The liberal state ‘created’ the LIAs in the nineteenth century

In the nineteenth century, LIAs became the predominant irrigation management model. Since the Middle Ages, farmers had participated directly in resource management, but most irrigation systems were managed by the local authorities (Glick, Reference Glick1970). Only in some Mediterranean regions, such as the so-called huerta of Valencia, had the autonomous authority of the LIAs consolidated against encroachments from municipalities (Peris, Reference Peris2015). The autonomy of some LIAs, commonly known as acequias in Valencia, was a gradual outcome, and had not existed from the Middle Ages, contrary to the idealised vision put forward by Maass and Anderson (Reference Maass and Anderson1978) and Ostrom (Reference Ostrom1990). This perspective is based on early nineteenth-century authors who indulged in a sort of ‘invention of tradition’; a system that was, in fact, the result of a lengthy formative process was considered rather the fossilisation of an ancient tradition, which was at that time under threat of economic changes and interventionist policies (Garrido, Reference Garrido2011). In these instances, canals were managed by the farmers themselves, under very different institutional guises, but decision power was generally limited to a small group of irrigation users (Pérez Picazo and Lemeunier, Reference Pérez Picazo and Lemeunier1990; Pérez Sarrión, Reference Pérez Sarrión1990; Peris, Reference Peris1992, Reference Peris and Drain2003).

The autonomous model, despite at first affecting only a small proportion of all irrigated land, became generalised in the course of the nineteenth century. This process was promoted by the state as a way of tackling conflicts arising in many irrigation systems following changes in the property structure introduced by the liberal revolution. The confiscation and public auction sale of church lands allowed the arrival of new owners. These came from the city, were unconnected with rural societies and did not participate in the election of town councils, which usually administered water for irrigation. On the other hand, the abolition of the seigneurial rights put an end to the influence of the old landholders in the management of local resources. These changes had altered the social balance of irrigation systems and upset the municipal management paradigm. From 1833 onwards, the new liberal state confronted this situation by organising irrigation-participatory management institutions wherever a new conflict flared or a new canal was built (Pérez Picazo, Reference Pérez Picazo1997; Ferri, Reference Ferri1997, Reference Ferri2002; Calatayud, Reference Calatayud2016a). These isolated actions led to the enactment of the 1866 Water Act, which established LIAs for all existing and future irrigation systems serving a minimum of twenty farmers and two hundred hectares. Although legislators argued that the new act merely consolidated an existing situation, in reality it was highly innovative. It generalised what had hitherto been but a limited autonomous management model and which was clearly distinct from the widespread municipal water management systems (Cerrillo, Reference Cerrillo1950; Maluquer, Reference Maluquer1982; Matés, Reference Matés1998; Calatayud, Reference Calatayud, Calatayud, Millán and Romeo2016b).

The state also defined how these irrigation management organisations were to operate. Each LIA was to be administered by a syndicate chosen by its members, who were also to elect a jury to solve disputes and impose sanctions. Although the composition of these associations was defined for each canal, general principles were established, one of which was especially relevant: certain decisions had to be adopted by general assembly, the value of votes depending on the amount of land owned by each member.Footnote ³ In short, the state tried to impose some degree of homogeneity by defining the LIAs’ institutional form and limits.

The autonomy of these systems had a direct bearing on the management of irrigation water. One crucial factor was the amount of water that each system was allowed to extract from aquifers. Existing irrigation systems were allowed to maintain their previous endowments, which sometimes dated back to medieval royal concessions. As such, instead of trying to modify them, the state endorsed these endowments under a new legal category. Only in new irrigation systems did the state intervene by assigning a given volume of water, as it happened, for example, in the cases of Canal de la Derecha del Llobregat (1849), Canal de Isabel II (1860) and Canal del Guadalhorce (1864).

Another important factor for the autonomy of the systems was the freedom that each had to impose their own rules. Each community preserved the freedom to legislate many issues as they saw fit. Water allocation systems, the introduction of changes in irrigation infrastructures, and enforcement of rules and sanctions were among these issues. Other institutional factors that were left for the LIAs to legislate autonomously included the size of government bodies, the duration of offices and the proportionality of voting systems.

The state supported the autonomous management of irrigation water in different ways. LIAs enjoyed better conditions than private companies: while the former were granted rights over water in perpetuity, the concession of rights to private companies was merely temporary, since it was granted for ninety-nine years. This was the case of the public limited company of Canal of Urgel, the Llobregat Canal Company, or even the foreign investors such as the New Majorca Land Company. In addition, in canals built through private initiative and with private capital, for instance the canal of Urgel, farmers had to constitute associations in each of the affected municipalities, which were to be granted full ownership of the canal one hundred years after the original concession.

