The Renaissance is an understudied field in the history of philosophy, and there continues to be a need for modern monographs about many philosophers from this period, as well as for reliable editions and translations of their works. As a case in point, the Platonist Francesco Cattani da Diacceto was well known during his life but is little studied today. The sixteenth-century Florentine philosopher, university professor, and Gonfaloniere was also a member of the Orti Oricellari and the Medici Sacred Academy. He dedicated his works to and corresponded with Pope Leo X as well as Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici, Bernardo Rucellai, Germain de Ganay, Cardinal Grimani, and Ficino, among others. He was praised by Corestesi, Castiglione, and Equicola, and was the subject of two biographies. A number of scholars have recently written articles about him, but Simone Fellina has just published a much-welcomed first monograph. Before the publication of this book the most recent volume on Diacceto was Sylvain Matton's edition of his De pulchro libri III (1986).
In 1946, Paul O. Kristeller published a substantial article that was the first detailed survey of Diacceto's life and writings. He offered eight conclusions: 1) Diacceto was Ficino's faithful disciple; 2) he placed greater emphasis on Pythagorean philosophy and mathematics than Ficino did; 3) unlike Ficino, he rarely quoted from Scholastic authors; 4) again unlike Ficino, he was not very interested in questions of Christian theology; 5) he did not follow Ficino in synthesizing Platonism and Christianity; 6) he distanced himself from Ficino's treatment of Aristotle and Peripatetics; 7) he openly criticized Giovanni Pico della Mirandola; 8) and he was influential in transmitting his and Ficino's Platonisms to his many pupils and literary relations. It is clear that Kristeller's method is to compare Diacceto to Ficino. Despite noting clear differences, Kristeller rightly considers him Ficino's disciple.
Fellina studies Diacceto's many philosophical works, including his De Pulchro, In Platonis Symposium Enarratio, I Tre Libri D'amore, and Panegyricus in Amorem, as well as his letters and his paraphrases of Aristotle and Platonic dialogues, in order to outline the features of his philosophy. His general approach and conclusions agree with Kristeller's. This is not to say, however, that Fellina merely repeats Kristeller. In particular, Fellina employs two methods of research. His first method compares Diacceto's writings with Ficino's and Pico's works in order to distinguish Diacceto's use of different sources. Fellina conveys, in other words, when Diacceto draws directly on Ficino and Pico as sources (e.g., on Ficino's commentaries on Plato's Parmenides and Plotinus's Enneads) to show whether he agrees, disagrees, or openly criticizes them. The fifth and last chapter of the book treats Diacceto's criticism of Pico. This topic is especially interesting since both figures sought to harmonize Plato and Aristotle and both philosophized about love. Also interesting is Fellina's examination of Ficino's, Pico's, and Diacceto's differing philosophical explanations for the myths of Ouranos, Kronos, and Zeus (322–27). Like Kristeller, Fellina concludes that Diacceto was more invested in Pythagorean philosophy and mathematics than Ficino was. It might be worth pointing out, however, that Ficino's relationship to ancient (pseudo-) Pythagorean sources, especially in Iamblichus, has long been neglected, and that Diacceto might have been continuing down a path shown to him by Ficino.
Fellina's second method is metaphysical. His chapters are organized hierarchically, descending in ontological (or henological) levels of reality. He devotes chapter 1 to the One/Good, chapter 2 to the intelligible world, chapter 3 to cosmology, chapter 4 to anthropology, and chapter 5 to theories of love and his critique of Pico. The book also includes an introduction, a very short conclusion, a bibliography, and an index. The chapters are not even in length. Chapter 1 is just over thirty pages, while chapter 4 is about one hundred pages longer. Given Diacceto's interest in the soul, the length of chapter 4 is understandable, although it might have benefited from editing. Fellina's two-page conclusion seems like a missed opportunity to frame his analysis.
Students of Renaissance philosophy will learn much from Fellina's book. It is a singular contribution insofar as it is the only modern monograph on Diacceto. His examination of Diacceto's writings is admirable, as is his approach of grounding Ficino, Pico, and Diacceto's writings in ancient philosophy. Fellina's book will be consulted by anyone interested in studying Diacceto, Pico, and Ficino, their legacies in the sixteenth century, and, more broadly, Renaissance Platonism and philosophies of love.
