Renaissance scholarship, up until recently, tended to see certain Italian cities, especially Florence and Rome, as singular intellectual centers, and others as periphery. During the past two decades there has been an undeniable attempt on the part of various scholars to shift Renaissance Naples from its peripheral status into a more central position. Much of this endeavor was directed to the study of Pontano. Matthias Roick’s study on Pontano’s theory of virtue should be seen as a significant contribution to this joint effort.
Giovanni Pontano (1426–1503) was known and often praised for the way he combined perfect humanist scholarship with the highest diplomatic and political responsibilities. Roick structures his book on the basis of these two aspects of Pontano’s figure: part 1 concentrates on Pontano’s role as a political actor and part 2 on his place in the humanist movement. Only after the author has inserted us deep into Pontano’s dual aspects do we move to part 3, which presents us with the main theme of the book—the concept of virtue. This structure helps Roick present a solid philosophical outlook, built on the basis of two firm pillars. Each one of the three parts of the book offers a rich contextual elaboration: he mentions significant precursors of Pontano, such as Lorenzo Valla and Panormita, and examines humanist philosophical traditions, for example in relation to the concept of fortune, from Petrarca to Poggio. Yet, one wonders if the contemporary Neapolitan humanists should not be included among those who contributed to Pontano’s philosophical thought.
Roick displays his thesis with great clarity. His forthcoming style of writing invites the reader to follow him willingly. Roick offers a comprehensive study of Pontano’s moral and political thought to readers from a broad spectrum of levels and interests in the history and philosophy of the Renaissance. He focuses on Pontano’s complex inquiry into the theme of virtue, which he sees as a moral psychology composed of “metaphysical, astrological and ethical notions” (123). Roick pays special attention to Pontano’s treatise De Prudentia, which he analyzes thoroughly. At the same time he draws on a large variety of Pontano’s works with an impressive familiarity.
The concept of virtue has recently been identified by James Hankins as the “central theme of humanist political writing,” as opposed to “republicanism,” “civic humanism,” or “city-state liberty,” which have been previously seen as the major themes of Renaissance political thought (James Hankins, “The Virtue Politics of the Italian Humanists,” in Beyond Reception: Renaissance Humanism and the Transformation of Classical Antiquity, ed. Patrick Baker, Johannes Helmrath, and Craig Kallendorf [forthcoming]). Matthias Roick is one of the scholars who has followed this new line of research.
Matthias Roick’s book also illustrates an up-to-date understanding of the mechanism of Renaissance humanism. His main claim is that Pontano’s philosophy is based on a recovery of Aristotle, but it is not a simple recovery based on mere imitation or translation. Roick helps us appreciate the humanist’s activity as a creative rewriting of classical writers: Pontano rewrites Aristotle in terms of contemporary culture, and as Roick stresses: “Naples is not Athens.” Roick explains that Pontano refuted the Aristotle taught in the traditional university setting that had lost the link between “reason and language, philosophy and eloquence” (103). Pontano recovered this link in a new philosophy which he initiated, defined in his dialogue Aegidius as the “Latin Philosophy,” which is based on a “refined style and elegance” and a “proper and pure Roman vocabulary” (105).
As the author himself states, he is not the first to deal with themes such as Pontano’s recovery of Aristotle, his linkage between philosophy and eloquence, and his concept of virtue. However, he claims, justly, that these issues have been pointed out but insufficiently analyzed. There is no doubt that Roick contributes clarity to all the issues mentioned above, placing them into a coherent philosophical picture. There is room to wonder whether Roick gives enough credit to the Italian scholars who have previously dealt with these issues, some of them already a few decades ago. For example, one could mention the not very known scholar Vincenzo Prestipino, who discusses the concept of virtue in Pontano’s work, or, more importantly, one of the greatest scholars of southern Italy—Francesco Tateo, who studied Pontano’s moral thought.
To conclude, Roick, following the footsteps of contemporary scholars such as Lodi Nauta, Victoria Kahn, James Hankins, and others, and at the same time revealing originality and creativity, does an excellent job of restoring to Pontano the fame that he enjoyed during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, not only as a poet and a politician, but also as a philosopher.
