Background
From the sovereign states of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, to the capital cities of Europe, acts of terrorism regularly occur around the globe, no longer confined to specific regions. The COVID-19 pandemic and the global disruption of both supply chain logistics and operational activities may have flattened the terrorism curve, but this is likely a temporary phenomenon. Reference Barton1 As terrorist organizations exploit new opportunities as a result of lockdowns and anti-state sentiments, experts believe terrorism activities will likely escalate in the post-pandemic era. Reference Kruglanski, Gunaratna, Ellenberg and Speckhard2
Terrorist attacks are growing in frequency and complexity, with increasingly sophisticated attack methods. This has led to the emergence of Counter-Terrorism Medicine (CTM), a Disaster Medicine (DM) sub-specialty focused on mitigating health care vulnerabilities and enhancing preparedness, with the goal of improving the medical response to terrorist events. Reference Court, Edwards, Issa, Voskanyan and Ciottone3,Reference Tin, Hart and Ciottone4
The use of mass-casualty weapons such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents remains a concern. This study aims to provide the historical epidemiology of CBRN use in terrorism and to detail specific agents used, allowing health care responders to be better informed about the unique CBRN-related toxidromes and injury patterns they may encounter. These data will also be useful in the development of responder training programs in CTM.
Methods
Data collection was performed using a search of retrospective data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). This database is open-access, with publicly available data collection methodology that includes artificial intelligence, that identifies events from news media around the world daily, as well as human evaluation of the events by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (College Park, Maryland USA). 5 The GTD was searched using the internal database search functions for all CBRN events occurring from January 1, 1970 through December 31, 2018. Years 2019 and 2020 were not yet available at the time of the study.
Results were exported into an Excel spreadsheet (Microsoft Corp.; Redmond, Washington USA) for analysis. Attacks met inclusion criteria if they fulfilled the following three terrorism-related criteria below, as set by the GTD. Ambiguous events were excluded when there was uncertainty as to whether the incident met any of the criteria for inclusion as a GTD terrorist incident. Attacks that were attempted but not successfully carried out were included. These criteria are determined within the database, rather than by the authors:
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Criterion I: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal.
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Criterion II: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
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Criterion III: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities (ie, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law, particularly the admonition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants).
In addition to GTD listed events, the grey literature was searched to ensure no major events meeting these criteria were missed. The database does not include acts of state terrorism.
Results
The use of CBRN accounted for less than 0.3% of all terrorist attacks. There were 390 total CBRN events (Figure 1), causing 930 total fatal injuries (FI; Figure 2) and 14,167 total non-fatal injuries (NFI; Figure 3). A total of 347 chemical attacks (88.9% of total) caused 921 FI (99.0%) and 13,361 NFI (94.3%). Thirty-one biological attacks (8.0%) caused nine FI (1.0%) and 806 NFI (5.7%). Twelve radiation attacks (3.1%) caused zero FI and zero NFI. There were no nuclear attacks.
![](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20210720120027816-0526:S1049023X21000625:S1049023X21000625_fig1.png?pub-status=live)
Figure 1. CBRN Events Breakdown by Modality.
Abbreviations: CBRN, chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear; E, events.
![](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20210720120027816-0526:S1049023X21000625:S1049023X21000625_fig2.png?pub-status=live)
Figure 2. CBRN Events Breakdown by Fatal Injuries.
Abbreviations: CBRN, chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear; FI, fatal injuries.
![](https://static.cambridge.org/binary/version/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20210720120027816-0526:S1049023X21000625:S1049023X21000625_fig3.png?pub-status=live)
Figure 3. CBRN Events Breakdown by Non-Fatal Injuries.
Abbreviations: CBRN, chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear; NFI, non-fatal injuries.
The Taliban was implicated in 40 of the 347 chemical events, utilizing a mixture of agents including unconfirmed chemical gases (grey literature suggests, but is unable to reliably confirm, white phosphorous), contaminating water sources with pesticides, and the use of corrosive acid. 6
The Tokyo Sarin Gas attack (Japan; 1995) contributed to 5,500 NFI and remains one of the most discussed terrorism-related chemical attacks in the world. 7 The use of VX, phosgene, Sarin, and hydrogen cyanide by the Arum Shinrikyo cult in separate events is also documented in the grey literature, though the perpetrators never formally claimed responsibility. Reference Danzig, Sageman and Leighton8
Biological attacks accounted for 8.0% of CBRN attacks. Anthrax was used or suspected in 20 of the 31 events, followed by salmonella (5), ricin (3), fecal matter (1), botulinum toxin (1), and HIV-tainted razor blades (1).
Radiation attacks accounted for 3.1% of CBRN attacks. Monazite was used in 10 of the 12 events, followed by iodine 131 (1) and undetermined irradiated plates (1).
