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“Consequentialism and Preference Formation in Economics and Game Theory”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2017

Daniel M. Hausman
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When students first study expected utility, they are inclined to interpret it as a theory that explains preferences for lotteries in terms of preferences for outcomes. Knowing U($100) and U($0), the agent can calculate that the utility of a gamble of $100 on a fair coin coming up heads is U($100)/2 + U($0)/2. Utilities are indices representing preferences, so in calculating the utility of the gamble, one is apparently giving a causal explanation for the agent's preference for the gamble.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 59 , December 2006 , pp. 111 - 129
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2006

References

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