A Greenlandic ‘cold rush’ . . .

Predictions of a ‘cold rush’ in Greenland – that is, a climate change-driven boom in natural resource exploitation, which results in economic prosperity and political independence for Greenland – date at least as early as 2007. In that year, a US embassy cable reported:

From this time onwards, the prevalence of ‘cold rush’ thinking has become evident both inside and outside Greenland. Again in 2007, Minister for Finance and Foreign Affairs Aleqa Hammond (Siumut) pointed out:

In 2013, after Hammond became Prime Minister, she described Greenland's decision to lift its 25-year-old uranium mining ban as ‘a great step towards independence’ and claimed that mining revenue could replace Denmark's annual block grant to Greenland ‘easily within my lifetime’ (as cited in Milne, Reference Milne2013). Under the 2009 SGA, Copenhagen pays the Greenlandic Self-Government an annual block grant of DKK3,439.6 million (calculated at 2009 price levels) in support of its activities (see Folketing, 2009, s. 5). This amount is adjusted for Danish inflation, although inflation in Greenland tends to be higher. It is thus expected that the real value of the grant will decrease over time. Subsequently, Hammond publicly and unequivocally declared independence to be Greenland's ‘long-term political goal’ (Hammond, Reference Hammond2014).

Across party lines, other high-ranking Greenlandic politicians have echoed these sentiments. Thus, in 2009, Minister for Finance and Foreign Affairs Per Berthelsen (Demokraatit) stated:

Similarly, in 2010, Prime Minister Kuupik Kleist (Inuit Ataqatigiit) ambitiously announced that:

As an unnamed official source put it more recently,

In other words, Greenland ‘aspires to be the first Inuit state in the world’ (Ackrén, Reference Ackrén and Heininen2014, p. 57).

These statements have been backed by Danish legislation designed to facilitate the economic aspect of the ‘cold rush’. The 2009 SGA established the principle that any mineral resource revenue generated in Greenland belongs to the Greenlandic authorities. However, once Greenland earns a certain level of revenue from such activities, the SGA sets down a scale according to which Denmark's annual block grant to Greenland will be reduced (Folketing, 2009, s. 8). Via this process, if the annual block grant is reduced to zero, then negotiations on future economic relations between Copenhagen and Nuuk shall commence (Folketing, 2009, s. 10). In 2013, the annual block grant from Denmark amounted to US$660 million – a very large chunk of Greenland's total budget.

The Naalakkersuisut/Government of Greenland (GoG) has also taken steps to assist the ‘cold rush’. In addition to its abolition of the ban on uranium mining in 2013, a year earlier the GoG passed the Large Scale Projects Act, which established the framework for the employment of foreign workers in mining and exploration projects in Greenland (Ringstrom, Vahl, & Fraende, Reference Ringstrom, Vahl and Fraende2012). Also, in 2012, it signalled its intention to develop the raw materials sectors in order to ‘contribute significantly to Greenland becoming more economically self-supporting’ (GoG, 2012, p. 25). In 2014, the GoG released its Oil and Minerals Strategy, estimating a tax revenue of more than $4.4 billion in 15 years on the assumption that it achieves its goal – namely ‘that there are always five to ten active mines in Greenland in the long term’ (GoG, 2014, p. 8).

’Cold rush’ aspirations are not simply a chronic case of domestic wishful thinking. Pro-mining, pro-independence local views have reinforced and perpetuated international ‘cold rush’ forecasts – and vice versa. Borgerson has argued that simply displacing Denmark's annual block grant with Greenland-generated income ‘could enable Greenland to demand political independence’ and that ‘Greenland might well become the first country born of climate change’ (Borgerson, Reference Borgerson2013). It has become commonplace to claim that mining and drilling are ‘the country's ticket to freedom’ (Emmerson, Reference Emmerson2010, p. 265); the key to Greenland developing ‘the financial clout to go it alone’ (The Economist, 2015). From this perspective, Greenland has the makings of an ‘Inuit petro-state’ (Steinberg et al., Reference Steinberg, Tasch and Gerhardt2015, p. 79). For Rasmussen (Reference Rasmussen2013), Greenland's natural resources play not just a deciding role in terms of its status in the world but also a romantic one:

. . .But in reality?

However, today in Greenland, there is little hard evidence to support these frenzied ‘cold rush’ predictions. At the time of writing, there is just one active mine in Greenland; it opened operations in May 2017, with an expected nine year lifespan. Another mine is presently being built (J. Hollis, personal communication, 25 August 2015 and 18 July 2017). For now, no projects related to the other four mineral exploitation licences granted by the GoG are going ahead. Of the 50 mineral exploration licences currently on foot, just six have drilling activities planned this field season (A. Varga-Vass, personal communication, 21 July 2017).