Discussion
Terrorism-related CBRN events are uncommon, but it is important for first responders as well as DM specialists and Tactical Emergency Medical Support (TEMS) teams to have a sound knowledge of historical precedence, including their toxidromes and medical management. While acts of state terrorism are not included in the GTD, CTM should take into account all potential mass-casualty causing modalities such as the use of Novichok in the Salisbury (United Kingdom) attack (2018). Reference Clarke and Weir9 The use of aerosolized carfentanyl during the Moscow theatre siege (Russia) by Spetsnaz agents in 2002 also provides immense educational value to CTM experts. Reference Riches, Read, Black, Cooper and Timperley10
Using TEMS teams to supplement other emergency response agencies during an incident can be advantageous in CBRN scenarios as well as in more traditional terrorist events involving explosives, firearms, or vehicle attacks. Medical providers in TEMS teams are often experienced in prehospital work and trained to provide time-sensitive care even in an unsafe environment. Their training includes an understanding of the tactical aspects of high-threat incidents and their implications on health care systems can facilitate treatment, triage, and clinical decision making. 11–Reference Hartle13
There is currently no national standard curriculum for tactical medical providers in the United Stated (US). However, CBRN knowledge is part of the competencies being taught during the most prevalent tactical medicine courses, including the Counter Narcotics and Terrorism Operational Medical Support (CONTOMS) course, and has been a part of earlier consensus work regarding TEMS training programs. Reference Heiskell, Auerback, Cushing and Harris14–16 The Tactical Paramedic Certification (TP-C), which is a prerequisite for medical work in many TEMS teams in the US and abroad, also requires basic knowledge of CBRN topics. 17
The early toxidrome recognition of CBRN attacks and subsequent prehospital medical management necessitates clinicians with strong situational awareness in high-threat environments, specialized training in appropriate personal protective equipment, and clinical knowledge in the use of agent-dependent antidotes. The experience from the 1995 Sarin attacks in the Tokyo subway suggested on-the-ground clinical leadership is best provided by specialized prehospital physicians. Reference Byers18 Furthermore, DM/CTM specialists have recently devised and published toxidrome recognition algorithms in chemical weapons attacks to facilitate the timely recognition and treatment in case of such events. Reference Ciottone19
There is currently no consensus globally on the best medical team composition to high-threat responses and the balance likely lies in a hybrid between traditional TEMS, tactical physicians, and DM/CTM specialists. The importance of having a senior physician available during a more conventional terrorist attack has been demonstrated in the Utöya shooting event in Norway in 2011 and the London Bridge terrorist attack in the United Kingdom in 2017. Reference Lockey20,Reference Hunt21 The use of tactical physicians with CBRN knowledge has been implemented in many countries in the past decades, including the US, Finland, Denmark, and France. Reference Hallikainen and Lund22–24
Rapid medical assessment and treatment of victims in an active “hot zone” remains a challenge in time-sensitive scenarios. Solutions to this “therapeutic vacuum” have been discussed, but there has been less success solving for the added complexity of a CBRN incident. Reference Park, Langlois and Smith25 The historic reliance on TEMS, specialized civilian hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams, or the military in a terrorist CBRN incident should be reviewed, as delays in deployment into areas of threat could significantly impact the prognosis of victims and are not resources readily available in most countries. Reference Miletta26 A similar approach has been adopted to the response to active shooter events, with tactics favoring a more rapid breach to provide emergency medical care. Reference Martaindale and Blair27
The United Kingdom implemented a modified response to CBRN and HAZMAT incidents that combines an initial operational response with a revision of the existing specialist operational response for ambulant casualties. Reference Chilcott, Larner and Matar28 Structured multi-agency guidelines to ensure rapid and effective responses have also recently been published. Reference Calamai, Derkenne and Jost29
There are on-going discussions to integrate CRBN protocols into standardized tactical medical care within the military and within Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) working groups. These include suggestions such as expanding the well-established MARCHE mnemonic to include CBRN threats. Reference DeFeo and Givens30
Health care responses to terrorism events have historically been confined to attending to those injured, maimed, or deceased, but the emergence of CTM as a sub-specialist group aims to analyze the health care risks of terrorist activities, rethink health care vulnerabilities, and attempt to mitigate the health effects of novel attack methodologies.
Counter-Terrorism Medicine is a developing DM sub-specialty focusing on all health care aspects of the disaster cycle (prevention, preparation, mitigation, response, and recovery). The health care complexities within CTM necessitate round table discussions with DM, counter-terrorism, tactical medicine, and law enforcement specialists and emergency response services to ensure streamlined, coordinated strategies in dealing with future terrorism events. Reference Kruglanski, Gunaratna, Ellenberg and Speckhard2,Reference Tin, Hart and Ciottone4,Reference Tin, Hart and Ciottone31
Limitations
The GTD is a comprehensive record of global events. It is maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, and is the basis for other terrorism-related measures, such as the Global Terrorism Index. Reliance wholly on the GTD is partially mitigated by confirmation with other lay sources, and searches for other online searches, but if there are incidents not reported in the GTD, this could limit the veracity of the findings. Furthermore, injuries and fatalities were cross-matched with news records rather than formal hospital or coroner reports, so rely on the completeness and accuracy of these sources.
Conclusion
Since the 1970s, CBRN-related terrorism has been a low-frequency event, accounting for less than 0.3% of all terrorist attacks. The majority of these were chemical attacks. However, the massive impact of these events, with high rates of deaths and NFI, make CBRN an important focus of CTM.
Managing time-sensitive casualties in a high-risk environment is challenging. Adding the possibility of CBRN contamination increases the complexity substantially. While CBRN events are low-frequency, high-impact attack modalities, they remain a concern given the rising rate of terrorist events and their potential as mass-casualty weapons. First responders and health care workers should be aware of historic use of CBRN weapons regionally and globally, and should train and prepare to respond appropriately.
Conflicts of interest/funding
none