CONFLICTS OF BASIC VALUES – MORAL ISSUES

Within recent years the clash of fundamental values regarding moral issues has fuelled heated public debates and scholarly research (Kirchner et al. Reference Kirchner, Freitag and Rapp2011; Knill Reference Knill2013; Mooney Reference Mooney and Mooney2001; Mooney and Schuldt Reference Mooney and Schuldt2008; Studlar Reference Studlar and Mooney2001; Studlar et al. Reference Studlar, Cagossi and Duval2013). This clash of values revolves mainly around questions of first principles such as matters of life and death or deviant behavior. An issue is declared as moral as soon as one group feels its core values or belief system threatened by an issue. Moral issues are therefore primarily defined by their framing rather than by their mere content (Engeli and Varone Reference Engeli and Varone2011, 241; Mooney Reference Mooney and Mooney2001, 3; Mooney and Schuldt Reference Mooney and Schuldt2008, 201; Meier Reference Meier and Meier1994, 4). Mooney (Reference Mooney and Mooney2001, 4) further specifies that “a policy is classified as a morality policy based on the perceptions of the actors involved and the terms of debate among them.” Against this background any issue may become morally charged as soon as it affects a group's core principles. Following the literature (especially Knill Reference Knill2013; Mooney Reference Mooney and Mooney2001; Mooney and Schuldt Reference Mooney and Schuldt2008; Studlar Reference Studlar and Mooney2001; Studlar et al. Reference Studlar, Cagossi and Duval2013), the most common morally charged issues are abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, and questions on drug abuse.Footnote ¹

Moral issues are further connected to three basic attributes: First, they are technically simple due to their straightforward conception of right and wrong (Mooney and Schuldt Reference Mooney and Schuldt2008, 201). Moral issues only allow two positions, being in favor or against it, whereas issues on taxation or economic matters allow positions between these two opposing poles. Additionally, moral issues are often framed in simple pictographic ways: there is the “sexual sinner” or the “irresponsible drinker” (see e.g., Engeli and Varone Reference Engeli and Varone2011, 241). Even rather technical issues such as stem cell research are easily understandable since they may be reduced to the question of life and death. Second, it is difficult to reach compromises on moral issues, as they concern issues of the heart and are constituted of two opposing positions. They comprise a zero sum game: a new regulation, the liberalization of abortion for example, allows a new set of values win; the old values are consequently defeated. Since they are based on the dichotomy of right and wrong, moral issues are thus not divisible (Engeli and Varone Reference Engeli and Varone2011; Mooney Reference Mooney and Mooney2001). Third, due to their simplicity, moral issues are highly salient in public debates. Every citizen can easily build his or her opinion on these issues since there are only two possible positions. Along these lines, Grummel (Reference Grummel2008) found that voter turnout is higher when moral issues are on the ballot. In this line, the turnout for the votes in our sample tends to be higher than in non-moral ballot votes. Moral issues are matters of the heart, which, by definition, are salient to the public and are decided on according to gut feelings.

The three above-mentioned features suggest increased difficulties in implementing decisions on moral issues, due especially to their high public salience and their indivisibility. Compared to non-morally charged policies, decisions on liberalizing or restricting moral policies are often more aligned to the prevailing public opinion (Camobreco and Barnello Reference Camobreco and Barnello2008; Mooney and Lee Reference Mooney and Lee2000; Mooney and Schuldt Reference Mooney and Schuldt2008). Consequently, moral issues frequently find their way onto the ballot, thereby leaving the decision process to the public (Biggers Reference Biggers2011). Politicians can easily withdraw from these highly conflictual issues and avoid playing a zero sum game with their voters (Tolbert et al. Reference Tolbert and Smith2005). Despite this top-down decision-making process, groups that feel their core beliefs to be affected use popular initiatives, so-called bottom-up instruments, as a channel to enforce regulations on moral issues. According to Studlar (Reference Studlar and Mooney2001, 40), “moral issues are one of the major categories of issues subjected to initiatives and referenda where they are available.”

