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Chalmers on Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Alex Byrne  and
Ned Hall
Alex Byrne
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT
Ned Hall
Affiliation:
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT
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Abstract

In his book, The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers argues that his theory of consciousness can lend support to the Everett “no collapse” interpretation of quantum mechanics. We argue that Chalmers's argument fails, and that any Everett-style interpretation should be rejected.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue 3 , September 1999 , pp. 370 - 390
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Send requests for reprints to the authors, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, E39–245, MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139.

‡

Many thanks to David Chalmers, Tim Maudlin, and two anonymous referees for Philosophy of Science.

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