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Is non-evidential believing possible? John Bishop on passionally caused beliefs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 January 2014

DAN-JOHAN EKLUND
DAN-JOHAN EKLUND*
Affiliation:
Department of Systematic Theology, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland e-mail: dan-johan.eklund@helsinki.fi
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Abstract

John Bishop and Andrei Buckareff have discussed in this journal Bishop's conception of faith, which he has later included in his Believing by Faith (2007). One key question concerned the possibility of believing on inconclusive evidence. Bishop suggested that beliefs may have non-evidential, passional causes that can sustain belief even if what is believed lacks adequate evidential support. Buckareff took a critical stance towards Bishop's claim. In this article I shall expand and defend Buckareff's central claims against Bishop's answer to the criticism as well as his revised view in Believing by Faith. My aim is to show that while beliefs may at times be caused by passional factors, it is doubtful that such beliefs could be sustained in full awareness. In general, I will argue that conscious non-evidential believing is not possible.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 50 , Issue 3 , September 2014 , pp. 309 - 320
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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