With Toward a Theory of Human Rights Michael J. Perry continues his investigation into the moral (and more generally religious) source or ground of the theory of human rights. The “morality of human rights” he locates in the concepts of “inherent human dignity” and “inviolability” as they are articulated in the International Bill of Rights. Perry then applies these concepts to capital punishment, abortion, and same-sex unions — to the condemned, the unborn, and same-sex couples — as a guide to a human rights-based understanding of appropriate lawmaking on these issues and of the particular role of courts.

Perry's The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford, 1998) argued that the human being is, in and of itself, “sacred,” and therefore asked readers to consider whether the very idea of human rights is not “ineliminably religious.” Surely, some readers will consider the very question to be ineliminably unimportant, but Perry does the rights-concerned community in every discipline a continued service with this next level of inquiry. While some theorists downplay or disregard the question of the moral (to say nothing of religious) content within rights theory and discourse, it remains a particularly critical issue. The role of religion and of morality generally, in the politics of human rights will likely continue to increase. Perry's voice is particularly relevant for those of us in secular, liberal democratic societies who wish to strengthen cross-religious/cross-moral understanding of, and commitment to, rights advocacy and protection.

Critiquing the secular rights theories of Ronald Dworkin and Martha Nussbaum, Perry asserts that they “assume[e] a consensus among human agents,” that they universalize the opinions of the “we” who believe that, in Nussbaum's words, “the good of other human beings is an end worth pursuing in its own right” (22). Perry points out that not all humans believe this, with the Nazis as a particularly glaring example. Yet Perry engages in the same kind of universalizing. He bases his theory of the morality of human rights on inherent human dignity and inviolability, then refers repeatedly to “we who believe” his theory, assuming that we who do believe thus are in agreement about its terms. In fact, many who agree wholeheartedly with his theory will have very different criteria for inherent dignity and inviolability, criteria that will appear to other supporters of the theory as blatant human rights violations. For instance, some will be of the opinion that a woman's inherent dignity is preserved by ensuring that she undergoes some form of genital cutting. Not to do so is to violate her spiritual and moral integrity, to cause her to be unacceptable to society, and to damage her own sense of dignity and self-worth. It is, some may say, to deny her human rights (and the woman — the subject — may agree). Others may well say, of course, that to require a person to undergo such procedures is to violate her dignity and core human rights. Both perspectives are consistent with a religious ground for the morality of human rights that Perry puts into the words of a character he creates called Sarah: “every human being is a beloved child of God and a sister/brother to me” (9). A second example is the belief that the preservation of one's inherent dignity and inviolability are contingent upon enforcing differing levels of rights enjoyment based upon one's caste. Discrimination, physical harm, or lack of sufficient food or shelter endured by Dalits may, for instance, be said to be a divinely mandated way of preserving the dignity of all persons based on their inborn qualities and station. What appears to outsiders to be violations of persons' inherent dignity is actually the karmic consequence of previous inappropriate behavior, even in a past life. These opinions may also be defended with the theory that the inherent dignity and inviolability of the human being are the source of the morality of human rights. The morality of human rights may indeed have become “the dominant morality of our time” (4), as Perry states. It is indeed global, but the actual content of that morality — even, or especially, if it is based on the human being's inherent dignity and inviolability — lacks consensus.

Perry's application of the principles of inherent dignity and inviolability to the questions of capital punishment, abortion, and same-sex unions is very helpful, especially in the comprehensiveness of his presentation of varying perspectives on his rights theory. There is one exception, however, and that is the absence of consideration of the inherent dignity and inviolability of pregnant women. The one reference to their experience is a quotation from the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade concerning the “distress” that continuing a pregnancy may cause. Perry's focus is solely on the dignity and inviolability of the “human life” that is the (pre-viable) zygote/fetus. Some pregnant women (and others) may be among the “we” who believe that the source of the morality of human rights is indeed inherent human dignity, and that their own is violated by being forced to continue pregnancies against their will. These opinions may well be held on genuinely religious grounds.

This review began with an affirmation of Perry's ongoing support for the place of morality and religion in theories of human rights. His various publications offer a strong critique of secular proposals; he casts doubt on their basic theoretical viability. This reader wonders if that critique is not too strong, both theoretically and practically. Consensus on the source or morality of human rights is not attainable; therefore greatly varying rights theories will need proactively to be supported if the securing of human rights for all is to have a chance.