1. Introduction
Many Supreme Court appointments have not changed the median Supreme Court justice. Recent examples are the appointments of Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Yet, observers widely view policy outcomes as changing only when the median justice changes.Footnote 1
We analyze a formal model to explore the consequences of changing the Supreme Court's composition without necessarily changing the median justice. Does the court's composition change which cases are heard? If so, how? Do policy outcomes change when non-median justices change?
Our model reflects three key features of the Supreme Court. First, granting certiorari requires approval by only four justices (colloquially known as the Rule of Four). Thus, changing the fourth-most liberal or fourth-most conservative justice shifts the pivotal voter for case selection. Second, majority opinions are created collectively. Therefore, the court's composition can also change the output of the opinion-writing process (Lax and Cameron, Reference Lax and Cameron2007; Carrubba et al., Reference Carrubba, Friedman, Martin and Vanberg2012; Cameron and Kornhauser, Reference Cameron and Kornhauser2010; Parameswaran et al., Reference Parameswaran, Cameron and Kornhauser2019). Third, dispositional votes determine who can influence the majority opinion. For any heard case, justices first decide whether to overturn or uphold the current ruling. These dispositional votes then determine which direction precedent will shift, as the bargaining coalition only includes justices supporting the majority disposition.
We build on existing models of the Supreme Court by adding a first stage where justices decide whether to grant certiorari. And for the final majority opinion, we use a reduced form approach reflecting properties of judicial bargaining models like Carrubba et al. (Reference Carrubba, Friedman, Martin and Vanberg2012) and Lax and Cameron (Reference Lax and Cameron2007).
We show two effects of changing justices who are pivotal for case selection. First, as hearing pivots become more extreme, the court is willing to hear cases with more moderate precedents. For example, the court hears a broader range of cases with relatively liberal precedents as the conservative hearing pivot becomes more extreme. We do not interpret this result as the court hearing a greater number cases because, empirically, case loads have been relatively constant for the past 20 years, at about 70–80 cases per term. Instead, we interpret it as the court being more permissive in the nature of cases it hears.
Second, more extreme hearing pivots lead to more split decisions. Intuitively, in more moderate cases, there is less consensus about which direction to move policy. Thus, dispositional votes are more divisive when those cases are granted certiorari.
We then study the effects of replacing the median justice. When the median becomes more extreme and hearing pivots remain constant, observed rulings of heard cases become more extreme as the majority opinion shifts. Yet, the range of heard cases changes less than when hearing pivots become more extreme. If, however, the old median's replacement is more extreme than a previous hearing pivot, then that previous pivot becomes the new median and the new justice becomes a hearing pivot. The court hears more moderate cases and these cases result in more extreme rulings. Next, we show how case selection depends on non-pivotal, non-median justices. Replacing an extreme justice with someone even more extreme can shrink the set of cases heard: extreme justices may pull rulings away from the binding hearing pivot, making status quo precedent more appealing. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the consequences of the death of justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg and court packing. Overall, our analysis emphasizes that case selection depends on strategic behavior by justices (Kastellec and Lax, Reference Kastellec and Lax2008; Johnson, Reference Johnson2018; Bonica et al., Reference Bonica, Chilton and Sen2020) and our departure from canonical move-the-median games (Cameron and Kastellec, Reference Cameron and Kastellec2016) provides new implications of Supreme Court composition.
To our knowledge, the only models studying the Rule of Four are Lax (Reference Lax2003) and Fang et al. (Reference Fang, Johnson and Roberts2007). In settings different from ours, Lax shows how the Rule of Four can increase lower court compliance with Supreme Court decisions, while Fang et al. focus on how the minority can use the Rule of Four to its advantage. Models of case selection typically assume the court receives a flow of possible cases (Clark and Kastellec, Reference Clark and Kastellec2013; Fox and Vanberg, Reference Fox and Vanberg2014; Beim, Reference Beim2017; Callander and Clark, Reference Callander and Clark2017; Parameswaran, Reference Parameswaran2018) and tries to rule correctly despite informational problems. We ignore informational problems and focus on ideology. Our focus allows us to isolate ideology, and we view our approach as complementing work analyzing informational considerations.Footnote 2
2. Model basics
We study a spatial policy-making game. The players are n (odd) justices. There is a case with status quo x sq in policy space ${\opf R}$. In our judicial context, policy is best thought of as a threshold. For example, what is an acceptable level of force by police? Moving policy leftward corresponds to a lower level of acceptable police force.