For the case of Switzerland, the prototype of direct democracy, this means that the most important decisions on moral policies take place via public referenda and initiatives. Similar to the United States, Switzerland also offers direct democratic instruments at the subnational level, although most of the decisions on moral issues are made on the national level. And unlike in the United States, most of the issues may only be regulated on the national level in Switzerland (e.g., abortion or same-sex marriage). Regarding moral issues, we were able to identify 13 national moral initiatives and referenda that occurred between 1992 and the present in Switzerland (see Table 1 for more details).

Table 1. Swiss Votes concerning moral issues (1992 – present)

*Note: information was retrieved from http://forsdata.unil.ch/projects/Voxit/docu_xl_htmD/ListeVoxDispoD.htm?lang=d&menu=4; The numbers refer to the numbering of the Voxit homepage; for the empirical analysis the votes were recoded so that a value of one always indicates a liberal voting decision.

As we and existing research in this field claim that moral issues are generally salient to the public, Figure 1 depicts the public and personal saliency of the respective moral ballot vote (on a scale ranging from 1 to 10). Overall we can see that the public salience on these issues is slightly higher in each of the 13 referenda for which data is available than the personal salience of the issue. Additionally, we took the turnout rates for these issues into account. The turnout gives a hint about the general saliency as more salient issues will draw more people to the ballot box (see e.g., Grummel Reference Grummel2008; Smith Reference Smith2001; Tolbert et al. Reference Tolbert, Grummel and Smith2001). In general, the long-term average turnout rate for Swiss ballot votes is 45 percent (see Vox Analysis). Our selected moral issue votes, however, exhibit an average turnout of 50 percent for the 13 votes. These comparatively higher turnouts as well as the descriptive statistics in Figure 1 underscore the increased public saliency of morality issues at the ballot box in Switzerland.

Figure 1. Public and personal issue salience of morality issue. Note: The results are based on the following survey question: (1) How salient is this ballot issue for you personally?? (2) How salient do you think is this issue for the general public? These questions weren't asked for the first two ballot votes. The numbers on the x-axis identify the different ballot issues as depicted in Table 1.

RELIGION AND MORAL VOTES

Since moral policies are based on first principles researchers often rely on cultural factors to explain moral policy outcomes (see e.g., Castles Reference Castles1994; Fink Reference Fink2008; Minkenberg Reference Minkenberg2002; Pickel Reference Pickel, Pickel and Krüggeler2001). Decisions on moral issues are made in political conflicts over indivisible values, which, in turn, are often firmly rooted in religious conceptions of right and wrong (Biggers Reference Biggers2011, 4). Since religion is a key determinant of “competing notions of how we should and should not live — the moral order” (Leege et al. Reference Leege, Wald, Krueger and Mueller2002, 13), it is not surprising that it is considered one of the most important factors in explaining moral policy outcomes (Fairbanks Reference Fairbanks1977; Fink Reference Fink2008; Hutcheson and Taylor Reference Hutcheson and Taylor1973; Minkenberg Reference Minkenberg2002; Morgan and Meier Reference Morgan and Meier1980). Fink (Reference Fink2008), for instance, shows that although economic interest plays a decisive role in stem cell research, variations in embryo research laws across Europe can only be explained if religious factors are taken into consideration. A predominant Catholic church and a larger proportion of Catholics within a country lead to more restrictive laws. Minkenberg (Reference Minkenberg2002) arrives at similar conclusions concerning abortion regulations: A strong Catholic church leads to more restrictive abortion regulations, whereas Protestants seem to be in general more liberal concerning abortion issues. The study by Morgan and Meier (Reference Morgan and Meier1980) concentrates on the religious effects on referenda voting in Oklahoma and concludes that religious factors on the county-level are just as important as economic factors in explaining moral policy outcomes in referenda voting. This is in line with findings by Fairbanks (Reference Fairbanks1977) on state liquor and gambling laws in the United States: Religious forces offer better explanations of the variance across states than economic interests.

