In this lucidly written and clearly argued book, Kent Dunnington offers his contribution to the ongoing debate on the nature of humility as a virtue. This debate has long roots. Why did Aristotle not include it in his list of virtues? Why did Augustine think that the Christian virtue of humility is something different from the pagan virtues of Rome and Greece? Later discussions still reflect these early questions. During the Enlightenment secular philosophies formed an ambiguous relation to Christian virtues, especially to humility. Some criticized it vehemently, while some tried to save elements of it. Notably, David Hume was willing to classify humility as an outright vice. Immanuel Kant sought to define humility in a such way that even Hume could have approved it, yet the result is a far cry from what the Christian humility is supposed to be. Even after the revival of virtue theories in our own time, thanks to the work of many Christian thinkers, Dunnington notes that many Christian virtue theorists pursue their projects in a way that is negligent of the specific Christian nature of virtues – as if Christian faith adds nothing worth mentioning to pagan virtue theories (157).

After offering a history of humility in the western theological and philosophical traditions, Dunnington defines radical Christian humility as ‘the disposition to have no concern to develop, clarify, attain, maintain, or safeguard an ego ideal, because of a trust that one's well-being is entirely secured by the care of God’ (88). This definition picks out the particular high ideals of humility exemplified by desert monks and Augustine, among others. Effectively, the origin and focus of this kind of humility is the life and especially death of Christ. By raising the bar, one arrives at a refined definition of humility, but then the question arises whether this is a possible, or even ethical, ideal to hold on to.

Dunnington acknowledges that the Humean critique, which has been more recently strengthened by feminist critiques, has a serious bite. If humility as radical unselfing is proposed to subaltern groups as an ethical ideal by those in power, this effectively robs them of the moral agency needed to resist blatant injustices. While granting this as a possible state of affairs (which should be resisted), he argues that it does not follow from this possibility of abuse that radical Christian humility should be neglected in toto and that no one should cherish it as an ideal. Moreover, radical humility as it is understood in the Christian tradition means the imitation of Christ, which on the one hand is never complete in this life, and on the other hand is an infused virtue, which is not available to us except as a divine gift. It is not generated and sustained by habituation as virtues normally are, but by divine passio, the act of God that annihilates our powers and potentialities and fills the soul with divine love.

While pride is often defined as an element of healthy personality because without some sort of self-reliance and self-worth you become servile and pusillanimous, radical Christian humility seems to proscribe pride in all forms – and this is exactly the point where secular traditions have parted ways with Christian virtue theory. Yet even from a Christian point of view it must be acknowledged that in our fallen state some sort of healthy pride is often needed, but it is an ambiguous companion that is always one step away from being transformed into our worst enemy. In the closing chapters, Dunnington balances between warning and recommendation. As noted, he recognizes the dangers of this ideal, yet he sees that this ideal must be upheld because without it Christians will be subjected to a false Gospel that promises us that God will make us ‘whole persons’ or grant us earthly flourishing in a way that is removed from the following of Christ. The gospel promises that life can be found in the midst of death, but this means neither the Nietzschean caricature of Heaven as a form of resentful vengeance nor the human flourishing promised by the prosperity gospel.

It has been a common critique of analytic theology that it is not properly theological and that it is too focused on philosophical issues divorced from the lived experience of the faithful and actual theological traditions. While I think that this critique is based on fragmentary knowledge of what is happening under the analytic theology label, Dunnington's important work is one example of the fact that the movement does not suffer from this alleged forgetfulness. In his book, Dunnington takes seriously and brings together theology, philosophy, and psychology in a fruitful and stimulating dialogue that is approachable and rewarding to readers of all levels. He offers a concise and insightful overview of historical developments and proceeds to give a constructive account of humility, which surely will remain standard in this field for a long time.