As regards hydrocarbons, the situation is even more rudimentary. There are presently no exploitation activities taking place at all in Greenland, and in terms of exploratory work, none of the current licence holders have done any drilling yet. Of the 16 hydrocarbons licences granted by the GoG, nine are in the process of being relinquished, while the rest have no near-term drilling plans (GoG, 2017, pp. 14–15; J. Hollis, personal communication, 18 July 2017).

There are various reasons why the pace of mining and drilling activities in Greenland remains sluggish. Low commodity prices following the global financial crisis have left companies struggling to secure the necessary investment to progress their exploration and exploitation projects. Thus, many of them have been put on hold, both in Greenland and worldwide. Small companies that tend to drive exploration in ‘greenfield’ sites – namely, those areas with a limited exploration history and only patchy geoscientific data – are particularly vulnerable in this difficult investment climate. Most of the areas in Greenland of interest to oil and mining companies are ‘greenfield’ sites. Finally, the higher cost of working in the Arctic comparative to other locations has also slowed exploration and exploitation activities.

Even assuming commodity prices make a major recovery over the longer term, Greenland remains a very challenging environment for natural resource exploitation. The population size is small – only 56,000 people – and, amongst those, training and education levels tend to be low. Drop-out rates in training and education in Greenland are high. For example, in the higher education sector between 2008 and 2012, while the numbers of starter students each year ranged from 142 to 214, the number of students completing their studies in each of these years fell in the range of 45 to 78. A similar trend is discernible in the vocational sector (Statistics Greenland, Reference Greenland2014, p. 25). In terms of infrastructure, land transport is very limited, with no roads between towns and villages. Hence, nearly everything – from people and equipment, to food and fuel – is moved by boat or air. While the warmer temperatures produced by climate change are increasing the levels of ice melt and accelerating glacier movement, for now around 80% of Greenland remains covered by thick ice (NASA, n.d.). The rest of Greenland's terrain mainly consists of bedrock, and weather conditions are often brutal, frequently causing transport delays. It is not just the unavoidably high economic costs incurred as a consequence of these factors, but also the niche expertise and experience needed to work in rugged Arctic conditions, which suggest that the total number of oil and mining companies active in Greenland is likely to remain low.

Exacerbating this state of affairs is Greenland's economic performance. In the lead-up to the election held in November 2014, figures released by the Finance Minister revealed a public deficit of €33.6 million (Dollerup-Scheibel, Reference Dollerup-Scheibel2014, p. 5). This figure, and the slow development of the natural resources industry, demonstrate that replacing the annual block grant with sources of Greenlandic income is by no means easy and remains a very distant dream.

As a consequence, academic experts with an in-depth knowledge of Greenlandic affairs have started to question ‘cold rush’ logic. Even if a ‘cold rush’ was taking place in Greenland – a conclusion which is difficult to sustain in light of the above observations– it does not necessarily mean that the revenue produced by a booming natural resources industry would actually benefit Greenland. A report conducted by a panel of 13 specialists from the Universities of Copenhagen and Greenland suggested that there is a ‘high risk’ that the economic benefits of a prosperous oil and minerals sector would in reality accrue to foreign workers recruited for their industry experience not to local residents (Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society, 2014, p. 23). The report also highlighted the risk of Greenlanders becoming a minority in their own country if the oil and minerals sector grows large enough to fund Greenlandic independence ‘within 20 or 30 years’ (Committee for Greenlandic Mineral Resources to the Benefit of Society, 2014, p. 23). The report concluded:

Others have also underscored that a ‘gung-ho’ approach to mining projects, without plans for reforming the wider Greenlandic economy, could leave Greenland in an even worse position once the minerals run out (Hviid, Reference Hviid2015, p. 10). Another consideration that is often overlooked is the likely negative impact of extensive drilling and mining activities on other potential and actual sources of income, such as tourism and fishing. For these reasons, Poppel (Reference Poppel2014) has argued for a ‘more diverse and multifaceted economic development strategy’ for Greenland, which plays to its existing strengths. He suggests focusing on areas such as tourism, hydropower, cultural activities and expanding the processing and refining of marine products to achieve a more balanced economic plan. In an interview in January 2017, Greenland's Prime Minister Kim Kielsen identified four priority areas for Greenland's economic future: fishing, tourism, mining and education (as cited in McGwin, Reference McGwin2017). To date, fishing remains the most important source of income (McGwin, Reference McGwin2017). Against this backdrop, it is evident that ‘cold rush’ predictions are very premature at best, and wildly optimistic at worst.

