Mikulas Fabry's excellent book examines the norms and principles involved in recognizing new states in international politics from the eighteenth century until the present, looking at individual cases in each chapter. Instead of offering a theoretical or narrow discussion of international law, it focuses on the international politics of state recognition, and the author places himself within the English School of international relations (IR) in viewing international politics as an international society. Fabry offers no grand theory to explain why the norms and principles of state recognition change, but he argues in his conclusion that the nineteenth-century principle of “de facto self-determination” has been unwisely superseded since decolonization after 1945 by a “positive” right of self-determination that recognizes states even though some lack the capacity to govern themselves. The book is divided into chapters that look at distinct historical periods and their different norms and principles about state recognition.
In a brief introductory chapter, Fabry dismisses realist theory with respect to this topic; realists incorrectly think force of arms leads to state recognition when there are instead a series of norms, principles, and practices that constitute a society of states that exists independently of a particular state. Since Martin Wight and others in the English School say little about this topic, however, Fabry claims that he addresses an issue that has been largely ignored in IR.
The first historical chapter discusses how the norms and principles of state recognition shifted among the major powers of Europe from one based on dynastic legitimacy in the eighteenth century to de facto self-determination in the nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century, only monarchs based on divine right of rule recognized new states. The rise of liberalism and the American Revolution challenged this principle, but only France and the Netherlands recognized America before the British Crown did so. Like the American Revolution, the French Revolution fought to form new states based on popular sovereignty; however, following Napoleon's defeat, the Congress of Vienna repudiated these satellite states and revitalized the principle of dynastic legitimacy.
According to Fabry, the norm of de facto self-determination was first established as the basis for state recognition when Great Britain and the United States agreed to recognize new states in Latin America in the 1820s. The Holy Alliance opposed London and Washington and insisted that only Spain could grant its colonies independence, but the two liberal powers maintained that the fact that these Latin American peoples were governing themselves independently from Spain was a sufficient basis to recognize them as sovereign states. Great Britain and the United States worried that Spain and other European powers might intervene in Latin America, and for them de facto self-determination became a “negative” principle meant to deter external intervention. Moreover, the liberal powers established in practice the principle of uti possidetis juris: new states created from former colonies should maintain the borders of the old order. De facto self-determination soon became the basis for recognizing new states in Europe in the nineteenth century as well.
In one of his major points, Fabry corrects a common misconception among IR scholars that the principle of self-determination was first promoted by Woodrow Wilson as the basis for recognizing states. Instead, Wilson was first to champion self-determination as a positive principle, suggesting that peoples had a right to independence and statehood even though they had not demonstrated a capacity for self-government. “Whereas the negative conception demanded of states respect for foreign self-determination endeavors by not interfering with them, the positive one imposed on states a duty to help bring these endeavors to the desired conclusion” (117). Given the difficulties at Versailles, Wilson discovered that positive self-determination led to many problems involving minority rights, borders, and uncertainty about the principle's applicability. In the end, Wilson fell back on de facto self-determination as the basis for creating new states.
Fabry asserts that Wilson's principle of positive self-determination achieved its ultimate success with decolonization and the massive increase in new states in the Third World. In the author's view, this principle in action was a radical departure from the past. “Decolonization was a phenomenon without precedent: never before had non-sovereign groups realized independence as a matter of mere assertion of aspiration” (148–49). He attributes decolonization in large measure to the norm that developed in the UN General Assembly, discounting the role of the two superpowers and the weakness of Great Britain and France after 1955. A big part of the new norm was that the new states that emerged from colonial states were supposed to maintain their colonial borders. Although many new states faced strong secessionist movements, the international community refused to recognize them. Fabry suggests that uti possidetis juris became the new “dynastic legitimacy.”
Positive self-determination and uti possidetis juris have continued in the post–Cold War period, says the author. Although the international community's recognition of the successor states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia might suggest that secessionist movements have become accepted, Fabry claims that the collapse of these two states came about in the eyes of the international community as a result of dissolution as opposed to secession. Fabry decries the fact that Germany and others recognized Bosnia, where a government did not control its territory. Moreover, the international community has refused to recognize Somaliland, even though it has had a functioning government within the dysfunctional state of Somalia. Fabry asserts that NATO's military intervention in support of Kosovo's efforts to secede from Serbia has been justified by the West as an exception to uti possidetis juris.
The book is highly successful in demonstrating how norms and principles have changed with respect to recognizing states. Fabry is particularly good at clarifying principles and comparing and contrasting them from one period to the next. The cases throughout are well researched and display solid judgment and analysis. The book is crisply written and well organized.
On a critical note, the book should have looked more at cases where actors wanted to be recognized as states but failed. In looking so much at successful cases, Fabry can be criticized for testing on the dependent variable. The author claims that his analysis focuses on international politics as opposed to law, yet he should have discussed at greater length the international politics of some cases. For example, Fabry demonstrates how crucial British and American cooperation was to recognizing Latin American states in the 1820s, yet it is unclear how much that issue contributed to this relationship that would largely serve as the cornerstone of international politics for many years thereafter. The author has next to nothing to say about the issue of recognizing Germany after the Second World War, which probably began and escalated the Cold War between the two superpowers, nor about the issue of recognizing Taiwan, which continues to haunt US–China relations. Though the author might be complimented for avoiding the polarizing debate about the relative importance of power versus norms in international politics, he should have cited more of the constructivist literature on norms. The norm against racism contributed to decolonization, a fact the author fails to note. Finally, Fabry is probably wrong that the Kosovo case is an exception to the principle of not recognizing secessionist movements, for norms promoting human rights—the basis for severing Kosovo from Serbia—will likely play a greater role in international politics in allowing new states to be formed as a result of secession. De facto self-determination, Fabry's choice, prevailed in a world with a sharp divide between the external and internal realms that no longer exists.
These minor criticisms aside, Recognizing States convincingly shows how important this poorly studied topic is to international politics.
