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The Experimental Evidence for Subjective Referral of a Sensory Experience Backwards in Time: Reply to P. S. Churchland

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Benjamin Libet
Benjamin Libet*
Affiliation:
Department of Physiology University of California, San Francisco
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Abstract

Evidence that led to the hypothesis of a backwards referral of conscious sensory experiences in time, and the experimental tests of its predictions, is summarized. Criticisms of the data and the conclusion by Churchland that this hypothesis is untenable are analysed and found to be based upon misconceptions and faulty evaluations of facts and theory. Subjective referral in time violates no neurophysiological principles or data and is compatible with the theory of “mental” and “physical” correspondence.

Type
Reply
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , June 1981 , pp. 182 - 197
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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