Drawing on these insights and with regard to direct democratic decision-making, religion should factor heavily into individuals' vote decisions (liberalizing or restrictive) on moral issues. On a general level an affiliation or self-identification with a particular religious tradition should impact on political behavior because it provides a social context in which individuals can connect their faith to political choices (Green Reference Green2010, 24). First, an individual's core values are rooted in a respective religious tradition and these core values are an important source for voting decisions. Second, religious leaders or members of the clergy provide internal cues by emphasizing the importance of these core values and by taking positions on political issues (Djupe and Gilbert Reference Djupe and Gilbert2008). However, these social processes are not limited to the local parish. Individual positions may also be influenced by the prevailing religious norms within the wider community (Kotler-Berkowitz Reference Kotler-Berkowitz2001; Lenksi Reference Lenski1961; Traunmüller Reference Traunmüller2011). And third, political parties, interest groups, and candidates seek support from religious communities by providing them with actionable information. As a result, individual voting behavior may be strongly influenced by general party alignments and the positions political parties take on moral issues. Actual religious participation reinforces all of these three mechanisms, since the most active members will be likely to most strongly adhere to the core values of their religious community and will also be more likely to be exposed to internal cues or external appeals (Djupe and Gilbert Reference Djupe and Gilbert2008; Green Reference Green2010; Norris and Inglehart Reference Norris and Inglehart2004; Verba et al. Reference Verba, Schlozman and Brady1995).

Regarding the traditional confessional cleavage in Switzerland — and therefore the belonging dimension of religionFootnote ² — we hypothesize that Protestants and Catholics will differ in their voting behavior on moral issues. An influential line of thought stresses the lasting role religious traditions play in forming the cultural and social life in a given nation or region (Fox Reference Fox2013; Inglehart and Baker Reference Inglehart and Baker2000; Norris and Inglehart Reference Norris and Inglehart2004; Toft et al. 2013; Weber [Reference Weber1920] 1988). According to this perspective, distinctive worldviews that were historically linked with or that once originated from religious traditions have left deep imprints on contemporary moral beliefs and values. Today, these values are part of the general culture and are shared by most of the citizens in a given context — regardless of whether they actually identify with the religious tradition. For example, the Protestant ethic of hard work and an ascetic life became imprinted in peoples' minds following Calvin's sermon in Geneva, and still has a psychological impact on Protestants, even on those who do not believe in predestination (Geissbühler Reference Geissbühler1999, 227). Accordingly, we not only expect that citizens differ in their voting decisions on moral issues depending on their individual religious belonging, i.e., whether they are Protestant or Catholic (Hypothesis 1), but also depending on the dominant religious tradition in the regional context within which they are situated (Hypothesis 2).Footnote ³

One fundamental difference between Protestant and Catholic worldviews with far reaching consequences for moral values concerns the role of the individual in its relation to God and the wider community: Whereas Protestants emphasize the individual's relationship with God, Catholics believe that the individual is related to God through the community (Greeley Reference Greeley1989, 485). The opposing positions of the generally more conservative Catholics who support traditional moral issues and the more liberal and flexible attitudes of Protestants are thus deeply rooted in the traditions' respective communalism and individualism (Norris and Inglehart Reference Norris and Inglehart2004; Scheepers and van der Slik Reference Scheepers and van der Slik1998; Scott Reference Scott1998). This also suggests that the moral positions of the two religious traditions will depend on the specific content of the respective issue: “Protestants will be especially likely to deplore vices which diminish personal integrity, honesty, and sense of duty. Catholics will be especially likely to be offended by actions which seem to violate relationship networks — adultery, prostitution, suicide” (Greely 1989, 487). As a result, we expect that Catholics will in general vote more restrictively on issues such as stem cell research as well as on abortion or homosexuality, but will be more liberal on issues concerning alcohol and drug use or gambling as compared to Protestants who may be inclined toward a rather ascetic and pious lifestyle (Greely 1989; Richard et al. Reference Richard, Bell and Carlson2000) (Hypothesis 3).

