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Divine omniscience, timelessness, and the power to do otherwise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2006

HUGH RICE
Affiliation:
Christ Church, Oxford, OX1 1DP
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Abstract

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There is a familiar argument based on the principle that the past is fixed that, if God foreknows what I will do, I do not have the power to act otherwise. So, there is a problem about reconciling divine omniscience with the power to do otherwise. However the problem posed by the argument does not provide a good reason for adopting the view that God is outside time. In particular, arguments for the fixity of the past, if successful, either establish His timelessness independently of the problem, or mean that the problem could not be solved by adopting the view that He is timeless.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
2006 Cambridge University Press