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Deflationary Metaphysics and the Natures of Maps
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Abstract
“Scientific theories are maps of the natural world.” This metaphor is often used as part of a deflationary argument for a weak but relatively global version of scientific realism, a version that recognizes the place of conventions, goals, and contingencies in scientific representations, while maintaining that they are typically true in a clear and literal sense. By examining, in a naturalistic way, some relationships between maps and what they map, we question the scope and value of realist construals of maps—and by extension of scientific representations. Deflationary philosophy of science requires more variegated stances.
- Type
- Metaphysics and Methodology of Science
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- Copyright
- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001
Footnotes
Sismondo: Department of Philosophy, Queen's University, Kingston, Canada K7L 3N6, sismondo@post.queensu.ca; Chrisman: Department of Geography, University of Washington, Box 353550, Seattle, WA 98195–3550, chrisman@u.washington.edu.
Sismondo acknowledges partial support from Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada grant 410–00–0515. Chrisman acknowledges partial support from National Science Foundation grant SBR 98–100075.
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