However, the autonomous management of irrigation water was always a combination of specific community rules (partially linked to a century-old tradition) and the state’s laws (which tried to homogenise water use).Footnote ⁴ Indeed, the consolidation of autonomous management models was not incompatible with the strengthening of the state’s role in water management. As previously noted, the LIAs had ample room for internal manoeuvre, but were subject to statewide regulation of concessions, which was defined by the Ministry of Public Works according to technical criteria. State engineers designed the technical characteristics of the works, assessed any damage to other users, decided when the flow of the river could be considered sufficient, etc. At the same time, the trend was for LIAs to become more homogenous, curtailing the enormous local diversity of the past. Nevertheless, the state’s homogenising efforts were limited in scope. Firstly, many systems took decades to form LIAs, and continued operating according to their former protocols. Secondly, although the law clearly distinguished LIAs and municipal management systems, local councils continued playing a significant part in many irrigation systems.

The important thing, however, was that irrigation users gained an increasingly prominent role as interlocutors with the state, as water demand grew and competition over fluvial resources escalated. In these new circumstances, which were fully crystallised by the mid-nineteenth century, LIAs were increasingly subject to administrative control; conversely, new water rights concessions had to be consulted upon and, to some extent, endorsed by the existing users (D’Amaro, Reference D’Amaro2017: 53).

LIAs emerged as the liberal state was taking shape, with its ideas of a modern public administration and individual property. In this context, as past community management models were being suppressed across the board, irrigation systems were an exception (Ingold, Reference Ingold, Cornu, Orsi and Rochfeld2017a: 869); hence their peculiar legal status. Although private corporations, these organisations had considerable autonomy in the management of a public asset. The ambiguity of this position generated some legal discrepancies, and a number of court rulings passed in the early twentieth century determined that the decisions adopted by LIAs had the ‘same status as decisions adopted by the administration’ (Martín-Retortillo, Reference Martín-Retortillo1997: 503). Other rulings determined that, in effect, LIAs acted as delegates of the state administration, and could execute debts and confiscate property, powers that were, at least on paper, exclusively attributed to the state (Moutón, Reference Moutón1910: 271; Martín-Retortillo, Reference Martín-Retortillo1997: 559–60; Gallego, Menéndez and Díez, Reference Gallego, Menéndez and Díez1986). Within this regulatory framework, LIAs were firmly established by the turn of the twentieth century, both at the local level and vis-à-vis the state.

The role played by LIAs in the design of irrigation policies in the twentieth century: participation or assistance?

The 1920s witnessed the beginning of a new stage in the governance of water. The relationship between users and administration became more complex owing to a combination of political and technological challenges. During the Second Republic (1931–9) and the postwar years, governments pushed forward a large-scale vision that saw water resources as a crucial factor for economic and social development (Molle, Mollinga, and Wester, Reference Molle, Mollinga and Wester2009), resulting in massive public investment aimed at expanding irrigation. In the second half of the twentieth century, ‘irrigation constituted the principal area of public agricultural investment’ (Clar, Martín-Retortillo, and Pinilla, Reference Clar, Martín-Retortillo and Pinilla2018). The relationship with LIAs, however, remained ambiguous.

Reforms took place during Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923–30) which, following the tenets of Fascist corporatism, introduced long-ranging changes to ‘hydraulic bureaucracy’ with the creation of basin confederations in 1926. These confederations, and their assemblies, aimed to put all agents involved in the promotion of water-related public works under a single authority: technicians, ministry officials, hydro-electric companies and the representatives of irrigation users.Footnote ⁵ Engineers tried to take control but were forced to abide by the decisions adopted by the basin assembly, which included representatives of water users. The state, therefore, recognised LIAs as stakeholders within the framework of the assembly (Melgarejo, Reference Melgarejo1988; Fanlo, Reference Fanlo1996; Mateu, Reference Mateu2010).

