Our two books share three important messages. First, the causes that can explain the outbreak of conflict, or the motivations to start participating, do not say much about the factors that either cause escalation or rebel retirement. It would be interesting to probe this finding further by enlarging the case material on which it is based. Moreover, this message has very practical implications. Although the reasons to become engaged in conflict tend to say very little about why conflict de-escalates or why individuals withdraw, these motivations deserve to be recognized more in the policy debates. Identifying and actively offering pathways out of conflict could and should more strongly influence realistic policy choices. Sen’s book offers very concrete starting points for this discussion.

Second, the evidence from the detailed case material helps us significantly to understand these conflict dynamics. Sen’s book takes this to a new level by talking to terrorists and proposing that we do this more. She also suggests this approach would provide a way forward to research escalation and de-escalation. Although I largely agree with her proposition, there are important considerations that need to be highlighted. For instance, I engaged a figurehead of an important Asian rebel movement, who lived in exile in Europe, in discussion with my students. I wanted them to talk to this person and gain a deeper understanding of individual pathways into violence and justifications for its continuation. After the event, I received scathing criticism from some of my colleagues for offering a platform to an individual with blood on his hands. This is a dilemma, and we need obviously to give serious consideration to these ethical issues.

Third, the books share a core idea that the prevalence of norms matters in explaining retirement and de-escalation. Sen stresses that entrepreneurs, who facilitate the social acceptance of retired rebels, play a key role in the transition out of violence. I argue that norm convergence holds important explanatory power in assessing de-escalation. We can clearly see new and exciting research questions emerging in this area, and I hope very much that scholars will take them up. Moreover, the perspective on norms offers alternative ways for thinking about policy options. Instead of a focus on economic incentives or degrading rebel capabilities, working toward common understandings and perceptions is likely far more productive.

Although we agree on these points, there are also areas where the books diverge. Sen focuses on the conflict in India, which was fought based on the principles of Mao and fits into the classification of an insurgency in my book. The lack of social embeddedness of terrorist groups, she argues, can explain their problematic pathways out of violence; Sen clearly explains the why and how. My book discusses a possible counter-case: Italy in the early 1980s. The social embeddedness of the Brigate Rosse was in decline after the murder of Aldo Moro, and the Italian penitence laws are credited with facilitating rebel exit. We do not see any entrepreneurs or stewards, but still this was seen as a successful example of conflict de-escalation and termination on the individual level. This highlights, I think, again the potential multiplicity of pathways out of violence, which deserve our scholarly and policy attention.