How does the world get governed? Recent scholarship has moved on from the long-standing debate over whether international institutions matter to an analysis of a more complex array of questions about the causes and consequences of the specific forms that global governance takes. This includes attention to rational design, bureaucratic routines, and the particular actors involved in producing governance (Barbara Koremenos et al., “The Rational Design of Institutions,” International Organization 55 [no. 4, 2001]: 761–99; Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World, 2004; Deborah Avant et al., Who Governs the Globe? 2010). In World Rule, Jonathan Koppell contributes to our understanding of these questions in three ways: He brings together different types of global governance organizations—both state and nonstate—in one analytical framework; he links design outcomes with the effort to deal with competing demands for accountability from different groups; and his systematic analysis of a wide array of organizations reveals interesting patterns in how they are structured.
To date, most international relations scholars have analyzed either international organizations in which states are the only members or nongovernmental or mixed types of international organizations, but rarely have they examined both together. The borders between state- and nonstate-based governance have blurred over time, making this distinction less useful. Koppell takes an admirably broad view of what he calls “global governance organizations” (GGOs), including both governmental and nongovernmental organizations in his framework. Indeed, he does not acknowledge this as an issue, but instead assumes that who participates in a particular governance initiative is simply another feature of organizational design. Yet, relatively few scholars have addressed these different types of global governance in one theoretical framework as he does (exceptions include Ngaire Woods and Walter Mattli, The Politics of Global Regulation 2009; Avant et al., Who Governs the Globe?).
Koppell argues that GGOs face conflicting pressures for accountability, and compromises among multiple demands influence the design of an organization. In creating GGOs, negotiators make trade-offs between these competing demands, and meeting one often undermines the other. Meeting accountability demands may require trade-offs between legitimacy and authority. The resulting compromises produce a design that does not meet normative expectations, with critics denouncing them as failures in global governance. Koppell sees them as reasonable accommodations that permit these organizations to operate despite cross-pressures. As he says in the opening pages of the book, “The undemocratic features of global governance organizations are not cast as unsightly blemishes to be surgically removed but as evolved attributes that allow global rulemaking organizations to survive and function effectively in a difficult environment” (p. 3).
The author begins his analysis by examining a central problem that bedevils all organizations, but international ones in particular: the struggle for legitimacy. Because they face intense and conflicting demands for accountability, GGOs struggle to maintain both legitimacy and authority. The heart of the analysis is an examination of 25 GGOs, ranging from the World Health Organization to Fairtrade International. These organizations all make rules in substantively important areas and vary in terms of their core characteristics: sector, or ownership (public, private, mixed); type of rule (treaty, regulation, or standard); membership; method of financing; and the technicality of their rules. Koppell identifies patterns across these organizations in their structure and administration, rulemaking processes, compliance, and the role of interest groups. The inductive analysis is based on categories and concepts drawn primarily from organization theory, although it is clear that the author has read widely in the international relations literature. The approach is very similar to that of the rational design project of Koremenos et al. (2001), but Koppell looks at a different set of design characteristics and examines a wider range of organizations.
Given the significant increase in the number of global governance organizations, how they interact has garnered recent attention, and this book devotes a full chapter to cooperation and competition among GGOs. Koppell's cases demonstrate that many organizations simultaneously pursue both cooperation and competition. Cooperation reinforces the legitimacy of organizations, despite ongoing competition for dominance. The author sees this combination as a reflection of the way they are embedded within governance networks. Two characteristics drive cooperation and competition: whether the problems the organizations address overlap and what types of organization are involved. But this does not give us sufficient understanding of the mechanisms at work, and I would have liked to see a deeper exploration of consequences and a better connection to relevant literature in international relations.
In the conclusion, Koppell identifies three clusters of characteristics that reflect different designs for global governance organizations: classical organizations; cartel, or club, organizations; and symbiotic organizations, which are primarily multistakeholder entities. These three types boil down to membership—broad or narrow, state or nonstate. These organizational designs address different demands for accountability, making trade-offs between authority and legitimacy. By leaving some expectations unfulfilled, they open the way for criticism. Koppell, however, argues that these compromises are not signs of failure but are deliberate design choices with certain limitations deliberately built in. In other words, they are strengths, not weaknesses, which is a counterintuitive argument to make.
World Rule is a thoughtful work that takes seriously the idea that organizational design matters. Instead of looking at how it matters for outcomes and effectiveness, however, Koppell looks at how design reflects the compromises made among different expectations and values we hold for GGOs. His analytical framework provides the reader with numerous categories and dimensions for examining institutional variation, and, in fact, the level of detail is at times overwhelming. One of the weaknesses of his analysis is that his conclusions may be biased by a limited sample. It would be interesting to see whether his generalizations hold up when applied to a different set of organizations, perhaps by looking at multiple organizations within a single policy domain. The sample itself misses some of the more interesting organizations, such as those dealing with human rights, which we might expect to face intense demands for accountability and high expectations.
Overall, this effort is an important contribution to our understanding of the wide variety of global governance organizations in existence today, and I expect that it will provide a solid basis for future research.
