Structural accounts of democratization are tricky. There is some input, such as economic growth, and some output, usually a democratic transition or consolidation. Yet the underlying stories that connect input and output are rarely empirically traced. In her well-crafted study, Danielle Lussier reminds us that these stories deserve more attention because “perhaps structures are important only to the extent that they foster certain intermediary conditions, which are the real ‘causes’ of democracy's survival” (269). Lussier is after these intermediary conditions.
Russia and Indonesia are her two cases. Both countries democratized in the 1990s, but they have successively taken different turns. Russia has swung back to authoritarian rule, whereas Indonesia has stayed steady on its democratic path. Structural theories have a hard time accounting for these two diverging trajectories. Given a higher GDP per capita, higher levels of education, and a longer history of independent statehood, Russia should have remained democratic, not Indonesia, whose structural conditions do not bode well for democratic survival.
To explain these unexpected outcomes, Lussier advances a theory that stresses the critical role of mass participation. Where citizens are politically active and engage in elite-constraining behavior, such as supporting opposition parties and participating in protests, political leaders cannot undermine democratic institutions without a fight. Where political apathy and elite-enabling behavior prevail, such as voting for the ruling party and individually contacting political officials, political leaders face less resistance when dismantling democracy. To test her theory, Lussier relies on global and national surveys as well as on interviews that she conducted in the mid-2000s with elites and citizens in two regional capitals in each country.
Yet why do Russians prefer elite-enabling behavior, whereas Indonesians rely more on elite-constraining behavior? Lussier points towards civic engagement, perceptions of political efficacy, and political trust. In Indonesia, citizens are involved in numerous and different autonomous organizations and enjoy a rich social life. This has allowed Indonesians to stay informed, learn valuable civic skills, and swiftly enlist supporters. The situation in Russia is starkly different. Due to the lack of social and civic engagement, Russians lack the ability and also the willingness to organize politically.
Lacking the skills and motivation to mobilize collectively, Russians rely on personal connections to get things done, and they thereby pursue narrow individualistic goals, not collective ends. In fact, their experiences since the collapse of Soviet rule have taught them that collective, political action is futile. In Indonesia, citizens have much stronger perceptions of political efficacy. Here, regular protests, involvement in elections, and support of opposition parties have caused political changes and protected Indonesia's young democracy from power grabs.
Finally, in nascent democracies citizens’ political trust is mainly focused on political leaders, not abstract and untested institutions. In Indonesia, citizens have extended this trust to a political elite that has largely observed constitutional limits on their power. In contrast, Russians have trusted political leaders who have attacked democratic institutions.
In sum, civic engagement, perceptions of political efficacy, and political trust have mutually reinforced each other and put Indonesia on a virtuous path of democratic development and Russia on a vicious path of increasing authoritarianism. Lussier's story is convincing because she traces the empirical evidence carefully and the use of two deviant cases is effective. However, she dismisses structural accounts of democratization a bit too fast. The actions of common citizens undoubtedly matter, but socio-economic development undeniably affects citizens’ readiness to become politically active. Where it does not, we need to look for countervailing forces, but not dismiss structural theories outright. Lussier actually points towards two such forces. First, whereas citizens in Muslim societies are generally more socially engaged through their religious organizations, Orthodox Christianity does not foster civic skills and networks as much. Second, Indonesian organizations under authoritarianism enjoyed more autonomy and were generally maintained after democratization. In Russia, autonomous organizations did not exist under Soviet rule and those that could have later served as foundations for social and civic engagement were rapidly dismantled.
In general, this study might lack the elegance and the prose of Robert Putnam's seminal book Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Yet, it too challenges common assumptions about the forces that stabilize and advance democratic rule, and thereby reinforces the message of other studies that stress the importance of mass action, such as on non-violent resistance. It is a welcome addition to the study of democratization.
