THE OFFICIAL DISCOURSE OF DIALOGUE

A range of sources provide us with a tentative but surprisingly consistent picture of the official positions of the key stakeholders to emerge around the provision for structured dialogue between the EU and confessional and non-confessional bodies. What is common to them, aside from the themes that they address and embody, is that they share the characteristics of an “official” discourse (Burton and Carlen Reference Burton and Carlen1979; Hayward Reference Hayward2009). Official discourse, aside from seeking to persuade publics of the “truth” of a given statement, is ultimately an attempt to reflectively reinforce the beliefs and theoretical horizons of the political/bureaucratic elites themselves. “Official” discourse has several key characteristics. First, it embodies the official opinion of the particular institution or body that is presented to an audience, whether this is political, religious, or otherwise. Second, the speaker is viewed in terms of their relationship to a specific organization or association. Additionally, the particular speaker holds a prominent role and embodies a high position of authority within the organizational hierarchy. Third, that the utterances of the speaker are in the public domain, whether published through media articles, speeches or press releases, official documents posted on internet websites, or positions articulated on the organization's website. A discourse should show a level of consistency across both time and space.

Prominent in the official discourse of the stakeholders concerned with church-EU dialogue's the idea of sharing. There is the concept of shared — and sometimes “core” — values as a mainspring of peaceful coexistence and as a normative underpinning for the ongoing project of European construction. Minority faith representatives, majority religious associations and institutions, and political institutions reflect and reiterate this concept of shared (or core) values. As Sajid (Reference Sajid2006) puts it: “The message is very clear: we need to create a common platform on common, shared human values.” We encounter also an official declaration, in line with much international discourse throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, concerning the validation of diversity and respect for other identity forms. For example, Commission President Barroso articulated the European Commission's official position thus:

The imperative behind the need for a set of common values was articulated by the Catholic and Reformist Churches in their joint 2001 document, the Charta Oecumenica:

Among Christian advocates, the assumption that common values are an intrinsic component of any projected “unity” is tied to a much more specific confessional horizon, the spiritual heritage of Christianity. Implicit in the language of the Christian associations is the prospect of Christian churches contributing to a much wider sense of commonality, an optimistic articulation of Christianity being supportive of a broader sense of “European-ness.”

The language of “consensus” and deliberation are prominent within much of the political and confessional/non-confessional discourse. What is articulated is the desire to be open to difference, to express differences respectfully, and to come to a common agreement as a result of shared horizons of meaning. Perhaps unwittingly, the former European Parliamentary President, Hans Poettering, captured this in the language of classic Habermasian discourse ethics:

Similarly, the EHF, in its submission to the Convention outlined the imperatives of late-modern governance and the potential for civil society to contribute to the realization of a shared society and fair politics:

Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, speaking to the European Parliament during the Year of Intercultural Dialogue in 2008, outlined the demands and responsibilities that dialogue placed upon the interlocutors.

A further common thread running through official discourses produced by political and confessional bodies is the imperative of respect for diversity and the promotion of tolerance.

In addition, diversity was not only to be tolerated; it was seen as a positive good in itself and that the EU had a responsibility to ensure that this was reflected in the future Europe.

Minority religious associations also articulated these imperatives of working toward greater tolerance and mutual respect.

Churches and confessional organization also point to the new trajectory in modalities of rule, and how a space has opened up for non-state actors to participate in the ruling process. Churches are clearly conscious of the opportunity to capitalize on the shift toward increasing the role of the third sector. Not only has this space opened up for civil society actors to contribute to meeting various societal challenges, but the EU has an obligation to include those components of society that are legitimately embedded in it.

And from CEC:

There are obvious parallels with the predominant themes within contemporary political theory. There is the emphasis on organic bonds of attachment, of community; there is the corresponding mediation of inter-community distinctiveness and the collective striving toward a society of shared values and equality. These contributions from political, confessional, and non-confessional actors exhibit a similar official discourse, which finds its conditions of possibility emanating from a notable shift in the practice of rule toward the end of the 20th century.