2.1 Timing
In the first stage, justices collectively decide whether to hear the case. To capture minority quotas such as the Rule of Four, hearings require consent from m = n − 1/2 justices. Hearings impose costs c ≥ 0 on each justice.Footnote 3
If the case is not heard, the game ends with x sq persisting.
Otherwise, there is a dispositional vote decided by majority rule. Each justice votes whether to move policy left or right from x sq.Footnote 4 We denote rightward votes d = 1 and leftward votes as d = 0. After the dispositional vote, justices in the dispositional majority determine the new policy location, which we refer to as the final ruling.Footnote 5
2.2 Preferences
Policy preferences are represented by quadratic loss utility.Footnote 6 Thus, each justice i has ideal point $\hat {x}_i \in {\opf R}$. Without loss of generality, we order justices $\hat {x}_1 < \hat {x}_2 < \cdots < \hat {x}_n$.
Along with the final ruling's location, justices care about dispositional votes.Footnote 7 One might wonder why justices ever vote against the majority; joining allows them to participate in bargaining and possibly influence the final outcome. In practice, however, dissenting may signal future behavior (Ginsburg, Reference Ginsburg2010) or increase a case's media coverage (Bryan and Ringsmuth, Reference Bryan and Ringsmuth2016). Moreover, justices may care about reputation, which could be damaged by joining dispositions they oppose.
Dispositional motivations are represented by $I\cdot 0 + ( 1 - I) \cdot l( x_{{\rm sq}}- \hat {x}_i)$; where I = 1 if justice i joins her preferred disposition and I = 0 otherwise, and l() is a concave loss function single peaked at 0. Voting against dispositional motivation is costlier for justices farther from the status quo.Footnote 8
Justice i's payoff from not hearing the case is $-( x_{{\rm sq}} - \hat {x}_i) ^2$. Because each justice i incurs costs c from a hearing, i's payoff from hearing a case resulting in final ruling $x^\ast$ is $U_i( x^\ast ) - c$, where
2.3 Final rulings
In practice, final rulings likely result from bargaining among majority justices. We do not explicitly model such bargaining. Instead, we assume final rulings satisfy four properties. Let dispositional majority M have associated final ruling $x^\ast _M$.
Properties of final rulings:
(1) If justice i is in dispositional majority M, then $0 \leq {\partial x^\ast _M}/{\partial \hat {x}_i} \leq 1$.
(2) If justice j satisfies $\hat {x}_j \geq \; x^\ast _{M_1}$ for dispositional majority M 1 and $M_2 = M_1 \cup j$, then $x^\ast _{M_2} \geq \; x^\ast _{M_1}$. Symmetrically, $\hat {x}_j \leq \; x^\ast _{M_1}$ implies $x^\ast _{M_2} \leq \; x^\ast _{M_1}$.
(3) Let $\overline {\hat {x}}_M$ denote the rightmost justice in dispositional majority M and $\underline {\hat {x}}_M$ denote the leftmost. Then $x^\ast _M \in [ \underline {\hat {x}}_M,\; \overline {\hat {x}}_M]$.
(4) Let justice i be in dispositional majorities M 1 and M 2, where M 1 ⊂ M 2. Then $( {\partial x^\ast _{M_1}/}{\partial \hat {x}_i}) \geq ( {\partial x^\ast _{M_2}}/{\partial \hat {x}_i})$.
Broadly, the properties say that all justices in the dispositional majority can (weakly) affect final rulings. By Property 1, shifting a dispositional majority justice moves final rulings weakly in that same direction. Property 1 also limits the size of that shift. Property 2 implies that adding a justice to a dispositional majority shifts the final ruling weakly toward that justice's ideal point. Property 3 assures that final rulings cannot be improved for every majority member. Property 4 states that justices have weakly more influence on the final ruling's location in smaller majorities than in larger majorities.Footnote 9
These reduced-form properties for judicial bargaining align with microfounded settings studied elsewhere, including Lax and Cameron (Reference Lax and Cameron2007), Carrubba and Clark (Reference Carrubba and Clark2012), and Parameswaran et al. (Reference Parameswaran, Cameron and Kornhauser2019). Our approach allows us to take the bargaining equilibria as given and focus on the implications for, and consequences of, case selection.
3. Analysis
3.1 Dispositional vote
We study Subgame Perfect Equilibria in weakly undominated strategies (hereafter just equilibria). In particular, we analyze equilibria featuring ‘monotonic’ dispositional majorities: either the dispositional vote is unanimous, or there is a justice i such that each justice j votes to move the threshold rightward, d j = 1, if and only if j ≥ i. In Lemma B.1 in the appendix, we show that sufficiently strong dispositional motivations ensure that such equilibria exist and henceforth we focus on that case.