These federations were soon in place in different hydrographical regions, and they provided a forum in which members of LIAs could defend the interests of their sector, even against ministerial projects. As a rule, local communities accepted this new administrative framework quite passively. In some instances, as Acequia Real del Júcar or Canal Imperial de Aragón (even with the support of the hydroelectric industries), the big associations became heavily involved in their organisation and implementation in the hope of controlling regional water policies from within (D’Amaro, Reference D’Amaro2017). In other cases, by contrast, the assembly-based nature of the basin assemblies did not convince all irrigation users, who saw these bodies as an attempt by the state to interfere in their affairs. For example, in the Turia river basin (Valencia), the leaders of the acequias openly rejected the possibility of being sucked into ‘the defects of economic-bureaucratic organizations’, that is, alongside the technicians.Footnote ⁶ As pointed out by Maass and Anderson (Reference Maass and Anderson1978: 46), the farmers in this region

Likewise, the small LIAs in the Júcar river basin (Valencia) regarded the constitution of basin assemblies as an attack against ‘the freedom’ of irrigation users. They feared that they would lose their traditional autonomy, forcing them to negotiate water supply matters with other users and state technicians. In contrast, hydro-electrical companies and the largest LIA pressed for the basin assembly to be constituted promptly.Footnote ⁷ Finally, in the Segura basin (Murcia and Orihuela), farmers took the middle road. Despite not trusting the technicians, they used the federation to keep control over water regulation, and impose their ancient rights (Maass and Anderson, Reference Maass and Anderson1978: 94). Local elites wanted to use the confederations, not only to play a role in water allocation, but also to consolidate their authority and limit the expansion of irrigation and the formation of new LIAs. However, this assembly-based system came to an abrupt halt with the beginning of the Civil War in 1936.

During Francoism (1939–75), irrigation users were forced to mobilise more than ever before to defend their interests. LIAs were no longer consulted in the design of regional water management policies. A ministerial order promulgated in 1942 decreed that water policies would be determined by technicians alone. Basin assemblies were abolished, which turned confederations into mere administrative bodies. Users, both agriculturalists and industrialists, lost their institutional presence in decision-making bodies. The most influential LIAs, however, refused to accept the passive role to which they were apparently fated, and over the next few decades sought to wrestle back control over water supply. They were convinced that traditional irrigation institutions had the knowledge, the local leverage and the right to take part in water allocation policies.Footnote ⁸ The important role of agriculture for the national economy allowed them to demand a say in the way water was distributed, while fighting against the regime’s attempts to suppress their autonomy and their very existence.

As noted in section two, the state limited itself at first to establishing a general legal framework ‘from above’. Until the Civil War, water concessions in perpetuity were not interfered with, despite increasing water demand. In effect, the legal framework supported community-based management associations while imposing restrictions on private companies, which could only aspire to temporary concessions (Martín-Retortillo, Reference Martín-Retortillo2003).

The perpetuity of concessions was one of the main arguments cited by LIAs, not only to fight back against the interference of the state’s technicians, but also to vindicate the LIAs role as a valid interlocutor with the state. The governments tried to use these institutions to control agricultural production and rural society. Even after the war, during early Francoism, the regime continued enforcing the official constitution of LIAs (Saízar, Reference Saízar1964). As a result, despite recurrent regime change, during the first half of the twentieth century LIAs increased their presence in the country’s institutional framework.

The figures presented in Table 1 are an attempt at reconstructing the dimensions and evolution of these institutions during the twentieth century. The data demonstrate that LIAs were already numerous in the early twentieth century, but also that their number increased significantly throughout the century, as a result of the expansion of irrigation that followed the construction of major water infrastructure by the state. Correspondingly, the number of LIAs members has also grown, as well as the total surface managed by these associations, which currently amounts to 80 per cent of the total irrigated area.

Table 1. Evolution of LIAs in Spain.

Notes: Irrigation user and irrigated area figures for 1972 represent a minimum, as the sources do not always provide this information, which is limited to the number of LIAs. The Canary Islands are excluded.

Source: Medios (1918); Catálogo (1972); Sancho (Reference Sancho, Arnalte, Camarero and Sancho2006: 23).

Although LIAs emerged within a statewide legal framework that tried to homogenise their features, they were characterised by great diversity. Many of those that already existed in 1916 had been in place for a long time. The date in which they were founded is significant. While those constituted in the twentieth century were more homogenous, following the legal framework, those created earlier had specific institutional peculiarities: such as the original internal division in sub-associations in the Acequia Real of Júcar river or the water tribunal in Murcia and Valencia that play a key part in the local communities of which they are a symbol of the autonomous irrigation management. Internal interaction dynamics were also different: farmers were more closely involved in resource governance in older LIAs, whose water distribution mechanisms were technically less sophisticated but which accumulated greater social capital (Sumpsi, Reference Sumpsi1998: 118). Another difference concerned the precision of water allocation mechanisms: while older LIAs relied on imprecise and non-quantified allocation mechanisms (water allocation was ambiguously determined on the basis of ‘needs’), twentieth-century systems distributed fixed volumes, measured according to the state-supported decimal system.

