Iran in World History offers an overview of Iran's rich, and historically interrupted, culture by contextualizing the impact of “Iranian Civilization” on other societies. This book, an engaging study of Iran's culture and history “seen through eyes of ordinary people” (x), illustrates how Persian literature, architecture, music, arts, dress, food, statesmanship, and religions were adopted by societies from the Mediterranean shores to India, and along the Silk Road as far as China. Foltz demonstrates that Persian culture, a point of pride for Iran, is a source of civilization similar to ancient Greece and Rome.
Foltz begins his exploration of Iran's cultural impact on world history by carefully defining the three main elements that constitute what he terms the “Iranian Cultural Identity.” For him, it is not Nowruz and gardens, or the past empires, philosophers, historians, architects, and mathematicians whose knowledge found their way into the leading centers of learning in Europe. According to Foltz, the principal features of Iranian cultural identity are the Persian language (Farsi), the Greater Iran (Iran-zamin), and Ferdowsi's literary masterpiece, the Epic of Persian Kings (Shah-nama), which tells the story of Persians from their origins until the Arab conquests in the seventh century.
Iran in World History comprises eight chronological chapters that also include images, maps, illustrations, and a timeline. Chapter 1 traces the history of the proto-Iranians to the Iranian plateau. Foltz argues it was Darius the Great (r. 522-486 BCE) who first self-identified as an “Iranian” in one of his royal inscriptions. He connects this with archeological findings at Shar-e Sukhteh, which suggest that the writing system used in the period was “first devised by the Jiroft culture” (6). Material artifacts from this massive urban complex include a number of firsts, from the oldest artificial eye, to evidence of brain surgery, dentistry, and animation (6). He further addresses the Iranians’ encounter with the Israelites as an important episode in the history of monotheistic creeds. The Avestan notion of heaven/hell, angel/demon, and a judgement day are now part of the Abrahamic religions.
Chapters 2 and 3 cover Iran's pre-Islamic history. The Achaemenid Empire (550-330 BCE) operated on the theory of minimal central interference in the provinces. This administrative model remained in place well into the Islamic era. Greek observers credited Persia's stability to Darius's laws, trade, standard coinage, fiscal accountability, and agriculture. Weakened by court politics, the Achaemenids could not withstand the armies of the Alexander of Macedon whose men famously pillaged and burnt Persepolis.
After the Seleucids (312-63 BCE), who had inherited a divided kingdom upon the death of Alexander, the Parthians who “claimed descent from the Achaemenids, rose to power” (29-30). Despite their wars with the Romans, the Parthians domestic policy was similar to that of the Achaemenids, which was one of non-interference in religious and cultural matters, as long as taxes were paid and rebellions were avoided. In the Sasanian period (224-651 CE), the Magi priests attempted to make Zoroastrianism the official religion of the empire, but the ruling shahs were largely opposed to outlawing any religion or eliminating competing forms of religiosity. Foltz mentions that “prior to legalization of Christianity, Christians fleeing the Romans found refuge in the prosperous Iranian cities, where they often flourished” (37).
Chapters 4 and 5 cover the history of Islam and the demographic movement of Turkmen tribes to Iran. For Foltz, the principal factor of Arab success in Iran was their economic policy. Arabs appointed their own supervisors in the central markets, conquered the established trade routes, and offered lowered taxes. By 750, disaffected Iranians and Arabs viewed the discriminatory ‘Umayyad mawali (clienthood; subservient status; non-Arab convert) system contrary to Islam's egalitarian message. Under the military leadership of Behzadan (Abu Muslim) the ‘Umayyads were ultimately defeated. The new ‘Abbasid Caliph transferred the capital to the edge of the Iranian cultural sphere in Kufa, until Baghdad was constructed by 762 north of Ctesiphon. Foltz writes the “Abbasid state could be considered a continuation of the Sasanian Empire in Islamic guise” (51).
Chapter 6 discusses the short-lived dynasties that followed. Foltz highlights Safavid ruler Nadir Shah's (r. 1736–47) attempt to end the religious intolerance toward the end of the dynasty. Nadir created a multiethnic army to overcome sectarianism and help Iran avoid annexation by its powerful neighbors. Nadir's polity dis-integrated into autonomous realms after his assassination. The Qajar dynasty (1785-1925) that ultimately formed was unable to fully extend their bureaucratic reach and collect taxes from regions dominated by tribal power, on whom they also depended for troops. During the volatile period of Qajar rule, Iran also endured severe epidemics, famine, and a financial crisis that paved the way for outside interference.
Chapter 7 centers on the modernization efforts of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979). Reza Shah (r. 1925–41) paralleled Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's coercive reform model so as to transform Iran into a modern nation and to bridge a perceived gap with European societies. Reza's achievements came at the cost of participatory politics and caused social divisions and economic stratification. Reza's pro-German inclinations was not acceptable to the British and Soviets, and he was consequently ousted in favor of his inexperienced son.
Under Mohammad Reza Shah (r. 1941–79), the influx of oil wealth made possible key advances in the fields of industry, education, military, infrastructure, and public health. Mohammad Reza did not bridge the gap between what his critics saw as a rift between western style modernity and “Iranianness.” Instead, he applied an iron-fist approach towards leftists, clerics, and dissidents. Anti-government views culminated in public demonstrations compounded by Iran's financial difficulties of 1976. By the late-1970s, Iranians from across the political spectrum rushed together to expel the Pahlavi Shah.
The final chapter covers the Islamic Republic of Iran. The new government created its own military body to avoid any perceived threats. A referendum was held in the same year to approve the creation of a yet undefined “Islamic Republic.” These measures incited a massive exodus of mostly educated urbanites. The communities in diaspora have kept their cultural identity alive with a strong emotive attachment to Iranian art, language and history. As cited by Foltz in the beginning of the book, the same factors of Persian language, celebration of Nowruz, and communal gatherings continues to connect Iranian expatriates. Whether among the diaspora communities or internal to the state during times of weak Iranian central rule, it was the everyday cultural practices that has kept the notion of “Iranianness” alive.
The book has a few minor shortcomings. It does not speak to the impact of debates concerning Orientalism on Iranian historiography. And Foltz spills little ink on the democratic aspirations of Iranians or on Iran's economic situation in the neoliberal era. Moreover, Foltz does not pay in-depth attention to how the Samanids and the Ghaznavids contributed to keeping the Persian culture alive, thus, the period after the disintegration of the Timurids until the rise of the Safavids is not explained well. Yet as the book's writing is direct and clear, students and general readers alike will find it useful. Iran in World History's biggest contribution is its simplicity of style in presenting an up-to-date history of Iran and its people to novice readers.
