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Can Psychology Be a Unified Science?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Lawrence A. Shapiro
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Abstract

Jaegwon Kim has argued that if psychological kinds are multiply realizable then no single psychological theory can describe regularities ranging over psychological states. Instead, psychology must be fractured, with human psychology covering states realized in the human way, martian psychology covering states realized in the martian way, and so on. I show that even if one accepts the principles that motivate Kim's argument, his conclusion does not follow. I then offer a dilemma that forces Kim to concede the possibility of a unified psychology. I close with a discussion of what, according to Jerry Fodor, is “really bugging” Kim.

Type
Philosophy of Social Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 953 - 963
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

My thanks to Juan Comesaña, Malcolm Forster, Carolina Sartorio, and Elliott Sober for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

References

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