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Revisiting a Signaling Game of Legislative–Judiciary Interaction
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 January 2017
Abstract
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By adding an informational component to the judicial review, Rogers (2001) argued that an independent court can be created and maintained by a legislature. This influential article, however, has one important mistake in its game-theoretical model that changes the equilibrium results and ultimately undermines the theoretical contribution to the discipline. The legislature no longer enjoys informational benefits by having an independent court.
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- Copyright © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology
References
Rogers, James R.
2001. Information and judicial review: A signaling game of legislative–judicial interaction. American Journal of Political Science
45(1):84–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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