Economic independence = political independence?

Fantastic economic forecasts aside, the fundamental flaw of ‘cold rush’ thinking is its equation of economic prosperity with formal political independence, as if the latter was an inevitable result of the former. While a strong economic base is an important foundation for independence, it is far from the whole story when it comes to deciding whether Greenland can or should become a nation-state. This is clear from the SGA itself. Chapter 8 provides (Folketing, 2009):

Chapter 8. Greenland's Access to Independence

1. (1) Decision regarding Greenland's independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland.

2. (2) If decision is taken pursuant to subsection (1), negotiations shall commence between the Government [of Denmark] and [the GoG] with a view to the introduction of independence for Greenland.

3. (3) An agreement between [the GoG] and the Government [of Denmark] regarding the introduction of independence for Greenland shall be concluded with the consent of Inatsisarut [the Parliament of Greenland] and shall be endorsed by a referendum in Greenland. The agreement, shall, furthermore, be concluded with the consent of the Folketing [the Parliament of Denmark].

4. (4) Independence for Greenland shall imply that Greenland assumes sovereignty over the Greenland territory [emphasis added].

Thus, both Greenland and Denmark accept that the details of independence are subject to an agreement by both sides and that any such agreement must be passed by the Folketing. Furthermore, both sides also accept that independence presupposes Greenland's willingness and ability not merely to enjoy the exercise of sovereign rights over Greenlandic territory but also to take sovereign responsibility for it. Nowhere in the SGA is ‘sovereignty’ further defined. Hence, it is sovereignty over territory – not economics per se – which remains the key hurdle to Greenlandic independence.

This understanding of sovereignty largely tallies with Bull's notion of sovereignty: for him, state sovereignty exists at both normative and factual levels (Reference Bull2012, p. 8). Therefore it is as important for a statehood-seeking political community to ‘actually exercise’ sovereignty ‘in practice’ as it is to assert sovereignty claims. According to Bull, a claimed right to sovereignty – even if supported by others – does not make a state ‘properly so-called’, unless it is accompanied by the ability to ‘assert this right in practice’ (Reference Bull2012, p. 8). However, the wording of the SGA – which refers to Greenland assuming sovereignty, rather than asserting it – implies that a more generous standard of sovereignty than that defined by Bull might be applied in the case of Greenlandic independence. ‘Assuming’ sovereignty leaves open the possibility that either Greenland demonstrates its capacity for fulfilling sovereign functions (that is, Bull's standard) or, at the very least, Greenland puts solid arrangements in place that address its sovereignty responsibilities.

To date, efforts by Greenland to tackle the sovereignty obstacle have been rather one-sided. So far, the focus has been on Greenland's external sovereignty – namely, ‘its independence of outside authorities’ (Bull, Reference Bull2012, p. 8). In 2003, Greenland's Commission on Self-Governance produced a report outlining six future political options (GoG, 2003, para 1.3):

1. (1) Independence;

2. (2) Union with another state (for example, the union between Denmark and Iceland 1918–1944);

3. (3) Free association (for example, the present association between the US on the one hand and Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands on the other; or between New Zealand and the Cook Islands);

4. (4) Federation;

5. (5) Greater self-government; and

6. (6) Full integration into another state.

The first three options require Greenland to become a nation-state in its own right. In a 2008 referendum, Greenlanders voted 75% in favour of greater self-governance. Since this time, Greenland's external sovereignty has been boosted by various provisions of the SGA, which explicitly recognise: (1) Greenlanders as a ‘people pursuant to international law with the right of self-determination’ (Folketing, 2009, preamble); (2) the GoG's standing to negotiate and conclude international agreements ‘on behalf of the Realm’ in areas ‘which exclusively concern Greenland and entirely relate to fields of responsibility taken over [by the GoG]’ (Folketing, 2009, s. 12(1)); and (3) the Greenlandic language being recognised as the sole official language of Greenland (Folketing, 2009, s. 20). The posting of Greenlandic representation to Copenhagen, Washington and Brussels, plus the participation of the GoG's Department of Foreign Affairs in international activities, including Arctic cooperation, the UN, the Continental Shelf Project and Nordic cooperation (http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en) have also bolstered Greenland's external sovereignty.