The most visible difference, however, concerned size, a factor that has a decisive bearing on the complexity of internal governance systems. Table 2 and Figure 2 divide LIAs according to number of members and irrigated area in 1972. Table 3 shows that the vast majority of LIA members were small owners.Footnote ⁹

Table 2. Number of LIAs according to size, Spain, 1972.

Source: Catálogo (1972).

Table 3. Number of irrigation users according to size of property, Spain, 1972.

Source: Catálogo (1972).

Source: Catálogo (1972).

Figure 2. LIAs according to irrigated area, Spain, 1972.

Most of the large communities managed canals built at a relatively late date, from the late nineteenth century onwards; some of these irrigation systems had originally been created by private initiative, passing further down the line into the hands of farmers after being rescued by the state from bankruptcy of the company, as it happened with the Canal of Aragón y Cataluña and with the Canal of Urgel (Ramon, Reference Ramon2004; Mateu González, Reference Mateu González2017). The size of LIAs determined their relationship with national water management bodies. As we shall see later, the initiative always lay with a very small number of large communities, which would thus effectively become the interlocutors with the state and, in practice, the representatives of the myriad small associations with limited political leverage.

In conclusion, LIAs assumed the management of agricultural water regardless of the size of irrigation system. It is not the case that there were different levels of state involvement depending on size and complexity of the system; the same institutional relationship applies in canals such as Urgel, which covers 70,000 hectares and nearly 50,000 properties, as in one of the thousand acequias that barely serve twenty hectares and a few dozen farmers.

The increase in the number of LIAs was the result of the expansion of irrigation, especially during the twentieth century: in 1916, irrigated land covered 1,366,441 hectares, while by late Francoism this figure had risen to approximately 2.5 million hectares. The major hydraulic works built during the 1960s greatly contributed to this expansion of irrigation. Between 1964 and 1972, the number of LIAs increased from 2,947 to 4,325; these LIAs administered approximately 60 per cent of the country’s irrigated area (Tasso, Reference Tasso1972: 345–6). In any case, the emergence of new LIAs during this period can be regarded as a paradox, because it is at odds with the Francoist trade union system.

Mobilisation and self-reflection in public discourse: from local defence to national rejection of the corporatist system

The Francoist dictatorship introduced an entirely new framework of labour relations in order to suppress class struggle and promote cooperation within each economic sector. In the agricultural sector, this corporatist system, inspired by Catholicism and Mussolini’s legal doctrine, resembled the Organização Corporativa da Lavoura imposed by the coetaneous dictatorship of Salazar in Portugal (Cabo and Lanero, Reference Cabo, Lanero, Lanero and Freire2011). Although formally framed in terms of ‘trade unionism’, labour relations in Spain were organised vertically, and were part of the regime’s interventionist economic and social policies, the expression of the most fascistic elements of the regime, called falangismo (Sanz, Reference Sanz2010). The constitution of a single Spanish Labour Organisation (OSE, after the Spanish acronym) threatened the autonomy of irrigation users and their historical institutions. The OSE was the only official representative of agricultural interests (Del Arco, Reference Del Arco2016) and was to integrate all labour-related organisations, even LIAs. Once more, the state’s ambiguous policies triggered the reaction of irrigation users, but this time collective action exceeded the limits of individual river basins.

The Trade Union Act of 1940 threatened the existence of LIAs, as well as of other institutions and associations. In the event, LIAs managed to escape the harshest measures of national-syndicalism and the wholesale mergers that suppressed other similar corporations. The food production in irrigation lands was crucial for the autarkic economic policies in force at the time. It was not convenient to overturn the water management system during the postwar crisis. In the second half of 1940s, however, Falangist’s tried to control the countryside by the agrarian trade unions of the regime: the Brotherhoods of Farm Workers and Livestock Farmers. The OSE imposed the incorporation of all rural associations in the Brotherhoods, including those that were already under the regulation of the Water Act (Criado, Reference Criado2004; Bernal, Reference Bernal2010). In order to meet their ends, the OSE tried to have a say in the regulations of newly created LIAs; and to meddle in internal elections, especially in those areas where this system was less influential.Footnote ¹⁰ Despite this, the OSE leaders were incapable of overcoming the resistance posed by LIAs, which never merged with the Brotherhoods. This was, to an extent, possible due to the social prestige of LIAs, both in the countryside and in ministerial corridors. This severely undermined the efficacy of the OSE in the countryside, and caused great tensions between Falangist leaders and the Ministry of Public Works (D’Amaro, Reference D’Amaro and Sanchis-Ibor2014). Confronted by the fact that the legislation was not being enforced, the Brotherhoods eventually gave up trying to impose a single water allocation system.

