story; they affected decisions that were made and the consequent outcomes, and these more often than not were on balance negative.

These three themes are artfully interwoven into the subsequent chronological narrative, beginning with the late perestroika period and the first years of Ukraine's independence (1989–93), when many if not all of the points of departure for the west and Russia and for Russia and Ukraine already became apparent. The remaining chapters more or less correspond to the presidential terms of Leonid Kuchma (1994–99, 1999–2004); Viktor Yushchenko (2004–10); and Viktor Yanukovych and Petro Poroshenko (2010–13 and 2013–15), offering the reader an excellent analysis of the wide array of issues and problems that came together to define the Ukrainian-Russian as well as the tripartite relationship. The overall result is a text that provides a much-needed update for Ukraine specialists and at the same time offers international affairs experts an excellent case study in conflict (mis)management.

The extent to which D'Anieri succeeds in explaining the how and why of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict is, in this reader's view, somewhat problematical. If by how and why he means only those issues and problems that came to the surface between Kyiv and Moscow specifically in 1989–2015 (the Commonwealth of Independent States and integration in the post-Soviet space more generally; Crimea; the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol; NATO; the EU; oil and gas supplies and transit) then the how and why is clear and clearly presented. But if we are talking about underlying issues and problems in the Ukrainian-Russian relationship, a formula that the author often employs, then we need to look elsewhere—and the first stop would be the longstanding conviction of Russian elites and much of the Russian citizenry that Ukrainians and Russians, as Vladimir Putin never tires of reminding us, are one narod (people), and that much of Ukraine is actually Russia, which is to say that Ukraine and Ukrainians are “fakes.” Now that is an underlying problem.