DIALOGUE PRAXIS

In his extensive theoretical exposition of how Associational Democracy could provide a framework for the management of religious diversity, Bader outlines how existing interest group representation and lobbying are compatible with his vision (Bader Reference Bader2007, 215). However, in an accompanying footnote, Bader acknowledges that:

Conceivably, this inability to provide more concrete proposals for the involvement of religion in the political sphere stems from the embryonic nature of the theorizing. Alternatively, it emanates from the implicit recognition that the formalization of Associational Democracy of religion is easier said than done. Ultimately, choices about who participates, who doesn't, how participation is to be configured, and in relation to what issues, do eventually have to be confronted, and that means that the process of exclusion, whether unintentional or not, becomes as important as that of inclusion. The implications of this for our analysis rest on establishing the viability of a normatively impelled reconfiguration of participatory or deliberative politics, which finds itself grafted onto existing and well establish political and policy processes — lobbying (Greenwood Reference Greenwood2003; Reference Greenwood2007). Our analysis is concerned with how these discursively expressed ideals are connected to practice.

Heritier (Reference Heritier1999) has identified two key properties in EU decision-making and policy processes: its basic and invariable diversity and the default approach in decision-making, the pursuit of consensus. Yet several questions emerge at this point: who should be considered an interlocutor, and why should the interpretations that they embody be taken as an authoritative one from the perspective they claim to represent? Why, in fact, should religious identity markers supplant other identity markers? There is even less consideration of the profound difficulty in securing “political compromise” (Bellamy and Warleigh Reference Bellamy and Warleigh1998, 464) from actors who may view the process as part of a strategy to actualize preferences rather than as a search for a common, consensus-based truth. Michalowitz highlights a useful question, which is pertinent at this point: is lobbying by private/corporate interests a means of interest mediation between meso-level actors and political authority, or is it more appropriate to describe it as mutual instrumentation (Michalowitz Reference Michalowitz, Warntjen and Wonka2004)?

One important distinction between terms that are often elided over within official discourse is the important difference between participation and deliberation. Emerging from the shift toward a “governance” modality, and the inclusion of non-state and non-political actors is the normative value placed on participatory democracy (Held 2006). It is clear that participatory democracy is a prominent normative paradigm within the EU, as expressed variously and enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. Active citizenship and engagement through (voluntary) organizations is a good in itself, usually in the sense that citizens learn to appreciate participation at any level. However, participation is not the same as deliberation (Mutz Reference Mutz2006; see also Vitale Reference Vitale2006). Deliberation, in the Habermasian sense, is where opposing, antagonistic, or incompatible perspectives are exposed to one another in a public sphere, thereby subject to revision or adjustment, and a working consensus achieved. As Mutz points out, participation and deliberation are not only different — they may even be antagonistic. It was Sunstein (Reference Sunstein2002; Reference Sunstein2000) who drew attention to the risks inherent in relying on “deliberation” in what he referred to as “enclave” settings, that is, those settings where only like-minded participants are present. Group polarization occurs because, Sunstein argues:

Generally, prevailing analyses considers the formation of institutional or associational religion as an effect (or end point) of pre-existing mobilized interests. A traditional political science reading of actors as the end points of power is exemplified by Schattschneider's concept of the “mobilization of bias” (Schattschneider Reference Schattschneider1960, 28). His insight is largely concerned with the trajectory and patterns of political conflict once these biases are crystalized. However, his descriptive term is useful for our purposes, insofar as it establishes the analytically distinct entities of an association or organization as a “bias” (with a specific normative orientation and related interests) and the idea of its “mobilized” form (in the form of a self-constituted association or institution). A necessary task for our research is to uncover the imperatives and processes of bias mobilization, in our case normative perspectives on society grounded in religious beliefs, in order to understand the implications of their foundational ideologies and substantive goal-directed strategies for EU governance. Theories of deliberation have tended to view aggregate interlocutors as given entities within the power matrix of politically initiated dialogue, without considering these interlocutors as the outcome of antecedent (and ongoing) power struggles within their respective independent spheres. Such a viewpoint tends not to give sufficient weight to the normative interpretations and imperatives of biases, still less to how they differ from each other.