By contrast, the major question of Greenland's internal sovereignty – defined as ‘supremacy over all other authorities within the territory and population’ (Bull, Reference Bull2012, p.8), and including enforcement powers not just decision-making (Evans, Reference Evans1998, p. 504) – has received comparatively little domestic attention. Yet this aspect of sovereignty presents an even greater challenge. Whatever its economic destiny, there are good reasons to believe that Greenland will struggle to maintain its internal sovereignty entirely unaided. Some of these reasons have already been alluded to – limited human resources (in terms of both numbers and education levels); limited infrastructure; limited Arctic-capable assets; a large, inhospitable land mass; and one of the world's longest coastlines. As climate change generates increasingly navigable waters, the resource requirements for sovereignty enforcement are only likely to rise. In reality, overcoming these internal sovereignty gaps – which are currently plugged by Denmark – in order to clear the path towards independence means the adoption of political, legal and military/policing arrangements that are acceptable to both the GoG and the Danish Government. A way forward may be possible whereby Greenland assumes sovereignty for the purposes of the SGA, while authorising others, on its behalf, to exercise certain sovereign responsibilities in relation to its territory.

To this end, there have been a few suggested models for addressing Greenland's sovereignty gaps with a view to making independence possible in practice. However, these models are not without their own problems. For example, one proposal for Greenland is an Icelandic-style model, where coastguard and law enforcement are run locally, within a wider system of security guarantees provided by the US and NATO (Wang & Degeorges, Reference Wang and Degeorges2014, pp. 9–11). Yet given Greenland's demographic and territorial constraints, it is not at all clear that an Iceland-inspired model is a viable option. Unlike Greenland, Iceland has a small territory and coastline; a more moderate climate; a population roughly six times that of Greenland, with 60% of young people expected to graduate from university at some point in their lives (OECD, 2014); advanced infrastructure and prolonged, direct experience of the wider international security sphere through its founding membership of NATO. Although Greenland has been covered by NATO's collective defence guarantee via Denmark's membership of the organisation since 1949 – the full details of which were spelled out in the 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement between the US and Denmark – Greenlanders’ direct experience of NATO has been very limited. It was only in the Igaliku Agreement of 2004 that a role for Greenlandic authorities as regards the American base at Thule was formally recognised (see Government of the United States of America and Government of Denmark, 2004). Without the abovementioned advantages enjoyed by Iceland, Greenland's prospects of assuming even this level of sovereign responsibility remain highly aspirational at best.

Drawing on the 2003 work of the Greenlandic Commission on Self-Governance, another proposal is that Greenland's sovereignty enforcement duties are carried out directly by the US and/or Canada, pursuant to a partnership agreement or free association. However, the US has been criticised recently over the adequacy and effectiveness of its capabilities in its own Arctic waters and territories, let alone elsewhere (Conley, Reference Conley2012; Le Miere & Mazo, Reference Le Miere and Mazo2013, pp. 102–105). In Canada, a recent government audit highlighted the absence of a cross-department, coordinated strategy for marine transportation in Canadian Arctic waters, as well as the fact that only an estimated 1% of these waters have been surveyed to modern standards (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2014, para. 3.17). Moreover, politically, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in which it would be in North American interests for a long-standing close ally, Denmark, to be divested of its Arctic power status, or for Greenland to follow its own path without input from Denmark. Alternatively, a free association with Denmark itself is yet another proposal. This possibility is expressly recognised in the 2008 report. The latter relied on the 2003 report of the Greenlandic Commission on Self-Government, and prepared the way for the 2008 Greenlandic referendum on self-government (see Greenlandic–Danish Self-Government Commission, 2008; see Ostergaard, Reference Østergaard2017 for a very recent discussion of the issues requiring resolution in pursuit of a free association agreement between Denmark and Greenland). Hence, it is Greenland's own lack of ability to exercise full-spectrum sovereign responsibilities over its territory, plus its lack of alternatives to a capable Denmark fulfilling such responsibilities, which prove the real sticking point on the question of Greenlandic independence.

By way of counterargument, it might be contended that if Greenland succeeds economically – that is, by generating sufficient income, at minimum, to replace Denmark's block grant – it would be in a position to abandon the SGA, thereby overcoming the ‘sovereignty’ precondition of independence specified by that Act. This, presumably, would then clear the way legally for a unilateral declaration of independence by Greenland, based on its right of self-determination under international law – a right already acknowledged in the SGA's preamble. While technically possible, this argument ultimately misses the point. Finding a way around the SGA's Chapter 8 is not the same as finding a practical solution to the very real sovereignty gaps the prospect of an independent Greenland presents. In the words of Finn Lynge, a former Member of the European Parliament representing Greenland, when questioned about Aleqa Hammond's notion of an independent Greenland:

In addition, these sovereignty gaps are not easily overcome by more money. In a tiny population on the world's biggest island, building the technical and professional capacity needed in support of national sovereignty requires strategic and creative thinking, plus strong and wide agreement on future political priorities and organisation. It is not exclusively, or even primarily, an economic exercise. Whether or not Greenland chooses the path to independence prescribed by the SGA, independence on its own terms or some other political arrangement altogether it must have some practical solution to the question of how to address its sovereignty gaps. Without this, the idea of an independent Greenland is chimerical. As a partial response to this challenge, the idea of introducing military conscription in Greenland has occasionally been raised (GoG, 2003, para 4.4). However, in the 14 years since this report, no further steps in this direction have been taken.