Although religious belonging has long been the primary mode connecting religion and political behavior, scholars in both the United States and Europe argue that differences within religious traditions are becoming more politically relevant than differences among religious traditions (Geissbühler Reference Geissbühler1999; Green Reference Green2010; Voll Reference Voll1991; Wolf Reference Wolf1996). In other words, the old confessional gap of the Protestant/Catholic divide is increasingly replaced by a new religious gap dividing the religious from the secular. Religious behaving is more or less independent of an individual's denomination and reflects true religiosity as well as the actual incorporation of religious beliefs and values (Nicolet and Tresch Reference Nicolet and Tresch2009). It is therefore important to compare individuals who are highly religious to those who are less or not religious. Moreover, the effect from religious belonging on the voting decision may be affected by the actual religious behavior. For instance, a negative effect from Catholic religious belonging should be even stronger for individuals that regularly attend religious service. Concerning the religious behaving dimension we thus hypothesize that, first, religious behavers will vote more restrictively on moral issues (Hypothesis 4). And second, that the effect of religious belonging on the voting decision concerning moral issues will be stronger for individuals that regularly attend religious service (Hypothesis 5).

The juxtaposition of the old confessional and the new religious cleavage already suggests a changing role of individual religiosity on voting behavior over time, but the exact nature of this dynamic is far from clear. There are heated debates concerning the changing role of religion in the public and political sphere. The popular view of secularization predicts that the effect of religious belonging as well as religious behaving will decline over time as the moral authority of the churches weakens and people become more individualized in their preferences and values. Moreover, rapid social changes, urbanization, enhanced political mass participation, and economic prosperity undermine the importance of religion for individuals and modern states (Bruce Reference Bruce2002; Reference Bruce and Haynes2009; Fox Reference Fox2013; Norris and Inglehart Reference Norris and Inglehart2004). Despite this emphasis on the social irrelevance of religion in secularized democracies, the opposite may be just as plausible. In fact, proponents of post-materialism, such as Ronald Inglehart (Reference Inglehart1977), argue that the shift from materialist politics to more value-based politics actually increases the salience of religiosity for political orientations as well as behaviors and thus renders religion more important. Accordingly, Geser (Reference Geser1997, 3) asserts that “while these developments certainly help to bring attitudinal divergences between religious and non-religious population segments into sharper relief (e.g., in the abortion issue), they may also favor the survival (or even the strengthening) of inter-confessional divergences.” In this line, Toft et al. (Reference Toft, Philpott and Shah2011) as well as Fox (Reference Fox2013) argue that the religious divide still persists but has changed from the animosities between different religious groupings to greater conflicts between religious and secular segments of the population. Summarizing these two arguments we cannot formulate a clear-cut hypothesis as the effect of religious belonging and behaving on decisions concerning moral issues could both decrease or increase over time (Hypothesis 6).

As already mentioned party politics may further play a crucial role in defining the relationship between individual religiosity and voting decisions on moral issues, since parties seek to mobilize the support of their constituencies, and further provide information as well as political recommendations. In Switzerland, the Christ-Democratic Popular Party (CVP) — which originated from the classical confessional cleavage in Switzerland — may have a strong influence on how Catholics and religious individuals in general vote on moral issues. In this line, we predict that a liberal party parole from the CVP should influence religious belongers and behavers to cast a more liberal vote on moral issues (Hypothesis 7).

