Jay Taylor's biography of Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) provides a full portrait of Chiang throughout his long career in military and political leadership. The book succeeds admirably, replacing a “cardboard figure” (1) with an informed understanding of how Chiang lived, led and lost mainland China, and ruled Taiwan. Taylor bases his account on five years of research, drawing on numerous interviews and a wide array of published and unpublished sources in Chinese and English. The result is a readable and even gripping book, likely to be appreciated by many general readers. For scholars, this definitive work will be a force to reckon with. Apart from casting off old biases against Chiang Kai-shek, its main contribution is a fresh examination of how Chiang handled China's crucial relationship with the United States, particularly during the period from 1941 to 1945. Because the book lacks detail on Chiang's handling of domestic politics, however, ample scope remains for further research on how Chiang Kai-shek's leadership shaped and was shaped by China.
Taylor's narrative follows Chiang Kai-shek through his career and brings him to life as a person. As a young officer, Chiang was evidently highly disciplined, decisive, conspicuously courageous, and ambitious. As a young man, he was attractive to women and involved in many transient relationships before renouncing other commitments in favor of Soong May-ling (1898–2003). Uninterested in the marriage arranged for him early on, it was only at his mother's insistence that Chiang eventually shared a bed with his first wife long enough to father Chiang Ching-kuo, the son in whom he placed great trust later in life.
For about a decade before the death of Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), a period when Sun lacked a territorial base or recognized authority to lead China's government, Chiang moved steadily toward the inner circle of Sun's Guomindang Party. After the Comintern began to support the Guomindang with military advisors and material assistance in 1923, Chiang became pivotal in this transfer of resources. Thanks to its reorganization along Leninist lines and Chiang's military leadership, the Guomindang succeeded in reunifying much of China's fragmented territory, formally reestablishing the Republic of China at Nanjing in 1928. By this time, Chiang Kai-shek had shaken off Comintern tutelage and led a violent attack on his party's left wing, driving out the Chinese Communists who had joined with Sun's encouragement. Chiang was thenceforth the Republic of China's most powerful person, maintaining his dominance within a large coalition of domestic allies and supporters and concerning himself constantly with strategic planning and the strengthening of national defenses. The alarming escalation of tensions between China and Japan from 1928 to 1937 diverted his attention from campaigns against the Communists who had fled underground and to the hills. In resolution of a dramatic confrontation at Xi'an in 1936, Chiang agreed to enter an anti-Japanese military alliance with the Chinese Communist Party. During World War II, he was the pivotal link between China and the West in the allied effort against Japan.
Through new research and an unbiased approach, Taylor updates our understanding of the wartime relationship between China and the United States. His account of the relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and General Joseph Stilwell is the dramatic heart of the book. Appointed in early 1942 to a less than clearly defined position as Chiang's chief of staff, Stilwell was determined to gain full command of China's armies. Thwarted by Chiang's refusal to step aside, Stilwell sought to undermine him. According to Taylor, he withheld U.S. supplies from Chinese forces, regularly underestimated the capabilities of the Japanese, discussed Chiang's supposed incompetence with subordinate Chinese commanders, and concocted plots to assassinate him. By the time Stilwell was recalled after almost three years, he had caused tremendous damage, and the repercussions were disastrous. Not only did Stilwell's lack of cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek cause needless loss of life among Chinese troops on numerous occasions, but also his verbal campaign against Chiang deeply prejudiced public opinion in the West. Largely because Stilwell sought to raise the standing of the Chinese Communists, repeatedly praising them as a promising alternative to Chiang's leadership, their political position was enormously strengthened by the anti-Japanese war. Taylor's interpretation thus shifts the blame for a dysfunctional partnership from Chiang to Stilwell. Yet the implication is clear that Stilwell's superiors, namely General Marshall and President Roosevelt, bear responsibility as well. The structural problem was that they did not concern themselves much with the distant situation in China, and thus did not recall an incompetent general as readily as if he had been doing similar damage in Europe or North Africa.
Although Chiang Kai-shek's interactions with Americans come into clear focus, his handling of domestic affairs remains shadowy in Taylor's account. Taylor provides a full depiction of Soong May-ling and some details on members of her family, but introduces only a few of the other figures who interacted with Chiang near the center of the Chinese polity. With such limited treatment of Chiang's interactions in domestic political and military affairs, he remains a puzzle in some ways. Particularly on the issues of corruption, violence, and his defeat by the Communist forces, the portrait lacks a focus distinguishing Chiang's agency from the structures that constituted and constrained his authority.
Taylor faults Chiang for not dealing effectively with corruption even though Chiang himself was personally honest and recognized the seriousness of the problem in his government and army. It is not clear, however, whether Chiang's concept of corruption was the same as Taylor's. We see in the book that both on the mainland and in Taiwan, Chiang's government was a relationship-based network of power more than a rule-based authority. Further exploration is needed to understand clearly how Chiang maintained his central position through continuous negotiation and the deployment of material resources.
Another aspect of Chiang Kai-shek's behavior calling for further examination is the murderous cruelty that he occasionally displayed. Taylor mentions instances of executions arbitrarily ordered and condemns the violence perpetrated against Taiwanese civilians in 1947 (591). His account does not make clear, however, whether a military commander's power of life and death over his subordinates and other victims was a regular or anomalous aspect of the political system within which Chiang operated. In his book, War and Nationalism in China, 1925–1945 (2003), Hans van de Ven argues that a “culture of violence” developed in China during the period of Chiang's career. The question of whether or not Chiang's style of leadership contributed to the development of a violent political culture awaits further investigation.
In 1949, Chiang Kai-shek lost control over the world's most populous country. This massive military defeat has generally been attributed to deficiencies of his leadership and judgment. Taylor's view is that Chiang's decision to attempt to wrest northeast China (the Manchuria region) from Communist control during the civil war (1946–1950) was a “disastrous decision” (3) based on “vast and incomprehensive optimism” (364). Here Taylor's judgment is perhaps a stray holdover from the old set of Western biases and excuses that he sweeps away. Chiang's own belief was that he had no choice; were he to lose the northeast to the Communists, it would be impossible to hold on further south. Mainland-based military historians consider that his strategy was sound. They describe the decisive Communist victory at Shenyang (Mukden) in 1948 as unexpected given the advantages held by Chiang's forces. (For an examination, see Liu Tong, Zhongguo 1948 nian liang mingjue zhan [Two fateful decisive battles in China in 1948], Sanlian, 2006). If Chiang's decision to concentrate forces in the northeast is viewed as rational rather than a disastrous error, explanations of his defeat must be sought elsewhere. A strong implication of Taylor's portrayal of Chiang's earlier interactions with the West is that his position on the mainland had already been irrevocably weakened by inadequate support from the Allies from 1942 to 1945.
The Generalissimo is sure to reach avid readers in mainland China and Taiwan, where many scholars will be interested in assessing the book in light of their own findings and insights. They may be expected to refine and extend many of Taylor's significant interpretations in further research.