Resolution of these types of issues requires careful reflection on Greenland's political, legal and strategic position; its future security needs; and its domestic and international goals, as well as the best way of achieving them. This level of serious and prolonged consideration about the details, timing, and costs and benefits of independence vis-à-vis other political systems has not yet taken place in Greenlandic political discourse, either at the elite or public level. Since the 2003 report by the Greenlandic Commission on Self-Governance, there have been no further attempts to flesh out such details – all of which are prerequisites for even the most basic evaluation of the independence issue. Despite their pro-independence rhetoric, no Greenlandic political party has elaborated their own model of independence for consideration and debate. On the contrary, as Breum and Chemnitz (Reference Breum and Chemnitz2013) have reported:

However, this may be about to change. At the end of 2016, Prime Minister Kielsen's new supermajority government established a Ministry of Independence, and the GoG was authorised to establish a constitutional commission in 2017 (McGwin, Reference McGwin2016a; ⊘stergaard, Reference Østergaard2017, p. 2). A poll conducted at the end of 2016 by Greenlandic newspaper Sermitsiaq found that 64% of respondents considered it either ‘very important’ or ‘somewhat important’ that Greenland become an independent state, though amongst the 18–29 years age bracket this majority fell to 56% (as cited in McGwin, Reference McGwin2016b). Widespread support for the cause of independence in theory is one thing; an answer to the practical question of Greenland's internal political organisation in the post-independence period is quite another.

Instead, for now, talk of independence in Greenland by local politicians and others remains largely that – talk. While domestic political aspirations are important – and, in Greenland, there is no doubt that independence is a very popular one – they are not the equal of a strong consensus around a well-considered, concrete plan to achieve the same. Thus, in present-day Greenlandic politics, support for ‘independence’ signals endorsement of perceived virtues, such as self-sufficiency, preservation of cultural norms and identity, and national pride, rather than the groundswell of overwhelming political intent needed to make formal political independence happen. Like ‘human rights’ and ‘freedom’, ‘independence’ is a value that attracts wide-ranging support within and across borders, and yet in terms of content and implementation, very real differences of perspective can and do emerge. With respect to Greenland, this observation is supported by a statement made in 2015 by then-Environment Minister Kim Kielsen (as cited in Breum, Reference Breum2015, p. 79):

As the debate about Greenlandic independence matures and deepens over time, the emergence of some divisions over specific details is to be expected.

Despite the ‘cold rush’ hype, Greenland is in no hurry to sever its formal and constitutional ties with Denmark. Since the election of Kim Kielsen as Prime Minister, there has been a noticeable, political shift of focus towards the day-to-day, practical business of improving Greenland's economic and social welfare, rather than talking up grand visions of wealth and Greenlandic statehood. According to Kielsen (as cited in Molgaard, Reference Molgaard2014), Greenland is not a new Klondike, but a ‘country under construction’. This strongly pragmatic, results-oriented approach informs Kielsen's own notion of what ‘independence' means in Greenlandic context, which stands in stark contrast with earlier, loftier ideas associated with ‘cold rush' thinking. This is apparent from a recent interview he gave:

The final proof is reflected in the status of the SGA itself. The SGA remains an Act passed by the Folketing; in the eight years since its enactment, it has not been accompanied by any mirroring legislation in the Inatsisarut. In practical terms then, from a constitutional perspective, the authority of the GoG continues to be derived solely from the authority of Danish law. Given that the SGA contains no special provisions concerning its repeal, it would appear that the Folketing could treat the SGA just like any other of its Acts – for example, repealing it at will, thus leaving the GoG on legally shaky ground. While politically this outcome is highly unlikely – not least because the SGA's preamble acknowledges its foundations in an agreement between the GoG and Government of Denmark ‘as equal partners’ – the fact that legally it remains possible is telling. Greenland's lack of mirroring legislation to date – plus the acceptance of ultimate Danish authority over Greenland that such an absence implies – suggests that in reality, Greenland is still more comfortable with its current political status than the ‘cold rush' proponents assume.