In surveying the literature on EU interest group representation, Woll (Reference Woll2006) identifies four branches of analysis: the corporatism-pluralism debate; collective action; European governance; and the Europeanization of interest groups. The latter two are of particular relevance here. Frequently, the inclusion of civil society interests is viewed as a mechanism by which an identified gap in democratic accountability can be bridged. As Greenwood (Reference Greenwood2003, 177) notes, any issue “packaged” as mitigating the democratic deficit already has a head start in garnering a sympathetic hearing from EU institutions. The legitimacy question is important because it provides a strategic opportunity for the religious associations under analysis to place themselves in a utilitarian role within the Unions decision-making system. Closely related is the idea of “Europeanization” of interests through their mobilization and interaction at the supranational level (Warleigh Reference Warleigh2001). The debate over the legitimacy issue is multifaceted and ongoing, but a skeptical note on its capacity to deliver legitimacy should be noted. A conceptual or logical leap has occurred in attributing the term “civil society” to what is ultimately “interests” and the utility of interests as a panacea for the Union's legitimacy woes is open to contestation (Curtin Reference Curtin2003; Sudbery Reference Sudbery2003). Lorenzo (Reference Lorenzo2003), for instance, has questioned whether the channels available for influencing policy and decision-making in Europe are equally open to all who might have a stake. It gives some salience to the point made by Hix (Reference Hix2005, 213), that the rapid proliferation of interest group activity at EU level since the mid-1990s correlates a notable decline in support for the EU.

The challenge, both in terms of research, and indeed of policy praxis, is to examine whether the attempt to short circuit the pursuit of a genuinely deliberative society and polity through already existing modalities of stakeholder engagement such as lobbying and interest representation is viable. Are we, by virtue of an official discourse that is largely congruent with prevailing trends in political theory, confusing neo-corporate strategies with real reform toward a democracy that embodies these very ideals? Have the pleasant sounding syntaxes of political and civil society actor statements seduced those concerned (academically or politically) into thinking that interest representation actually does embody the ideas of shared space, mutual respect, consensus and tolerance, and the pursuit of common goals? We need to contrast theory with praxis. Here, analysis seeks to isolate the subtle but important variation in the modes of interaction between the informal and formal manifestations of dialogue and to consider these in light of the actions of prominent religious institutions or associations within the equivalent timeframe.

Our study draws upon documentation produced after several dialogue events (in November 2001 and October 2002) under the auspices of the “Soul for Europe” initiative, which relate directly to the question of church-EU dialogue (Group of Policy Advisors 2002; 2003). Those who participated at the events arranged by the Group of Policy AdvisorsFootnote ¹ (Appendix 1) ranged across the multiplicity of faith traditions, and included religious, cultural, and academic figures from across Europe. This is an important detail in itself, from the point of view of the ideal deliberative model implied in the statements outlined above.

By contrast, since 2005 dialogue has been characterized chiefly by bilateral contacts between the Commission and a narrow selection of associations (Appendix 2). When the annual formal event is examined these have engaged only the main monotheistic traditions for most of the life of the dialogue process (Appendix 3). Notable exceptions of this convention include the 2006 event, which included the Dalai Lama, and the more recent 2010 event, which included Sikh and Hindu participants for the first time. In short, the broader participatory range that characterized the informal events (in Appendix 1) was not the modus operandi for the formalized provision since 2005 (Appendices 2, 3), the net effect of which is the fragmentation of the dialogue process and the erosion of deliberative telos. The greater bilateral emphasis afforded little opportunity for substantive deliberation over specific policy questions with each other. In addition, there have been (to date) clear asymmetries in contact frequency between various religious associations attending the annual formal meeting between the Commission and the monotheistic faiths (Appendix 5). The findings confirm Schlesinger and Foret's earlier assertion of a strong bias toward the main Christian associations, through core associations (COMECE and CEC; see Schlesinger and Foret Reference Schlesinger and Foret2006).

What is clearly inferable from the tabulated breakdown is that some religious traditions are accorded a more prominent formal role than others. Hinduism, for example, though included in the informal seminars of 2001 and 2002, is absent from any aspect of the formal process with the Commission since 2005 until 2010. But the question here is not merely about the (mal-) distribution of contact opportunities with the Commission. It is primarily about the clear absence of the recognizably inter-discursive modality that was approximated through the informal deliberative democratic ideal outlined by Bader (Reference Bader2007, 245). Although former Commission President Jacques Delors encountered considerable difficulty in the early 1990s in getting coherent religious voices to engage with the EU's institutions (Foret and Schlesinger Reference Foret, Schlesinger, Fossum and Schlesinger2007), the formalization of the dialogue provision and its incorporation into the Draft Constitution was a result of sustained, coordinated lobbying efforts by the two main Christian associations, COMECE, and CEC, throughout each of the rotational presidencies around the period of the Convention. While the main Christian denominations pursued the formalization of dialogue and the deepening of bilateral consultations, their former Humanist partners in dialogue found themselves increasingly at odds with the emerging pattern, culminating in their opposition (along with other civil society bodies) to the dialogue provision when it finally manifested itself as Article I.37/Article I.51 of the Draft Constitution.