Tensions peaked again in the 1950s, with the rebirth of national-syndicalist aspirations, which led to an unexpected outcome. In 1953, representatives of the main agricultural regions met in order to organise national representative institutions. These meetings resulted in 1955 in the constitution of the National Federation of Irrigation Associations of Spain (Fenacore, after the Spanish acronym). This organisation aimed to defend the autonomy of LIAs concerning water management, to participate in the design of hydraulic works and to create an unprecedented united national front against Falangist pretensions. In 1955, Francoism officially sanctioned the existence of a voluntary representative association that acted independently of the OSE.Footnote ¹¹

The representatives of Fenacore claimed to work for the interests of all LIAs in the country, including those recently constituted in irrigated areas created on the initiative of the regime and those that managed subterranean water sources. They were aware that their interests could be safeguarded only if they acted as a unified lobby, taking advantage of their links with the Ministry of Public Works and other government actors. As a result of their zeal, the number of members grew exponentially in just a few years. The seventy-two communities that took part in the initial meetings in 1955 administered 240,000 hectares. Most of them administrated over 1000 hectares (Figure 3). Two years later, the membership of Fenacore had rocketed to 160 associations, concerning an area of over 350,000 hectares.Footnote ¹²

Source: ARJA, Actas JG. 1955, no. 2250.

Figure 3. Associations that have subscribed to Fenacore on the day of its incorporation (1955).

The voluntary nature of the membership of these associations and the independence of the Federation from the OSE demonstrates that the larger associations were trusted to represent the interests of the whole. Most of the leaders of Fenacore belonged to associations that managed areas in excess of 8,000 hectares (Table 4).

Table 4. Fenacore’s Board of Directors in 1955: water users’ institutions and their representatives.

Source: ARJA, Actas JG. 1955, no. 2250

Figure 4 shows that the most influential acequias from eastern Spain (Valencia, Alicante y Murcia, the traditional irrigation lands dating back to the Middle Ages) featured prominently among the leadership. Just four council members came from smaller institutions, managing irrigation areas that were just over 2,000 hectares in size.

Source: ARJA, Actas JG. 1955, no. 2250.

Figure 4. Members of Fenacore in 1955 (hectares per province).

In the late 1950s, during a major shift in the balance of governmental power, Falangists started a ‘new campaign towards effective integration’. It was an attempt to recover their former pre-eminence in rural areas and in water management. Among other things, they accused Fenacore of being illegal, and the Federation was officially disbanded in 1959. But nevertheless, its representatives continued with their work semi-clandestinely throughout the 1960s.Footnote ¹³

In 1957, the national leadership of the OSE tried again to impose the Brotherhoods as the key representative institution for agriculturalists. They claimed to have the right to manage water flows in those areas where LIAs did not yet exist.Footnote ¹⁴ The expansion of irrigation, which followed the construction of major water infrastructure by the regime, had left an institutional void, and the Brotherhoods aimed to organise new water users in these areas according to the principles of the Francoist trade union. Generally, these were areas where there was no tradition of irrigation agriculture, and therefore of community-based water management systems.

For instance, the Brotherhoods from the province of Murcia declared – without specifying how they had done it – to be in control of LIAs in some new irrigation areas, such as Caravaca (Murcia). In other instances, they could make no headway, for example with the nearby Junta de Hacendados de la Huerta de Murcia, which the trade unionists were forced to admit was ‘an old institution, with deep roots in agricultural life’.Footnote ¹⁵ This offensive underlined the differences between traditional LIAs and other, less organised users, which were more vulnerable to the corporatist aspirations of the regime.Footnote ¹⁶ For this reason, during the dictatorship LIAs had to organise mutual support and information networks in order to defend their water-management rights. The leaders of Fenacore focused on trying to minimise the interference of the OSE, providing legal support to the less active associations and openly confronting the leaders of the Brotherhoods. To this end, they consolidated their links with the Ministry of Public Works, which was in bitter disagreement with Falangist leaders over the irrigation issue.Footnote ¹⁷ This revealed the contradictions of a regime, which, despite the unifying corporatist legal framework, was forced to admit the important role played by community-based water management systems.