In equilibrium, each justice i has a unique cutpoint, $\check {x}_i$, fully characterizing her dispositional voting strategy. If $x_{{\rm sq}} < \check {x}_i$, then i votes to shift precedent rightward (d i = 1) and, similarly, $x_{{\rm sq}} \geq \check {x}_i$ implies she votes to shift precedent leftward (d i = 0). Additionally, the cutpoints have the same order as ideal points, which implies monotonic dispositional majorities.
We can use the dispositional cutpoints to easily order final opinions for heard cases as a function of x sq. Let $x^\ast _i$ denote the final opinion of the dispositional majority if d j = 0 for all j ≤ i and d j = 1 for all j > i. For example, in a five-member court hearing a case with $x_{{\rm sq}} \in ( \check {x}_2,\; \check {x}_3)$, the final opinion $x_2^\ast$ is written by justices 3, 4, and 5. Properties 2 and 4 imply that final opinions are ordered $x^\ast _{{n + 1}/{2}} \leq x^\ast _{{n + 1}/{2} + 1} \leq \cdots x^\ast _n = x^\ast _0 \leq x^\ast _1 \leq \cdots \leq x^\ast _{{n-1}/{2}}$. Intuitively, the left-leaning bare majority writes the leftmost ruling, $x^\ast _{{n + 1}/{2}}$, and the right-leaning bare majority writes the rightmost ruling, $x^\ast _{{n-1}/{2}}$.Footnote 10
3.2 Case hearings
We first establish a necessary condition for a justice to vote to hear a case: she must be in the dispositional majority. In heard cases, the final ruling is worse than x sq for minority justices. Intuitively, they never want to bear costs of hearing cases resulting in worse outcomes.
LEMMA 1: Justices never vote to hear a case for which they will be in the dispositional minority.
For case selection with quota m = n − 1/2, it suffices to focus on two justices who are the decisive pivots, P L = n − 1/2 and P R = n + 3/2. We focus on P R, as P L is analogous. Optimally hearing a case requires the benefit from setting new precedent to exceed the cost of hearing and deciding the case. Formally, if $x_{{\rm sq}} \in ( \check {x}_i,\; \check {x}_{i + 1}]$ for i < n + 1/2, then the case is heard if and only if
We can characterize whether the court hears $x_{{\rm sq}} \leq \check {x}_{{n + 1}/{2}}$ using conditions similar to (1), and $x_{{\rm sq}}> \check {x}_{{n + 1}/{2}}$ using analogous conditions for P L.
Lemma 2 shows existence of an interval of cases around $\hat {x}_{{n + 1}/{2}}$ that are not heard. In the main text, we focus analysis on this interval to emphasize our key points. Yet, there can exist other intervals of non-heard cases. In the appendix, we fully characterize which cases are heard and show that the main analysis illustrates the primary takeaways.
LEMMA 2: The court does not hear cases with $x_{{\rm sq}} \in [ \underline {x},\; \overline {x}]$, where $\underline {x} \leq \check {x}_{{n + 1}/{2}} \leq \overline {x}$.
In $[ \underline {x},\; \overline {x}]$, the left endpoint is the most moderate status quo that the right hearing pivot votes to hear. Similarly, the right endpoint is the most moderate status quo that the left hearing pivot votes to hear. All cases between the endpoints are not heard and their final ruling is x sq. See Figure 1 for an illustration.
We are interested in how changing justices’ ideal points alters which cases are heard and final rulings. First, we show that more extreme hearing pivots are willing to hear more moderate cases.
PROPOSITION 1: As the right hearing pivot gets more extreme, x increases. Symmetrically, $\overline {x}$ decreases as the left hearing pivot gets more extreme.
If a hearing pivot becomes more extreme, two main forces produce Proposition 1. First, status quo on the opposite side of the spectrum become less favorable to the shifting pivot, which encourages granting certiorari. Second, the final ruling can move, which may help or harm the shifting pivot. If it helps her, then this second force complements the first. But if the final ruling becomes less favorable, then the second force discourages granting certiorari and counteracts the first force. Yet, Property 1 implies that the first force always dominates. Thus, the overall effect encourages hearing the case. For example, the overall effect of a more conservative hearing pivot increases x, so the court hears cases with more moderate liberal precedents.
Although Proposition 1 conveys key forces, it only applies to the central interval of non-heard cases. Proposition 2 extends the result. The key forces are similar.
PROPOSITION 2: As the right hearing pivot gets more extreme, the court hears a broader range of cases with left-leaning precedents. Symmetrically, the court hears a broader range of cases with right-leaning precedents as the left hearing pivot gets more extreme.