Even before the Convention, the European Commission invited proposals from Christian associations for furthering the practical development of church-EU dialogue. In response, Christian church association recommendations included inter alia the call for an explicit coordinating body to deal with the representations of religious associations, minimal media attention (COMECE-CEC 2002; 1999) and, in its response to the White Paper on Governance, CEC suggested a “differentiated approach” to religious communities by European institutions (Conference of European Churches 2002a: section 2.12), a request that would be echoed by CEC in its contribution to the Convention (see Conference of European Churches 2002b). The joint response in 1999 by COMECE and CEC put forward recommendations that included:

• • Establishing a Joint Preparatory Group, which would consist of staff from COMECE, CEC, and the Commission tasked with the preparation and planning of the dialogue meetings and monitor follow-up implementation;

• • Establishing dialogue meetings, which would deal with major issues on the EU agenda, and exchange ideas with European civil servants involved with the theme of the meeting;

• • Working Sessions, which would facilitate more direct input from the churches in relation to specific policy questions;

• • Presidential Meetings, which were envisaged as an opportunity to discuss matters of “mutual concern and interest” about European integration (COMECE-CEC 1999).

In a follow-up joint document (COMECE-CEC 2002), both associations reiterated their preference for a pre-legislative consultation procedure that would enable churches to comment on planned legislation. In addition, dialogue seminars between both associations and the European Commission were proposed, but no mention is made of including other religious associations, still less any other relevant non-religious associations or wider civil society. The working sessions and presidential level meetings were again stressed as desirable developments. The 2002 submission also included a proposal for the establishment of a “liaison office” within the Commission to facilitate contacts between the Commission and these church associations and religious communities, as the current contact mechanism within Group of Policy Advisors was deemed inadequate given the growing plurality of issues. This liaison office was envisaged as a specific mechanism to facilitate “the consultation of Churches and religious communities on planned legislation” (COMECE-CEC 2002: section 3).

Noteworthy contributions by other churches relating to the development of church-EU interaction include the Russian Orthodox Patriarch's response to the Commission's White Paper on European Governance. The Patriarch made the point that:

Echoing these sentiments, the EKD, in its response to the White Paper, made it clear that “consultations” with advisors to the Commission President were “no substitute for participation in policy-making processes.” Furthermore,

It is noteworthy also that EU institutions clearly do not regard formal requests from dialogue partners on equal terms. In 2007, responding to an enquiry from an MEP from the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) group, the then President of the European Parliament, Hans Poettering, made the point that:

In fact, the evolving demands of COMECE with respect to the operation of dialogue began to take shape in a speech given by its President, Mgr. Adrianus van Luyn to that organizations' plenary session in November 2007. Having outlined that “dialogue” was “constructive for all Christians” and was an “expression of the Church's solidarity with the world” (Commission of the Bishops Conference of the European Community 2007); the COMECE President then posed a series of questions that appeared to indicate a certain level of dissatisfaction with the current operation of the dialogue provision.

This opportunity to pursue the expansion of the dialogue provision beyond the bilateral level was not intended to include other religions or non-confessional associations in policy discussions, however. Its full implications emerged in a later document jointly issued by COMECE and CEC in early 2010. In it, the two Christian associations made another series of proposals regarding the implementation of Article 17.3. Principal among these was a desire to expand church association contact with the EU beyond the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council to include its other EU institutions and consultative bodies (COMECE-CEC 2010, section IV.I). The statement also reaffirmed a desire to maintain an avenue to “address the EU institutions on their own behalf in relation to matters of their specific concern” (COMECE-CEC 2010, section IV.I). These requests for strengthened bilateral exchanges were implemented within months. By July 2010, a “Dialogue Seminar Event” co-organized by COMECE and CEC had been attended by a range of EU institutions including the Economic and Social Council of the EU (see Appendix 4).

