I appreciate Professor Walldorf’s positive words about The Great Delusion. He also offers some thoughtful criticisms, which I address in this response.
First, Walldorf maintains that “post-Cold War US–European cooperation” is “puzzling” for my theory, but can be explained by the fact that liberal democracy has “cooperative effects on states.” This argument is based on democratic peace theory, which I challenge in The Great Delusion. Transatlantic relations were excellent during the unipolar moment for two reasons: (1) European leaders believed that the US military presence in Europe was a powerful pacifying force, and therefore they maintained close relations with Washington to keep American forces in Europe; and (2) the United States faced no meaningful threat from Europe, and thus there was no basis for hostility.
Second, Walldorf asks whether I expect China and Russia to be “more docile” if the United States adopts a foreign policy of restraint, as I advocate. Regarding China, the answer is no. If China continues its impressive rise, it will try to dominate Asia, which will cause the United States to act forcefully to contain Beijing. Concerning Russia, the answer is yes. In fact, restraint toward Moscow would have served Washington well during unipolarity, as the policy of liberal hegemony was principally responsible for causing the Ukraine crisis. Restraint would also work well in the future, because Russia does not seriously threaten US interests and indeed could help contain China.
Third, restraint is already “on the rise” in the United States, says Walldorf, and this policy is largely due to “public pressure,” which arises in the context of “the contested nature of democratic politics.” Regrettably, there is little evidence to support this claim. There are more troops in the greater Middle East today than when President Trump took office in January 2017. The United States is more hostile toward China and Russia under Trump than it was under President Obama. And despite Trump’s rhetoric about abandoning regime change, he is working hard to topple governments in Iran and Venezuela.
Public opinion polls show that most Americans prefer restraint. Unsurprisingly, presidential candidates Obama and Trump promised to pursue a more restrained foreign policy if elected. Once in the White House, however, they reneged on their promise, and the public hardly protested. Walldorf also tells us that the elites in liberal democracies engage in “self-reflection” and “self-critical learning.” I see hardly any evidence of such behavior in the US foreign policy establishment, which helps explain the recurring failures of liberal hegemony during the unipolar moment. This problem is compounded by the lack of accountability in liberal democratic America.
Finally, Walldorf challenges my claim that liberalism will matter little for US foreign policy in the coming Sino-American security competition. After all, he says that US policy toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War was heavily infused with liberalism. I disagree. Washington focused laser-like on the balance of power in its rivalry with Moscow, frequently acting in ways that contradicted liberal democratic principles. An ideology-based foreign policy is only feasible in unipolarity, but as the United States has shown over the past three decades, a powerful state can get into much trouble if it goes down that road.
