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Well-Ordered Science: Evidence for Use

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Nancy Cartwright
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Abstract

This article agrees with Philip Kitcher that we should aim for a well-ordered science, one that answers the right questions in the right ways. Crucial to this is to address questions of use: Which scientific account is right for which system in which circumstances? This is a difficult question: evidence that may support a scientific claim in one context may not support it in another. Drawing on examples in physics and other sciences, this article argues that work on the warrant of theories in philosophy of science needs to change. Emphasis should move from the warrant of theories in the abstract to questions of evidence for use.

Type
How Should Philosophy of Science be Socially Relevant?
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Miriam Solomon , December 2006 , pp. 981 - 990
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am very grateful to the Latsis foundation, the British Academy, the National Science Foundation, and a London School of Economics and Political Science–Columbia project grant for support on this research and to Philip Kitcher, Julian Reiss, and Damien Fennell for help with ideas and presentation. (The material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under grant no. 0322579. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the view of the National Science Foundation.)

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