DATA AND METHODS

To test our seven hypotheses we draw on the Vox Analysis, which comprise standardized surveys of 1,000 respondents conducted for each issue of every national public vote in Switzerland since 1977. These Vox surveys were established to receive better insights into individual voting behavior in Swiss initiatives and referenda. Accordingly, they not only ask vote-specific questions (e.g., participation, decision), but also collect information on general socio-economic variables such as sex, age, education, or religious affiliation. Overall we identified 15 moral issue votes for the period between 1992 and 2012, but unfortunately, since one of our main explanatory variables — church attendance — is missing for two referenda, we had to limit our sample to 13 referenda and initiatives. Among them are three concerning questions of genetic engineering, seven concerning issues of drug abuse or gambling (addictive behavior), and three on abortion and homosexuality (sexuality). Individual decisions in these moral referenda are our dependent variable and are coded 1 for a liberal decision and 0 for a restrictive decision on the respective moral issue.Footnote ⁴ Out of the 13 moral issues on the Swiss national ballot between 1992 and 2012, 11 resulted in a liberal decision.

Our main explanatory variables are an individual's religious affiliation (belonging) and church attendance (behaving), both of which capture the institutional dimension of religion as well as the old and new religious cleavage in Switzerland (Nicolet and Tresch Reference Nicolet and Tresch2009). As we are mainly interested in the difference in voting behavior of Catholics and Protestants, we restrict our sample to these two-denominational categories. Forty-three percent of the respondents in our sample identify as Protestant and 42 percent as Catholic. All other confessions as well as the non-religious are not considered in the following analysis. The religious denomination dummy is coded 0 for Protestants and 1 for Catholics. Overall Protestants and Catholics are equally distributed in each of the 13 surveys.

Religious behaving is measured as a respondents' church attendance which ranges from 1 (never) to 5 (once a week) and is treated as continuous. Figure 2 depicts the percentages of weekly (upper graph) and no church attendance (lower graph) for Catholics and Protestants in the 13 moral issue votes in Switzerland. From the upper graph we can conclude that Catholics are more frequent church goers than Protestants, whereas they hardly differ in the category for no church attendance (see lower graph). In sum, there are some minor fluctuations throughout the 13 popular votes, but in general both percentages of weekly and no church attendance are rather stable over the years.

Figure 2. Minimum and maximum church attendance by denomination and moral issue vote. Note: The numbers on the x-axis identify the different ballot issues as depicted in Table 1.

We further consider the percentage of Catholics on the cantonal level as well as the regional mean of church attendance to test the effects of contextual religiosity. Information for the former is taken from official Swiss census data (Eidgenoessische Volkszaehlung 2000); information on cantonal religious behaving was aggregated from the individual level survey data. Following our argumentation from Hypothesis 7 we further include the vote recommendation from the Christ-Democratic Popular Party (0 = restrictive, 1 = liberal) on the referendum level in order to capture a potential political party influence.

Finally, we take into account additional control variables that are said to influence individual political behavior in popular votes. These are age, gender, educational level, and political ideology on the individual level. The prediction is that older, less educated, and ideologically right individuals will generally hold more conservative attitudes leading to a less liberal voting decision (see for example, Milic Reference Milic2008). Concerning gender we assume that females will generally be more restrictive in their voting pattern, although they are said to be more liberal on issues concerning homosexuality (Olson et al. Reference Olson, Cadge and Harrison2006). As a Swiss specific variable we add a measure for the linguistic region to the models and further control for urbanization as this factor is often said to lead to more liberal values (Inglehart and Baker Reference Inglehart and Baker2000). All variables except for the dummies are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by two standard deviations (Gelman and Hill Reference Gelman and Hill2007).

To test the hypotheses on religion's role in individual voting behavior, we estimate a series of Cross-classified Logistic Multilevel Models where N = 5147 individual respondents are cross-classified according to two grouping levels: J = 13 referenda and K = 26 cantons (Gelman and Hill Reference Gelman and Hill2007). The estimation procedure is based on Maximum Penalized Likelihood, which is equivalent to Bayesian estimation with priori-distribution of the unknown variance component (Chung et al. Reference Chung, Rabe-Hesketh, Dorie, Gelman and Liand2012). We use the blme-package in R for the estimation (Dorie Reference Dorie2011).