Randal Rauser's Theology in Search of Foundations is an ambitious attempt to repair the tarnished reputations of both metaphysical realism and moderate foundationalism within contemporary philosophical theology. Rauser justifies this project in two ways. First, he argues that questions concerning the nature of truth and justification arising within the field of epistemology have significant consequences for the viability of ‘public’ theology (p. 8). Thus, for theologians to regain the credibility needed to participate in the public squares of the academy and society, they must show that their theological claims are both justified and likely to be true. Second, Rauser argues that moderate foundationalism promises to repair the rift between lay Christians and academic theologians introduced by the ‘bracing universalism of classical foundationalism’ and exacerbated by the ‘stifling insularity’ of its non-foundationalist alternatives (p. 255).

The book is divided into three sections. Chapters 1–4 trace the demise of classical foundationalism. The first two chapters narrate the failed attempts to justify theology by means of rational proofs (Descartes), evidence (Locke) or experience (Kant): each of which accelerated theology's marginalisation as a scientific discipline. Chapter 3 provides a brief, accessible, and therefore highly useful introduction to the terminology of contemporary epistemology. The fourth chapter discusses the viability of classical foundationalism, which Rauser sees as possibly true, yet unjustified (p. 105).

The second section (chapters 5–8) examines the contemporary theological and philosophical climate wherein non-foundationalism reigns supreme. Chapter 5 explores the work of philosophers such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam in order to highlight the futility of attempts to transcend the realist, anti-realist debate (p. 125). Chapters 7 and 8 examine Bruce Marshall's ‘trinitarian non-foundationalism’. Rauser wonders at Marshall's reliance on the work of Donald Davidson, whose metaphysical austerity is ill-suited to theology (p. 197). Rauser also argues that Marshall's attempt to ‘analyze the concept of truth in terms of the Trinity’ is unproductive (p. 200) and that Marshall's deontological epistemology threatens to subordinate theology to alien standards of justification (p. 223).

The third section (chapters 9–10) promises a moderate foundationalism and realism which succeeds where both classical foundationalism and non-foundationalism fail. Contrary to the failed alternatives, Rauser believes that his approach to the justification of Christian belief both coheres with common-sense realism and guards the epistemic virtue of theological inquiry (p. 271). Rauser borrows heavily from Alvin Plantinga's work on proper basicality, warrant and proper function. In particular, Rauser seeks to ground theology in simple perception by means of Plantinga's inclusion of the sensus divinitatis within the list of properly-basic-belief-producing faculties (p. 235). The final chapter extends this moderate foundationalism and critical realism to discuss the nature of Christian doctrine. Rauser argues for a cognitive-propositional theory wherein doctrine ‘aspires to true description’ (p. 256). Against those like George Lindbeck who argue that such approaches stifle ecumenical engagement, Rauser responds that such worries confuse knowledge of universals with universal knowledge (p. 278). Thus, the claim that persons possess knowledge of universals does not entail that such knowledge amounts to a complete description of the world (p. 281).

Rauser's book embodies an admirable search for the foundations of a viable and virtuous public theology. However, while it amasses highly useful arguments for debates with non-foundationalist colleagues, its appeal to the direct perception of non-linguistic concepts and properties (p. 212) falls prey to the very arguments Rauser levels against appeals to inerrant texts in justifying Christian doctrine (p. 36). Just as the act of interpretation renders the concept of textual inerrancy useless, the acts of thinking and communicating render the concept of direct perception rhetorically ineffectual. Neither, it seems, are of much help in matters of disagreement.