By contrast, repeated requests by the EHF to be formally included as a participant in the annual dialogue event were consistently refused. In March 2010, the EHF again requested that the upcoming annual event with the Presidents of the Commission, Parliament, and Council fully reflect Europe's diversity by including both the non-religious perspective, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Hindus (European Humanist Federation 2010). In the event, the Sikh and Hindu faiths were represented. However, the EHF and other philosophical and humanist perspectives met separately, and only with the Commission in October of 2010.

The clear disjunction between the official commitment to dialogue and inclusiveness on the one hand and the manifest pursuit of differentiated and deepened exclusive (or co-exclusive) bilateral relations with a pivotal EU institution on the other hand speaks to a different set of imperatives to the ones we might expect from a stress on the ideals outlined by Rawls, Habermas, or Bader. The range of issues pursued by the various religious associations is diverse, but the process of selecting either the participants or the themes for discussion remains opaque. Previous dialogue topics include commentary on ongoing EU legislative initiatives, as well as on more strategic and long term reflections on Europe and its integration; the environment, biomedical ethics, development aid, migration and asylum, intercultural dialogue, and more recently poverty and exclusion. A further range of issues where the views of churches would be highly relevant, but which have not yet materialized in any of the dialogue seminars, was highlighted by an all-party working group of MEPs in a letter to the Presidents of the main institutions in December 2007 (European Parliament Working Group 2007). In their letter the group proposed:

There is, of course, no onus on the part of political authorities to adhere to the ideals of normative theorists. Nevertheless, two points are worth making. First, the official discourse employed by prominent actors (political and religious) involved in or associated with the dialogue provision has consistently drawn on such second order normative standards in justification of praxis. Second, it seems clear that the EU generally, and the Commission in particular, were more than willing to support (albeit symbolic) informal initiatives that did approximate the deliberative standard of greater inclusion, but have not transposed that mode of interaction to the formal structures operative since 2005. Even the more recent practice of dialogue seminars remains institutionally bilateral. The tendency to conceive “dialogue” in light of the face-value standards of deliberative understanding, power-free mutual interaction, and consensus seeking, even on specific policy matters, neither approximates nor illuminates the emerging pattern. The “dialogue” provision, therefore, needs to be considered in light of alternative questions such as interests and power.

The purpose of the foregoing analysis was not to evaluate the capacity of stabilized church-EU relations to benefit (or not) the legitimization imperatives of either the Commission or wider European institutional governance (see Greenwood Reference Greenwood2003, Chapter 6). It was instead to highlight the disjoint between official justification for structured church-EU dialogue and actual practice. Christian church associations have proved themselves adept at cultivating high-level contacts and securing many operational privileges for consulting the Union's key agenda setter and principal institutions in the decision-making mechanism relative to other civil society actors. Contrasting this success with the fortunes of other perspectives is instructive. Islamic associations have had considerable difficulty in mobilizing into a coherent voice at national level, still less at EU level. Hindu and Sikh associations have only now been formally involved in even symbolic contact with the Commission President, ironically as a result of intervention by Humanists. The Humanists only managed their first bilateral meeting with the Commission President after considerable efforts on their behalf by MEPs. It is doubtless difficult to justify the wholesale establishment of dialogue with every faith tradition or philosophical conviction. But it does highlight the need to forego ideas of deliberation in favor of an analytical perspective that accounts for power, strategy and self-interest on the part of religious associations.

It must be questioned whether deepening path-dependent relations between EU institutions and particular religious associations meet the basic requirements of equality. At the very least, alternative visions of belief within any one tradition should be admitted on the same basis. Massignon noted that: “[t]he Commission Presidency refuses to select one sole interlocutor for each religion, thereby recognising the plurality which exists within each denomination” (Massignon Reference Massignon2007b, 578; see also Massignon Reference Massignon, Al-Azmeh and Fokas2007a; Reference Massignon2008). This is not reflected empirically (Appendix 5). Over the course of the formalized provision with the Commission, the two main Christian associations (COMECE and CEC) have both retained their key place at the annual events, and while other Christian role holders were admitted (high-ranking clergy from various cities) they remained very much within mainstream institutions. Even with regard to Islamic associations there has so far been a remarkably consistent utility of particular representative bodies invited to some of the annual dialogue events.