Indeed, the confrontation with the OSE forced LIAs to rethink their role and prerogatives. The desire of irrigation users to be part of the public debate led to the convening of national conferences of LIAs from the 1960s onwards. These conferences were organised by the – now semi-illegal – Fenacore, but had the support of the Ministry of Public Works. These conferences demonstrated the irrigation farmers’ resolve to act autonomously, and stressed the need to negotiate a new regulatory framework with the state. The conferences were conceived as arenas in which the agrarian elites could interact directly with the state administration, not only concerning legislation, but also water infrastructure and the design of irrigation institutions. These conferences, therefore, became an essential forum for the interaction between ministry officials and LIAs leaders, since Francoism offered no channels for institutional debate.

This explains the increasing popularity of Spanish irrigation management as a subject of research in the central decades of the twentieth century. Its uncertain future triggered a public legal debate about water management and collective action, essentially between technical and political cadres of the administration and the legal advisors and leadership of the associations. The LIAs based their defence in three key arguments: first and foremost, their history and tradition, which also included fully consolidated rights over water use; second, the efficiency of their collective-based water management system, which had guaranteed an intensive production regime and the supply of both domestic and international markets; and third, the fact that their ends did not transcend the administration of water (Alonso, Reference Alonso1972; Brugarolas, Reference Brugarolas1964).

The irrigation users’ discourse – which had the support of many legal experts and engineers – emphasised the economic aspects of agricultural production. In this regard, technicians and farmers agreed that collective water management was the most efficient approach from an economic point of view. This was the case also in other countries. As pointed out by Ingold (Reference Ingold2017b), technicians in nineteenth-century France argued that traditional users guaranteed a more efficient exploitation of water resources.

Furthermore, the definition of the legal character and prerogatives of LIAs became an urgent matter. It was a direct consequence of the irrigation users’ struggle against the OSE. The regulatory framework, which had emerged in a very different political setting (nineteenth-century liberalism), was being used to defend the collective and autonomous management of irrigation during the era of authoritarian intervention. Representatives of traditional irrigation systems took advantage of the ambiguity of the law, which left ample room for their concessions and autonomy. On the one hand, they vindicated an autonomous management of water resources and the right to follow their own rules. On the other hand, they claimed to be purely administrative, apolitical organisations that operated under the umbrella of the Ministry of Public Works. Many reached the conclusion that the nineteenth-century Water Act did not clearly regulate their role, and there was persistent talk of changing the law (Maestre, Reference Maestre1969; Bolea, Reference Bolea1969; Fernández, Reference Fernández1974; Pérez Pérez, Reference Pérez Pérez1994).

Despite all the talk of legal change,Footnote ¹⁸ this did not take place until after the return of democracy, when the 1985 Water Act fully defined the legal status of LIAs. According to some legal experts, the new law took into consideration the conclusions adopted at the conferences of 1972 and 1975 about LIAs as public corporations with legal personality. When the new Water Act was finally passed, LIAs leaders were heavily involved (Bolea, Reference Bolea2016: 31–42; Castellano, Reference Castellano2006: 316–17). Therefore, they had succeeded in leading politicians and state officials to adopt their discourse. LIAs had a very active public profile, achieved through leaflets and newspaper articles, and participated in many national and international meetings concerning water rights (Bolea, Reference Bolea2016: 360–1; Primer Congreso, 1984: 185–90); according to their discourse, their experience in the management of the landscape and the use of public resources was to be taken into consideration, not only with regard to their own internal rules, but for shaping legislation at the national level.

In conclusion, the Francoist government threatened directly to interfere with the institutional design of LIAs, while excluding them from decision-making arenas (users had no say in the operation of basin assemblies). The growing interventionism and the attempts at framing LIAs within the state-sponsored Brotherhoods triggered the reaction of the most influential and active LIAs; the perceived external threat drove LIAs to new levels of cooperation and self-awareness, and to form, for the first time, a nationwide unified lobby. This enabled the consolidation of LIAs’ position in the democratic period both in terms of public opinion and the institutional structure of the state. Fenacore, in which over five hundred associations participated, was granted an ‘advisory role’ in the Ministry of Public Works.Footnote ¹⁹ More recently, LIAs have stood up in defence of their rights in the face of the publication of the European Water Framework Directive in 2000, which threatened to revise old concessions (Sancho, Reference Sancho, Arnalte, Camarero and Sancho2006: 48–52). Their social role has remained, therefore, very active; they have been aware of the central role that they play in water management, and have been able to interact with the public administration in the design of their own rules.