3.3 Change in dispositional majorities
We have shown that more extreme hearing pivots are willing to hear more moderate cases. Next, we study the effects on (i) the composition of dispositional majorities and (ii) final rulings. In general, more extreme hearing pivots make observed decisions more divisive and final rulings more extreme.
Lemma 2 implies that x is the most moderate left-leaning status quo that P R hears. Let $\hat {x}_{P_R}^\prime \geq \hat {x}_{P_R}$, with corresponding x′ ≥ x, by Proposition 1. Thus, cases x sq ∈ (x, x′) are not heard if $\hat {x}_{P_R}$ is the right hearing pivot, but are heard if she is replaced by $\hat {x}_{P_R}^\prime$. For these cases, either the dispositional majority is identical to that if x sq = x, or it has fewer justices. Thus, more extreme hearing pivots lead to smaller dispositional majorities for cases with precedent on the opposite side of the spectrum.
More extreme hearing pivots also affect dispositional majorities for cases on their own side. For example, there are cases for which $\hat {x}_{P_R}$ joins the dispositional majority but $\hat {x}_{P_R}^\prime$ joins the minority. This more extreme hearing pivot shrinks the dispositional majority from n + 1/2 + 1 to n + 1/2.
Fixing the court, smaller dispositional majorities produce more extreme final rulings. Thus, changes in dispositional majorities can affect final rulings. For example, some cases will have one fewer conservative in their dispositional majorities and, in turn, more liberal final rulings.
3.4 Changes in other justices
We now discuss how non-pivotal justices affect case selection. Even though non-pivotal justices are not decisive in case selection, their effect on final rulings can alter $[ \underline {x},\; \overline {x}]$. If final rulings shift toward a hearing pivot, then the court hears more cases with precedents opposite that pivot. Symmetrically, if final rulings shift away from a hearing pivot, then the court hears fewer cases with precedents opposite that pivot.
For example, a sufficiently extreme justice may pull final rulings farther away from a hearing pivot and expand the interval of non-heard cases. Consider a dispositional majority containing a justice $\hat {x}_j \geq \hat {x}_{P_R}$ and producing final ruling $x^\ast \geq \hat {x}_{P_R}$. If j becomes more extreme, the distance between $\hat {x}_{P_R}$ and $x^\ast$ increases by Property 1. Appointing very extreme justices therefore presents a trade-off: heard cases have more extreme final rulings, but the court may hear fewer cases with moderate precedents.Moving the court median without changing the overall ordering is roughly equivalent to shifting any other non-hearing-pivot justice. However, the interval characterized in Lemma 2 can shift through changes in dispositional majorities, as well as through changes in final rulings. And if $\underline {x} = \hat {x}_{{n + 1}/{2}}$, then increasing $\hat {x}_{{n + 1}/{2}}$ can cause such changes even if the final ruling is unchanged. See Figure 2 for an example.
If the ordering changes such that a former hearing pivot is now the median justice and a new justice is a hearing pivot, then there are multiple effects. Beyond the already noted effects of moving the hearing pivot, changing the court median switches some cases from one dispositional majority to the other. A new median justice may actually be more important than previously understood because, as far as we are aware, the combined impact on the dispositional majority and case selection has not been noted.
3.5 Conclusion
At the time of writing, the Supreme Court was attracting substantial attention following the death of justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg and subsequent nomination of Amy Coney Barrett. As Barrett was widely expected to be one of the court's most conservative justices, the median would shift from Roberts to Kavanaugh. This change is clearly important, but our analysis suggests additional significance. Confirming Barrett would not only produce a more conservative median, both hearing pivots would also be more conservative. Roberts would be the new left hearing pivot. Our analysis suggests the new court would hear a broader range of cases with liberal precedents and, with only three liberal justices, issue relatively moderate final rulings in cases with “left” majorities.
Following Barrett's nomination, some Democrats discussed “court packing,” i.e., adding seats to the Supreme Court. Adding two liberal justices would shift the median leftward. It would also shift both hearing pivots leftward, but how far depends on whether the Rule of Four is modified. If the rule changes to reflect additional seats (i.e., a Rule of Five), then the hearing pivots will revert to those before Ginsberg's death (Breyer and Kavanaugh). But maintaining the Rule of Four would produce a left hearing pivot more liberal than Breyer and a right hearing pivot more conservative than Kavanaugh. To match the pre-vacancy court most closely, any expansion must be paired with a modification to the Rule of Four.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Keith Schnakenberg, John Kastellec, APSA 2020 attendees, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at https://doi.org/10.1017/psrm.2020.47.