I am grateful for such a thoughtful review of Religion and Authoritarianism and for the opportunity to expand on some of the important points raised by Professor Driessen. One of the challenges of comparative research in countries as large and diverse as China and Russia is to ensure that the subtle nuances are not glossed over. This response provides me with an opportunity to highlight some of these nuances.

One of the points touched on by Professor Driessen is the presence of patriotism among religious communities in China. Indeed, patriotism or patriotic sentiments were observed across many faiths of both registered (official) and unregistered (unofficial) religious groups. However, I would add that patriotism does not necessarily mean love of the Chinese government nor love for the communist party. Religious leaders were quite careful in expressing their love for China as a country and rarely extended these same sentiments to those who rule it.

Another area of clarification has to do with the patterns of religion-regime cooperation and the winners and losers of such exchanges. Driessen correctly points out that material resource tend to dominate the interaction between religious and state actors across both countries. At the same time, I argue that non-material resources, such as cultural capital and the historical traditions of some religions, equally shape and sharpen patterns of interaction. Some religious groups' insider status dramatically lowers the risks of cooperation on the part of the local government, whereas the outsider status of other faiths functions as a handicap. In this sense, religion-regime interaction is a complex interplay of not only material resources, but also cultural, ideational, and transnational linkages.

One final interesting point raised in the review, and one that is not addressed in Religion and Authoritarianism, is the possibility of a return of national religions in China and Russia and the ideational role of religion in (re)constructing national identity. Here, I would largely agree with Driessen's observation that there has been a return of national religion in Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Orthodox Church stepped into the role of national defender and definer, often with the assistance of the Kremlin. Although Orthodox Christianity is not formally a state religion, it informally plays that role — that is, to be Russian in the post-Soviet context is also to be Orthodox. Where I differ with Professor Driessen is in suggesting that this same process is taking place in China. Beijing remains deeply committed to secularism and atheism and it is not reaching out to any religion to define national identity or Chinese-ness. Perhaps the closest parallel would be the increased role of Confucianism in the public square, but that is beyond the scope of the book. I would further add that religious groups in China tend to be tolerated so long as they do not interfere with the interests of the regime, but even those with the closest ties to those in power have far less independence, autonomy, and influence than the Russian Orthodox Church. The simple explanation for this difference is that communism did not collapse in China, therefore, making the nation-building project and the potential role for religion all the less politically pressing.