In Afghanistan, the authors critique the West's response to the war on terror in Afghanistan with a focus on the United States’ response. The four chapters in the book are organized chronologically, beginning with the events of September 11, the immediate U.S. response and the disagreements between U.S. officials in regard to which country the U.S. should focus their efforts on, and concluding with the war in Afghanistan and an analysis of the West's failed efforts at nation building. Bird and Marshall analyze international aid policies, military strategies, the interim Afghani government under Hamid Karzai, and the South Asian landscape which was key in keeping Osama bin Laden safe. The Pakistani military and intelligence cooperation is listed as a factor that complicated nation building. This alliance was seen as unreliable due to the corruption in both institutions resulting in their respective members helping insurgents rather than the West. Escalating insurgency activity and the growing heroin trade are also presented as factors that complicated the international community's attempt to nation build. Overall, Bird and Marshall illustrate the West's response as dysfunctional and, hence, a failed attempt to achieve the international goal of capital building, governance, and the development of the nation into a Westernized democracy because of a lack of clear communication and consistency from all involved parties.